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The history of the mezzogiorno region of Italy is interwoven with the role of mafia-type 
associations, whose influence has affected the lives (and profits) of businesspeople from 
whom they collect pizzo “protection money”. The fear of reprisals and the lack of trust in law 
enforcement agencies make it very difficult for businesses approached by these groups for 
the first time to report the extortion. Once paid, the repeated, normalised and regularised 
cycle of paying the pizzo is difficult for businesses to break away from. Using the case study 
of the town of Ercolano, this thesis analyses how a community characterised by entrenched 
norms of paying the pizzo was able to overcome and uproot its localised extortion rackets to 
become a model of the anti-mafia movement in Italy. It considers how the pizzo may be best 
understood, how one community responded to it and to a localised mafia-type association in 
turn.   
Using a methodology that includes a ten month ethnography in the town, a questionnaire for 
members of the local antiracket association, and interviews with businesspeople, 
representatives from Civil Society, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary, this thesis 
analyses the defeat of Camorra extortion rackets through the mobilisation of Civil Society 
and its relationship with law enforcement agencies in a town characterised by deeply-rooted 
norms of pizzo paying. At the same time, it analyses the response of various Civil Society 
Organizations and the State to the Camorra on a cultural level, fostering attitudes that make 
it difficult for it to thrive.  
The thesis presents an empirical study based on fieldwork of a town previously 
characterised by a substantial influence by Camorra clans. In particular, it identifies culture 
and cultural norms that maintain the dominance that mafia-type associations have over 
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Glossary of terms 
 Definition 
Area grigia Grey Zone. Specifically referring to the space between legal 
and illegal activity where mafia groups attempt to place 
themselves.  
Camorrista Individual member of Camorra clan. 
Camorristi Plural of camorrista. 
Capoclan Camorra boss. 
Carabinieri Italian military police. They are charged specifically with 
investigations regarding Organized Crime and Terrorism. 
Codice Penale Italian Penal Code. 
Comune Commune/town. Referring both to the local government, and 
the town itself. 
DC Demcrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats), a now-dissolved 
political party that dominated Italy in the post-war period until 
the Tangentopoli scandal.  
Federazione Antiracket 
Italiana (FAI) 
Italian Antiracket Federation. A group encompassing local 
antiracket associations throughout Italy. It is supported by the 
Italian Ministero dell’Interno, and enjoys support from law 
enforcement agencies: 
http://www.antiracket.info/home  
Fondazione Pol.i.s. “Politiche Integrate di Sicurezza per le Vittime Innocenti della 
criminalità e i Beni Confiscati”: Integrated security policies for 
innocent victims of crime and conficated assets.  
A non-profit foundation under the jurisdiction of the Campania 
regional government. It publishes information relating to 
transparency and activities taken against corruption, in addition 
to the funding of research projects, documentation centres and 
publications on organized crime and the fight against it on a 
regional level. 
Giunta Local comune administration. 
Herculaneum The Roman settlement upon which the city of Ercolano is built. 
It was destroyed by pyrocrastic flows in the Plinean Eruption of 
79AD, and rediscovered in the 18th century. It has received both 
public and private funding (the Hewlett Packard foundation), 
ix 
and the 16th most visited tourist attraction in Italy. It is a 
UNESCO World Heritage site, and is widely regarded as 
exemplary in Conservation management.  
Libera NGO. National association of associations that manage assets 
and properties confiscated from mafia-type associations.   
Mafia / mafia  When used with a capital “M”, it refers to the Sicilian Cosa 
Nostra. With a small “m”, it refers to mafia-type associations in 
Italy in general. 
Mafiosità Mafia-ness. The extent to which something is of, or for the 
(m)afia 
Mezzogiorno The South of Italy. Broadly understood as the regions which 
were formerly controlled by Il Regno delle due Sicilie before 
Italian Unification in 1861. 
Ministero dell’Interno Italian Ministry of the Interior / Home Office. 
Napoli Italian name for Naples. 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
Omertà Commonly associated with the Cosa Nostra, this word refers to 
the wall of silence that communities have regarding everything 
related to mafia associations. This is upheld by members of 
mafia associations, as well as individuals in the communities in 
which they operate. See Sciascia’s Il giorno della civetta (1961)  
PD Partito Democratico (Democratic Party), originating from the 
PCI (Partito Communista Italiana – Italian Communist Party), 
the PDS (Partito Democratico della Sinistra – Democratic Party 
of the Left) and La Margherita (a Christian-Left party)  
Pizzo The payment of money or services by a legal business to a 
mafia association 
Pizzo “a tappetto” The obligation of pizzo payment by every business in an area 
Pizzo periodico The frequency of pizzo payment when it is limited to three or 
four times a year at specific festivals 
Pubblico Ministero (PM) Italian investigating magistrate. In the Italian legal system, the 
PM is active in the investigation and collection of data in a case 
as well as presenting the evidence in the Courtroom. The PM 
communicates directly with law enforcement agencies, often 
with particular referent officers    
Quartiere (sing.)  District/area of a city 
x 
Regno delle due Sicilie The Kingdom of the two Sicilies. The State that stretched the 
whole of the mezzogiorno region until its incorportation into the 
Kingdom of Italy in 1861.   
Resina Former name of Ercolano up until 1960s/1970s  
Scavi Excavation site. Referring specifically to Herculaneum  
Tangente  Tribute. This refers specifically to the money paid by a smaller 
organized crime group or a business to the Camorra clan within 
whose area they conduct activities. With this payment they may 
be paying “rent” to use the area, or a “bribe” to access the illicit 
market  
Tipo mafioso “mafia-type” association. The classification of mafia 
associations in Italy 


















Glossary of names 
  
Name  
Bossa, Luisa Mayor of Ercolano between 1995-2005 for centre-left 
coalitions that later became dominated by the PD. She is 
currently a deputy for the PD/Articolo 1, and a member of the 
commissione Parlamentare Antimafia. 
Buonaiuto, Antonio Mayor of Ercolano for the DC. Murdered by associates of the 
Ascione clan in the run up to the 1990 election. 
Buonajuto, Ciro PD. Mayor of Ercolano 2015-present. Nephew of Antonio. 
Daniele, Nino Mayor of Ercolano between 2005-2010, member of PD, 
current Councillor for Culture and Tourism for city of Naples, 
current president of Ercolano per la legalità (antiracket 
association) 
Filippelli, Pierpaolo Pubblico Ministero (PM) for Ercolano from the mid-2000s to 
2015. Currently based in Torre Annunziata.  
Di Fiore, Antonio Former Lieutenant of the Ercolano Carabinieri 
Grasso, Tano Honourary President of the FAI. Founded an anti-racket 
assocation in his native Sicily. Was a principal actor in the 
foundation of Ercolano per la legalità.  
Incoronato, Pasquale Ercolano-based Priest. Principal organiser of La Tenda, La 
Locanda di Emmaus and a youth association linked to his 
parish, Centro Pastorale Giovanile 
Ottaviano, Raffaela Honourary President of Ercolano per la legalità. A clothes 
store owner who denounced the Camorra to the Carabinieri in 
2004 
Scognamiglio, Giuseppe President of Radio Siani coop. 
Scudo, Fausto Ascione camorrista, turned pentito. Decoded the Ascione 
ledger.  
Siani, Giancarlo Former journalist for Il Mattino, murdered in 1985 by the 
Camorra. 
Strazzullo, Vincenzo Deputy Mayor of Ercolano 2005-2010, Mayor of Ercolano 
2010-2015. Accusations of wrongdoings with regard to the 
provisions of public work during his time as Mayor led to his 
decision not to stand for the PD mayoral primaries in 2015 
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Preamble 
Anyone who owns a car or scooter in Naples will tell you that if you want to go out in the 
evening and park your vehicle in the centre, you will have to pay individuals in the street 
referred to locally as parcheggiatori abusivi, illegal parking attendants. As you approach a 
spot they unsubtly catch your eye, indicating prego prego! Come on! Park here! Don’t worry! 
When you eventually park they state that they would like a bit of money for their trouble, 
since they helped you park after all, asking only for a bit – maybe a few euros, just as a tip, 
don’t worry, have a nice evening mister. Charging drivers for the parking spot would be 
illegal, since the property is not theirs to rent, so instead they ask for a “tip”. This social trap 
obliges the driver to pay. Non-payment has two main considerations. On the one side, in 
refusing to pay they know that they have to spend the rest of the evening with the worry that 
their car has been damaged whilst they are not there to keep an eye on it. On the other side, 
refusing to pay the individual who has, though unwarrantedly, assisted in parking the car 
would be a rather impolite and tight-fisted thing to do. It’s only a few euros after all. Perhaps 
it is a dishonest way to make money, but no one wants to seem tight-fisted - I’d rather enjoy 
my evening without the hassle at the back of my mind, and it’s a fairly normal phenomenon 
around these parts anyway, so maybe it’s better just to pay. 
One day I went with some friends by car to an area of the city where we saw there were 
some parchggiatori patrolling the area. We had a good look around to see if we could park 
somewhere else instead, but no luck. We parked a bit further away so as to try and stay out 
of their view, but by the time we got out of the car one of them approached us. We decided 
to ignore him, claiming ignorance as non-Neapolitans and just greeted them with a ciao 
whilst continuing to walk past and left it at that. He started muttering under his breath – how 
mean, uncivil and dishonourable we were to refuse to give him a tip (despite not even giving 
him a chance to provide his phony valet service). 
Despite its clear purposeful design by the parcheggiatori, where violence and criminal 
damage is only ever subtly insinuated rather than actualised, the passive acceptance of this 
relationship by drivers, in effect, is extortion. Extortion has many different shades. Obvious 
extortion would be an overt threat for the purpose of extracting something of value. The 
passive relationship in our case is something more subtle and grey, where not only is the 
driver party to the transaction (i.e. they willingly give a “tip”), but also the extorter arrives with 
a smile, asking for a kind contribution – one that is difficult to refuse due to the miniscule 
sum, the social politeness trap that the parcheggiatori set, and the imagined fear of 
retribution if the sum is refused.  
2 
This attitude towards the parcheggiatori, and the often passive acceptance of their activities 
are illustrative of the ability of criminality, petty or serious, to exist in an area relatively 
unchallenged. A condition was created whereby there is little incentive (neither financial nor 
social) to stand up to this incivility and illegality. A driver is left with a “rational” decision of 
definitely losing a few euros, or maybe paying 100 or more in damages and in addition to the 
inconvenience, where individuals are more likely to opt for the less inconvenient option. 
There are other factors to consider which influence the decision-making process, such as 
the existence of private parking (i.e. a legal business on privately owned land) which is far 
more expensive than the tip that the parcheggiatori charge, but also more importantly the 
inability for local law enforcement to prevent this widespread phenomenon. Since there is 
little option to act in a way that keeps money away from the parcheggiatori, and therefore 
other probable criminal enterprises, there is no incentive to act like a “good citizen” by 
refusing to pay. 
This thesis approaches the nature of extortion with regard to mafia associations and their 
collection of so-called “protection money” from businesses. Like the parcheggiatori and their 
requests for “tips”, the imagined violence that they evoke and the perceived lack of support 
from law enforcement to react to such crimes place businesspeople in a troubling situation. 
This study examines how this has presented itself in a town affected by mafia-type 






































During the arrest of a known camorrista at his home in Ercolano in 2009, a small ledger was 
found in a kitchen cupboard. The ledger detailed, area by area, street by street, every 
business in the town that his clan was receiving extortion money from, alongside the name 
or nickname of the owner, the frequency of payment and how much they paid (see Figure 1). 
Despite the fact that eighty businesses were listed, only six businesses in the area at that 
time had actually denounced an attempted extortion by the local clans, meaning, for 
whatever reason, a large number of businesses were paying the local clan in silence without 
reporting it to the local police. It was clear that the local law enforcement agencies were 
unable to demonstrate to businesspeople that they would take denunciations seriously. 
However, with a list of businesses that paid the clan, the police began visiting the 
businesses one-by-one, assuring them that they could denounce without concerns for their 
safety. In the subsequent trial, forty-one defendants from the Ascione clan were in court 
facing forty businesspeople-cum-accusers backed by the local antiracket association for the 
charge of extortion dating back to the previous decade. They were successfully imprisoned, 
effectively removing all of the major actors of the extortion racket in the area.   
After a series of denunciations against the two local Camorra clans between 2004 and 2009, 
the refusal of a local baker to pay the Birra clan was met with a bomb being placed in her 
bakery. The antiracket association and the law enforcement agencies reacted to this by 
staging a march through the town: demonstrating to the citizens and businesspeople in the 
town that there was an alternative to paying the clans. They wanted to show that law 
enforcement agencies were genuinely standing alongside the business community against 
the clans. The trial that followed was a product of the denunciation of the baker, as well as a 
number of other local businesses who had decided to denounce together.  
Using the case study of the town of Ercolano, Italy, this thesis seeks to understand the 
process of awakening of civil society and overcoming vicious circles of distrust. It studies 
how businesspeople and members of Civil Society fought locally rooted mafia-type 
associations and beat them. In other words, this thesis analyses the process whereby a 
community previously characterised by distrust in the authorities and the apathetic conviction 
that things would never change, was able to become the model for the anti-mafia movement. 
In this, I propose to test two hypotheses: (1) extortion money (the pizzo) paid by businesses 
to mafia-type associations is best understood as a systemic tax; (2) the process of changing 
attitudes towards mafia-type associations has become the focus for the anti-mafia 
movement.  
5 
In the rest of this introductory chapter I present a review of the relevant literature where I 
define the key terms, before stating my hypotheses and their related theoretical framework, 






Figure 1. An excerpt of the Ascione ledger.  
As we can see, five different areas/streets are shown, with the name of the business and the pizzo amount to be 
paid in euros.  
(La Repubblica, 8 July 2010) 
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1 Defining our terms 
It is important to define in detail what exactly we mean when we talk of specific terms so as 
prevent confusion. If words and terms are merely pictures of ideas that speakers exchange 
between one another, then it is important to get the picture right, whilst also noting that the 
words each contain contestable ideas. This section is aimed at making sure that when use a 
term we have the correct picture and the correct ideas. 
 
1:1 Defining organized crime, mafia, Camorra 
Similarly to other writers on the topic, I must begin by acknowledging that there is no 
accepted definition of organized crime in academia. In order to avoid getting caught in a 
labyrinth of definitions, I have adopted the definition of an organized crime group (OCG) 
given by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: 
a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting 
in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences 
established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit (UNODC, 2004, p.5). 
This is a fairly broad definition of organized crime that helps us differentiate it from one-off 
criminals, whilst also placing importance on the necessity of “serious crimes or offences” 
(UNODC, 2004, p.5) being committed, an aspect which differ in scope from State to State. 
The character of the offence is determined by various historical, socio-economic and 
structural conditions, individual and organisational agency, activities (both licit and illicit) 
conducted by different OCGs in different geographical (or virtual) locations. Following Alison 
Jamieson (2000), I reject the notion that organized crime is extraneous to society, on the 
grounds that its formation, organisational history and future trajectory are as much a product 
of society as they are a determinant of the society around it. This makes the study of 
organized crime a rather holistic enterprise, where it is important to consider the cultural and 
historical context in which they exist, as much as the structure of the group itself, where each 
has the power to shape the other.  Given the variety of groups that we have on our planet, 
the categorisation of certain “types” of organized crime becomes important, so that we may 
understand and confront them better. Researchers such as Von Lampe (2008) have been 
wary of comparing “apples and oranges”, distinguishing between (1) entrepreneurial 
activities and structures, (2) criminal structures that serve a social function and (3) 
organisations that serve quasi-governmental functions. In the first of these, Von Lampe 
identifies economic criminal structures aimed purely at financial or material gain. The second 
refers to providers of contacts, status, or a specific criminal/localised value system. The third 
7 
refers to those organisations that enforce rules of conduct or settle disputes in a quasi-legal 
way in a given territory (Gambetta, 1993; Varese, 2001). Finally, it is important to appreciate 
that some associations can and do use politics as a means of solidifying and profiting further 
from their economically profitable activities. As Armao aptly puts: 
It might be useful, at least for social scientists if not for politicians and investigators, 
to consider and define organized crime as a genus, including many different species 
depending on the geopolitical and historical context. In other words, we may imagine 
a sort of continuum, starting with organized crime in the sense of a group of 
individuals who act together to commit crimes of different types (such as robbery, 
drug pushing, etc.), even on a transnational basis; then moving on to crime 
syndicates as well structured criminal groups with different hierarchical roles devoted 
to the search for profits, acting first of all as entrepreneurs; and finally at the other 
end of the continuum mafia, as the most specialized criminal group, also using 
politics (which means the totalitarian control of a territory) to obtain profits (2003, 
p.28). 
We are able to refer to the organized crime genus as encompassing its broad and literal 
meaning (i.e. crime that is organised by its perpetrators) as well as the use of local and 
national politics by a mafia association to gain capital. Within this context comes the 
question as to how we define mafia and how it may differ from an organized crime group in 
general, an area of debate amongst theorists. Given that, at least in the Anglophone world, 
the word came into the public eye through cultural assets such as The Godfather and other 
films, plays or books which tend to depict Italian (or Italian-American) organized crime, there 
is a tendency to equate organized crime in general with mafia (like the “Japanese Mafia” or 
the “Nigerian Mafia”). We should resist this generalisation. The Italian penal code goes some 
way to addressing this ambiguity, in classifying what it considers to be a tipo mafioso (mafia-
type) association. Article 416-bis states that: 
An organisation is considered mafia-type when those members who take part in the 
organisation use the force of intimidation and the conditions of subjugation and 
omertà that derive from committing offence, in order to directly or indirectly acquire 
the management and, therefore, control of economic activities, concessions and 
public services or to gain profits or unjust advantages for the organisation itself or for 
others (legge 13 settembre, 1982 n. 646). 1  
                                                          
1
 All translations from the Italian, unless otherwise stated, are mine. 
8 
Whilst this provides us with a sufficient cleavage to distinguish the broad UNODC “organized 
crime group” and slightly less broad “mafia-type” definitions, there is further difficulty when 
we compare the varying structures and activities of different criminal groups (mafia-type or 
otherwise). For example, there is a significant difference between the single structure Sicilian 
Cosa Nostra and the multitude of individual Camorra clans that operate in and around 
Naples, but they are both to be considered as mafia-type. The former has been theorised as 
a vertically structured organisation consisting of separate groups (cosche), who are 
ultimately under the jurisdiction and control of the bosses above them (Hess, 1973; Arlacchi, 
1988; Dickie, 2007) specialising in selling private protection and trust (Gambetta, 1993). The 
latter have been theorised as a collection of separate and fragmented clans with no overall 
control over the area – much less monolithic and often in competition with other local, and 
often similarly structured, organisations (Saviano, 2007; Behan, 1996; Allum, 2001), at times 
closer to urban “street gangs” than the cultural image of the mafia. For convenience, the 
terms “mafia” and “mafia-type” association will be used interchangeably as applying to a 
group understood in this sense in Italian law.  
The mafia-type “association” relevant to this thesis is the Camorra, whose members we refer 
to as camorrista (sing.) and camorristi (pl.). They originate from the Southern Italian region of 
Campania, particularly the cities of Naples and Caserta, though they are present throughout 
the region and conduct their activities throughout the rest of Italy and the world (Sales, 1988; 
Behan 1996; 2009; Saviano, 2007; Roberti, 2008; Varese, 2011; Allum, 2016). The term 
“Camorra” alone could be misleading, as it implies that there is one overarching 
organisation, but the reality is that of individual associations (clans) that sometimes share 
similar cultural and structural characteristics. In this sense, I share Lamberti’s view that the 
Camorra as a unitary organisation does not exist, and has never existed (2009, p.484).  
Individual clans are geographically rooted in their respective community, “comune” (town) or 
“quartiere” (district), though they often conduct their activities and have contacts elsewhere. 
The number of clans and the lucrativeness of the criminal activities that they conduct 
frequently lead to conflict and alliances between different clans. The clans are often named 
after the head of the clan and their family, though the clans themselves are not always 
strictly family orientated and organised. As noted by Di Gennaro, the history of the Camorra 
is more closely linked with individual urban and family histories who expand into their own 
territories through illegal economic activities, rather than as one overarching group or 
federation (2016, p.25).  Individual Camorra clans generally represent what Von Lampe 
would refer to as “family clans”, whose membership is defined by blood, marriage and 
extended family through bonds of trust, but also share features of what he refers to as 
“territorial mafia-like” associations, such as the claim to control over legal and illegal 
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economic activity (2008, p.12). As the influence of a particular family name within a clan 
changes, so too does the name of the clan. For example, the clans with which this thesis is 
most concerned are the “Ascione clan” (named after its founder, Raffaele Ascione) and the 
“Birra clan” (named after its founder, Giovanni Birra). As in Italian, they are referred with the 
definite article: for example the Ascione clan is referred to as “the Ascione”. Both clans are 
based in Ercolano and have alliances with other clans in the surrounding area. Alliances 
which combine the resources of previously separate clans are denoted by a dash (e.g. the 
Ascione-Papale clan), though often the more powerful/well known/influential clan is 
preferred. To avoid confusion in this sense, I will always distinguish between individual clans 
to refer to localised mafia-type groups in the Campania region, and small m “mafia” for 
mafia-type associations in Italy in general as prescribed in 416-bis of the Italian penal code. 
This includes, but is not limited to, the Cosa Nostra/Mafia, Camorra clans, ‘Ndrangheta and 
the Sacra Corona Unita, operating respectively in Sicily, Campania, Calabria and Puglia. 
It is common to refer to criminals who operate in Campania in general as “Camorra” or 
somehow related to Camorra, but this is inaccurate. Whilst it has been common in the media 
and in speech to refer to the collection of separate Camorra clans in general as “the 
Camorra” rather than “this clan” or “that clan”, it is perhaps more useful to refer to broad 
assortment of groups that influence localised social and economic life as a “system” – in 
which we may include these smaller peripheral criminal groups. This is reflected in locally 
spoken Neapolitan language which refers to the phenomenon as ‘o sistema (Saviano, 2007; 
Lamberti, 2009), indicating Camorra clans as a dominant aspect of interlinking and localised 
power relations. In this sense, much like the use of “mafia”, the word “Camorra” is used for 
the sake of convenience, given that individual clans referred to as “Camorra” differ in specific 
history and the activities they conduct, whilst at times sharing a similar location and 
networks.  
This system involves Camorra clans as well as other complimentary actors operating in the 
gap between the legal and the illegal spheres. This not only benefits these actors, but also 
expands the networks of the system and increases the influence of such a system in society. 
The system is elaborated in a visible way (clientelism, counterfeit goods, prostitutes in the 
street, drugs dealers, news headlines of arrested camorristi, cash-only payments, informal 
work in cash, etc.) but it is also elaborated in an assumed atmospheric sense whereby one 
looks at each of these and links it back to the Camorra. The assumption that the shop on the 
corner is paying protection money; that the women sat on the balcony all day watching 
passers-by is a look-out; that the group of young men hanging out in the same place day-to-
day are discussing dodgy dealings; that the fireworks you see and hear during the night and 
sometimes during the day are not mere celebrations or kids having fun, but instead 
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messages between Camorra affiliates (Pine, 2012). Some of these assumptions are correct, 
some of them are just assumptions, but the innuendo that they could be true is played upon 
by camorristi and observers alike, thereby helping to foster a unique atmospheric presence 
which then affects how one interacts with the community to the clans’ benefit.  
The lucrative/material purpose and logic of organized crime groups in the UNODC definition 
of the phenomenon is important, as is the distinction made by law 416-bis, but they do not 
tell the whole story. Difficulty arises when we consider mafia-type associations as having a 
character that transcends financial or material benefit, such as quasi-governmental functions 
(Von Lampe, 2008) or the “atmospheric” influence like o’ sistema. This is also true when we 
consider collaboration/infiltration of camorristi in local politics, and the extent to which o’ 
sistema is able to condition a population to reproduce norms and behaviours which are 
favourable to the clan. This is precisely what we refer to when we talk of the extent to which 
“mafia” groups on our organized crime continuum have the ability to influence politics. In 
short, the manner in which a criminal group is able to influence (1) formalised political power 
– such as politicians/counsellors on how an area is governed and (2) what we could describe 
as “subtle” political governance such as the conditioning or manipulation of a community, its 
behaviours and norms in general.  In Foucauldian terms this type of power is termed 
gouvernementalité: the manner in which the State governs or exerts control over a 
population (Foucault, 2008 [1978-79]; Dean, 2009), which we apply here to mafia-type 
associations in general and Camorra clans in particular, and the manner in which some have 
been able to shape and mould their “population” without the need for force. This can take 
various forms. In a very crude sense we can refer to strict politicking – the “carrot” rather 
than the stick, where a group attempts to demonstrate the advantage of its continued 
existence to a population.2 In a more subtle sense we can refer to the process whereby a 
mafia is able to gradually assimilate and shape local economic relations, whilst 
simultaneously moulding societal norms and individual behaviours to serve them through 
atmospheric assumptions alongside actual activity.  
As noted by D’Alessandro (2009) Camorra strategies in a community are such that they 
attempt to assume a dominant role in relationship networks that create trust between both 
economic and non-economic actors, assuring greater rootedness in a community in socially, 
networked and territorial ways. Similarly, according to Sciarrone (2011) it is through the 
attainment of a certain level of “social consensus” that mafias are able to adapt to social 
change and (re)produce itself. A mafia’s interlinking networks and structures do this by 
accumulating and exerting “social capital” (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993), appropriated by 
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 For example, analysing the account book of a Chicago-based OCG, Levitt & Venkatesh (2000) noted that the 
group placed money aside to pay for “community events”. 
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individuals to achieve their own strategic goals (Sciarrone, 2011, p.7). This (re)production 
involves the (re)defining of behavioural, cultural and social norms that already exist, making 
a group’s existence in an area easier, if not desirable for sections of the populations. I agree 
with Sanzone (2014) that, whilst the politico/judicial and socio-economic dimensions of the 
Camorra are important, the cultural aspects that help sustain a clan in an area have been 
rather understated. As he notes, “there is always a rapport between criminal behaviour and 
value systems, the culture that sustains, nurtures and often legitimises these types of 
actions” (2014, p.21). It is here where we can see parts of ‘o sistema in action. I return to this 
in greater detail in the “theoretical framework” subsection with a particular focus on Gramsci 
(1999 [1916-1935]) and Bourdieu (1986). Some parts of the population actually want and 
need o’ sistema to exist as it provides them with some kind of service (its members, 
associates, their families, third-party contacts, etc.), others reproduce the cultural signs that 
the group emits, whereas the rest are placed in a situation where they passively accept its 
existence. 
In this section we have seen that it is important to make the distinction between “organized 
crime”, “mafia” and “Camorra”. Organized crime is a broad term and has been used to 
describe the phenomenon in general, from criminal activity that is organized in a group, to 
the control or influence of politics to gain capital. There is little or no use in drawing 
comparisons between a small-time organized crime group and a mafia-type association 
because they interact with their communities in vastly different ways. The umbrella term of 
mafia/mafia-type at the other end of the continuum uses politics – both formal and subtle to 
accomplish their goals in the form of territorial and economic domination without the need for 
violence. In this thesis we refer to these types of organisations as Camorra clans.  
 
1:2 Protection money, tangente and pizzo  
The widespread payment of extortion money in Ercolano is typical of the mezzogiorno region 
(Gribaudi, 2009; Gunnarson, 2014; Grasso, 2014; Ciconte, 2015; Di Gennaro, 2015) as is, 
more distressingly, the omertà codes of silence among segments of the population and 
mafias themselves. This section discusses the literature around payments paid by 
businesses to mafias in Italy.  
It has been common to refer to this type of payment as “protection money”, though this can 
easily be accused of being nothing more than a euphemistic term, given that the type of 
‘protection’ that is offered by the clans is protection from the clans themselves. Some 
historians have claimed that a business’s non-payment and non-conformity to what the clan 
requests is not an option without (often violent) reprisals (Hess, 1973, p.103). Other theorists 
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have noted the contrary, convincingly claiming that there have been occasions where 
businesses have voluntarily paid mafias for the genuine receipt of a protection service.  
Referring to the clandestine slaughtering market in Sicily, Diego Gambetta wrote that a main 
market for Mafia services is located where the State is unwilling to provide protection, that is, 
when the business that requires protection is itself illegal (1993, p.17). In this sense, the 
Mafia was in a position to offer private protection to those illegal businesses or enterprises 
that were unable to gain protection from the State. As Cayli suggests with reference to 
Gambetta  (1993) and Blok (1974), the mafia phenomenon in Italy cannot be understood 
without understanding the country’s political history, socioeconomic differences amongst its 
different regions, the lack of central authority in the Southern regions, and the culturally 
closed social structure of the mezzogiorno, where trust among individuals and towards the 
State was destroyed at the time of unification (2013b).The end of feudalism in the early 19th 
century and the expansion of the Italian State at the expense of localised traditional power 
structures in the South after 1860 necessitated the provision of protection and trust by 
private actors.3 In this context, Mafia entrepreneurs provided private protection to “legal” 
businesses. These businesses chose to pay for protection from these Mafia entrepreneurs 
because of the perceived inability of the Bourbon State to provide protection after the 
transition away from feudalism. In this vacuum of uncertainty, local private entrepreneurs 
that we now know as Mafiosi flourished, given that they were trusted more than the 
authorities and were able to reassurances to concerned businesses through their specialised 
protection. In simple terms, there was a market and demand for protection that the Bourbon 
State was unable to provide, in the sense that it lacked what Weber called the “monopoly on 
legitimate violence” (Weber, 1919), which was provided by private entrepreneurs instead. 
Putnam followed Gambetta and Thomas Hobbes in claiming that Mafiosi provided a kind of 
“privatised Leviathan”, where trust and security were obtained through private Mafia 
protection, rather than the State or by civic norms and networks (Putnam 1993, pp.146-7). 
This Leviathan sold two things: protection and trust, which were bought voluntarily by a 
businessperson and came in the form of a Mafia entrepreneur who would punish those who 
harm their client’s business through robbery, violence, the non-completion of business 
contracts and even the loss of revenue due to competition. This had a knock-on effect of 
non-paying businesses being made less secure, since they were protected neither by the 
State nor by the Mafia with the result that criminals would be more likely to target businesses 
                                                          
3
 An account of the evolution of private protection in Italy from Unification onwards is available through VCB 
Securitas, 2016 
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that did not have explicit Mafia protection, making the payment for private protection 
rational.4  
A connection has been noted between Camorra clans and independent criminal groups 
whereby assignments of drugs are bought from a clan, and then sold in their territory by 
independent criminal groups (Gribaudi, 2009). These independent groups have been 
observed to pay the Camorra clans an additional tangente (tribute) (Pine, 2012, pp.3-4). The 
piazza managers of the Di Biasi clan of the Quartieri Spagnoli district in Naples, for example, 
have been observed to collect a single fixed fee from these independent groups in addition 
to the payment for the drugs themselves, thus reducing their risks and simply acting as a 
protector for the dealers themselves (Gribaudi, 2009, p.216). The “product” being sold, per 
se, is both the licence to conduct a business in a territory without hindrance, and a bribe to 
access aspects of the illicit economy in which the Camorra is involved, including their 
contacts throughout other areas of the local economy. As declared by Pine: 
A tangente refers to either a bribe extorted or a bribe paid. A tangente is duplicitous; 
it activates a relation between individuals, a relation that can itself be duplicitous. 
This is especially that case when paying an extorted bribe is beneficial to the “victim,” 
and the relation between the “extortionist” and “briber” is more like a business 
partnership than predatory taxation. The businesses that get entangled in such 
relations are typically the larger and more powerful corporations whose market 
success a crime clan prefers to support and enhance. (2012, p.24) 
It would be incorrect to call this type of payment strictly “extortion”, in the sense that there is 
some kind of agreement and mutual benefit between the two parties. The tangente refers to 
this type of payment in general – whether it is a legal or an illegal business. Payment of it 
may also guarantee protection on behalf of the clan, but also the potential monopoly of a 
product in the area, where the clan would punish any other businesses that try to operate in 
their territory who are selling the same product, or the dealer for buying their product from 
another clan (Gribaudi, 2009, pp.215-6).  
An intriguing proposition presents itself when we consider the relationship between legal 
businesses and Camorra clans to be similar to the relationship between independent 
criminal group and Camorra piazza managers, such as that described by Gambetta.  
                                                          
4
 This is comparable to private security burglar alarms in a neighbourhood. A would-be burglar is less likely to 
attempt a burglary on a house with an alarm, making those houses without alarms more prone to burglaries. If 
a business openly refers to their Mafia protection, then the principle is the same.  
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Legal businesses are not “extorted” per se, rather, they willingly cooperate with the Camorra 
for mutual benefit. D’Alessandro (2009) writes of a complex relationship between some 
“legal” merchants and Camorra clans, as in the case of investments of dirty money into 
adjacent licit businesses, so that a clan has access to “clean” money. This cooperation 
between businesses and Camorra becomes spread throughout an area where it becomes 
socially accepted by the local business community (Beatrice, 2009). Where an extortion 
racket already exists, a business is able to choose whether to become an active part of the 
relationship, paying for extra use of Camorra contacts and intermediaries to benefit their 
business/social status (Arlacchi, 1998), or to remain a passive and extorted business who 
pays only to continue working. The point is that this is a payment that must be made, and a 
business can choose whether they are a wilful actor in this transaction or not. In the context 
of Campania, this is, again, linked to o’ sistema and the effect of Camorra socio-economic 
activity upon the culture and mentality of local social and economic actors.   
There is some ambiguity between these different types of payment depending on the 
rootedness of the mafia in any particular area. As we have already noted, there is a 
greyness in the distinction between that which represents the Camorra, and that which 
represents its associates, and the economic activity that the Camorra conducts/influences. 
The sheer extent of the illegal and informal economy in Campania, including regular 
economic crimes, makes it incredibly difficult to measure the size of Camorra influence on 
the sector as a whole (D’Alessandro, 2009), as a result of the numbers businesses who are 
willing accomplices of the Camorra and those who submit to them are unknowable without 
detailed access to Camorra financial data.  
Given the different motivations for payment, it is necessary to distinguish between those 
businesses who pay mafias willingly (insofar that the business is a willing partner) and those 
who pay against their will (insofar that any benefit from payment that they receive is not their 
reason for payment). For the first categories we have already mentioned these types of 
payments by an illegal business or enterprise for rent/protection (following Pine: tangente); 
payments by a legal business for protection where the State is unable or unwilling to offer it 
(following Pine and Gambetta: genuine protection money); and those area grigia payments 
by a legal business for the access to a certain part of the market that a mafia has an 
influence upon. The following sections examine unwilling payments by businesses where an 
individual is intimidated or forced to pay. We refer to this as “pizzo”.  
The word “pizzo” means “lace”, as in the materal. There are various accounts as to why this 
word has been used to denote payments. A persistent theory is its similarity to the Sicilian 
word for a bird’s beak, “pizzu”, and a Sicilian phrase about the amount of money taken from 
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different businesses by the Cosa Nostra: “not too much to ruin the business, but just enough 
to get the beak wet” (Zaffuto, 2012). Another theory finds its origin in Bourbon prisons in the 
nineteenth century. As reported by an imprisoned Duke from Lecce, Sigismondo 
Castromediano, the insides of these prisons were controlled by camorristi who collected 
“taxes” for every aspect of a prisoner’s life: bread, clothing, and even “rent” for the patch of 
ground where a prisoner slept. The latter of these was referred to in prison slang as the 
“pizzo” (Dickie, 2011, p.37-42); theory is that it then entered the vernacular as a word for an 
obligatory “tax” payment to the Camorra in general.   In the context of the business 
community, the pizzo refers to protection money as an imposition, when a businessperson 
does not necessarily require “protection” like that ascribed by Gambetta or the tangente. Like 
the Sicilian pizzu, it is not designed to destroy a business, rather it is to take a relatively 
small amount of money from a business and collect it regularly. Like the pizzo of 
Castromediano, it is an expression of territorial dominance and the obligations that a 
business has to a clan to merely exist.  Its imposition en-masse in a territory represents a 
racket, where large swathes of businesses in a community individually pay the pizzo. This 
general conception of the pizzo is also corroborated by Addiopizzo, a non-governmental 
organization (NGO) fighting organized crime, helping victims, and encouraging businesses 
to denounce their extorters. They define the pizzo as: 
A type of extortion practiced by the Cosa Nostra and given by shopkeepers that 
believe that the requests are to secure “protection” on their business. Broadly, it is 
also a form of control over a territory, in that imposing a duty means claiming the 
recognition of their own sovereignty.  
On a regular basis the collector comes to the entrepreneur to collect a certain 
amount of money, which will be used to pay salaries of affiliates in the organisation, 
to look after the families of members in prison, to pay court costs of the bosses and 
for any other criminal investments. Payment in cash is not the only type of pizzo. It 
may be replaced or accompanied by the imposition of staff or suppliers close to the 
clan (Addiopizzo, n.d) 
It may come in cash payment as a start-up payment, a monthly payment or yearly payment - 
there have even been instances where Mafiosi receive payment several times a day of only 
€1 or €2 at a time, adding up to thousands over the course of a year. But there are other 
forms of payment which have been recorded in studies into former pizzo-payers in Palermo 
by Addiopizzo including, but not limited to the installation of mafia-owned “videopoker” 
gambling machines in shops, cafes or bars, imposed suppliers, imposed stipulation of sub-
contracts, imposed staff, imposed co-partnerships (Zaffutto, 2012). In the Quartieri Spagnoli 
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district of Naples a relatively small pizzo was collected from businesses in the form of the 
“lotteria pasquale” (Easter lottery), whereby blocks of lottery tickets were distributed to 
shopkeepers for a mysterious draw. This reduced the extortionate character to the pizzo, 
particularly thanks to the small sum of pizzo actually requested. The pretence of mutuality 
through a “lottery” and th small sums involved simultaneously masked extortion to the 
authorities, whilst providing a system of checking the level of compliance among local 
businesses (Grasso, 2006).  
In Campania, clans have been noted to impose several different types of pizzo, depending 
on their necessities. As reported by D’Alessandro, similar activities to the lotteria pasquale 
are becoming more common in the historical centre of Naples in the time around elections, 
whilst more traditional means of pizzo payment “a tappetto” (carpet) and “pizzo periodico” 
are becoming less frequent in the city. In the same sense that we can refer to carpet 
bombing of a city to mean the complete covering of a city, pizzo “a tappeto” refers to the 
carpet covering of an area in pizzo requests. D’Alessandro noted that this does not exist at 
all in the central area of Naples, but instead is more frequent in the Eastern area of the city 
where the clans are redrawing their presence (D’Alessandro, 2009, pp.442-3). Indeed, the 
President of Sos Impresa5 Luigi Cuomo suggested that the type of pizzo that a clan imposes 
gives us an idea about the situation of the clan: in areas where a clan is historically rooted, 
where extortion is their core business and where there are small clans that are linked with 
much more structured clans, the pizzo is a tappeto. Where the extortion is only a small part 
of the criminal activity, the request is a one-off (Confesercenti Napoli, 2012). The “pizzo 
periodico” instead refers to the periodic payment of pizzo at the major religious: Christmas, 
Easter and sometimes Ferragosto (the August bank holiday) (Gerina and Vasile, 2015).   
It has been observed that the phenomenon of extortion is the most evident feature of mafia-
type association and is an expression of their territoriality (D’Alessandro, 2009; Grasso, 
2012). As such the imposing of pizzo is a purposeful operation strategy for the political 
control of a territory (Colletti, 2016). In judicial terms the criminal action of requesting money 
from a business develops a scope of “mafia” when it is constant over time, concentrated on 
a specific territory and carried out in association with others (Grasso, 2006). In this sense we 
can distinguish between organized crime and those “one time” criminals who extort 
businesses, and individuals acting alone. In an analysis of racketeering in Naples in the 
years 2002-6, Tano Grasso noted the progression from simple extortion of businesses 
towards a kind of territorial power that a racket actually represented:   
                                                          
5
 Sos Impresa: An association founded in Palermo 1991 by a group of businesspeople concerned about the 
influence of organized crime on their businesses. It now exists as a nationwide association 
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[t]he decisive breakthrough occurs when the offender becomes a person “of respect” 
or when they come to be seen in the territory as recognised “authority”. As in the 
case of the pizzo: the young offender, if paid monthly by a businessperson with 10 
employees for the purpose of “protection”, inevitably takes on a different role. Now 
this “payment” has power: he can now ask the businessperson to hire his friends and 
relatives or to buy from certain supplies. How can a businessperson reject such a 
request from his “protector”? (Grasso, 2006, p.12)    
This occurs across the territory where the group operates, where the more ingrained the 
norm of pizzo-paying becomes, the greater power and influence the clan has over a 
businessperson in strictly power and political terms. This shows economic considerations to 
be a secondary concern: the political/power driven aspect of the pizzo for a group becomes 
a particularly useful tool to differentiate between different types of organized crime groups. 
Eliana Pezzuto noted: 
the term racket or “pizzo” therefore refer to criminal conduct designed to obtain 
regular and systematic payment of a sum of money from economic operators in a 
particular area, so that they would not be subject to intimidation or retaliation from the 
group exercising their control. It is not a coincidence that mafias use racketeering as 
a source of funding as well as an instrument for acquiring consent and conditioning 
the social and economic life of whole areas of the country, which for years have 
limited the freedom of enterprise and development for their own benefit. (2015, 
pp.11-12) 
This “conditioning” aspect of racketeering is consistent with the conflict theory strand of 
sociology, against the functionalist one. In accepting a broadly Marxist rather than 
Durkheimian understanding of the function of social norms, the pizzo is stated here as an 
economic imposition as well as a purposeful tactic for pacifying a territory through the 
creation of certain norms. This pacification and conditioning of a business community to the 
normality of payment expresses a mafia group’s territoriality and brings a businessperson 
into contact with o’ sistema as a structure as well as a mentality. Once the norm of paying 
has been established for a business or a business community, the facilitation of further 
payment becomes easier to collect without the necessity of threats or actual violence. It is 
worth noting another entity that does this too: the State, particularly when we consider 
taxation. Businesses pay State taxes because they are required by law to do so, but they are 
more likely to pay taxes if they judge that other businesses pay them too (Kirchler, 2007). In 
these terms we can note the similarity between the establishment of tax norms, and the 
governance of the population by the State, to those conducted by mafia groups. Toros and 
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Mavelli in particular noted the biopolitical extent to which Camorra clans, similarly to the 
modern State, exist in a 
relation of mutuality, which goes beyond the economic dimension and invests society 
as a whole through the production of norms, ideas, practices, values, codes of 
behaviour and specific understandings of what counts as true or false. The Camorra, 
in other words, is a mechanism of governance/governmentality which has contributed 
to the production of subjectivities and of a distinctive political vision, albeit one not 
articulated and presented as such. (2013, p.80)  
Insofar that they occupy the same geographical space as the State, Camorra clans extract 
taxes as their own “rights of seizure” in the form of the pizzo (2013, p.80), which for certain 
clans has been demonstrated to directly go towards a cassa comune (common fund) 
(Colletti, 2016). This fund is managed by those in the upper echelons of a clan for its general 
organisation, and the provision of economic and legal assistance for camorristi and their 
families, thus acting as a “fully integrated social security system” (Colletti, 2016, p.74). In this 
system, Camorra affiliates collect pizzo from businesses, then give this to their capo-zona 
(local boss), who gives it to their boss. This money is then pooled in the cassa comune, with 
salaries paid by pushing an amount of this money downstream to the capo-zona and then 
the affiliates (Colletti, 2016, p.59). Alongside this cassa comune, money obtained from pizzo 
collection has also been used to provide “clean” money to invest in the legal economy 
(Sciarrone, 2011). The pizzo paid by businesses directly contributes towards this localised 
social security system in a similar manner to the Liberal State and State taxes. The crucial 
difference for the Camorra in this context is that the money that goes towards their cassa 
comune is collected from individuals who directly benefit from social security that it 
facilitates. We see here at least two contrasting spheres of influence: one broadly 
represented by “the State”, and another broadly represented by “mafiosi”, each one with its 
own distinct set of socialised values and norms which they draw from one another and a 
broadly shared understanding of “culture”. This is, of course, a simplification. The following 
section addresses the issue in a more complex way with regard to Civil Society. 
2:3  Civil Society 
In this section we introduce the relevant debates and literature concerning Civil Society, 
which we then place within the context of organized crime. This will be followed by a 
theoretical overview. Civil society, as noted by Michael Edwards “mean[s] different things to 
different people, plays different roles at different times, and constitutes both problem and 
solution” (Edwards, 2004, vi) having been referred to as “a noun (a part of society), an 
adjective (a kind of society), an arena for social deliberation or a mixture of all three” (ibid. 
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p.4). When we speak of Civil Society it is important to ask whether we are referring to what is 
actually observable around us or merely the idealised vision of what it should be.  
The etymological root of the term is to be found in Cicero’s Societas civilis, itself deriving 
from the Aristotelian concept of the polis where Civil Society was viewed  
as a rule of law and a political community, a peaceful order based on implicit or 
explicit consent of individuals, a zone of ‘civility’. Civility is defined not just as ‘good 
manners’ or ‘polite society’ but as a state of affairs where violence has been 
minimized as a way of organizing social relations. It is public security that creates the 
basis for more ‘civil’ procedures for settling conflict – legal arrangements, for 
example, or public deliberation (Kaldor, 2003, p.7).  
This should be placed in the context of what has been termed the Civilizing Process (Elias, 
1978) namely: as the modern State evolved and began to have greater influence on 
individual’s lives through education and the pacification of the population in general, 
individuals began to control their human excesses, developing shame and a greater 
cognitive awareness of those around them, subsequently reducing interpersonal violence in 
the community (Freud, 1908; Weber, 1919; Foucault, 1977; Elias, 1978; Pinker, 2011). The 
emphasis here is that this is only possible through by changing social relations away from 
“nature” with extra attention given to establishing the “civility” in  a society which makes the 
Societas civilis possible.  It is of upmost importance for a State/community to have a public 
monopoly on legitimate violence (Weber, 1919) which, from above, overlooks, manages and 
secures Civil Society in the form of the Societas civilis itself. Social awareness in this context 
becomes linked to this ‘polite society’, whereby selfish human urges are controlled, replaced 
and made subordinate to the State, and therefore, society in general, particularly with regard 
to abiding by the law. The law is the product of society which, through the apparatus of the 
State, exists on the one hand for the benefit of society and on the other exists for the State 
to be able to govern society more effectively as lawmakers seem prudent.  
Hegelians and Marxists conceive Civil Society broadly as bourgeois society. We will refer to 
it as Hegel did as the Bürgerliche Gesellschaft, whereby Civil Society is “that arena of ethical 
life between the [S]tate and the family” (Kaldor, 2003, p.8) which was formed with 
commercial society, the end of feudalism/mercantilism and the development of the 
bourgeoisie. Thus Civil Society is inseparable from and equated with the bourgeoisie. It is 
through this specific emancipation from the previous social and economic stratum that we 
locate the beginnings of Bürgerliche Gesellschaft. In the sense that the public monopoly on 
legitimate violence eased the need for protection in a community, enabling individuals in 
society to turn their attention to other matters other than protection, increased surplus of 
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products and the emancipation of the bourgeoisie gave the bourgeoisie more time to turn 
their attention to other matters other than production. Somewhat hammering the point, Hegel 
regarded Civil Society as:  
the achievement of the modern world … the territory of mediation where there is free 
play for every idiosyncrasy, every talent, every accident of birth and fortune, and 
where waves of passion gush forth, regulated only by reason, glinting through them. 
(Hegel quoted in Kaldor, 2003, pp.11-12) 
Here Civil Society is about the interactions between people outside of the family and the 
State. Expanding upon the Marxist concept of Bürgerliche Gesellschaft we can also identify 
another cleavage through Gramsci, who instead viewed Civil Society in the words of David 
Forgacs as:  
the sphere in which a dominant social group organizes consent and hegemony, as 
opposed to a political society where it rules by coercion and direct domination. It is 
also a sphere where the dominated social groups may organize their opposition and 
where an alternative hegemony may be constructed. (1999, p.420) 
It is essential to note that Gramsci had a much more fluid conception of difference between 
State and Civil Society, contending that the “Statist” and “political elements” of civil and 
consensual organisations matched the disciplinary mechanisms of the State despite their 
voluntary aspects (Bellamy and Schecter, 1993, p.119). These disciplinary mechanisms 
remind us of Foucault’s concept of biopolitique (or rather, it is Foucault who follows 
Gramsci), which, combined with the idea of a ‘dominant social group’ aspiring to impose its 
own hegemony, serves to entrench Civil Society in a Statist (or rather, in Gramsci’s words, 
“ruling class”) discourse. To reiterate, the strictly Marxist and Hegelian view of Bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft places Civil Society simply in the gap between family life and the State, 
whereas the Gramscian conception contends that it is rather the “ensemble of organisms 
commonly called ‘private’” (Gramsci, 1999, p.306) that one in direct contrast with political 
society / the State.  
Following this we can look at the largely protest- and activist-driven ‘post-Marxist’ conception 
of Civil Society which 
presupposes a [S]tate or rule of law, but insists not only on restraints on [S]tate 
power but on a redistribution of power. It is a radicalization of democracy and an 
extension of participation and autonomy. On this definition, civil society refers to 
active citizenship, to growing self-organization outside formal political circles, and 
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expanded space in which individual citizens can influence the conditions in which 
they live both directly through self-organization and through political pressure. 
(Kaldor, 2003, p.8) 
The emphasis is on civic culture and the production and expansion of civic-ness, all in the 
context of democratic principles, to include aspects such social mobility, the social/political 
involvement of people in the world they live in and holding political power to account, 
whether this be purely on the local, regional, national or international level. There is not 
necessarily a ‘need’ for the State in this regard, but the utilisation of concepts drawn from 
Civil Society is made easier by the States cooperation and/or implementation. Civil Society 
contains an unavoidable political aspect, even if this is limited to the expansion of 
democracy, with an emphasis on acceptance, tolerance and a general anti-racist and anti-
discriminatory discourse supplemented alongside the widespread inclusion of peoples in 
general. This Civil Society is probably much better understood as a kind of social movement 
or zeitgeist, with a general focus on people wanting change from the bottom-up. 
The subsequent broad (neo)liberal strand of Civil Society is the most prevailing and actively 
enacted understanding of the term, given the rise of international institutions such as the 
World Bank and the post-1990 supremacy of neoliberal economics.6 From its roots in 
traditional liberal writers of the 18th century such as those associated with the French and 
American revolutions as well as in the 19th century through writers such as Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1988 [1840]). We see a comprehension of Civil Society which focusses on self-
help of individuals with regard to a community would alongside a State become limited. Civil 
Society is viewed as necessarily separate from, but also complementary to the State. In his 
study on Democracy in America, Tocqueville identified the increasing foundation of voluntary 
associations (which we can consider Civil Society Organizations) in the United States to be a 
result of a non-intrusive (neo)liberal State because: 
among democratic peoples all the citizens are independent and weak. They can do 
hardly anything for themselves, and none of them is in a position to force his fellows 
to help him. They would all therefore find themselves helpless if they did not learn to 
help each other voluntarily. (1988, pp.514-5) 
                                                          
6
 The terms “neoliberalism” and “neoliberal economics” are politically loaded and have a dense literature. For 
clarity’s sake, when I refer to them, I am referring to the broad set of policies that advocate moves away from 
a centralised State towards greater privatisation so as to give individuals the control of their own destinies, 
away from the perceivedly overbearing and intrusive State. In particular, I am referring Hayekian economics as 
presented in Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1943). 
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This means that the formation of associations was necessary for individuals to survive, for 
the community as well as the State to function better, and to improve the freedom of its 
citizens: 
If the inhabitants of democratic countries had neither the right nor the taste for uniting 
for political objects, their independence would run great risks, but they could keep 
both their wealth and their knowledge for a long time. But if they did not learn some 
habits of acting together in the affairs of daily life, civilization itself would be in peril. A 
people in which individuals had lost the power of carrying through great enterprises 
by themselves, without acquiring the faculty of doing them together, would soon fall 
back into barbarism. (1988, pp.514-5) 
Civil Society is seen as a natural outcome of the liberal State, which then further 
complemented the freedom, liberty and democracy of the citizens of that State. De 
Tocqueville further iterates what these associations entail, and how they functioned in 19th 
century American society 
Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever 
forming associations. There are not only commercial and industrial associations in 
which all take part, but others of a thousand different types – religious, moral, 
serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute. 
Americans combine to give fêtes, found seminaries, build churches, distribute books 
and send missionaries to the antipodes. Hospitals, prisons, and schools take shape 
in that way. Finally, if they want to proclaim a truth or propagate some feeling by the 
encouragement of a great example, they form an association. (1988, pp.513) 
To de Tocqueville, not only was Civil Society in this manner complementary to democracy in 
the United States, but also essential for the trust bonds and general survival of the liberal 
State and liberal ideals in general.  
The sheer breadth of all of these conceptions leads us to say that when we talk of Civil 
Society in general as it is fostered by the Liberal State, we are not talking about specific 
organisations – we are talking broadly about ideas of active citizenship, cooperation, 
tolerance, pluralism, social movements, associationalism and mutual interests between 
people which can (but does not always) manifest itself through organisations. Given the 
prevalence of this ideology, when we speak of Civil Society Organizations (and strictly its 
“organizations”) we use the definition which is provided by the World Bank: 
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the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a 
presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or 
others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic 
considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of 
organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor 
unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, 
professional associations, and foundations. (World Bank, 2013) 
These are sometimes used as a “complement to government action” (World Bank, 2013), 
which unavoidably cements the majority of action and legitimacy originating from the State. 
Without the State, Civil Society is unable to flourish, but without Civil Society the (liberal) 
State would find the achievement of democracy, liberty and freedom much more difficult. 
This indisputably broad definition we can see a Civil Society that is necessarily distinctive 
from the governments and for-profit businesses vision that can encompass cultural and 
personal life. The main emphasis from the World Bank definition is that of “organizations” 
which somewhat delimits Civil Society as “a non-profit third sector” which seeks to substitute 
for varying State functions (Kaldor, 2003, p.9), which, given the emphasis we also wish to 
give on ideas and mentality associated with Civil Society (the noun), that often exist without 
complimenting government action, does not tell the whole story.  
The diffiucult definition and uses of Civil Society are important in the context of our study. In 
the context of the western world where (neo)liberalism is most pervasive, the idea that 
individuals have the power to better their own communities through Civil Society and 
associationalism is an important one. Likewise, different associations are founded for 
different reasons and thus may understand their importance for their community and the 
manner in which they interact with the State in different ways. Plurality in this context is key, 
but so is the observation that the State chooses to fund certain Civil Society Organizations, 
certain activities, or certain campaigns over others, broadly based on the efficient allocation 
of resources that facilitates Social Capital only so far as it will lead to self-help and 
independence from further State intervention. In this context it is important to reiterate not 
only that Civil Society is used and co-opted by the State, but also to stress its importance as 
a multitude of actors outside of State influence and its role in creating and fostering different 
cultures, behaviours and beliefs.     
Now that I have explained my key terms, I can proceed to my hypotheses before showing 
my theoretical framework.  
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2: Research questions and hypotheses 
One of the central questions that I seek to answer in this thesis is “what is the pizzo?” How 
does it function, and how is it enforced? The pizzo itself is the centrepiece of this project 
because, unlike other actions that characterise actions by mafia-type associations, it is a 
phenomenon that explicitly expresses a clan’s territoriality (D’Alessandro, 2009; Grasso, 
2012; Colletti, 2016) and sovereignty over a local population. With this I hypothesise that for 
the clans, for the judiciary, for law enforcement agencies and for the businesses who pay it, 
the pizzo is understood as a systemic tax. I follow this line of reasoning: it is a tax in the 
sense that, similarly to the taxes an individual pays to the modern State, a person is duty-
bound to pay it. Non-payment without good reason involves some form of disciplinary action: 
where the State uses fines and potential prison time, the Camorra demands extra payment 
and may inflict violence. It is paid to an entity which pools the money together for the benefit 
of what it sees fit. In the case of the Liberal State, elections ensure that the money collected 
from individuals across society benefits the community as a whole (at least in theory). In the 
case of Camorra clans, the collection of the pizzo has been demonstrated to go towards the 
general organisation of the clan and its own clandestine social security system, such as 
paying salaries of its members, their families and other essentials such as legal fees 
(Sciarrone, 2011; Colletti, 2016) comparable to a State civil service, for the benefit of an 
unelected authority represented by the boss, their family and their advisors.  
Similarly to the payment of State taxes, the payment of pizzo is facilitated by established 
norms: as a general occurrence an individual does not pay taxes because they are scared of 
the repercussions of non-payment. Certainly individuals are aware of the potential 
repercussions of non-payment, but pay taxes because it is an established norm in a society, 
rather than because they are fearful of these repercussions. By hypothesising the pizzo as a 
systemic tax that a business is duty bound to pay, we note that there is an established norm 
of paying in this context. Like the State, it is hypothesised that clans have moved past the 
need for violence as a means of extracting money from a community in a systematic manner 
– businesses pay the pizzo, like they pay taxes, because there is an established norm for 
doing so. This is intrinsically linked to the absence of the metus causa factum (Pezzuto, 
2015, p.10): tax is not paid due to fear of violence from the establishment, but instead 
because it is the norm to do so - a businessperson does not worry about tax payment, and 
though could complain about it, it is a generally accepted factor when managing a business. 
This norm has been established by multiple payments to the clan over time whereby a 
business becomes accustomed to the payment to the point at which it is normal and habitual 
to pay, here I draw similarity with La Boétie and the concept of servitude voluntaire (1975 
[1553]). This is where conflicting cultural spheres come into consideration: one that 
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comprehends the payment of money or services to an organized crime as a “bad” thing vs. 
another that views it as normal or even essential. The process of regularising pizzo payment 
is assumed to be like “creeping normality”, or what we can best metaphorically explain as a 
frog in boiling water. If a frog is placed into boiling water, it will jump out immediately. If it is 
placed in lukewarm water on a hob where the water is slowly brought to boil, as the 
metaphor goes, the frog will not realise and instead be boiled. The thought process here is 
the same – a business is initially approached for a small amount of money for pizzo. A cost-
benefit calculation is made, whereby it is deemed more beneficial to actually pay the pizzo. 
At this point the Camorra increases the temperature and extracts as much as they can out of 
the business. From the perspective of the businesspeople, perhaps the best philosophy to 
consider would be the so-called “slippery slope” or in legal jargon Principiis obsta et respice 
finem,7 lest the businessperson become subject to the overt control and influence of the 
camorrista without even realising.The tyrant then imposes a kind of disciplinary mechanism 
which fosters the reproduction of a desired behaviour (Foucault, 1977).  
On a broader societal level, the use of symbolism plays an important part of this. In a 2012 
reflective article about his 1993 magnum opus, The Sicilian Mafia, Diego Gambetta referred 
to symbols and insinuations that influenced individual decision making. He refers to a 1986 
anecdote of a Canadian research in Palermo who was nudged into leaving: “Someone had 
stolen his dirty laundry from his car boot, and a few days later he found it cleaned and ironed 
back in the boot of his car with a note that simply said “buon viaggio”” (2011, p.8) concluding 
his article that “I too received interesting subtle messages that encouraged a rapid exit. I 
thus realised that violence was not the only resource of these men.” (pp.8-9). These are 
examples of “aesthetic-affective effects” that Pine referred to in 2012 referring to the 
Camorra and its influence on culture in Naples. These “effects” refer to the atmosphere that 
a group is able to evoke by not actually doing very much. The idea that they were there was 
enough to influence one action or another (Pine, 2012, p.14). This represents the power that 
a mafia-type association has over an area, indeed, if anything, the need to use actual 
violence shows that the group is in less power than previously assumed.   
In this manner the concept of the pizzo as simple “extortion” and for pure financial gain is 
rejected, as there is undoubtedly an element of habit and “moulding” of a certain culture of 
obedience being developed. The payment of pizzo has a very political and power-centric 
aspect to it: the amount of money that is collected can often be rather small. Other activities 
such as drugs trafficking and involvement in the waste disposal industry are far more 
lucrative, but do give a group a direct territorial sovereignty over an area.   It is in the small 
                                                          
7
 Resist the beginnings and think about the outcome. 
26 
amounts involved and the repeated submission to the tyrant where it is claimed that these 
types of disciplining mechanisms which facilitate the payment of pizzo make the pizzo similar 
to a tax, albeit a clandestine one that exists for the benefit of a smaller segment of society – 
rather than the whole of it.   
In hypothesising that the pizzo functions as a means of social control and influence, 
particularly in the way in which it fosters consent and norms which favour the clans, we 
move towards our second hypothesis. I hypothesise that the process of changing attitudes 
towards mafias has become the focus for the anti-mafia movement. It is hypothesised that 
actions against organized crime in Italy inherently have a “social” or “cultural” angle, whereby 
mentalities that help to sustain a clan’s presence in an area have been purposely targeted 
by the State. In general terms we look towards the way in which a clan is able to continue 
existing in an area, whereby we point towards a general criminal/mafia (sub)culture and 
cultural sphere which contrasts to the culture which the State tries to develop. In more 
specific terms, we focus on the way that the practice of pizzo paying has become 
normalised, and then how the State and/or Civil Society react to this normality. Different Civil 
Society groups, State supported or otherwise, are understood to have approached the issue 
of organized crime as a problem of mentality, social conditions and culture. In this sense, I 
borrow from Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus, which we understand to mean the 
embodiment of Cultural Capital in a physical space (1986). The response of the anti-mafia 
movement is one which attempts to alter and reconfigure the existing habitus through 
pedagogy and engagement. This is hypothesised to be a kind of Cultural Warfare 
(Gunnarson, 2008), where we engage in broader notions of Cultural Hegemony (Gramsci, 
1999 [1916-1935]) and the manner in which it reconfigures localised Cultural Capital. In 
broad terms, I point to the co-option of individuals in a society through the changing of 
localised cultural norms alongside the role of soft “community” policing and traditional law 
enforcement tactics as a means in which a deeply rooted mafia association may be 
defeated.   
I hypothesise that given the normalised rationale for payment in the “criminal” sphere, the 
State/Civil Society has responded by attempting to change or shape the manner in which 
businesspeople view the relationship between their businesses and security. They seek to 
emphasise that the State is present and will react to charges of extortion, because it is on 
the businesses’ side. In understanding the importance of social power and culture, 
purposeful actions coordinated by the State but enacted by Civil Society and individualised 
trust networks are pursued in order to sideline and replace the socio-cultural norms that 
sustain criminal governance. This is not simply a process of demonstrating the existence of 
a Hobbesian State Leviathan, but a process that involves the co-option of Civil Society at the 
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expense of the clans in a broadly neoliberal approach to governance based on relationships 
of trust. I propose to analyse this process in one geographical area where the Camorra is 
very present. The State and various Civil Society groups are theorised to have approached 
the issue of Camorra in this context as a problem of contrasting social norms and culture 
that hinders good governance and that which is perceived to be a good society. The task of 
altering these norms is then wedded to repression by law enforcement agencies and the 
judiciary as a means of uprooting Camorra in an area.  
The backbone of these two hypotheses is an assertion that the Camorra cannot and should 
not be countered purely in Statist and judicial term, and that the State and Civil Society have 
reacted accordingly. Judicial repression removes those who are already involved in Camorra 
clans and their associates, and therefore those who are a product of their environment, but it 
does not (at its purest) address underlying factors that cause and sustain the Camorra as a 
phenomenon. With regard to the pizzo, the nature of the relationship between the citizen and 
the State is examined focusing on a mixture of the breaking down of the State monopoly on 
violence and taxation (Weber, 1919), as well as the development of a rival “criminal”/”mafia” 
cultural sphere. At the very least, this sphere is understood to have partially occupied the 
same habitus as the State, claiming some localised sovereignty, and sustained by a 
populace who are apathetic, accustomed or outright endeared to the influence of the 
Camorra in their area.  
3: Theoretical framework: Cultural Capital and Hegemony 
Following Jamieson (2000) we reiterate that mafia-type associations are not extraneous to 
society. Their members and their activities part are both a product and modifier of the society 
and culture, with ther norms, values and incentives of which they are part. As such, they 
should be studied through a sociological lens. Notwithstanding the existence of the State, 
mafia-type associations have been noted to have developed particular types of quasi-
governmental functions (Von Lampe, 2008) on a localised level. It is also important to note 
that many of these groups continue to exist due to some kind of collaboration or consent of 
non-members around them. Following on from my hypotheses, this section explores two 
broad themes. The first is how a mafia-type association affects specific cultural norms, 
values and beliefs within an area. The second is the role of incentives, and how a mafia-type 
assocation and the society in which they exist incentivise (or dissuade) individuals from 
certain actions, particularly through those localised cultural norms, values and beliefs. Here 
we consider the way that these social, economic and cultural factors help to sustain a 
particular localised power structure by consent.  
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I interpret the role of social norms through the lens of conflict theory, following a broadly 
Marxist interpretation of society and the economy under capitalism (Marx, 1990 [1867]). 
Contrary to Durkheimian interpretations thereof, conflict between different sections (classes) 
of society under the existing economic system is understood to be the main driver in socio-
economic relations. Following the discourse of 20th century Marxist scholars (such as 
Gramsci) that sought to explain why the capitalist system had not collapsed as Marx 
predicted, I point to culture, norms and hegemony that made individuals act against their 
own self-interest. As such I interpret social norms as serving to entrench an élite in a society, 
in a vertical and permeating manner. Following this mantra, I draw on concepts of Cultural 
Hegemony (Gramsci, 1999), Cultural Capital (Bourdieu, 1986) and corps dociles (docile 
bodies) (Foucault, 1977; 2008), whereby the interlinking norms of a society (an external 
influence on the Ego) and inter-personal relations reconfigure personal development and 
behaviour to be more attuned to the necessities of the élite. As a social class, the élite 
maximises its benefits, establishing dominance in real terms, but also in cultural and 
hegemonic terms. This élite is interpreted on multiple levels: both at the level of State and 
society in general, and on the local level where a local élite is able to influence local social 
norms. From a Foucauldian perspective, I note the role of governance in shaping and 
moulding a society to be more easily governable (gouvernementalité).  
With regard to Cultural Hegemony, I refer to the ability of an élite to govern by consent. For 
Gramsci this referred to the process by which cultures and behaviours that help sustain the 
dominant economic system permeated from the élite down to other social strata. This 
simultaneously made élite norms, cultures, values and behaviours appealing to classes 
below (as an incentive for their self-improvement), but also helped maintain the status quo 
(Gramsci, 1999). An earlier illustration of this was provided by La Boétie (1975), who, 
drawing upon the socio-economic position of French serfs under feudalism, noted how 
society became so permeated with traditions and ideas that sustained this structure that 
revolt was unthinkable. In a similar fashion Alain Badiou referred to this as “enemy 
propaganda”:  
‘The goal of enemy propaganda is not to is not to annihilate an existing force (this 
function is generally left to police forces), but rather to annihilate an unnoticed 
possibility of the situation.’ In other words, they are trying to kill hope: the message of 
this propaganda is a resigned conviction that the world we live in, even if it is not the 
best of all possible worlds, is the least bad one, so that any radical change can only 
make it worse.” (Žižek, 2015, pp.233-234) 
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This serves to reinforce the status quo in that it renders ideas of alternatives as naïve or 
foolhardy, whilst also inhibiting individuals from acting out of self-interest. Similarly here I 
draw on the thought of Wilhelm Reich on the mass psychology of fascism, noting in 
particular his astonishment in the relatively low number of people who actually steal food 
regularly despite being hungry (Reich, 1946). They have been socialised into thinking that 
stealing is wrong and, therefore, starve rather than break the law, acting against their own 
self-interest.  
For communities that have been influenced by a mafia-type association and its cultural 
hegemony the logic is the same. Where they have been able to gain a foothold in a 
community, influencing the socio-economic lives of the inhabitants, there are remnants of 
this kind of hegemony that affect individual behaviours that serve to benefit the group itself. 
This becomes particularly acute in areas where the State is largely perceived as absent or 
uncaring, where a mafia-type association is able to disrupt or outright replace State-
emanating Cultural Hegemony, with particularly regard to pedagogy and behaviour. On one 
side, individuals are co-opted to join these groups, or reproduce cultural and behavioural 
norms that sustain this status quo. On the other, the permeation of these groups into the 
fabric of society is enough to make other re-orderings of society and social relations 
unthinkable, thereby applying the logics of power in this structure to other structures too. 
This is a view that would be best summarised in the widely held view that the mafias are 
corrupt, but so too are the politicians which leads to the belief that, nothing will ever change. 
8 This is the least bad of all worlds. 
Through this quasi-governmental function they have ability to affect local socio-economic 
power relations, which influences the behaviour of members in this localised society and 
culture. In occupying this hierarchical role and influencing socio-economic power relations in 
place of the State, a mafia-type association is able to influence how individuals interact with 
the society around them, either willing it purposefully or just as a reaction to the existing 
power relations. This applies to an individual’s decision to join or cooperate with a criminal 
group, as much as it applies to people who commit criminal or financial misdemeanours, and 
businesses who decide whether to denounce an extortion request or not.  
In particular, mafia Cultural Hegemony is understood to have pacified their local population 
through the diffusion of cultures and behaviours that undermine trust in the State in favour of 
                                                          
8
 A similarity can be drawn between Evans & Giroux’s (2015) analysis of youths in the American crime series 
“The Wire”, wherein the logic of Chess was applied to the permanence of local power relations where the 
structure always stayed the same. The small-time pawns have the ability at their own risk to become a big-
time queen and do as they like, to try and kill the king, but the structure, the norms of movement, always stays 
the same (pp.156-8). 
30 
mafias as localised groups. It is a hegemony that accepts the crimes that mafias commit, but 
also believe that politicians do far worse, and that committing crimes is just a fact of life: 
criminality is everywhere and politicians are crooks who only help someone when it is in their 
interests to do so. It is a hegemony that pacifies a population through apathy and the 
disbelief that a person can change the system as it is. The philosophy of a notable Camorra 
boss of the 1970s, Raffaele Cutolo, for example, was noted by Dickie (2013) as an ideology 
that was crudely nihilistic to its core. It seemed to give agency to young uneducated and 
troubled Neapolitans to escape their almost certain future in poverty, in favour of a life as a 
camorrista that was conceived as more glamourous. The only way to escape was to become 
a deviant in an unjust society: 
“The day when the people of Campania understand that it is better to eat a slice of 
bread as a free man than to eat a steak as a slave is the day that Campania will win.” 
Cutolo also directly defines personal sovereignty. It emerges in the art of making do, 
and it culminates in a sort of self-making combustion: “The value of life doesn’t 
consist of its length but in the use made of it; often people live a long time without 
living very much. Consider this, my friends, as long as you are on this earth 
everything depends on your willpower, not on the number of years you have lived.” 
(Pine, 2012, p.51) 
This is not a perspective that should be wholly rejected as propaganda, but something which 
should be considered when analysing the appeal or hegemonic pacification that the Camorra 
has. It demonstrates the extent to which Camorra clans have had an “ideology” per se, with 
their own value system which can be contrasted to broader society and development sought 
by the State. It is a lens through which its members interpret the world around them.  
Through the Camorra and ‘o sistema, young Neapolitans that have relatively little agency are 
able to seize some. They start playing the same games as the corrupt politicians they see in 
the media, but on a smaller and more violent scale that only really reveals itself locally. They 
see those who have freed themselves from the conflicts that life naturally brings as denying 
parts of themselves, and as hypocritical – since they would be as violent and corrupt as 
them if they weren’t so safe (and bored) in their ivory towers. Conflict is a natural part of life, 
so why not seize that fruitful and exciting part of life? – by force if necessary. It is a reaction 
to a system that some young Neapolitans feel has failed them, and does not help reach all of 
those things they want in their life, and for their community and countrymen.  
This works at its crudest for a prospective camorrista, but more subtly for the 
businessperson who wants to benefit from the position of the Camorra, and even more 
subtle still for the businessperson who pays the pizzo without denouncing because the 
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position of camorristi, criminality and dirty dealing is understood as a simple and 
unchangeable fact of life.  
The appeal of mafiosità (mafia-ness) is an important cultural factor to consider, and is 
related to a hegemony that competes with the traditional State hegemony. On that which is 
Schmittian “political”9 in this context, it is worth recalling the notable case of a Camorra 
capoclan (boss) who purposely used his “lower class” regional Neapolitan language in a 
formal “Italian” setting of the courtroom, a social faux-pas in Italy, which should not be 
understood in purely classist terms: 
While the judge has the distinction of wealth, status, influence, and family name, the 
same is true for the capoclan. From this perspective, the self-aggrandizing 
performance of ‘O capoclan rival those of the judge. The judge sees an 
undereducated man indulging in the arrogant excesses of smania di protagonismo 
(the neurotic need to be the centre of action). ‘O capoclan sees the judge, and by 
extension the magistrature, not as the adjudicator of a sovereign state but as a force 
that competes with his own personal sovereignty … Both the camorrista and the 
judge see each other as pretenders to power. (Pine, 2012, p.32) 
There is an allure to becoming a camorrista outside of a purely economic dimension that 
plays on the rejection of formalised power systems in favour of a more individualised one. In 
this example we see the competing localised power relations contra the intrusion of the 
Italian State. There are two competing cultural spheres with different value systems 
converging in the same geographical space. The values that generically defined “camorristi” 
contrast with those of the generically defined “judge”, “magistrature” and “State”, in the 
sense that they hold different cultural signs, norms and behaviours to be more attractive or 
appealing than others.  
This may be interpreted through Bourdieu’s notions of Cultural Capital (1986). The latter 
refers to the types of education and socialisation that determine an individual’s progress in a 
society. In our case we have two broadly different spheres with two broadly different value 
systems for interpreting the value of an individual’s Cultural Capital. In this context, “o’ 
                                                          
9
 “The political must therefore rest on its own ultimate distinctions to which all action with a specifically 
political meaning can be traced. Let us assume that in the realm of morality the final distinctions are between 
good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable. The question then is 
whether there is also a special distinction which can serve as a simple criterion of the political and of what it 
consists. The nature of such a political distinction is surely different from that of those others. It is independent 
of them and as such can speak clearly for itself.  
The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend 
and enemy” [Italics added for emphasis] (Schmitt, 1929, p.26).  
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Capoclan” and the judge differ upon which behaviours and cultural signs they deem to be 
more attractive. In this geographical space we see the convergence and conflict between 
these two value systems. One claims to represent a type of “localness”, “Napoletanità” 
(Neapolitan-ness) and an authenticity to one’s true inner Hobbes, Machiavelli or Thucydides 
that characterises the manner in which to reclaim one’s individual agency. The other claims 
to represent that which is liberal, lawful, “cultured”, ordered and civilized in the normatively 
and societally determined meaning of each term. There is a profound difference between 
what the “criminal” or “mafia” sphere and the “State” or “Civil Society” sphere consider more 
valuable in cultural terms. Not only are the aspects of Cultural Capital profoundly different, 
but so too are the types of Cultural Capital. Bourdieu held that Cultural Capital can present 
itself in three forms: Embodied: such as skills, abilities and competences; Objectified: such 
as the functions of objects to demonstrate these skills and competences and; 
Institutionalized: such as university degrees which demonstrate such competences. For o’ 
capoclan and the judge the importance of each form and what each deems to be important 
within each form differs immensely.  
Camorra clans in this sense are reliant on certain types of Cultural Capital to exist, as well as 
creating and then developing further types of dispositional Cultural Capital for aspects of the 
population which allow it to carry on existing. This explains the use of already existing 
cultural imagery and events, such as religious processions (La Repubblica, 8 June 2016; 
Sales, 2016), which enable an appropriation and then adoption of a certain cultural value 
which a community deems valuable for the benefit of changing a clan’s “image”. The 
rejection of State-related institutional Cultural Capital (such as degrees and institutional 
education) holds a different reasoning. Given that Camorra power in a poor and less 
educated community relies on its ability to attract those who are poor and less educated, 
adopting a mentality that is less about philosophy and knowledge and more about what is 
the case and situation at hand. Pine noted a similar rejection of institutional (embodied) 
Cultural Capital for members of the Camorra when he wrote that:  
the camorrista’s authority rests not on “formal” education but on his know-how. 
Rather than the presumed impartial sovereignty of reason, it is his “embodied 
intelligence” and his awareness of the possibilities for action that render him 
supreme. The camorrista concerns himself less with ideas of “truth” or “justice” than 
with what Niccolò Machiavelli called the “effectual truth of things.” [“la verità 
effettuale”] (Pine, 2012, p.33) 
This is the same for the society which they inhabit, and it is to the Camorra’s strength that 
they are able to focus on localness and those who are the “bread and butter” of an area to 
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justify their own existence as a pure product of the society they inhabit, and are a reaction to 
the (often) corrupt politicians and State. In the context of Civil Society, both as societa civilis 
and as represented through organisations and associations, conflicting (cultural) 
hegemonies are used by forces who wish to uproot mafia-type associations in a community, 
as well by these same associations to further entrench themselves in the same community. 
In “criminal” appeals to a population, pro-crime “embodied” Cultural Capital becomes more 
valuable to individuals in a society than that which is anti-crime. The role of Civil Society 
regarding the fight against organized crime, then, to use Bourdieu’s notions of Cultural 
Capital as well as Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, is to change the nature of the habitus 
where the socio-cultural sphere of “Civil Society” meets the broadly and pejoratively termed 
“mafia” or “criminal” socio-culture sphere that now inhabits it.10 In communities which have 
become heavily influenced by these kinds of mafia/criminal socio-cultural spheres, the aim 
should be on the one hand to discredit these spheres whilst at the same time 
proposing/creating/developing a different spheres entirely to counter them. Following 
Gramsci, Civil Society that receives the support from élites becomes a mechanism to 
permeate the appropriate ideology in the form of cultural and behavioural norms. This has 
been achieved by development in a broadly targeted manner that fosters self-sufficiency and 
“resilience” (Duffield, 2014 [2001]; Evans and Reid, 2014; Singha, 2005) through selective 
developmental funding. This élite ideology then permeates the rest of society, co-opting 
private individuals and associations, thereby providing a foothold that ensures the survival of 
the status quo, whilst also developing society in a certain direction that ensures its easier 
governability within a certain demarcation of private freedoms. In this context, it is 
noteworthy that not all development is ‘good’ and worthy of promotion (Evans and Reid, 
2014, p.84), and that Civil Society Organizations are funded and co-opted on the basis of 
their applicability to State policy. In focussing on Cultural Capital, Civil Society and the State 
though the disposition of a culture of legality, local socialisation processes are altered in a 
purposeful way, thereby affecting the manner in which individuals see the Camorra, legality 
and organized crime in general.  
What we have not discussed yet however is the specific appeal that mafia-type associations 
provide to individuals in a population, and how the State and Civil Society are able to counter 
it.  Alongside specific lucrative and economic factors, the attractiveness of a mafia-type 
                                                          
10
 As noted in 1929 by John Landesco of criminal and “good citizen” spheres in Chicago: “the gangster is a 
product of his surroundings in the same way in which the good citizen is a product of his environment. The 
good citizen has grown up in an atmosphere of obedience to law and of respect for it. The gangster has lived 
his life in a region of law breaking, of graft, and of “fixing.” That is the reason why the good citizen and the 
gangster have never been able to understand each other. They have been reared in two different world” 
(1929, p.1057) 
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association has been achieved by the appropriation of specific cultural signs that align 
interests or beliefs of a population with the group. In the mezzogiorno region the alignment of 
certain local Church parishes with criminal clans has been an issue, whereby religious 
parades have purposely walked below balconies of local clan bosses to show respect, giving 
some symbolic weight to the clan from the Church. It should not be forgotten that camorristi 
and their supporters are very much a part of the society and therefore the culture in which 
they live. For example, it has been observed that camorristi have gesticulated towards 
Catholic symbols such as the crucifix before or after organized killings (Sales, 2016), with a 
view of making their act of killing somewhat redemptive or sacred. Other local cultural signs 
and indicators create some kind of symbiosis in this respect too. The use of regional 
languages and manners of speaking (Pine, 2012, p.32), normative values of honour and 
masculinity (Trevaglino et al., 2016), combined with symbolism, symbolic appropriation11 and 
expressions of localness vis-à-vis the State12  make normatively understood notions of 
criminal behaviours openly accepted by a society. A noteable example elsewhere is the 
funding of community events, such as that described by Levitt and Dubner (2006, p.91-2) 
where an American OCG placed money aside to pay for social events to keep the locals 
favourable. 
As Roy Godson explained with regard to drug cartels along the US-Mexican border, it is 
difficult to encourage a population, particularly young people, to oppose organized crime 
when popular media reinforce ideas about organized crime and trafficking through pro-
drugs/machismo songs (2000, p.98). In the context of the Camorra in Naples, we need only 
look at the symbiosis of artists, agents and lyrics of the local Neomelodici13 music scene with 
Camorra clans and camorristi (Pine, 2012; Sanzone, 2014). Some of the lyrics, for example, 
speak of the honour and prestige that being a camorrista brings (see Sanzone 2014 in 
particular) promotin this choice in life. Whilst we should be cautious in splitting songs into a 
pro- and anti-crime camp, the songs represent at the very least the failure of the 
State/society to provide adequately for its citizens. It is important to note, as we have already 
done, that criminal groups are a part of the society in which they live – meaning that any 
appeal that they have is based on pre-existing notions. As Allum (2001) noted, notions of 
                                                          
11
 See for example the “Trademarks” section in: Gambetta (1993, p.127-158); the apparent mimicking of the 
Marlon Brando’s portrayal of the fictional “Don Corleone” from Francis Ford Coppola’s The Godfather (1972) 
by Cosa Nostra boss Luciano Leggio during a 1974 court appearance in Dickie (2004, p.184) that demonstrates 
the dual nature of symbolism, where art mimics life and life mimics art. 
12
 An example of this is the accepted use of violence as a means of defending one’s honour in the culture of 
the American South as demonstrated in: Nisbett and Cohen (1996). 
13
 Neomelodici is referred to by Pine as “voicy Neapolitan-language lyrics, disco-pop tones and melodramatic 
(and ironic) melodies”. Famous Neomolodici songs such as “Nu Latitante”, “il mio amico camorrista” 
romanticise qualities of “camorristi”. The relationship between the Camorra and some of the music studios 
that produce this kind of music is available in. (2012). 
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family and friendship are closely related to honour in the South, which have been exploited 
by the Camorra. Individuals have joined the Camorra and have stayed loyal to it because of 
the bonds of friendship that the group provides them with. The appeal of normatively and 
socially defined norms of honour or prestige which an individual may receive by being a 
male “criminal” or “latitante” (fugitive/outlaw)  for example, is based on pre-existing norms 
and cultures that the Camorra exploits for its own benefit (Saviano, 2007, p.144; Toros and 
Mavelli, 2013, p.80-2).  
I interpret the diffusion of culture that enhances the attractiveness of becoming a camorrista 
to an individual (due to the search for prestige) through the lens of Bourdieusian Cultural 
Capital. The diffusion of apathy towards establishment political processes, of the normality of 
corruption in all levels of society, of individualism over community and the disbelief that one 
may change society and societal norms – all of which maintains the status quo can be read 
through the lens of what Foucault termed Docile Bodies. In the same manner that Foucault 
noted the disciplinary mechanisms (Foucault, 1977) of socialisation in Liberal democracies 
to make populations more easily governable, so too has the Camorra fostered the 
socialisation of docility amongst the society which they attempt to govern. Following 
Foucault, Agamben (2009) wrote of the mechanisms in post-industrial democracies that 
have led to the creation of the passive citizen, a so-called “Bloom”,14 who is productive with 
regard to the dominant economic system (neoliberalism) and social capital, but does not 
question the overriding narrative unless it is productive to the creation of more economic or 
social capital. We may apply the logic of the fostering of passivity put forward by the Tiqqun 
collective (2000) and then Agamben (2009) to the Camorra’s presence in a community, and 
the creation of its own ideal citizen: its own “Bloom”. A citizen’s passivity to Camorra 
dominance and the Camorra’s collaboration with political and entrepreneurial classes serves 
to increase its dominance and entrenchment in society. Society becomes stuck in a vicious 
cycle. There is a belief that denouncing camorristi does not do anything, because law 
enforcement and the State either cannot or will not help – nothing will ever change, because 
the corruption of the élite and criminals will always happen. This unfortunately leads to the 
further development of these criminal and corrupt practices, thereby increasing apathy 
towards politics in general.  In this sense, these passive citizens are their own worst enemy 
– their silence ensures that these behaviours and this culture continue unhindered. Gramsci 
and Foucault help us tread a line between those (sub)cultures in a habitus that is created 
naturally through hegemonic domination on the one hand and much more insidiously with an 
                                                          
14
 Based on the character “Leopold Bloom” of James Joyce’s Ulysses, this “Bloom” exists entirely through the 
world’s structures around him, moulding and shaping his behaviour accordingly. See: Agamben, 2009; Tiqqun, 
2000. 
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the outward attempt to govern on the other. Both of these then determine what kinds of 
cultural capitals are attractive or appealing for different sections of society. 
Despite the importance of culture within this, it is important to remember the pre-existing 
structural issues that characterise the area with which we are concerned. Widespread 
unemployment, particularly of young people, has been widely reported in the mezzogiorno 
region, as has been the level of corruption and general underdevelopment. It is necessary to 
tread a line which accounts for the “cultural” appeal of this life, the reasons for apathy 
amongst people who could resist it, as well as the plausibly understandable social and 
economic necessities for individuals. Indeed in the words of Franco Roberti, the head of the 
anti-mafia directorate in Rome:   
Italian [m]afia groups have exploited the social inequalities between “strong” and 
“weak” citizens doing business with those among the former who feel they are above 
the law, and recruiting the latter as labourers. The latter delude themselves that only 
through lawlessness and mafia militancy can they achieve the economic and social 
progress they think would otherwise be unattainable. (2014, p.141) 
This however somewhat misses the point. For people who live in these areas, this reality is 
not a delusion – it is a statement on the inequality and lack of opportunities in an area where 
the only (easy) way to achieve economic and social progress genuinely is through 
interaction and cooperation with these Camorra clans, one way or another. As Sales stated, 
the widespread use of extortion became an easy way for Camorra clans to put a large 
number of young people who were unable to find legal employment to work through the use 
of violence (1988, p.193) – increasing the influence and income of the clans in the 
communities that they inhabit by exploiting social problems such as underemployment, an 
abundance of unskilled labourers and general apathy to the status quo to their benefit. As 
Parini has convincingly stated, Italian mafias are not the deus ex machina which operates in 
an area free from resistance from perceivably passive southerners (2003, p.148). Rather 
they should be understood as a system of power which attempts to govern a population for 
its own goals which generally disregard the populace in that particular region. At the same 
time, they need to remain beneficial to individuals there in some way or another (or at least 
give the impression of doing so). The simple dichotomy that Roberti mentions is elaborated 
thus: the “strong” (business owners, the petite bourgeoisie, and the political elite - the 
pejoratively and generally described “rich”) are able to, if they so wish, cooperate and enter 
into the illegal economy through OCG contacts and middle-men (the middle-men themselves 
being part of the “strong” too) for their own benefit. Conversely the “weak” must choose 
between a relatively unskilled, sometimes dangerous but potentially lucrative income as part 
37 
of a clan, or a harder, generally difficult and low-paid position in the legal economy where, 
when we consider poor social mobility, it is often about “who you know”, rather than “what 
you know”. A person must choose between interacting with a mafia-type association and ‘o 
sistema, or not – knowing that either decision will not affect the existence of such a group; If 
I cooperate I may benefit from this system, if I do not, I will not benefit but the system 
continues to exist regardless without me. This then fuels greater apathy in the belief that this 
is the system as it is now, and will always be.  
4: Methodology  
The secretive and unlawful nature of organized crime in general makes researching the 
phenomenon a difficult task. On our organized crime continuum (Armao, 2003), the 
peculiarity of mafia-type associations, with their political influence and establishment of 
omertà in a community, add to this. Mafia-type associations affect the willingness of 
individuals in an area to denounce them (Di Gennaro, 2015). This is related to the general 
trust that individuals have in the law enforcement to challenge their activities where and 
when they present. There is an issue with the amount of data that a researcher can feasibly 
obtain through fieldwork (Gambetta, 1993, p.14) and also a consideration of the reliability of 
the data collected when the object of research is itself illegal and certain objects that we 
search for are invisible (Pizzini-Gambetta, 2008, p.349).. Despite these issues, reliable data 
collection on organized crime is not impossible.  
The nature of the pizzo required a mixed methods approach. It required approaches that 
attempt to understand how widespread it is, how it functions, as well as the efforts and the 
manner in which law enforcement agencies and Civil Society reacted to it. Quantitatively I 
wanted to understand how many businesses pay, or have paid the pizzo in a given territory, 
but for the reasons mentioned above, this becomes a difficult task. Indeed as a 1993 Italian 
Parliamentary Report stated, despite the extent of organized criminality in Naples, only 82 
instances of individuals denouncing extortion in were reported in the city in the previous year 
(Imposimato, 1993, p.33). For a metropolitan city of over 3,000,000 people and an estimated 
100 or so criminal clans, many of whom have been demonstrated to have been involved in 
widespread and systematic extortion of businesses, such a small number of reported 
extortions is astounding. It is indicative of the unreliability of certain kinds of quantitative 
criminal data, particularly when this data is based upon a supposed relation of trust between 
the individual and the judicial system. Qualitatively, I wanted to know how and why the pizzo 
is paid, and what are the cultural norms and perceptions that surround its payment. This 
becomes more complicated when, as far as we understand it, the pizzo is the product of 
mistrust or lack of faith in the State and law enforcement agencies. This makes the amount 
of data we can access limited to the amount of people who have actually brought 
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themselves denounce it, or of criminals who have since spoken about the extent to which it 
was paid in an area. It is no surprise that much of the access to data regarding criminality, 
be that access to criminals who have become State witnesses (Gruppo Abele, 2005; Allum, 
2006), interactions with criminals and their practices (Venkatesh, 2009; 2013; Pine, 2012; 
Thompson, 1966), interactions with people who have denounced criminals, and access to 
people in broadly termed “Civil Society” (Jamieson, 2000; Schneider and Schneider, 2003; 
Gunarsson, 2008) is dependent on some kind of cooperation and granting of access to a 
researcher. Despite obvious difficulties, fieldwork is invaluable to the study of social 
phenomena such as organized crime.   
It was deemed prudent to study an area where a business community not only had a history 
of paying pizzo to a mafia-type association, but despite of this influence, managed to 
denounce the group to the point where its extortion racket was uprooted. In this way both of 
our hypotheses could be analysed whereby the particular nature of the pizzo as it was paid 
in a given community could be observed, alongside the reaction to it. The defeat of a mafia-
type association in an area, so the logic went, would mean that businesspeople and law 
enforcement officials would be more willing to talk about their experiences. These 
experiences vary from when the mafia-type association had a significant influence on the 
community, to the time when this influence was eclipsed, whilst simultaneously providing us 
with a blueprint as to how this process flowed. In studying an area where a racket was 
defeated, and defeated in recent memory, it is possible to collect data where there 
necessarily is an abundance of criminal data – thereby identifying those factors that 
encouraged individuals to denounce when they were not able to before.  
In this sense, I chose to study one Italian comune and how it was able to defeat organized 
crime. The aim of this method was to learn lessons from one detailed case study that could 
then be used as a benchmark for the mafia phenomenon elsewhere in Italy, and provide 
clues for an antidote. Whilst the choice of one comune inevitably diminishes the 
generalisability of the the study, the provision of omertà and the payment norms remain 
constant, making the study applicable elsewhere. In this regard and in agreement with 
Sanzone (2014), I stress that in order to truly understand organized crime and its effect on 
an area, we must move beyond a purely judicial, political, social and economic approach to 
also include culture. This is particularly pertinent when we consider the influence of social 
norms to be a crucial factor when referring to the power that mafia-type associations have 
over the habitus. The most effective way to do this is by going to the area and actually 
studying it face-to-face, and contrasting it with those other important factors.  To account for 
the restrictiveness of studying organized crime at a distance, and to avoid a solely judicial 
and quantitative centric analysis of the phenomenon, a broad and holistic case study method 
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was selected as the most feasible approach that was likely to yield results. I made an active 
decision for “deep” research of one community, rather than “broad” research of the 
phenomenon in general – the assumption being that the experiences in one comune are 
likely to be similar to other comunes and communities throughout the mezzogiorno region.   
The town of Ercolano in the province of Naples was chosen as the case study for three 
main reasons. Firstly, the extent to which it is referred to by the FAI and its related 
institutions as a “model” for the anti-mafia movement (Grasso, 2012). Secondly, its own anti-
Camorra movement reached ascendency in the last ten years, meaning that its key players 
(from the antiracket association, law enforcement, etc.) are approachable for comment. 
Thirdly, it is a community where I was able to obtain access to an anti-mafia association 
through a gatekeeper. At inception, I chose to split the town into three broad clusters which I 
observed in different ways:  those who can be broadly termed as “the State” (law 
enforcement agencies, the judiciary, politicians), “Civil Society” (members of organizations 
and associations opposing organized crime both actively and passively), and the rest of the 
population which is being influenced by policies and initiatives of the other two groups. Using 
our two hypotheses, my interest rested on understanding how the pizzo functioned and how 
individuals in the town responded.  
By interacting with each of these clusters in turn, using a purposely open ended and 
grounded approach to the topic, I wanted to slowly move up this ladder to observe how the 
anti-mafia movement presented itself, and how far reaching their activities were for people in 
the town. After gaining access through gatekeepers, I lived and worked for ten months 
(September 2014 - July 2015) in Ercolano in order to build a personal network and observe 
cultural norms regarding their relationship to (il)legality and the perception of organized 
crime. Data was compiled by adopting a mixed methods approach which relied on a ten 
month ethnographic research in the town, snowball sampling, questionnaires and interviews 
with members of the judiciary, local government, law enforcement, the business community 
and voluntary associations.  
The first period was characterised by simply living and working in the area, and making no 
effort to approach any aspect of the anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano so as to build my 
own personal network independently of Civil Society Organizations. I moved to the 
neighbouring town of Portici, two minutes walk from Ercolano, and began working as an 
English teacher. I worked for a language association, as well as privately in the area for 
almost the entirety of my fieldwork.  
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The second period was devoted to approaching Civil Society Organizations and asking for 
access so as to carry out my project. In this, I identified four key players in the anti-Camorra 
movement, all of whom granted me access in one form or another. I attended meetings, 
interacted socially with members, befriending a number of them, and conducted interviews 
where possible. At the end of this period, I distributed questionnaires to members of the 
antiracket association, and conducted inteviews with its constituent business owners when 
they consented.  
The third and final period dealt with the State. This was purposely left until the end of the 
project so as to satisfy any concerns regarding their adversarial position against the 
Camorra. In this period, I continued my relationship with members of Civil Society, and 
organised interviews with representatives of the State. I was hosted at the Torre del Greco 
police station, where I interviewed three officers from the Carabinieri, one of whom was the 
personal link between the Carabinieri, the judiciary and the anti-racket association in 
Ercolano. Finally, I was hosted by the Intervestigating Magistrate for Ercolano at his office, 
with whom I conducted an interview. 
The primary data that I collected is summarised in the following table: 
Table one 
Representatives Groups   Data collection details 
General 
population 
Individuals met through 
ethnography 
 Participant observation.  
 Working and living in the Naples 
metropolitan area for ten months.  
Civil Society Church & “Centro Pastorale 
Giovanile” Ercolano 
 Participant observation. Attendance of 
mass. Socialising with members.  
 One interview with local priest  
Civil Society Youth Forum “Forum dei Giovani” 
Ercolano 
 Participant observation. Attendance of 
meetings. Socialising with members 
Civil Society Social cooperative “Radio Siani”, 
Ercolano 
 Participant observation. Attendance of 
events. Socialising with members 
 Interviews with two members 
Civil Society Antiracket association “Ercolano 
per la legalità” 
 Socialising with members 
 Interviews with nine shopkeepers 
 Twenty-one completed questionnaires 
for members 
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State Law enforcement agencies  Visit to Carabinieri Caserma 
 One group interview with in-service 
Carabinieri officers with the rank of 
Captain and Lieutenant  
State Judiciary  One interview with the-then serving 
investigating magistrate 
State Politicians   One interview with former Mayor who 
introduced anti-Camorra measures 
 
The most obvious emphasis is the role of participant observation and ethnography. Living “in 
the field” and using snowballing sampling helped inform which Civil Society Organizations 
were relevant to this study. To do this, I adoped the Chicago School approach to urban 
sociology and ethnography through participant observation, combined with an ethnographic 
approach to snowball sampling and a holistic study of the area. Following sociologists, 
ethnographers and anthropologists who conducted research “in the field” in areas noted for 
the presence of organized crime, such William Foote Whyte (1943),15 Sudhir Venkatesh 
(2009; 2013),16 Italo Pardo (1996)17 and Jason Pine (2012),18 this project sought to go 
directly to the location and actively interact with a specific community so as to get a unique 
look at society itself.  
This method is not without its issues. As noted by E.H Carr in his ‘What is History?’ lectures, 
it must be remembered that “History cannot be written unless the historian can achieve 
some kind of contact with the mind of those whom he is writing” and that we “achieve our 
understanding of the past, only through the eyes of the present. The historian is of his own 
age, and is bound to it by the conditions of human existence” (1961, p.24). For the 
ethnographer the principles are the same. This works in a variety of ways when it comes to 
interactions between the researcher and a participant and can be seen in something banal 
                                                          
15
 A young graduate who conducted a participant observation research project in an Italian slum in Chicago for 
three and a half years in the 1930s as part of a fellowship from Harvard University.  
16
 An Indian-American sociologist whose university study into the black urban poor turned into a decade of 
living alongside and studying the Black Kings gang in Chicago, interacting with and becoming friends with 
various players in the gang and community that they inhabited. He supplemented this with a study into the 
underground economy in New York, interacting with people as varied as socialites and cultured high-end 
escorts and drug dealers to see how they linked together in a social system.  
17
 A Neapolitan anthropologist who studied central urban quarters in Naples, living there for 20 months 
between 1984-86 studying the people who inhabited these areas and how they coped with life in these 
traditionally “chaotic” places.  
18
 An American Anthropologist who began researching the Neapolitan Neomolodica scene and the role that 
the Camorra had upon it. To do this, Pine got involved with the scene itself – making music videos and 
commercials on pirate television – all to build a portfolio and start his own recording studio.  
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such as appearance, likeability or similar interests, or even deeper aspects such as 
perceived trustworthiness, or with social distinctions such as age or class.  Any of these 
could lead to the collection of different data by a different person, even if the research 
questions were the same. This leads to a greater scrutiny of “my” account of the social 
environment and events, which is welcomed as much as it is unavoidable. We must face the 
simple truth that everyone is biased, and people have the tendency to exaggerate, 
misremember details, deflect questions, and sometimes outright lie. We as social scientists 
must come to terms with the fact that this is simply the human condition, under which we 
must conduct and then analyse our data accordingly. It is universally claimed that we as 
researchers must try to be objective, which is true, though I firmly believe that objectivity in 
the field of society is unachievable. In this sense, the role of me as the researcher is 
incredibly important, and is an unavoidable variable of this research. 
The table above refers to the socialising with members of Civil Society Organizations and 
the attendance of their meetings. Interaction in a formal capacity meant that I could explain 
my project, and ask for their assistance where necessary. Indeed, on visiting the Forum dei 
Giovani for the first time to speak to its organising committee, I was handed the results of a 
questionnaire that they had conducted on the perception of the Camorra by young people in 
Ercolano. Interaction on this face-to-face level provided the basis for understanding the 
activities that the individual associations conducted, how they were funded and/or structured, 
as well as paving the way for interviews where necessary. Interaction with their members in 
an informal capacity meant I was able to talk to the individuals who were part of these 
groups in a natural way, thereby facilitating further snowballing and interaction with new 
contacts, expanding my personal network and interacting with the community further. My 
position as an English teacher proved to be incredibly useful because many of the members 
of the associations wanted to practice their English with me, thereby providing me with even 
greater access to their members.  
To correlate businesses that were members of the anti-racket and their reasons for joining, 
and their perception of the pizzo, I tailored a questionnaire that asked for general 
demographic data to see whether there was a general trend as to the archetypal member of 
the anti-racket, in addition to measuring how the individual gets their information and form 
their world view, measuring their trust in different individuals or institutions, finishing with a 
section on their experiences with the pizzo and the racket. This questionnaire can be seen in 
Appendix IV. A number of these questions were purposeful duplicates of a previous 
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questionnaire survey conducted in Palermo for Addiopizzo members by Carina Gunarsson19  
(2014) The participants chosen were solely the businesses that were signed up members of 
the antiracket available through the FAI website and document entitled “La guida per il 
consumatore critico antiracket 2014” (FAI, 2015). The completion of these questionnaires 
was followed by requests to interview the shopkeeper anonymously. Of the forty-five 
accessible businesses from this list, only twenty-three shopkeepers returned their 
questionnaire, of whom twenty-two completed it in full. This was a disappointing, though, 
wholly unsurprising result. Three businesspeople revealed in the questionnaire that they had 
paid pizzo in the past.Nine of the businesses consented to an interview, one of whom 
admitted to paying pizzo in the past, and detailed his experience of the process during the 
interview.   
The primary data detailed here provide us with a unique dataset to study organized crime, 
mafia-type associations, and, more specifically, the ways in which they can be uprooted. In 
this thesis, primary data is classified as follows: interviews that I conducted are referenced in 
text first by a letter that indicates the type of person I interviewed (N= businessperson, CS = 
member of a Civil Society Organization, POL = politician, LE = law enforcement/judiciary) 
followed a number distinguishing individuals in the same category, which is then followed by 
the date the interview was conducted (i.e. 18032014 = 18th March 2014). The ethnographic 
data was recorded in a fieldwork log-book for the duration of my project, a selection of which 
is available in Appendix V. The following section details the secondary data used.  
 
Due to the growing collaboration between the Italian Ministero dell’Interno and the FAI, 
portions of the most recent data on mafia extortion are available online and in print. During 
the process of this project, FAI released a number of highly relevant publications regarding 
the anti-racket movement in general towards the end of 2015, to celebrate its 25 years in 
existence, with some of the publications focussing in parts on our chosen community. 
Mariagrazia Gerina and Vincenzo Vasile’s I Processi dell’Antiracket: Una guerra civile mite 
(The trials of the antiracket – a gentle civil war) (2015), systemically analysed trials 
throughout Italy where mafiosi were tried for the charge of extortion or attempted extortion. 
In this book alone, a whole chapter was dedicated to Ercolano, using exerpts from the trials 
and other data which has been used to further contextualise our project.  
                                                          
19
 I thank Carina Gunnarson for her kind assistance in sending me a copy of the questionnaire that was used in 
this article, and allowing me to pose some of the same questions to shopkeepers who had joined an anti-pizzo 
association 
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Gerina and Vasile’s work was based on an analysis of data from another FAI project, 
“ZOOM Processi Penali”,20 that published extracts of judicial data online, organised by Italian 
regions, and then by comune.  The access of data published for the purpose of transparency 
by the Italian State, the Ercolano administration, and the Zoom project relies on the trust that 
the data that was published was not edited or altered in any way, and was without omission. 
This research follows the assumption that the data for the purposes of transparency are 
complete and without omission, albeit with an inherent Statist bias. Information from the 
Zoom project, however, should be viewed more cautiously because the data available are 
not the minutes of the trials, but instead the highlights and relevant information from specific 
cases involving the extortion racket. Whilst there is a lot of data available without this editing, 
there is data missing that could be relevant, such as the full transcripts of the trials. 19 trials 
in Ercolano are detailed in the Zoom documents covering the period from 2000 until 2011.  
As a more qualitative exercise, Filippo Conticello’s Storia del movimento antiracket 1990-
2015 (The history of the anti-racket movement 1990-2015) (2015) also dedicated a whole 
chapter to Ercolano community. These publications were double-edged swords in that they 
inform much of the primary data that I collected before their publication and vice-versa, 
whilst unfortunately replicating some of the data such as the account of specific 
shopkeepers.  
In addition to the publications linked to FAI, some of the associations that I studied produce 
their own material regarding organized crime and the role of the antimafia in Ercolano. The 
most obvious of these is Radio Siani, a free access webradio station. They publish 
programmes, updates, news articles and reports of events and initiatives that they conduct 
locally. Uniquely, they also conduct interviews with local and national anti-mafia activists, 
politicians and figures. Their analyses are simultaneously considered to be reporting the 
anti-mafia movement as well as facilitating its further development, in that their raison d’etre 
is the openness and accessibility of information about Camorra and the anti-Camorra. These 
are all disseminated publically via Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and their webradio website, 
and privately via a private Facebook group for association members – which I was also 
kindly made a member. Their analyses in particular are viewed as indicative of the anti-mafia 
movement in general, but also particularized in a specific context – as much a product of 
their socio-cultural context as they are defining its development.  
With regard to the relationship between Civil Society Organizations and the State, there is an 
abundance of data which informs data collected in the field and vice-versa, particularly when 
considering public-private partnerships and socio-economic development as a means of 




preventing criminality. Due to the extent of political corruption that was uncovered in Italy for 
much of the post-war period, culminating in scandals surrounding the Cassa del 
Mezzogiorno, reconstruction money following the 1980 Irpinia earthquake (Behan, 2009; 
FBI, n.d) and then Tangentopoli, there was a significant drive for transparency and public 
accountability (OECD, 2000, pp.190-203). This has meant that a number of documents, 
accounts and governmental decisions have been placed online and accessible to the public. 
A number of these laws or decisions are useful to the study of the pizzo, the influence of 
organized crime upon an area, and the way in which local government has responded. With 
regard to local political decisions, the “Legge no.241/1990 articolo 3” mandated that every 
“every administrative measure, including those related to administrational organisation, the 
conduct of public works and staff must be justified”.21 Combined with a Decreto Legislativo 
(Legislative Decree) D.Lgs n.33 del 14/03/2013,22 which obligated administrations to make 
these documents free to access, both regarding requests by the public, as well as their 
publication online, we are able to access the reasons provided for the pursuit of certain 
communal policies. Individual comune account books are covered by this provision, and are 
often available online, whereby we are able to qualify where a comune spends its money 
year to year, and to whom it gives tax breaks. These account books are mostly dedicated to 
individual welfare provisions by which it shows the amount of money it gives, or it discounts 
from young people for school, or sick and elderly people due to illness – but a portion of it is 
also dedicated to money that is given to local social initiatives as a means of subsidising 
them without directly involving the comune. This is demonstrated most prominently with the 
money that is given to local churches annually as a form of charity, but can also come in the 
form of helping organisations such as the Red Cross, drug rehabilitation or more specific 
social or youth programmes. The combination of these provisions means that it is possible to 
analyse how specific comunes have responded to organized crime, which in turn infers the 
manner in which they understand the phenomenon.  
The final destination of assets and goods confiscated from mafia groups in any given 
comune is also interesting in this case, and is characterised by the same transparency. The 
process involves assets and goods being confiscated from a mafioso, transferred to the 
ownership of the State, then managed by a State-funded consortium until the relevant 
communal administration awards the assets or goods to an association that has applied to 
be its landlord. Much of this process is conducted openly, meaning that we are able to see to 
whom the comune entrusts a property, and its reasons why. Whilst much of this broad 





 http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2013/04/05/13G00076/sg  
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macro-data is available online via the Libera association and the publications that they 
produce, individual Italian comunes have much more specific data available on their comune 
website. Such data includes the details of the confiscation, the valuation of the assets, who 
the assets were given to and for what purpose – which are updated each year so as to detail 
any changes that have occurred to the property. Additionally, these documents often refer to 
particular giunta or communal decisions which decided to whom these assets were assigned 
and why. It is here where we are able to quantify and then analyse individual organizations 
or initiatives that have received these assets. In the area of our case study, the Campania 
region, the regional government created the Fondazione Pol.i.s., a non-profit foundation 
under its jurisdiction which adopted a regional strategy with regard to the confiscation and 
then re-use of these goods, as well as mitigation of distress of victims of organized crime. It 
does this through the publication information relating to transparency and those activities 
taken against corruption, in addition to the funding of research projects, documentation 
centres and publication regarding organized crime and the fight against it on a regional level. 
These are ready for analysis, and are incredibly useful with regard to following economic 
capital (and therefore financial support) from the State and its institutions to the associations 
and initiatives on the ground.  
These secondary sources are further substantiated by an analysis of newspapers and their 
online archives when they have mentioned Ercolano and organized crime. I used the local 
newspapers/journals “Metropolis” and “L’Unità”, as well as national newspapers such as La 
Repubblica and Corriere della Sera. Conveniently, Rather conveniently, a book was 
published 2012 written by the former Mayor of Ercolano, Nino Daniele and the former 
lieutenant of the Carabinieri in Ercolano, Antonio Di Florio, and the honorary president of the 
FAI, Tano Grasso, entitled “La Camorra e l’antiracket” (the Camorra and the antiracket) 
detailing their experience in creating the antiracket.  Di Florio’s chapter is particular useful in 
this sence where it is possible to cross-reference local history of the Camorra and the anti-
mafia, because he dedicates several pages at the end of his chapter detailing the names of 
murders or attempted murders of camorristi in chronological order 
5: Organisaton of study 
This study is organised as follows: the first chapter provides a background to the case study. 
I introduce Ercolano’s history, demographics and political culture, before I outline the legal 
framework and powers that law enforcement agencies and the judiciary have when fighting 
mafia-type associations. Two sections on criminality then complete the chapter: one on the 
history of the Camorra in Ercolano, and a second that details criminality in the area more 
broadly. This provides the context on a local and a national level for the case study.  
47 
The second chapter, “Paying the pizzo”, focusses on the actual process of extortion by 
Camorra clans against businesses in Ercolano. It begins by presenting the judicial account 
of the local Camorra clans and the pizzo that they demand from businesses, before 
analysing the particulars of pizzo payment. I was interested in knowing; (1) the process by 
which businesses paid the pizzo; (2) how many businesses paid the pizzo before the growth 
of the anti-Camorra movement and; (3) what the the motivation for continuous pizzo 
payment was. The data in this chapter is based on interviews with the PM (Investigating 
Magistrate) for Ercolano, members of the Ercolano anti-racket association (who also 
completed a questionnaire about their reasons for joining) and an analysis of judicial minutes 
from relevant trials involving the extortion of businesses in Ercolano.  
The third chapter, “The State’s response to the Camorra”, details the different approaches 
attempted by the State in the context of Ercolano. I start with the use of “hard policing” in the 
area, particularly through the use of cooperating witnesses and mass arrests, which I 
evidence through specific cases in the town. Next I analyse the use of regional, State and 
European funding, in addition to partnerships with third-sector organisations, all aimed at 
restructuring the economy so as to change the cultural and socio-economic context that 
allows mafia-type associations to thrive. This is followed by a section concerning the so-
called cultura della legalità, the culture of legality, and the way that the State and its 
institutions have attempted to alter the cultural context and habitus in which citizens 
(particularly the young) live. I focussed here on the social programmes that the State funded 
as a means of making young people more active citizens, as well as the provision of facilities 
and tax exemption for associations that follow this broad discourse. I conclude the chapter 
by explaining the model that Law Enforcement, the judiciary, relevant Civil Society 
organizations and politicians have used to undermine local Camorra clans: the “Modello 
Ercolano”.      
The final chapter, “Civil Society’s response to the Camorra” outlines varied responses to the 
Camorra by four different Civil Society Organizations. This chapter expands upon the 
discussions in the previous chapter, particularly with regard to culture and habitus, and the 
selective assistance given by the State. I introduce each of the organizations in turn, the 
activities they conduct, and their place within the broader anti-mafia movement.  
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The Terrible beside the Beautiful, the Beautiful beside the Terrible, cancel one another out 
and produce a feeling of indifference. The Neapolitan would certainly be a different creature 
if he did not feel himself wedged between God and the Devil  
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 1797 
 
This chapter provides background information on the case study, Ercolano. It first introduces 
the town itself, its history, and its political culture. It then outlines the judicial and law 
enforcement framework against mafia-type associations and their contacts on a national 
level, before detailing the recent history of Camorra clans in and around Ercolano, 
concluding with a section on the local criminal landscape regarding informal work and petty 
crimes.  
1:  Ercolano 
1:1 The town 
Due to the historical significance and the oft celebrated beauty of the area in general, much 
has been written about Ercolano (formerly Resina, and Herculaneum) and its surrounding 
area including Pompeii and Vesuvius. Since the 1700s It has been described by foreigners 
who visited the area on the Grand Tour (Black, 2003), including Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe, Lord Byron, Walter Scott, Mark Twain, and Alexandre Dumas, and continues to be 
visited by tourists today. In 1927 Resina  had 30,000 inhabitants and was described as a 
thickly populated township consisting mostly of poor houses and dwellings, “ready to yield to 
social progresses” that the Italian State had planned for public health, with the provision of 
new housing for its citizens who lost their homes due to excavations at the Herculaneum 
archaeological site (Corti, 1940). Likewise, during the Allied invasion of Italy, Norman Lewis 
described the city as one of those “grimy, war-husked towns” (1978, p.23) trapped between 
Vesuvius and the Bay of Naples. The picture post-war became one of poor and sometimes 
illegal urban construction, which affected the overall architectural character of the area and 
left only the most vulnerable people in the centro storico of the city. Between 1951 and 1981 
Ercolano was the site of a major population and construction “boom” alongside the nearby 
cities of Portici and San Giorgio, a process that has resulted in the significant extension of 
the Neapolitan urban area (Laino, 2008, p.396).  
The parts of the city which could be considered assets or “pull factors” for visitors, such as 
the Herculaneum excavations (the remains of a Roman city destroyed in a volcanic 
eruption), access to Mount Vesuvius, villas from the Bourbon era and the city’s proximity to 
the sea, have been identified as areas of economic and social stagnation following financial, 
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edificial and political mismanagement over the past 50 years. The precarious location of 
Ercolano and the area surrounding Mount Vesuvius, a dormant volcano, in the face of the 
growing number of residential dwellings being built which further exacerbated risk to human 
life and property led to the passing of a law at the regional level for these at-risk “Zona 
Rossa” communities (Legge Regionale n.21 of 10 December 2003), forbidding the building 
of any new structures for residential purposes, as well as the expansion of already existing 
properties to prevent the increase in the number of possible inhabitants. Whilst there has 
been a number of illegally constructed buildings since (and a number of these have since 
been demolished), this law means that the inhabitants in the area had to either live in 
buildings that already existed (though as we have already seen, 80% of them in Ercolano 
have been hastily built since the 1960s) or move elsewhere. The “extraterritoriality” of the 
inhabitants in the centro storico is similar to that of the social context of the Neapolitan 
“bassi”23 present in the centre of Naples in areas such as the Quartieri Spagnoli and San 
Lorenzo noted by Pine (2012) and Pardo (1996). The difference in Ercolano, however, is that 
whilst these older and decaying buildings are located in the centre of the city (similarly to 
Naples), they have been flanked on all sides and outnumbered by crude residential 
apartment blocks not too dissimilar from small “gated communities” often with a resident 
security guard and requiring a passcodes to enter. This keeps the graffiti draped centro 
storico and public life out. These gated apartment blocks are significantly more expensive 
than the bassi Ercolanesi, segregating the city into the generally poorer centro storico in the 
centre and the gated and non-gated apartment blocks slightly outside the centre and along 
some of the newer commercial areas.  
The city is served by the tariffed Napoli-Reggio Calabria highway, three train stations and a 
suburban bus network. Two of the stations are on the Circumvesuviana line, a small network 
of narrow gauged lines that link the city of Naples with the ports of Torre Annunziata, 
Castellammare di Stabia and Sorrento, as well as other more difficult to reach communities 
on the opposite side of Vesuvius. Both of these stations are on the Napoli-Torre Annunziata-
Sorrento line. The main Circumvesuviana station, “Ercolano Scavi” is situated in the centre 
of the city, and is a short walk from the Herculaneum archaeological site along the main 
street in Ercolano, Via VI Novembre. Due to the number of visitors to the site, every train 
stops at this station. The smaller station, “Miglio d’Oro”, is in the South East of the city at the 
periphery of Torre del Greco serving a residential area every 30 minutes. The city is served 
by the Trenitalia (the State railway) station “Portici-Ercolano”, at the periphery of 
                                                          
23
 This is the plural of “basso”, translated as “low”. It is also referred to as “vascio” in Neapolitan. It generally 
denotes a ground floor dwelling (Pine, 2012, p.3; Pardo 1996, p.7). An anthropological account of life within a 
Neapolitan basso in San Lorenzo is available in Pardo (1996) 
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neighbouring Portici, itself constructed by the Bourbons to link Naples and the Bourbon 
palace at Portici close to the sea. Nowadays it links Naples with Salerno on a railway line 
that follows the coast. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries Ercolano had another railway 
line, the ferrovia vesuviana, the Vesuvian railway, which linked the centro storico with 
communities overlooking the centre and a funicular railway ascending the volcano.24  The 
Circumvesuviana is managed by a public-private partnership between the region of 
Campania and a limited liability company, Ente Autonomo Volturno (EAV), and is infamous 
for its delays and cancellations to its services. It is also notable for its dated and vandalised 
cars and the seeming uncaring non-checking of tickets which has led a large number of 
people to use the service regularly without a ticket. Its unreliable service between its termini 
is amplified by its limited services late evening, finishing as early as 10pm. This is also true 
for the less regular but equally premature services of the Trenitalia line – which has the extra 
hindrance of being a long walk from the centre of the city. Buses in the (sub)urban area of 
Naples are managed by Azienda Napoletana Mobilità (ANM), and like the Circumvesuviana, 
are notorious for their unreliability, ancient vehicles, regular strikes due to poor pay and 
working conditions, and lack of ticket inspection – further fuelling their underfunding and poor 
service. Partially due to these underdevelopments, travelling by car has become the 
preferred method of travel in the area for locals, and those who do not have cars are forced 
to choose between staying locally or waiting on unreliable and crowded public transport.  
A published assessment of the town’s geography, economy, assets and issues are available 
in Appendix VI.I. 
 
1:2  Demographics  
The population of Ercolano had been steadily growing since the official census began (1861 
at around 12,000 inhabitants) until a sudden boom in the post-war period took its inhabitants 
from 30,000 in 1936 to 39,000 in 1951. This followed with year on year population increases 
to its peak in the 1991 census with 61,000 inhabitants (Tuttitalia, n.d), when the population 
began to fall to its current estimate at 53,972 at the end of 2015 (ISTAT, 2009a). The 
average age of the population is growing as the percentage of older people increases, and 
younger people move to other areas of Italy and Europe in search of work. The percentage 
of the population over 75 years old grew (in part due to the post-war baby boom) making up 
2.9% of the population in 1991, 4.4% in 2001 and 6.4% in 2011 (ISTAT, 2011b). 
Simultaneously, the birth rate has been dropping from 12.3 per 1000 in 2002 compared to 
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 Due to various eruptions, most notably in 1906 and then 1944, which damaged the funicular railway, the 
project was eventually abandoned. Vesuvioinrete.it (n.d)  
Today the volcano is accessible by road, and by a tourist bus 
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9.3 per 1000 in 2014 (Comuni Italiani, n.d), alongside the percentage of the population 6 
years old and younger: 9.1% in 1991, 7.5% in 2001 and 6.5% in 2011 (ISTAT, 2011b).  
Figure 1 is an elaboration of the 2011 census data (ISTAT 2011a) with Ercolano presented 
in 5 different areas. 0 is the area on the slope of Vesuvius making up part of the Parco 
Nazionale del Vesuvio, a large but sparsely populated area of the city that contains less than 
0.19% of the population and so is largely ignored.  1 (in red) is the area leading towards the 
city of Torre del Greco and contains one of the Ercolano Circumvesuviana stations, partial 
access to the sea via the old antico bagno Favorita (a small bathing resort), apartment 
blocks, old Vesuvian villas converted into family dwellings, a football stadium and some 
smaller commercial nucleated areas.  Area 2 (in blue) contains the main Circumvesuviana 
station (Ercolano Scavi) where the majority of tourists from Naples, Sorrento and the rest of 
the Amalfi Coast arrive into the city. The station leads onto the main street, Via IV 
Novembre, towards the entrance of the Herculaneum archaeological site, along a number of 
businesses aimed at drawing in tourists.25  In the North-West of the area there is the Mercato 
di Pugliano (Pugliano market - a part of the centro storico) and in the South-East there are 
some more recently constructed buildings and apartment buildings which meet alongside 
and then North of Via IV Novembre to form the central commercial area of the city. Area 3 (in 
purple) is the rest of the centro storico, which feeds off the Western half of the Corso Resina 
towards Portici and Naples, the Agriculture Faculty of the Università Federico II di Napoli and 
the Reggia di Portici.26 It is also the area that contains the entirety of the Herculaneum 
excavation site and the Teatro Romano (Roman Theatre). Both sides of the Corso Resina 
contain narrow alleyways (vicoli) which feed onto it and are made up of bassi, balconies and 
small businesses.  
The North Western quarter of Area 1 which borders this area also contains a number of 
older housing complete with vicoli and bassi. Closer to the sea, there is past and present 
industrial land which has slowly been abandoned over the years, some of which has been 
replaced by newer apartment complexes. Even though the city is located along the sea, 
access is difficult due to man-made barriers. Area 4 (in green) is made up of more recently 
constructed buildings away from the central commercial area of the city primarily  of 
residential housing, often in gated apartment blocks and stand-alone apartment buildings. 
The main road in the area goes along the South Western slope of Vesuvius and has a long 
string of businesses along it, though it is generally only reachable by car or by infrequent and 
unreliable local buses.    
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 One interesting attempt at this is a pizzeria  that  greets the tourists with a large and grammatically incorrect 
sign: “Welcome in Ercolano”.  
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Areas 0-4 elaborated in the Ercolano 2011 Census 
(ISTAT, 2011) 
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Area 2 is overwhelmingly the most densely populated area of the city with a population 
density of 25,155.1 people per sq km,27 with an actual population of 12,554 people, followed 
by Area 3 at 11,612.5 people per sq km. What is notable about these two areas is how 
similar they are to one another compared to the rest of the city. Both encompass the centro 
storico, and both are flanked at their peripheries by densely populated and recently built 
apartment blocks. They have the highest proportion of the population over 75 (7.7% and 
7.5% respectively compared to 6.1% for Area 1 and 4.9% for Area 4) (ISTAT, 2011a), and 
the highest proportion of people aged above 65 and above who live alone (22.7% and 
22.9% compared to 16.9% each for area 1 and area 4) (ISTAT, 2011a), where the number of 
widows greatly outnumbers widowers (Tuttitalia, 2016). Finally the proportion of dwellings 
that are owned compared to the number of dwellings that are occupied is lower (54.6% and 
56.6% in these areas compared to 71.2% and 64.1% in the remaining two) (ISTAT, 2011a).  
Area 2 has the lowest proportion of buildings that are deemed to be in a “good” state of 
conservation at 30.9% (compared to 70.5%, 67.3% and 79.4% respectively for Areas 1, 3 
and 4) (ISTAT, 2011a). With regard to education, Areas 2 and 3 have the lowest percentage 
of 25-64 year olds with a high school diploma or degree (33.7% and 36.3% compared to 
53.9% and 45.9%) (ISTAT, 2011a); the lowest percentage of 30-34 year olds with a 
university degree (11.7% and 14.3% compared to 24.9% and 17.1%) and the highest 
incidence of people aged 15-19 that do not study and do not work (33.8% and 30.4 
compared to 21.3% and 24%) (ISTAT, 2011a). With regard to employment, they also have 
the lowest participation in the jobs market (35.7% and 35.6% compared to 41% and 41.1%), 
as well as highest  rate of unemployment of those over 16 years old (33.7% and 35.6% 
compared to 21.9% and 25.1%) and the lowest rate of employment (23.7% and 24.7% 
compared to 32% and 30.8%), whilst Area 2 has the lowest rate of employment among 15-
29 year olds (16.8% compared to 19.1% 19.5% and 19%) (ISTAT, 2011a.)  Inhabitants in 
these areas are also less likely to have a job of medium-high level of specialization (25.2% 
and 24.6% compared to 38.7% and 32.8%),28 but more likely to have a job with a low level of 
specialization (24.8% and 24.7% compared to 15.3% and 17.2%) (ISTAT, 2011a).29 They 
are less likely to work or study outside of Ercolano (16.1% and 17.9% compared to 25.8% 
and 28.6%), and less likely to use their own form of transport (38.2% and 40.2% compared 
to 54.3% and 66.9%) (ISTAT, 2011a).30 
                                                          
27
 To give an idea of how densely populated this is, a comparison with the most densely populated city 
(proper) in the world is useful; Mumbai has a population density of 29,650 per sq km. Area 2, however, is 
about half a kilometre square in size 
28
 Legislator, entrepreneur, manager, intellectual, scientist, professional. 
29
 Professions without qualifications. 
30
 Car, scooter etc.  
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Other comparisons indicate a similarity in the percentage of people who use public transport 
(17.6%, 18.9% and 18.9% for areas 1, 2 and 3) with the exception of Area 4 (14.6%) likely 
due to the greater distance from the Circumvesuviana line, the inefficiency of bus transport, 
as well as the greater reliance on private transport (66.9%) (ISTAT, 2011a). Area 1 had the 
lowest incidence of households with children with employed and retired persons (with 7.5% 
compared to 14.9%, 11% and 11% for areas 2, 3 and 4),31 as well as the lowest percentage 
of families with six or more members (3.8% compared to 5.4%, 4.5% and 5.4%) (ISTAT, 
2011a).  For the areas in and around the centro storico, the picture that is painted is one of 
greater social and economic hardship – with the densely populated Areas 2 and 3 
consistently performing worse than the rest of the city with regard to education, prospects for 
young people and employment, combined with a greater proportion of people over 75 and as 
well as a lower portion of householders who own their own home (ISTAT, 2011a). Between 
the two areas, Area 2 performs consistently worse. Area 2 is also the most readily 
associated area with the Camorra and criminality in general.  
 
1:3 Politics 
Like the rest of the Campania region, the post-war politics of Ercolano was dominated 
primarily by Christian democratic parties. That is to say, first by the centre-right Democrazia 
Cristiana32 (DC), then by coalitions of centre-left Christian parties that culminated in the 
Partito Democratico (PD). This is the case in Ercolano, save for a period in the mid-1970s 
when the council was dominated by the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI). Indeed in Ercolano, 
results of over 70% for such coalitions have been a regular feature in local, regional and 
national elections for much of this period. After the Tangentopoli scandal in 1992 and before 
the inception of the PD, the winning lists were formed of former DC politicians alongside 
centre-leftists, whose national parties would later form the PD.  
There are three notable local political earthquakes that are important to understanding the 
state of politics in the comune of Ercolano. Firstly is the assassination by one of the local 
Camorra clans of a leading DC politician, Antonio Buonaiuto in 1990, a former mayor and 
likely future mayor in the upcoming election. His murder preceded the dominance of the clan 
over the next administration with regard to public contracts, eventually resulting in the 
dissolution of the communal administration by Presidential decree. This period was followed 
by stewardship of the comune by the State until the next communal election could be held. 
The second earthquake was the 1995 election that resulted in the landslide victory for a 
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 Identified as households with potential for economic hardship. 
32
 Christian Democratic party. 
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centre-left coalition on an anti-Camorra/corruption platform under Luisa Bossa, further 
cementing the Camorra as a prominent election issue.     
After deciding to become a candidate for regional elections in 2005, a new candidate, Nino 
Daniele, was chosen for mayor under a similar coalition. Given the rise in violence between 
the two local clans, he stood on a stronger anti-Camorra platform and was elected promising 
to demolish illegally constructed buildings built by Camorra and their entrepreneurial 
associates. Daniele in particular was instrumental in establishing personal links between the 
administration, anti-Camorra associations, and the business community through an 
antiracket association and law enforcement agencies. Similarly, Daniele also successfully 
applied for developmental funding from the European Commission through the Campania 
regional government with a particular focus on structural adjustment, with an aim of making 
the city more accessible for tourists. He decided to stand down as candidate in 2010 to 
stand for the regional elections. In the following primaries he was succeeded by his vice-
mayor, Vincenzo Strazzullo, formerly a member of the now defunct centrist Christian political 
party La margherita.  
In a sign that the Camorra was continuing to influence local politics like in the early 1990s, a 
political scandal, ‘Caso Ercolano’ was revealed at the end of 2014 whereby the number of 
members of the local PD surges from 300 to 1200 in a short space of time shortly before the 
names of candidates for the mayoral primaries were announced. The previous rules stated 
that in order for a candidate to participate in primaries, they had to gain 30% of the 
members’ signatures from the previous year, but this was changed to be 30% of the 
members’ signatures from the end of 2014. Under the previous rules, a candidate needed 
only 30% of 300 signatures, whereas now 30% of 1200 signatures were required, leaving a 
number of candidates apparently out of the running. In theory this was not an issue, but it 
became so when it was revealed that, a large portion of the 900 extra members were related 
to local Camorra clans. This meant that a number of PD candidates were to be left out of the 
running for the primaries because of potential Camorra entryism. In light of this, the local 
head of the PD, Antonio Liberti, gave the list of names to the Police and the Autorità 
nazionale anticorruzione (National Anti-Corruption Authority - ANAC) so that they could be 
investigated. (La Repubblica, 31 January 2015) 
Further deepening the scandals with the PD, a number of in-office counsellors and 
administrators including Strazzullo and his Deputy Mayor, (both of whom were standing in 
the PD primaries), four other councillors, an entrepreneur and an engineer were implicated 
for bribery for the provision of public works, including the construction of a new police 
station. Given these two scandals, the provincial secretariat decided to cancel the primaries 
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and make Liberti the PD candidate for Mayor. In response to this, apparently worried about 
how this would look on a local level, the PD directorate in Roma intervened and overturned 
this ruling and made another candidate, Ciro Buonajuto, the sole candidate for Mayor. The 
young and charismatic Buonajuto was a vocal supporter of Matteo Renzi and was one of the 
candidates who would have been knocked out of the running due to the large influx of 
Camorra families to the PD list. He was also the nephew of Antonio Buonaiuto, the former 
Mayor who was murdered by the Ascione in 1990. Buonajuto was elected mayor of Ercolano 
in May 2015 on the first turn on an anti-Camorra, anti-corruption platform like Bossa and 
Daniele before him.  
Whilst Buonajuto has been visibly present alongside local associations against the Camorra 
and corruptione, his administration has been strongly criticised. In December 2016 a series 
of extra scandals including further investigations into PD corruption brought the Ercolano 
political system into disrepute. Alongside the scandals for the provision of public works under 
his predecessor, Vincenzo Strazzulo, other longstanding councillors have been accused of 
corruption: One councillor is suspected of transferring €10,000 of public works to another 
former councillor currently under investigation for vote trading. His administration is also 
being accused of not doing enough to help victims of criminality and their families, as 
demonstrated recently by an apparent “administrative error” that meant that the 
administration did not send any representatives in court to assist the family of a young man 
who was killed in 2009 in a case of mistaken identity. Not only does this undermine the work 
that the anti-mafia movement has done, but the local media have been drawing parallels 
between Buonajuto’s “error” and another error that lawyers in the suspected corrupted 
Strazzullo’s administration made when they “forgot” to file some paperwork to assist an 
antiracket maxi trial in 2011 that would demand damages from the clan. Indeed in worrying 
signs, Buonajuto has been accused of “forgetting the fight against the Camorra” (Metropolis, 
12 December 2016). Under Buonajuto’s administration the city of Ercolano has sought to 
become the Italian City of Culture on numerous occasions, but has fallen short each time.  
In 2016, Ercolano voted overwhelmingly against Renzi’s constitutional changes. Today the 
PD remains the largest party, but is slowly losing grass-root support to the populist 
Movimento Cinque Stelle.  
The remainder of this chapter deals with the judicial and police powers, before localising the 
experience of the Camorra and other criminal activity in Ercolano. 
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2: Law enforcement and criminality 
2:1  Judicial and police powers in Italy 
Judicial repression against organized crime in Italy has a variety of different instruments, 
ranging from legislation that specifically targets the mafia phenomenon to general police 
activities. The adoption of Art. 416-bis in 1982 (Legge 13 Settembre, 1982 n.646) into the 
Italian Penal code is an example of this, where the definition of a mafia-type association was 
formally integrated into the judicial system. An issue was identified: the strength and 
influence of a particular organized crime group in the country, and the understanding that 
particular crimes conducted by an individual who is a member of this group are often acted 
in concert with other crimes conducted by a mafia-type association for the purpose of 
economic/social dominance, organised by omertà. This means that a crime is often part of a 
larger process which involves more law breaking. With the new law, individuals could be 
prosecuted for one crime (mafia association) that is then understood to contain a variety of 
other crimes which generally come alongside membership of a mafia-type association. Mere 
members of such an association would be punished for three to six years in prison, whereas 
those who promote, manage and organize such an association are punished for four to nine 
years in prison – all in addition to any other crimes they have committed as part of these 
associations. Art. 110 c.p. furthered this in tackling the so-called area grigia (grey zone), 
targeting individuals (politicians, lawyers, businesspeople, accountants, contractors etc.) 
who provide assistance to those committing crimes under 416-bis. The process of interaction 
between the licit and illicit has been identified in the new law as an issue, whereby a mafia-
type association is noted to have been benefitting from access to the legal economy through 
intermediaries or “middle men”. The law criminalises the interaction of individuals in the legal 
economy with those who would be punished under 416-bis, effectively denying their access 
to the legal economy through the middlemen. This is similar to Art. 418 of the Italian penal 
code. However, rather than focussing on denying access to the legal economy, the new law 
focusses on the social interaction between mafia-type associations and a community. With a 
wide net, it punishes individuals who provide shelter, food, hospitality, means of transport, 
and means of communication to anyone who are members of organisations described in the 
aforementioned Art.416-bis, thus denying them access to a community and its citizens who 
could help facilitate their crimes.  
Another particularly notable addition to the penal code is Art. 41-bis (Legge 7 Agosto 1992, 
n.35) which, if enacted by the head prosecutor, allows for the suspension of certain prison 
regulations for those “making use of conditions” or “in order to facilitate” the mafia-type 
association in relation to when there is evidence such as to “deem there to be an existence 
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of links with a criminal, terrorist or subversive”33 individual. These measures range from: (1) 
prevention of contact with members of the criminal organisation they are a part / allied to; (2) 
the limitation of visits by outside individuals to once a month, and the further limitation that 
this person can only be a family member or other household members (except in 
extraordinary circumstances); (3) the limitation of goods received from outside the prison; (4) 
isolation from other prisoners; (5) the censorship of correspondence with the outside world; 
(6) the restriction of outdoor exercise, which itself cannot be conducted in groups of more 
than four people at a time. The role of certain individuals (the boss, for example) was 
identified as pivotal in the day-to-day organisation of a clan, where they were still able to 
conduct business despite being incarcerated. This law was an attempt to mitigate against 
this by imiting the communication between this individual and the outside-world, thus 
strangling the organisation itself. A notable effect of this has been the greater influence of 
the boss’s partner in the everyday running of the clan, given that they are generally the only 
individuals who are permitted to see the boss and can relay any messages for the clan 
onwards. The combination of these laws in particular serve the purpose of designating 
particular social groups as criminal;  of criminalising individuals who assist them (though 
themselves not necessarily linked to the group); and the potential inability of an individual 
linked to mafia-type association to contact associates on the outside.  
A much blunter instrument is the Legge 45/2001 (Legge 13 Febbraio 2001 n.45), which 
deals with cooperating witnesses (collaboratori di giustizia or pentiti) where a convicted 
individual and their family can be placed under witness protection and potentially have their 
sentence reduced when they collaborate fully with the law enforcement. A cooperating 
witness is described as 
Whoever, having been part of a criminal association, decides to detach themselves 
from it cooperating with the authorities by giving information on the organisation and 
crimes committed.34 
This includes provisions for reducing punishment and giving special treatments during 
custody, the possibility of receiving benefits whilst in prison, in addition to receiving special 
protection for the cooperating witness and their family. This special protection may include: 
video surveillance and alarms by local police, relocation and financial support to socially 
                                                          
33
 The translation here is important, particularly with regards to the other elements of Art.41-bis. The original 
texts says “far ritenere la sussistenza di collegamenti con un’associazione criminale, terroristica o eversiva”. 
The importance here is this instance is that this article is openly treating mafiosi in the same way as 
“terrorists” and “subversives”. The article is an addition to the 1975 law “legge 26 luglio 1975, n.354” which 
only dealt with terrorists and subversives, but such was the reaction after the murder of Judge Giovanni 
Falcone that the law was added to in order to include mafiosi in 1992. 
34
 Deputy Prosecutor Gery Ferrara from the Procura della Repubblica in Palermo, April 2012. 
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reintegrate them, giving the person(s) new identities. All of this is available in return for 
consent to ongoing interrogations, not meeting other cooperating witnesses and identifying 
all assets owned so that they can be given to the judicial authorities. Whilst the law was 
originally designed to combat the Brigate rosse in the 1970s,35 the measure has been widely 
used by the Italian State to combat mafia-type associations to understand the structure and 
activities of particular criminal groups, in addition to naming key individuals, alliances and so 
forth. Access to these collaborators of justice has also been made available to researchers 
by respective law enforcement officers, which have been used to try to understand the 
people who have participated in mafia-type associations, their personal histories, their 
reasons for joining and their general psychology – all of which can and does help inform 
government and police policy (Gruppo Abele, 2005). A number of other laws exist regarding 
organized crime, but we will not investigate these further, as the laws in themselves are not 
the focus of this research project. They are mentioned here only to demonstrate that the 
mafia phenomenon has been targeted directly in the Italian legal system, as a crime in and 
to itself.  
In Italy the main policing body which deals with organized crime is the L’arma dei Carabinieri 
(henceforth referred to as the Carabinieri) and one of the four parts of the Italian armed 
forces. They collaborate with other police forces in Italy on a local level,36 but data collection 
and policing strategy against organized crime is ultimately coordinated by the Carabinieri, 
who then pass this data on to the judiciary and the relevant investigating magistrate 
(Pubblico Ministero – PM) for whom they have officers directly dedicated. For “ordinary” 
criminal cases in Italy, the interception of communication is legally limited to individuals 
where there is already existing evidence of having committed a crime and where a judicial 
investigation has already started: namely where the aim is to collect greater data and 
prosecute more individuals and when approved by the relevant magistrate. However, as with 
terrorist and human trafficking investigations, organized crime is not classified as an 
“ordinary crime” (Galli, 2016, p.671-2), and investigators are instead permitted to monitor 
suspected individuals preventatively (i.e. before the crime has taken place). As noted by 
Galli, these expansions were introduced in relation to terrorist offences following the 
kidnapping of then-Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1974 and then amended in 1982 to deal with 
organized crime offences. In order to prevent its abuse by the law enforcement and “allow 
for systematic scrutiny”, “the surveillance equipment to intercept the communication is 
physically located within the office of the Pubblico Ministero”, though the PM may authorize 
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 The Red Brigades, a Leftist revolutionary group which resorted to violence in order to destabilise the Italian 
State in the 1970s and 1980s. 
36
 Polizia Municipale (Local communal police), Polizia di Stato (State police), Guarda di Finanza (Customs police 
dealing with borders, taxes etc.). 
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the installation of the instruments in other structures instead, where this scrutiny would not 
be present: 
Operations can last for a maximum of 40 days, subject to the subsequent renewal of 
20 days each, where the legal requirements still subsist (as underscored by the 
public prosecutor in his written application). Preventive interceptions must end once a 
criminal activity becomes manifest (notitia criminis). However the law does not limit 
the number of available renewals. (Galli, 2016, p.673) 
The processes of data include, but are not limited to, stake-outs and surveillance of 
particular properties, data collected from surveillance devices connected to Carabinieri 
vehicles, undercover/plain clothed activities, surveillance of conversations between 
convicted criminal associates in prison and their visitors and, when approved by the 
appropriate judge, the wiretapping of certain phone lines. Whilst the approval for 
preventative wiretapping in a mafia-type case requires the approval of the relevant PM, this 
is somewhat of a blank cheque when considering Art. 416-bis, Art. 418 and Art. 110 c.c. This 
is particularly given their extensiveness in covering (1) those who are believed to be 
members of a mafia-type association, (2) those who are not members of the mafia-type 
association but are facilitating their access to the legal economy and (3) those who are not 
members of the mafia-type association, but provide them with some kind of assistance. It 
cannot be said that the Carabinieri monitor every suspected criminal’s phone, given that 
there needs to be a suspicion of guilt that a crime is going to be committed, but any wide 
interpretation of these three laws allows for preventative communication interception in 
principle which must be approved by the PM. A notable limitation on police and judicial 
powers, however, is that information provided by security services and pentiti/police 
informers “cannot be used as investigative elements to ground an application for 
preventative wire-tapping” (Galli, 2016, p.673). Despite this, the extent to which they have 
collected data on Camorra clans is massive, as demonstrated by an analysis of wiretapped 
phones of the La Torre Camorra clan between October 1998 and April 1999 by Campana 
(2011), revealing 1824 pieces of contact between 202 actors in that period alone which, if 
viewed as a benchmark for the amount of data collected on specific clans, signals that law 
enforcement agencies are able to collect a vast amount of data.  
As of yet, there is no specific legislation regarding the monitoring of WhatsApp or other 
popular Instant Messaging (IM) services in Italy. Applications such as WhatsApp, Facebook 
Messenger and (to a much lesser extent) Telegram are widely used in Italy as a means of 
communication. When installed on a phone, the app uses internet rather than phone lines to 
communicate between users, meaning that the information is only stored on the application 
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on the phones themselves, and on the WhatsApp servers in the United States. Traditional 
“wiretapping” involves a member of the law enforcement recording a phone call or 
intercepting a text message as the means of communication is conducted between the 
sender and the receiver. IM, on the other hand, cannot be intercepted in the same way. 
Access to these servers is possible through legal channels, though it would depend on the 
willingness of WhatsApp Inc., and Facebook, based in the United States, to cooperate with 
foreign magistrates. In 2016, WhatsApp announced “end-to-end encryption” for all of their 
products, meaning that data was no longer stored on, or accessible by, WhatsApp servers, 
effectively meaning that the only way to legally access data stored in the conversation logs is 
on the phones themselves (WhatsApp, 2016). It has been suggested by former security 
services employees turned whistle-blowers in the United States that it is possible to hack 
phones and then access this data through the phone itself, rather than through the app (BBC 
News of 5 October 2015) and that this happens on a large scale in the UK and the US, 
though there is no evidence of this being used in Italy. A more widely available means of 
access to the conversation logs would be through the physical phones themselves, which 
could be requested by law enforcement as part of the Legge 45/2001 pentiti law, though 
there is no evidence which suggests that this has happened as of yet. This demonstrates 
that with regard to surveillance, police tactics will always have to adapt to new technology, 
and, arguably, will never be enough.   
Whilst these strict judicial measures are undoubtedly quantifiable in terms of number of 
arrests and amount of assets seized, the justice system here is mostly a reactionary actor, 
punishing individuals who are already involved in mafia-type associations, both directly and 
indirectly. The problem with this approach (and this approach alone) is that the majority of a 
clan can be arrested, but the reliance on the clan and the revenue it creates is unchanged 
through its associates, their families, power-brokers and middle-men. The aforementioned 
Articles 110 c.c. and 418 of the penal code go some way to criminalising the area grigia and 
prosecuting supporters, middle men and power-brokers. However, underlying reason as to 
why people partake in criminal activities: be that as an actual member of a group, an 
associate, a family member or a friend – is not dealt with (Allum, 2001). Corruption in the 
political, law enforcement and surveillance sphere also remains relatively untouched. The 
structural and personal influences that cause individuals to become a member or supporter 
of a clan or bend the rules are minimally affected. These laws are ultimately reactionary to 
crimes that have already been committed, even when they are designed to make the cost 
and chance of getting caught greater than the benefit of breaking the law. In short, if one 
takes the view that people turn to organized crime out of lack of opportunities, money, or 
simply because that is the socio-economic context that they are born into, the mass arrest of 
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clan associates simply makes their need greater: it makes the decision to turn to further 
criminality even more likely. The structure and socio-cultural sphere around them still exists. 
Mass arrests in this sense by themselves do not defeat or wholly uproot the organized crime 
phenomenon: they make individuals in more vulnerable situations more desperate, leaves 
poor families without a breadwinner and may also leave a power vacuum which another clan 
may move into.  They also lends themselves to a framework which will, necessarily, always 
advocate more “powers” as a tool to overcome a defined insecurity, ultimately at the 
expense of liberty. 
 
2:2  The Camorra in Ercolano 
After World War Two the area around Ercolano was well-known for smuggling, particularly of 
cigarettes, centred round the area close to the Mercato di Pugliano, a vintage clothes market 
(in Area 2) which specialized in American army uniforms. One elderly contact during 
fieldwork recounted his experience as a young boy in the years following the Allied invasion, 
when he and his friends would obtain cigarettes and army uniforms and sell them in 
Pugliano and elsewhere in Naples. The relationship between the American army clothing 
and cigarettes is telling, given that the post-war Naples’ cigarette smuggling boom emanated 
from the influx of American cigarettes from the soldiers and the army bases. The smuggling 
networks that were created were to be eventually used by other more illicit drug smugglers, 
and finally used by Camorra clans (Paolo, 2004). The history of Camorra clans in the area 
as a whole is a confusing story, given the sheer number of clans, splinter groups from clans, 
and changing alliances and rivalries.  
In 1977 hashish and heroin reached Naples thanks to a working relationship between the 
Sicilian Vernengo family and two different clans in the Naples area: the De Biase clan in the 
Quartieri Spagnoli in the centre of the city, and the Cozzolino clan in Ercolano. During the 
1980s and the early 1990s Ercolano became one of the main centres for the sale of heroin in 
the area (Daniele, 2012, p.20). Following the downfall of Raffaele Cutolo and his Nuova 
Camorra Organizzata (NCO) in the late 1980s, Portici, Ercolano and Torre del Greco were 
left mostly under the influence of the Ascione clan and its allies the Vollaro (from Portici) who 
were on the winning side during the Camorra war. With this supply from the Sicilians, 
combined with a relationship with a number of other affiliates based around Europe, the 
Cozzolino clan was able to import large quantities of the drug to supply other clans in 
Ercolano. The dominant clan in Ercolano, the Ascione, took advantage of this relationship by 
working with the Cozzolino on a local level to outmanoeuvre rival clans (Di Florio, 2012, 
p101-2). They effectively wiped out another clan in the city, the Esposito, further extending 
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themselves into waste management and local politics, alongside the traditional activities 
such as racketeering and smuggling.  
The murder of Buonaiuto outside his home in 1990 signalled a particularly radical shift in 
local Camorra activity. The murder by the Ascione appeared to have been motivated by 
Buonaiuto’s future plans to change contracts regarding urban waste procurement, should he 
be elected to mayor or to the comune in general. The contracted company was later 
discovered to be controlled by an affiliate of the Ascione. The dominance of the Ascione was 
evident when, following an investigation by the prefetto (prefect) di Napoli in June 1993, the 
council that was elected in 1990 was dissolved due to the influence of organized crime, with 
the report citing the clan on numerous occasions: 
 To the President of the Republic, 
The city council of Ercolano (Naples) re-elected in the elections of 6 May 1990 
presents evidence of infiltration by organized crime that compromises the impartiality 
of the elected organ, the good performance of the administration and the operation of 
services. 
[…] 
In particular, in the time before and after the electoral campaign for the re-election of 
the aforementioned city council of 6 May 1990, the Ercolano area was the theatre for 
a violent clash between two Camorra clans, the Ascione and the Esposito, ending 
with the decimation of the latter and the resulting clear territorial domination of the 
former.  
The murder of the lawyer, Antonio Buonaiuto, fits into this context who, in the 
comune of Ercolano, was the Mayor several times and, at the time of the attack, was 
an outgoing councillor as well as part of the management committee for local 
sanitation n.30 and the councillor for the administration of the Vesuvian aqueduct. 
This aforementioned criminal episode is connected to the events surrounding the 
award of communal solid waste collection contracts, a sector in which the interests of 
organized crime tend to meet. (Discreto del Presidente della Repubblica del 14 
giugno 1993) 
In response to the indisputable influence of the Camorra on politics and the challenge that it 
presented to democracy in the city, as well as its citizens’ wellbeing, the local church 
parishes in Ercolano staged a march. Complete with white banners and peace signs, a 
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10,000 person march against the Camorra and against degradation in the city went around 
the Mercato di Pugliano. One of these protesters was Luisa Bossa, a schoolteacher of Latin 
and Ancient Greek, who was elected two years later Mayor of the city with a landslide for a 
centre-left coalition Her election victory, o’ miracolo, the miracle, as it was called (L’Unità, 30 
August 2003) was important in a number of ways. It signalled a split from normal politics in 
the city and the dissolution of its council two years previously, particularly given that Bossa 
was well educated, a local, inspired by the shame that the dissolution brought the city, 
outside the political establishment and, moreover, a woman. Her electoral campaign 
attracted particular attention of the voters simply because she stood on a platform pushing 
for “rebirth” of Ercolano, with a focus on legality. Her 61% of the vote does not tell the whole 
story. Not only did she gain that share of the vote, her party in her mayoral coalition won 
3,000 more votes than the entirety of the second placed coalition, the centre-right, making 
her coalition unchallenged in local politics until the next electoral cycle. One of the first things 
that her administration did was to crack down on smaller elements of illegality throughout the 
city. Structures that were not conforming to building regulations, particularly in the area 
around Pugliano with only 5 out of 21 were found to be legally compliant. (L’Unità, 30 August 
2003).  
Further investigations into the growing power of the Ascione led to a “blitz” in 1996 against 
them and their affiliates in a Carabinieri operation titled “Nemesi”, arresting 194 individuals 
(Di Florio, 2012; La Repubblica, 13 May 1997). Other than highlighting the huge numbers of 
camorristi that were present in the area, Nemesi resulted in a number of members becoming 
pentiti and denouncing other members. One notable pentito, Leonardo Zirpoli, alongside his 
brother, Salvatore, began to denounce their former partners but, under threats from other 
clan members, later retracted their statements. A few weeks later Leonardo’s 16 year-old 
son, Ciro, was murdered in Portici, which had the opposite effect that the clan wanted and 
actually led to the Zirpoli brothers cooperating further with law enforcement (Centro di 
Documentazione regionale contro la Camorra, 2009). 37  Zirpoli’s testimony, together with 
that of another pentito, Simone Cozzolino (the boss of the Cozzolino clan) revealed that 
there was a number of Polizia di Stato officers based in Portici-Ercolano and a number of the 
Naples-based drug enforcement that were on their payroll, so that action wouldn’t be 
pursued against the Cozzolino and their affiliates: the Ascione and the Vollaro. They were 
bribed between two-five million Lira (€1000-2500) a month, as well as receiving gifts such as 
cars, specialist meats and cheeses to blame rival clans, and other innocent people for 
crimes committed, or to simply look the other way. Among the arrested was Sossio 
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 Zirpoli’s continued cooperation with law enforcement led to Ciro’s grave in Ercolano being desecrated: it 
was burned down and the marble gravestone slab destroyed with a hammer.  
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Costanzo, head of drug enforcement in Naples for over 10 years, alongside four of his 
colleagues and fourteen officers from the Portici-Ercolano police, however Costanzo was 
later declared innocent. One of the arrested officers, Innocenzo Treviglio, decided to turn 
State witness too, collaborating in bringing a number of other officers to justice too, 
effectively stopping the relationship between the law enforcement and the clans that had 
damaged public trust in them. 
The decapitation of the Ascione and their affiliates, combined with the jailing of their boss, 
Raffaele Ascione in subsequent trials, led to the rise of the Iengo-Birra clan: a collaboration 
between bosses Tomasso Iengo, formerly of the Ascione, and Giovanni Birra, founded 
shortly after the end of the Camorra wars of the 1980s. In 1997, Iengo and his son were 
killed in an ambush, leading Birra to search for new partners in the Neapolitan hinterland to 
fill the vacuum.  In the first months of 2001, they secured an alliance with the Iacomino 
family leading to the formation of the Iacomino-Birra clan. The growing strength of the 
Iacomino-Birra in exploiting pre-existing drug trafficking networks led them to move into 
areas infamous in Ercolano for drug dealing and drug smuggling, the so-called “Cuparella”: a 
small enclosed area just off Corso Resina in Area 2 of the city, capitalising on the already 
established drug market (Di Florio, 2012).  
In the early 2000s Ercolano and the surrounding area were effectively split into two 
groupings: on one side were the Ascione-Montella-Papale-Suarino-Nocerino clans and on 
the other were the Birra-Iacomino-Durantini-Savino (Di Florio, 2012, p.104), with the Birra 
occupying the half of the city closest to Portici and the Ascione occupying the half closest to 
Torre del Greco. The dividing line between the clans was on Via IV Novembre in our 
aforementioned Area 2, leading to the Herculaneum excavation site. Regarding their 
respective extortion rackets, the dividing line was also the main commercial area of the city, 
where it was common for businesses to pay pizzo to both clans.  
This effective truce between the two groupings were broken in 2003 when the acting head of 
the Ascione, Mario Ascione and the head of the Montella, Ciro Montella were killed in an 
ambush (Di Florio, 2012, p.125). There followed years of conflict which, though costly for 
both sides, with sixty clan-related homicides (Conticello, 2015, p.150), eventually left the 
Birra as the most powerful clan in Ercolano. In 2004, in an effort to gain more money, the 
Ascione approached more shops for the pizzo, specifically in zones that were viewed to be 
under Birra control. One shopkeeper they approached denounced them immediately, going 
straight to the Carabinieri station (Daniele, 2012, p.46-7; Conticello 2015; Gerina and Vasile, 
2015). The shopkeeper, Raffaela Ottaviano, was placed under 24/7 police protection for a 
year and a half. She testified in court in June 2005 against her would-be extorters, putting 
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them in prison for just under four years and they were also fined. In May of the same year, 
Nino Daniele, a candidate for the PD, was elected mayor of Ercolano on an anti-Camorra 
platform during a Camorra feud. His anti-Camorra rhetoric attracted the attention of Tano 
Grasso, the President of FAI, suggesting to the local lieutenant of the Carabineri, Antonio di 
Florio, Nino Daniele and Raffaela Ottaviano to set up an anti-racket association “Ercolano 
per la legalità”. It took another year before the first person stepped forward to denounce 
attempted extortion, after being approached by the Birra. In an attempt to advertise the 
movement and gain supporters elsewhere, Daniele and Ottaviano gave various interviews 
on regional and national television and radio to tell the country their story.  
In 2007, an operation titled “Reset” was orchestrated against the Birra by the Carabinieri, 
leading to fifty-four arrests and the confiscation of a number of apartments and material, all 
of which was used as “beni confiscati” to benefit the local community (Daniele, 2012; Di 
Florio, 2012). The individuals arrested were key: it included the entire directorate of the Birra 
clan, effectively decapitating them. To add insult to injury, the eventual trial from this 
operation was assisted by evidence from three pentiti. 
On 2nd April 2009 a ledger detailing businesses who paid the pizzo to the Ascione was found 
in an arrested extortionist’s home, which was later decoded by a pentito, Fausto Scudo 
(Gerina and Vesile, 2015, p.208). One important fact revealed by the ledger was that while 
eighty businesses in one district of the city had been paying money to the Ascione, at that 
time only six of these businesses in the town had actually denounced the clan. The 
subsequent trial in November 2009 was a watershed moment for the anti-racket, as it 
involved forty-one defendants, and forty-two accusers who were supported by FAI, Ercolano 
per la legalità, Sos impresa38 and the Comune of Ercolano in the courtroom. The key players 
of the extortion racket for the Ascione were thus removed from the picture. Shortly 
afterwards in December, the Carabinieri conducted an operation “Regalo di Natale” 
(Christmas present) which arrested twenty-one individuals of the Ascione and Birra clans 
going back to the 1980s. This operation was the result of businesspeople coming forward 
and denouncing their extorters (Gerina and Vasile, 2015). 
After being extorted for years by various different clans in the area, Filippo Nocerino, a 
construction business owner, decided to take action into his own hands. He attached a 
hidden camera to his watch, and filmed extorters from various clans demanding pizzo from 
him. He gave this video to the Carabinieri, together with other pieces of evidence that he had 
collected over the previous fifteen years. He was placed under 24/7 police protection in 
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 A national anti-racket association which, amongst other things, encourages pizzo-paying shopkeepers to call 
them on their “hot-line” for advice. 
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November 2011, just before the start of Operation “Vento” which arrested twenty-eight 
people throughout the area. He later denounced these individuals in court in 2014, where he 
revealed that he had already previously denounced the Camorra in the 2000s for extorting 
his business, but due to inadequate protection by law enforcement, he was forced to drop 
the case and continue paying the clans. He now considered it to be safe to denounce the 
clans. (Gerina and Vasile, 2015). As Conticello notes, everyone who arrives in Ercolano 
knows that everything has changed now. Where there was fear, omertà and ten homicides a 
year, the pizzo is not paid anymore: in Ercolano the Camorra has lost, and the antiracket has 
won. Now that almost no criminal activities conducted and there are no longer fearful 
businesspeople, the city’s redemption is studied in schools and has gained interest from 
abroad (2015, p.147).  
 
2:3 The local criminal landscape 
Beatrice (2009) contended that criminal groups in the area, commonly (and sometimes 
falsely) referred to as “Camorra”, exhibit a wide spectrum of peculiarities that determine their 
nature. These range from simple “thugs” that pester the district they live in or the middle 
classes to the point of exclusion from daily life; to small groups of acrimonious youths who 
move from their home district and harass people for their own gratification; to groups which 
we would traditionally associate with 416-bis.  It is these 416-bis groups within the Campania 
region that this thesis is concerned, rather than those periphery/contracted groups below 
them. Whilst there have been large alliances of Camorra clans in the post-war period, clans 
are still mainly characterised by what an Italian Ministero dell’Interno (Ministry of the Interior) 
report on organized crime called “pulverizzazione” (1999, p.15): a pulverised and powder-
like abundance of smaller clans in a larger interlinking network.  
The illegal activities conducted by Camorra clans vary from traditionally dependable and 
constant money-making activities such as extortion of businesses (Di Gennaro, 2015) and 
usury (Di Gennaro and Elce, 2015) to more lucrative but riskier activities such as the 
trafficking of drugs (Roberti, 2008), weapons (Ministero dell’Interno, 1999), and cigarettes 
(Paoli, 2004; Guarino, 2011) as well as illegal waste disposal (Saviano, 2007; Martone, 
2011) and the production of counterfeit goods such as clothes and DVDs (Gribaudi, 2009; 
Brancaccio, 2011). As these groups have grown and gained greater influence on the market, 
certain clans have outsourced the actual sale of illegal products in their territory to smaller 
criminal groups. This has complicated the borders between what we should term “Camorra” 
and that which is a smaller criminal group. For example, Camorra clans have been observed 
to pool their central supply of a drug and sell it to smaller (non-Camorra) groups for a profit, 
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sometimes selling to multiple groups who are only permitted to sell the drugs at certain times 
of the day. In this sense we can refer to a Camorra clan as having multiple “levels” whereby 
the first, central and integral part of the clan is contrasted to the outer peripheries of its 
operations, which are conducted by other separate, but affiliated, groups that do not 
necessarily have an organic relationship with the clan (Gribaudi, 2009, p.213-217). Similarly, 
certain clans, such as the Caselesi, have moved away from this lower level dealing towards 
more bourgeois and entrepreneurial crimes that blend the licit with the illicit such as money 
laundering and waste disposal (Saviano, 2007;  Colletti, 2016), whilst still retaining the broad 
“Camorra” label due to their geographical positioning. 
With regard to the so-called area grigia, mutual relationships between clans and 
businesspeople, politicians, civil servants and other individuals in positions of power have 
facilitated corruption and other crimes. These interlinking relationships are related to ‘o 
sistema in both a structural and cultural sense: they simultaneously represent the link 
between the licit and illicit economy, and a mentality that favours clientelism and contacts 
over due process (e.g: Train, 1912; Allum, 1973; Walston, 1988). This clientelism in Naples 
was noted, quite patronisingly, by Arthur Train to represent the culture of the Italians in 
general and of the mezzogiorno region in particular as one which has “never fully grasped 
the Anglo-Saxon idea that even the King is subject to the law” (1912, p.143). Rejecting this 
kind of Essentialism that pits an uncivilized (Southern) people against (Northern) European 
civilization is important because of its overgeneralisation, but also for its more discriminatory 
and oppressive politics. The worst of these is represented in the Positivist school of 
criminology advocated by Cesare Lombroso (Gibson, 2002) that linked the biological factors 
that decide ones appearance as indicative of ones propensity to criminal behaviour. In this 
vein, whilst caution should nonetheless be maintained for the amoral familism of Edward 
Banfield (1958) that treads the fine line between cultural Essentialism and the necessity of a 
civilizing process in the mezzogiorno region, the extent of reliance on patronage and 
favouritism that supersede due process in Neapolitan and Southern society should not be 
ignored. This cultural practice fuels o’ sistema, using these pre-existing norms for overtly 
criminal purposes, thereby further refuelling those initial cultural norms and bringing them 
into contact with criminality. Borrowing from Blok (1974), Pine refers to the Camorra in this 
context as “not a circumscribable thing but a part of everything, the atmospheric state of 
things” (2012, p.15) where its existence is not only sensed and experienced, but also 
imagined and assumed in the areas they operate. It is based in the (often correct) belief that 
the Camorra operates in every aspect of life of certain districts, thereby influencing the 
character of relations within that same district. 
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The story of the Camorra in Campania is one of localised clans that have attempted to 
dominate the local market, situating themselves in the area grigia, reproducing themselves 
through the continued collaboration with third parties who benefit from their existence. Their 
imagined and actualised presence in different levels of society further exacerbates distrust in 
public processes, in the establishment and increasing apathy to the idea of process. In this 
regard, it is also important to clarify the obvious point that crime, petty and serious, exists 
externally to the Camorra that at times this external crime assists the clans, whilst also 
remembering Camorra and their associates offer opportunities for individuals on both a 
psychological and economic level where the State has fallen well short.  
The socio-economic context is one of chronic underdevelopment and wealth inequality 
where the visible degradation of parts of the region has fuelled what has been called the 
“Broken Window Theory” (Kelling & Wilson, 1982) elsewhere. This is the process by which 
citizens in an area start to believe that authority does not exert any discipline and does not 
care, thus breaking the bonds of the social contract. The name stems from the idea that if a 
building has a smashed window that is remains unfixed for a long time, people who see the 
broken window frequently will start to believe that no-one cares about the area at all. The 
theory was tested by Phillip Zimbardo in 1969: 
He arranged to have an automobile without license plates parked with its hood up on 
a street in the Bronx [a famously rundown area of New York City] and a comparable 
automobile on a street in Palo Alto, California [a famously affluent area] . The car in 
the Bronx was attacked by "vandals" within ten minutes of its "abandonment." The 
first to arrive were a family—father, mother, and young son—who removed the 
radiator and battery. Within twenty-four hours, virtually everything of value had been 
removed. Then random destruction began—windows were smashed, parts torn off, 
upholstery ripped. Children began to use the car as a playground. Most of the adult 
"vandals" were well-dressed, apparently clean-cut whites. The car in Palo Alto sat 
untouched for more than a week. Then Zimbardo smashed part of it with a 
sledgehammer. Soon, passersby were joining in. Within a few hours, the car had 
been turned upside down and utterly destroyed. Again, the "vandals" appeared to be 
primarily respectable whites.  
Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun or plunder and even for 
people who ordinarily would not dream of doing such things and who probably 
consider themselves law-abiding. Because of the nature of community life in the 
Bronx—its anonymity, the frequency with which cars are abandoned and things are 
stolen or broken, the past experience of "no one caring"—vandalism begins much 
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more quickly than it does in staid Palo Alto, where people have come to believe that 
private possessions are cared for, and that mischievous behavior is costly. But 
vandalism can occur anywhere once communal barriers—the sense of mutual regard 
and the obligations of civility—are lowered by actions that seem to signal that "no 
one cares." (Kelling & Wilson, 1982) 
This is applicable to much of the mezzogiorno region and Naples in particular precisely 
because of the level of vandalism and seeming lack of caring that one sees on a daily basis. 
The most visual of these are the significant amount of graffiti in the streets and on public 
transport, some of which has been around for many years. Likewise, the infamous problem 
of rubbish collection that made news headlines around the world. Crimes associated with 
traffic and vehicle regulations are also common, but often unreported. Uninsured vehicles, 
riding scooters without a helmet or unsafely, speeding, disregard for traffic lights or 
pedestrian crossings, double (and triple) parking, illegal seizure of public parking spaces, 
illegal collection of parking fares, and other relatively low level crimes are widespread. Like 
every large city, there is also predatory petty crime ranging from pickpocketing to muggings, 
however there is little evidence officially linking these crimes to Camorra in any meaningful 
way.  
Other widespread petty crimes include fare dodging – an indicator of the lack of 
consequences for non-payers and lack of investment in ticket machines and barriers, rather 
than the inability for the population to pay for the tickets. Indeed on the Circumvesuviana 
train system in particular, attempts by staff to inspect tickets have been met by abuse from 
some travellers, where the fear for their safety has dissuaded some of them from inspecting 
at all. Buses face a similar issue, but ticket inspection remains almost entirely unenforced 
where the bus driver has no part to play in the ticket inspection process, meaning that they 
rarely ensure that passengers have validated their pre-paid ticket on the vehicle. The result 
is that people rarely pay for their journey by bus.  
There is a significant “black market” in the city ranging from undeclared irregular work, tax 
avoidance, sale of illegal goods, and everything in between involving private individuals, 
businesses and smaller criminal groups. The reasons for this are numerous. The 
inaccessibility and inflexibility of State bureaucracy dissuades individuals from declaring their 
income, but important too is the unlikelihood of being caught and of prosecution. The lack of 
contracted employment for unskilled workers is also an issue, whereby it is a greater 
incentive for a small business to pay someone “off the books”, which a vying employee 
readily accepts.  Landlords frequently rent properties in cash to tenants without contracts, 
sometimes giving tenants the option of a contract only if they pay extra money to cover for 
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the extra tax burden. Indeed, a noted practice has been of legal businesses offering to pay 
employees a certain percentage of their wage directly in untaxed cash, so as to reduce a 
business’ and employee’s tax liability, something that is beneficial to both parties. The 
unregulated and irregular nature of work in Naples in particular (see Pardo, 1996) favours 
undeclared cash transactions between individuals. Irregular and undeclared work comes in 
many different forms, ranging from casual employees for small businesses who are paid 
cash-in-hand, freelancers who work without declaring their income and workers (often 
migrants) working for organisations directly linked to stolen or counterfeit goods. The amount 
of cash transactions between individuals and businesses favours money laundering 
practices by Camorra and non-Camorra individuals alike. For young people who, like many 
young Italians, still live with their parents and thus do not have bills to pay, a large amount of 
their monetary transactions exist only in cash.   
 
3: Concluding remarks 
This chapter has introduced our case study and the essentials that pave the way for greater 
analysis in the following chapters. On a local level, I presented Ercolano’s demographics, 
recent political history and the history of the Camorra clans operating in the area. Like many 
communities in the mezzogiorno region, Ercolano is a town characterised by high youth 
unemployment. Similar to many communities in Campania, and in the area around Naples in 
particular, it has also been characterised by the influence of Camorra clans that became 
involved in local politics alongside other activities such as trafficking and racketeering.  
On a macro level, I analysed police and judicial powers in response to the Camorra, and 
provided a snapshot of the criminal landscape of the Neapolitan hinterland. In particular, I 
outlined the laws that provide the definition of and sentence for a “mafioso” (in our case, 
camorrista) and their connections outside of their association (those in the area grigia). I also 
outlined the legal use and limitation of the two main weapons at the disposal of the 
Carabinieri and the judiciary: that of the testimony of cooperating witnesses (pentiti) and that 
of surveillance (wiretapping specifically). As well as this judicial perspective, the size and 
chatacter of the informal economy in the region is also an important factor to remember – 
particularly when considering relations between individuals in the area. The following 
chapters deal with the “meat” of the thesis.  
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This chapter is devoted to the pizzo and how it has been paid in Ercolano. I draw upon the 
first-hand accounts of Ercolano-based businesspeople, court proceedings and practitioner 
accounts from the serving Investigating Magistrate as well as members of the local 
Carabinieri. The data is analysed as follows: I begin by introducing the judicial understanding 
of the term and how it is understood in Ercolano, and how Camorra clans have been 
observed to extract money from businesses. I then analyse this transaction from the 
perspective of the business people who used to pay the pizzo. This is followed by a 
discussion on how widespread the pizzo was in the community, concluding with a debate as 
to why certain businesses have paid, and others have not. In most, but not all cases, 
pseudonyms are used when I refer to businesspeople.   
 
1: The Judicial perspective 
In 2015 the then serving investigating magistrate for Ercolano, Pierpaolo Filippelli, described 
the pizzo as 
basically extortion, a bribe. If we can put it thus, it is a “tax” that a clan claims from 
shopkeepers in order for them to be left alone. This is so that they can be left to work 
in peace without repercussions or the worry of being ambushed or attacked at their 
own place of work or home. Say that I am in charge of the clan: if you want to work 
without any hassle, you need to give me some money, or if you don’t want to give me 
money, you need to give me goods free of charge, or you have to hire one of the 
people that I tell you to hire. So, the pizzo is an abuse by a clan against an 
entrepreneur, against a shopkeeper and it is a criminal offence that is very damaging 
to their assets and their rights. However it is an offence that damages the whole 
economy because where there is an area where there is pizzo, where there is the 
Camorra, there isn’t any investment from other regions. If there were an entrepreneur 
from abroad, or Northern Italy that would like to invest in Ercolano or maybe another 
area of Italy, that finds out that here they pay the pizzo, they would rather invest more 
in another area instead. So this is a very damaging factor as it is a case of 
development that has been missed out in Ercolano. 
We say that the pizzo is extortion and also harmful to a person’s liberty, to a person’s 
dignity, because a person who is forced to pay out of fear, it is clear that they are 
made to do something humiliating to go and pay a camorrista. To work and then 
have to pay a piece of their earnings to the camorrista. It is a person being robbed of 
their dignity, and so it is a very serious criminal offence. It is a serious criminal 
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offence that typically comes from Camorra clans, because extortion is important for a 
clan not only because it guarantees it money, but also because through the pizzo the 
clan truly shows its domination over a territory. It is like it were the State – it has 
command over a territory, and much like the State it wants you to pay taxes, and so 
here the clans want the shopkeepers and the entrepreneurs that operate in their 
territory to pay tax to the clan […] 
It could also happen that in some cases, alongside the payment of money, there 
would be a consignment of goods free of charge. So a shopkeeper of a shoe shop 
would give a pizzo of 100 euros but also five or six pairs of shoes for free – this is 
also a pizzo. There could also be a shopkeeper or entrepreneur who, instead of 
paying pizzo in money, is forced to hire a person chosen by the clan –that is also a 
form of extortion. Another form of extortion is that of changing cheques and money, 
some of it stolen, which forms a part of recycling laundered money for the clan. There 
are many forms of pizzo. The important thing for the clan is that everyone pays. At 
times the clan is willing to reduce the pizzo. In times of crisis, however, everyone 
pays. (LE 30062015) 
Unsurprisingly, the image of the pizzo given here is not that of a voluntary payment for the 
receipt of a service, but instead an extraction of money or services from a business under 
duress or the threat of violence. Filippelli corroborates our comparison between tax and 
pizzo, noting that the payment is not about the money per se, rather it is the submission to 
payment which signifies Camorra power.  
The pizzo identified here is more than a simple monetary transaction where money is given 
to the camorrista by a businessperson metus causa factum (Pezzuto, 2015, p.10), but also 
contains the provision of additional caveats which range from the forced hiring of staff 
(themselves likely linked to the clan in some way), the “rights of seizure” (Toros and Mavelli, 
2013; Foucault 2008) of goods that are sold by the business, to assistance in Camorra 
money laundering schemes, namely transforming physical cash collected illegally elsewhere 
into legal custom once it enters a business. With regard to each of these, it is easy to see 
the possibility of a “creeping normality” or a “slippery slope” where an initial small allowance 
or adherence makes it difficult to refuse future requests that may grow in the amount that is 
demanded. The examples that Filippelli mention amount to a blank cheque in future visits 
(simple monetary payments, and the taking of goods), an undue influence over the business’ 
employment policy (with no assurances that the number of staff, their salary, will not 
increase), and the slow assimilation of the business into its criminal enterprise (particularly 
through money laundering). The provision of money laundering activities is particularly 
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duplicitous and ingenious since it requires a businessperson to have an active role in the 
crime on behalf of the clan. It requires a business to forge its account books, an illegal act, 
and therefore aligns the interests of the business with that of the clan – making business an 
active partner and, therefore, fostering omertà.  This cooperation becomes more diffuse as it 
becomes more socially acceptable (Beatrice, 2009). 
Each one of these types of pizzo denotes an assimilation of the business itself and a 
transformation in the culture and norms as to how individual businesses organise 
themselves. This is seen through the general “submission” side to the transaction and 
acceptance of Camorra power and/or its claim to legitimacy, but also through the changing 
of the business culture and conduct themselves. Encouraging a business to launder money, 
for example, involves a business putting money through the business as a legal transaction. 
It involves the hope that no prudent tax inspector checks that the amount of any particular 
“good” or “product” being sold is more than the amount you are able to provide.  
I provide here a short example to explain how this functions: a beauty salon has only has a 
certain number of staff working at any time and, depending on the length of the work day, 
can only ever theoretically “sell” a certain number of products a day. It can, therefore, 
theoretically only make a certain amount of money every day based on the length of each 
transaction. It is more difficult to launder money through physical “products” for the simple 
reason that you have to buy and then sell the physical product to begin with. If the “product” 
you are selling, is not “physical”, such as a haircut, then it is relatively easy to launder money 
gradually through the business, as long as you have the existing tools or staff to run the 
business (hairdressers, scissors, chairs, etc.) and as long as you do not exceed the amount 
that you can theoretically make in a day compared to the amount of staff that are working on 
any given day. Once this money is in the business, it can be used in a variety of ways, such 
as buying products from other Camorra businesses so as to place “clean” money into the 
hands of the clan.  With regard to the pizzo, dirty Camorra money is mixed with the clean 
money the business makes day-to-day. This forces the businessowner to be creative in their 
account books and then making clean and traceable transactions to Camorra related 
affiliates that act as a front for further money laundering elsewhere.  
Certain Camorra clans in the area have engaged in property speculation based on the inflow 
and outflows of the business, the ownership of casinos abroad, and legal investment in the 
local tourist sector (Behan, 1996, p.127).  Some members of the Ascione clan were arrested 
in 2008 in Florence on the charges of money laundering. They appeared to have been using 
contacts in other clans (the Casalesi and the Mazzarella) to purchase real estate (La 
Repubblica, 12 May 2009) in which a suspicious €1,000,000 deposit was flagged by a bank. 
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In subsequent investigations, €10,000,000 was confiscated in total (Il Terreno, 13 May 
2009).  
In this we can see how important certain businesses like these are to Camorra clans, in the 
sense that they are a means of cleaning dirty money, whilst, at the same time, fostering 
submission in businesses where the clan is based. Besides the illegality of this relationship, 
the business would have to pay tax on this extra non-existent income, and, if audited, to 
explain where this extra revenue has gone if not into the business itself. On being caught for 
faulty accounting, a businessperson can claim that they actually understated their real 
turnover elsewhere in order to avoid tax. This would lead to a fine for tax evasion, but would 
not disrupt the money laundering operation (which would entail greater fines and 
punishments). Indeed, as Behan noted, this may be why there are so many retail outlets in 
the mezzogiorno region: these inflows and outflows of cash are normal, difficult to trace and 
to monitor without massive resources (1996, pp.127-8).  
The forced hiring of staff enables the Camorra to either (1) genuinely give one of their 
associates a legal job where the clan is able to “pay” them indirectly through the business 
they are extorting or (2) simply give them a job on paper, when the businessperson is paying 
a member of staff who never comes to work. The first of these means that the Camorra have 
influence and a means of checking the business and its activities, whereas the second of 
these is an ingenious way to pay Camorra associates with clean money. The strict monetary 
pizzo and the pizzo which entails the giving away of goods involves an alteration of a 
business plan and/or account books much like money laundering. If audited, a 
businessperson must be able to account for the loss of goods or money that has gone 
missing from the business. As noted by D’Alessandro (2009) and Beatrice (2009), the clan 
affects the relationship of a business to the law, making them complicit in the crimes. It 
becomes in both parties’ interest to keep the details of any kind of arrangement secret.  
Filippelli detailed further cleavages in pizzo payment, stating that there is an inherent 
difference between two different types of businesspeople:   
the pizzo paid by the shopkeepers – the ones that have shops (physical shops) – 
shoe shops, patisseries, the butcher – and the pizzo paid by entrepreneurs – who 
basically are at a place from time to time who have a work contract for a specific 
place. The entrepreneur in reality pays an amount in relation to the work that they are 
doing varying from between 3% and 5%. The shopkeeper is different – it is not as if 
they work every now and then –they can be found at the shop everyday. And these 
shopkeepers paid once a month or (something more common in Ercolano) three 
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times a year: Christmas, Easter and August. So every month, or during the most 
important festivals. (LE 30062015) 
In many ways Filippelli corroborates what I have already discussed in the introduction with 
regard to the FAI and from Tano Grasso (2012). This is unsurprising given that his co-
authors in Camorra e l’antiracket were public servants who worked in Ercolano, even though 
the “three times a year” payment has also been a feature in other communities in the 
mezzogiorno region (Gerina and Vasile, 2015). Filippelli stressed the difference between two 
different types of businesses: the business with a physical shop and regular opening and 
closing times in at least one set location, where a customer can freely walk in and buy 
products (which we henceforth referred to as “shopkeeper”); the businessperson who has a 
business without one set location, where they are contracted for a temporary period on a 
project (henceforth referred to as “entrepreneur”). This distinction was also corroborated in 
other interviews I conducted with members of the Carabinieri at the Police Station in Torre 
del Greco, who work with Filippelli: they quoted a 3% figure as a pizzo for entrepreneurs who 
have contracted works, such as apartment buildings and anything else involving concrete 
(LE 18042015).   
The following section outlines these two different pizzos as they were experienced by 
businesspeople and the manner in which the Camorra have attempted to collected pizzo.  
 
2:  How does a business pay the pizzo? 
In 2000 a building contractor named Filippo from Ercolano was approached for money by 
members of the Ascione clan. They wanted a percentage of his earnings in order to allow 
him to conduct his activities in their territory. Unwilling to pay them, Filippo decided to 
denounce his would-be extorters, leading to their arrest and eventual sentencing after he 
stood in court alone and denounced them. Despite this, the Ascione continued to demand 
money on new contracts that his business had received elsewhere. Filippo eventually 
decided to stop denouncing: 
I did not feel comfortable. I was not safeguarded by anyone, not the doctor, not the 
judiciary, not the law enforcement. There weren’t any associations to support me – 
no one. In fact, when I tried to speak to the law enforcement or to anyone, I found 
omertà … perhaps it was not the right climate. […] The threats just continued. I 
couldn’t stand it anymore, so I left to work in Genova alone instead. (Gerina and 
Vasile, 2015, p.225) 
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Six years later Filippo returned to his hometown to try and work nearby. Despite conducting 
all of his activities behind a hard metal shutter in private, it only took twenty days before he 
was approached by another clan, whose emissary told him that in order to continue to 
conduct business, he would need to “conform to the rules”. “I was prepared, I was waiting for 
him”, Filippo said in a court appearance a few years later. “Did you not denounce the 
aggression?”, asked the investigating magistrate. “No, I had already suffered too much”.  
Often when his business was contracted in the area, he would be approached at his work 
place by members of a clan, requesting a percentage of the money. At times, he was 
approached by more than one clan separately, with the result that he had to pay the costs of 
his as well as a percentage of his earnings to multiple clans. For Filippo, this first began at 
contracted works in Ercolano, then in Naples, followed by the surrounding area of San 
Giovanni a Teduccio, San Cristoforo and San Giovannello: it must be stressed that this is not 
a phenomenon affecting Ercolano but the mezzogiorno region in general (Gerina and Vasile, 
2015; Conticello, 2015). At one point he was contracted alongside his brothers to restructure 
an apartment building in the Mercato quarter of Naples and was called to go and negotiate 
with their client on some extra work that they required: 
We knew that there was the Camorra and we explained to our clients that we wanted 
absolutely nothing to do with these gentlemen. At this time I was staying in Genova, 
coming back every fifteen days just because I have a family, and I only went to visit 
this building site once. I happened to be on this site on this particular day by chance. 
They needed some more work done on the building, and had requested a meeting 
with me just to understand what I would quote them. For this I brought along my 
brother Biagio, to this meeting along with our other brother Mariano, just for support. 
At a certain point without warning the client interrupted and started yelling at us, we 
were all at fists. They started to leave whilst talking amongst themselves about what 
had happened, when four people suddenly arrived. Then for some reason, they 
began to beat me, and only me, I suffered for half an hour. My brother Mariano tried 
to intervene so they turned to beat him too, then at a certain point they turned to my 
brother Biagio who was sat and they broke his finger. After half an hour of being 
beaten, they opened the door, and the corridor was full of people. Out of this crowd 
of people came Roberto, this Roberto was Roberto Mazzarella [a member of the 
Mazzarrella clan, from Torre del Greco] (Tribunale di Napoli, Procedimento penale 
n.1244/2013 cited in Gerina and Vasile, 2015, pp.226-7)  
As noted by Gerina and Vasile, to that which was being sought was a “bribe” of varying 
amounts, all payable on religious holidays – but the extra problem for Filippo was that this 
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amount grew each time he met with the Mazzarella.39 Every now and then, Filippo would be 
summoned by the Mazzarella clan: sometimes in a bar, sometimes on the building site or 
even at the grandmother’s house of a worker that he was forced to hire. With every new 
meeting came a new clan, and more money to pay (2015, p.228). This was made even more 
outrageous when, in 2007, Filippo received a new summoning by someone he did not 
recognize: he was to follow a car up to a building, follow people up to the third floor where he 
was met in an apartment by people who told him that they were from the Rinaldi clan. The 
Rinaldi clan and the Mazzarella clan were rivals, had fought one another during the Camorra 
wars of the 1970s and 1980s, where the Mazzarella were part of La Nuova Famiglia and the 
Rinaldi were part of the NCO and Raffaele Cutolo. The Rinaldi had called this meeting with 
Filippo to know how much he had paid the Mazzarella. The reality of the situation was even 
more complicated, however, as Filippo was paying both the Mazzarella, and another clan 
which was historically linked to the Rinaldi: the Formicola clan. On hearing this name, the 
Rinaldi began a long discussion, forcing Filippo to wait outside on the balcony. When he was 
called back in, he was quoted a figure of €17,000 which he agreed to pay, given the 
circumstances. As well as this pizzo of €17,000, Filippo was “almost forced” to buy certain 
shares in a consortium which was working on the port to develop tourism in Ercolano and 
Portici. Following this, he was told to allow the clan to be a part of this venture, by making 
one of the camorristi a member of the consortium (pp.228-9). 
In 2009, Filippo decided to do something about his situation. He reported that “since it was 
very difficult to be able to identify people, as many people look like one another, it was 
impossible to describe everyone […] I decided to film them in order to leave a trace of that 
which happened” (p.234). Working with the Carabinieri, he filmed his interactions with the 
clan and then gave them the tape as evidence. From 12 October 2011 onwards, every 
interaction with clan members was filmed by a camera hidden in Filippo’s wristwatch. The 
first thing filmed was extortion by the Mazzarella and the Formicola clans, with a payment of 
€4,000 (3% of a €130,000 contract) that they came and took directly from the site: “It was all 
in 500 euro notes” (p.235). In December 2011, the Carabinieri started arresting the people in 
these videos in “Operazione Vento”, arresting 28 people from five different clans. One of 
these videos was subsequently released online, and shows the meeting between Filippo and 
his extorters.40 The video shows how, on the work of renovating the “Albergo dei Poveri” for 
which he was getting €450,000, he was approached by the clan for a pizzo payment of 
€22,000. On hearing the amount, Filippo responded “It’s not possible, how am I able to do 
                                                          
39
 For a detailed insight into the Mazzarella clan see Gribaudi, 2011, which mentions Roberto specifically. 
40
 The video and some of the excerpt are available at: Il Fatto Quotidiano, 30 January 2012:  
http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2012/01/30/filma-camorristi-chiedono-pizzo/187916/  
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this?”, at which the camorrista’s response was simply :“I don’t give a fuck” (Il Fatto 
Quatidiano, 30 January 2012).  
Regarding the main points on this particular type of pizzo payment, Filippo’s account gives 
us much to ponder. Firstly, that of Camorra territoriality: the borders of different clans appear 
very fluid in the sense that various clans are operating and extorting entrepreneurs in one 
another’s areas. As we can see, this leads to entrepreneurs regularly paying a portion of the 
contracted money to multiple clans in the same area. The same laws that allow for 
accountability on public funding in the face of endemic corruption also allow the details of 
construction contracts to be available to the public. The information regarding entrepreneurs 
who receive public contracts in a territory is available in the public sphere, often published by 
local administrations, making an accurate demand for a specific figure much easier to 
accomplish by clans. Indeed the local Carabinieri noted that: “the Camorra finds out that 
there is a project of 200,000 euros, for example, and so, goes to the site and asks […]  So 
there isn’t a fixed amount” (LE 18042015). 
Private contracts are more difficult, as the attainment of a figure is only available through 
certain channels such as contacts inside the construction industry. However, ongoing works 
in an area make it easier to approach specific entrepreneurs. Secondly, the pizzo payment 
for the entrepreneur comes in various forms: the most obvious are a percentage of the 
contracted money for the project and alongside imposed workers. There is also the imposed 
purchase of materials or shares or the forced signatures of contracts sponsorships allowing 
camorristi an incursion into the entrepreneur’s business or sector on a local level, further 
assimilating free businesses. This has a knock-on effect and enables a Camorra clan to 
influence, if not dictate, local construction policies, laundering money through unfinished 
(and sometimes illegal) construction works.  
Another Ercolano entrepreneur in the area, D.L.R41 had a slightly different experience, 
whereby in November 2007 he was relayed a message by one of his workers from two 
individuals who had arrived at his construction site: 
 Tell the boss that he needs to come fuori al ponte. 
D.L.R. asked his staff where this place was exactly, at which his staff informed him that it 
was an area of the city which is known for the presence of Camorra in our Area 3. He 
decided not to go there. Close to Christmas, the individuals came back, asking 
 Why hasn’t anyone come? Tell the boss that he needs to come fuori al ponte. 
                                                          
41
 As named in the Zoom document “ERCOLANO 19, 2007-8”. 
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He decided not to respond this time either, particularly because it was close to Christmas 
time and he was suspending work for the holidays. The two individuals did not take kindly to 
the indifference shown by D.L.R. and decided to be much more explicit in their next visit in 
March 2008: 
Do we have to be ambassadors for you again? If that’s what you want … don’t you 
want to be left in peace? Say to him [D.L.R] that that he needs to come to the 
Moquette. 
The word Moquette literally means “carpet” or “rug”, but here it was the Ascione clan’s 
euphemism for “extortion racket”, as well as the place where a businessperson had to go in 
order to pay the pizzo. If you are ordered to go to the Moquette, it means that you have to go 
to a specific place to pay. In the case of the Ascione it refers to an apartment in a residential 
block located on a street close to the centre of Ercolano, Via Panoramica, (see figure 1) 
where the stairs that the shopkeeper climbs to get to the apartment are covered in a red 
carpet (Daniele, 2012, pp.21-2): 
This is the third time that we have come here … do you not know that you are in 
Ercolano?   What are you waiting for? For us to raise our hands against you?  
Under these conditions, and after some thought, D.L.R and his employee decided to 
denounce these individuals to the Carabinieri rather than pay. D.L.R announced his intention 
to the Carabinieri to go to the Moquette and meet these individuals. On arriving at the 
Moquette, he was met by a single person, “D.P.P”: 
You know who we are, and you know why you are here. We want to be friends with 
everyone. 
D.P.P requested a sum of money that would be “something adequate” because “things 
aren’t going so well” and “we are in need”. That same day, D.P.P was arrested by the 
Carabinieri (ProcedimentoPenale n.18204/08 R.G.N.R. 9341/08 R.G. TRIB). Much like with 
Filippo, the modus operandi of the clans involved an approach by camorristi, followed by an 
invitation to an apartment owned by the Camorra where an amount is formally arranged. The 
“regularity” of payment as identified by Grasso and Filippelli does not apply to entrepreneurs 
because their businesses do not have one set “project” and the business necessarily moves 
around the area, meaning that it is expedient for a clan to resort to extortive tactics on each 
individual project rather than a regular collection of money. There is a difference between 
paying once a month over the course of a single project, and paying once a month 
indefinitely, something which for this type of entrepreneur is not attainable.  
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The manner in which payment was conducted with the Ascione has been described by 
various other businesspeople who paid the pizzo. This is the account of another 
businessperson: 
I took the money to the Moquette. Sometimes I would take it there and they would 
say “Fuori al ponte”, which is the front of the Ercolano Post Office, where there is a 
road called Vico Moscardino, and I went to take it there… I entered onto the street, 
there was a house on the left, and I went there and brought this money …  
Sometimes I brought it there and to … where there is the Enel [an electric and gas 
company] written on the buildings … zi’ Luigi, where zi’ Luigi lives. (Gerina and 











There are two different locations being described here. The first is in an apartment building, 
which is where “zi’ Luigi” lives (the road Via Panoramica is located on the map by a red circle 
which is in our Area 1 of the city mentioned in a previous section). “Fuori al ponte”42 or “For 
‘o ponte”, as described elsewhere in Neapolitan, is Vico Moscardino (ProcedimentoPenale 
n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.) (indicated on the map by a yellow circle in our Area 2 of the town).  
Zi’ Luigi is Luigi Nocerino, who was the acting boss of the Ascione whilst the real boss, 
Raffaele Ascione was in prison. One of the more striking things about the “ponte” is its 
location in the heart of Ercolano. It is within short walking distance from the main street in 
                                                          
42
 Tr. Outside of the bridge 
Figure 1 
Aerial map of Ercolano 
(Googlemaps) 
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Ercolano and the Herculaneum archaeological site (located in figure 1 with a pink square). 
On one side it is facing a famous Bourbon Villas, Villa Campolieto, designed by one of the 
most famous architects in Naples, Luigi Vanvitelli.  At times the businesspeople would be 
told to go into Luigi Nocerino’s home, as described by another building contractor in court: 
Witness: We entered immediately into the lounge and it was there where we 
sat. 
 Lawyer: So, the entrance enters immediately into the lounge? 
Witness: Yeah. As you enter, like so, on the right, there is an armchair and a 
table in the centre, and we sat. (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.210) 
So here we are able to visualise the ease at which a businessperson paid. They would go to 
Via Panoramica, call the appropriate apartment and then either go up and pay in person, or 
be ordered to go to the stronghold of the Ascione in Vico Moscardino, much closer to the 
economic heart of Ercolano, walk down a narrow alley leading to the courtyard and leave the 
payment of money there. The image of a single armchair at a table, with presumably other 
smaller seats around it in Nocerino’s apartment, or a businessperson being ordered from 
place to place to give away money is a potent one, giving us an idea of the strict hierarchical 
power dynamics that the boss and his clan were trying to evoke.  The use of specific 
language or catchphrases has been disseminated in the wider community by the Ascione, 
where they attempted to create a norm, or at least a specific understanding of what those 
linguistic signs meant.   
While the Ascione had the Moquette and the “ponte”, the Birra instead had the “Cuparella”, 
referring specifically to two streets, “Via Pace” and Via Cuparella, both close to the market 
area of Ercolano in Area 2, where a representative of the clan would approach the 
shopkeepers and then take them to a nearby apartment to receive the money.  Further 
evidence of the phenomena of a first meeting where the clan establishes contact, and then a 
second where they take payment, is exemplified by a baker in the market quarter of the city: 
It was at the end of October 2009 when an individual came in and ordered me to talk 
to someone with who he was affiliated, who, according to him, was in charge of 
Ercolano. I said “commander…” because, I mean, if he says he’s in charge of 
Ercolano, I guess that’s what I should call him– I bake bread, I’m a baker, I didn’t 
know. He just said, “Yeah you need to come to this place”, and for the first few days it 
didn’t really sink in.  
85 
That was until he came here again, but this time he didn’t come alone, but instead 
with another two or three people, ordering me to go outside with them, all of this in 
front of everyone in the bakery. This was annoying because the other customers 
were scared to leave - people weren’t coming into the bakery anymore. (N5 
18032014) 
In this situation, a member of the Birra clan approached a business person, and ushers them 
into contact with a second individual, in this case the “commander”, who tells the 
businessperson what they are to do. If the shopkeeper did not obey, other members of the 
Birra would come to the business and harass the businesspeople and customers of the 
business. In this meeting one of the Birra associates, Ciro Savino, addressed the baker thus: 
Oh, so you didn’t understand the ambassador from yesterday? That you had to come 
to the Cuparella […] You have to help us out because we are having a few problems. 
As everyone else is paying, you have to pay us too. You’ve gotta give us 5,000 euros 
now, then 300 euros every month. (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.212) 
The process itself involves the initial contact with the clan through the ambassador who 
requests a meeting, the meeting establishes power dynamics and the demand of tribute, 
which, if not followed and adhered to, will result in intimidation in the business itself. The 
baker did not pay this amount, resulting in further threats involving having a gun pointed at 
her and her staff, and then a small bomb placed outside the business. The bomb destroyed 
the shop shutters, but fortunately did not lead to any casualties. Like the Ascione clan, we 
observe similarity between the modes of escalation adopted by the Birra clan to the steps of 
escalation that follow a request for pizzo that Henner Hess described in Sicily (1973, p.103). 
Indeed in June 2009 a building contractor from Ercolano was murdered by the Ascione clan, 
apparently for not paying pizzo. From what has been reconstructed by Ascione pentiti, the 
contractor had already paid his pizzo to an individual from the clan by doing some work in 
his home for free, but the clan wanted money too. It seems that he refused, leading to his 
murder by being shot, his body being burned, and then left in a landfill on a road on Mount 
Vesuvius (NapoliToday, 10 March 2009). 
The manner in which the pizzo has been experienced is varied. Giuseppe is an owner of a 
shop and inherited the pizzo from his father, who in turn had inherited it from his father. 
Giuseppe’s grandfather had paid the pizzo ever since the Ascione had shot at the shop 
shutters back in the 1970s, and they paid every festivity until it was changed to monthly 
payments of 200 euros a month. They paid the Ascione until 2006, when the Birra clan 
expanded in the area and forced Giuseppe to pay 250 euros on festivities to them too 
(Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.213; Daniele, 2012, p.22-3). The pizzo paid to the Ascione 
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carried a hereditary element to it, in that when the business was handed down to the new 
owners, pizzo paying was a pre-existing and normal part of the business plan.  This is an 
ingenious side to the pizzo, given that the disposition for paying pizzo is already established 
(in this case for two generations), making it abnormal to not pay it, even if it is resented.  
Ciro owns what Filippelli would refer to as a “physical shop” in Ercolano and is now a 
member of the antiracket. For years he paid the pizzo to the Ascione clan in Ercolano. He 
was approached every festivity by a member of the clan and told to give him a “present for 
the prisoners”. I asked him about the relationship that he had with the men who came to his 
shop, curious about any kind of dynamics that were involved between these two individuals, 
at which he said there was no relationship at all: the camorrista would arrive every now and 
then, close to the aforementioned festivities, give a reminder that the prisoners need 
presents, and would then leave. Ciro inherited the business from his father, and unlike 
Giuseppe, he gave no indication that his father paid too. The “present” that was asked for 
(between 3% and 5% of takings) would be rounded off for an easy payable figure (N3 
15042015). During the subsequent trial he said that the extortionist would come to the 
business and say “I come in the name of the Moquette, you need to give me 500 euros for 
the prisoners” (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.211). Similarly, in June 2004 a pizzeria in Ascione 
territory was approached by three young guys who threatened the owner, asking for a sum 
of money: “We are doing the rounds of the area from top to bottom, we are getting the 
salaries for our friends in prison”. 
On refusal, one of them became even more threatening, saying that the owner obviously did 
not understand who they were, and what was going to happen to him. After they left, the 
owner went to the Carabinieri, where he identified the individuals (Procedimento Penale 
n.30025/04 R.G. – 10723/04 RG.Trib). This appeal to “prisoners” is, if correct, an interesting 
revelation and corroborates research conducted by Alessandro Colletti in an analysis of 
judicial accounts of the Casalesi Camorra clans (2016), whereby money collected from 
businesses was purposefully set aside for the salaries of those camorristi in prison and a 
kind of social welfare for their families. Declarations from other pentiti in Ercolano have also 
indicated the use of a system similar to social welfare for clan associates and their families 
(Camorriste, 2016), indicating that the claim is at least partially true.  
Further demonstrating the extent of the extortive attempts, a prominent businesswoman in 
the area, Raffaela Ottaviano43 was approached by members of the Ascione in 2004, 
                                                          
43
 I use Raffaela’s real namel, as compared to aliases that I have used for other shopkeepers simply because 
she is such a vocal part of the anti-racket movement. Her name is already in the public domain, having being 
interviewed by the BBC, Radio Tedesca and other European broadcasters, in addition to being given an award 
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reporting it to the Carabinieri. To contextualise her case, she owns three businesses on the 
same street in Ercolano – all located on the main street which is understood to be the 
boundary between Ascione and Birra territory. She became a minor celebrity after she 
denounced the Camorra, allowing herself to be interviewed by various people throughout the 
media and becoming the honorary President of the local antiracket association “Ercolano per 
la legalità”. Here is a lengthy account of her experiences, which are pieced together from 
various interviews, meetings and judicial accounts: 
Interviewer: The first thing to start, what is your name? 
Raffaela: My name is Raffaela Ottaviano, I’m a shopkeeper, and the first woman to be 
liberated from the Camorra in Ercolano – the first person. 
Interviewer: How did this idea [to denounce] occur to you? This first courageous step. 
Raffaela: It’s not that it “occurred” to me. I just didn’t accept it. I was very angry, and I 
just went and denounced. Here in doing this I took the [first] step […] I left, 
went to the Carabinieri station for Ercolano, and denounced. 
[…] 
Interviewer: But what was it like beforehand? Did you pay too? 
Raffaela: Never. They never came to me. [Their visit in 2004] was the first time. The 
first time they came I didn’t even understand what they wanted from me. The 
first time they came I said “Ah okay I understand, you’ve mixed me up with 
someone else” and I said “go away immediately”. They also wanted to tell me 
a price, he said “there are three shops, what should we do?” I said, “It doesn’t 
matter, because I’m not interested in your product”, this is what I said. Then 
he shows me courtesy, and goes outside. Another two of them I faced in court 
alone … (N 18032014)  
According to her own judicial account, the interaction with the Ascione went thus: on the 15th 
March 2004 around 11am, two individuals rode up to one of her shops on a scooter. One 
stayed outside on the bike, whilst the second went inside: 
Extorter: lo Zio [the uncle] sent me. 
Raffaela: Who is lo Zio? 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
for services to the Italian Republic from the Presidente della Repubblica. I know from personal experience that 
she would much prefer me to use her own name, rather than a pseudonym.  
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Extorter Zio Giannino. 
Raffaela asks twice who Giannino was 
Extorter: I ask the questions here, not you. 
Raffaela: I’m the one who’ll be paying, so I want to know who it is who I have to pay. 
Extorter: Don’t you want to pay? 
At the negative response from Raffaela, A.G. [“Extorter”] replies in a threatening tone. 
Extorter: Alright then, until next time. 
The next day, a different man turns up at the shop: 
Extorter 2:  Lo Zio sent me … Signora, you already know what you need to do, it is what 
you want to do - you want to pay us. 
Raffaela again refuses to pay, at which he replies: 
Extorter 2: Until next time then… until next time 
Shortly afterwards, Raffaela crossed paths with the two men from the day before who were 
returning from another business on the main street in Ercolano. They looked at her and 
remarked “infamona”, “infamous one”. The infamy associated with a criminal who turns away 
from the criminal system, yet it was less an insult than an instruction of what will happen to 
her if she does not “play ball”. (Procedimento Penale n.1170/05 RG. Trib. – 15676/04 
R.G.P.M).  It was at this point that Raffaela decided that she needed to denounce, and so 
she went to the local Carabinieri. She recounted what happened next on the Italian talk-
show “Beati Voi” on the Catholic TV network TV2000: 
Host:  So when they left you ran [to the Carabinieri station] immediately? 
Raffaela: Immediately, right away, as soon as I could. I went to the local Carabinieri 
caserma looking for the lieutenant there. The lieutenant wasn’t there, but I 
said, “no you have to call him again, because if I leave I will never come back 
– I need to denounce”. The person there said “But Signora, to whom are you 
referring?” “The Camorra!” I said “extortion! So I need to denounce 
immediately!” The lieutenant immediately came down, and invited me up. He 
said to me “Right away before you tell me what happened, show me the 
surveillance photos, because otherwise they might escape” “Right now?” 
“Yes, right now” […]. 
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Host:  So they were arrested – the same day? 
Raffaela:  [She nods] Right away, because I went there immediately. (Tv2000it, 2015) 
The Lieutenant, a Venetian, sat with Ottaviano personally to get her account. There is no 
accessible judicial data on “Extorter 2” from the second day, leaving us to assume that he 
was not identified, and therefore was not tried. Both in court and from the victim in 
interviews, there are a number of questions regarding the timeline. From the judicial 
accounts we see that this happened over two days (15 and 16 March 2004), whereas from 
her personal account where the impression is given that all of the interactions occured on 
the same day leading her to “leave immediately” for the Carabinieri.  
In addition to payments in cash, the clans also forced shopkeepers to buy specific products, 
presumably related to businesses under their control or influence in some way. One example 
of this was the forced purchase of a particular coloured ornamental star at Christmas time 
which was to adorn their shops. The Birra first imposed the purchase of white stars to pizzo 
payers, which the Ascione followed up by imposing the purchase of red stars (Daniele, 2012, 
p.22), so as to make it easily visible who was paying, and to whom, whilst also 
demonstrating to other shopkeepers in the wider community that the influence of these clans 
on their local businesses was generally a normal and accepted thing in the city. To an 
outsider these stars mean nothing, but to someone who is already paying the pizzo and is 
thinking about denouncing their extorters, they are demonstrative of the grasp that the clans 
have upon the businesses. This is not unique to Ercolano. A similar situation was noted in a 
trial in 2004 in the area of Afragola where the Moccia clan charged businesses to “rent” 
Christmas stars over the Christmas period (Confesercenti Napoli, 2012). Similarly, during the 
Easter period some businesses were encouraged to deliver Easter themed ornaments and 
gifts (wine, Easter eggs, ornamental doves, panettone) to social gatherings related to the 
clan, whereby the leftovers would then be resold by the clan to other businesses (Daniele, Di 
Florio, Grasso, 2012).  
This type of pizzo functions in two ways: firstly in a pure economic way whereby a business 
“buys” a product for more than it is worth (giving the clans clean money, since it can be 
written off in business account book as “decoration” or “advertising”), and secondly in a more 
symbolic manner, whereby camorristi can show the extent of their power over a community. 
Similarly to this was the forced purchase of bread: kilos and kilos of bread (Daniele, 2012, 
p.21-2), seemingly produced by a clan-related business, were likely to go towards a money 
laundering operation. The following is an account by a butcher based in Ercolano of an 
exchange he had with a member of the Birra:  
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“How is it that you are getting bread from someone else, Zi’ Pietro said that you had 
to get bread from us. We’re not looking for any trouble, but you’ve gotta do the same 
as us…” 
“I’ve already got plenty of bread”. 
“You don’t get it, if you don’t take the bread from us, where does that leave us? Look, 
don’t make Zi’ Pietro mad, because otherwise you’ll have problems”. (Gerina and 
Vasile, 2015, p.207) 
The butcher was told to buy “10 kilos a day from Giovanni and 10 from Giuseppe”, but the 
forced purchase was not all beneficial, simply because the costs he had to pay were above 
market value: on the market normally it would cost 80 cents a kilo, but he had to pay 1.30 
euros for bread he did not want, the majority of which he would have to throw away at the 
end of the day: 
“If I took 10 or 15 pieces of bread from one clan, I also needed to take 10 or 15 
pieces from the other clan” explained the butcher who, after years of paying his dues 
to the Birra-Iacomino, started also paying the Ascione-Papale. He tried to tell them: 
“No, I don’t need any bread”, but he was just silenced all the same: “I have brought 
you bread, so you either can sell it, or you can just pay me all the same”, explained 
the new debt collector who introduced himself as “Zi’ Pietro’”. (Gerina and Vasile, 
2015, pp.207-8) 
In this example there is a clear initiative to collect clean money at the expense of the butcher 
who is forced to ignore local free-market logic and instead buy that which is more expensive. 
This forces him to abandon his initial supplier of bread and provide money to local clans for 
their services, thereby giving local Camorra-owned (and legal) produce providers clean 
money at the expense of those genuine local suppliers, and therefore harming the local 
economy and giving clean money for clans to invest elsewhere.  
Another shopkeeper simply identified as “G.D” had an experience where the pizzo he paid 
went beyond cash payment or the forced purchase of goods: 
G.D. paid three times a year, from 2006 to 2009: at times in cash (200-300 euros), 
other times through shop merchandise (IT products). 
The collector or collectors presented themselves in the name of “Zio Luigi”, a person 
known by the victim as a member of one of the local organized crime groups [the 
Ascione]: “he said that lo Zio had sent him. We understood because rightly, partly 
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from the newspapers and partly by the character that we know of our town, of fear … 
we have to give them this little gift, so they say”. 
Once again one of the accused, S.V came up to the victim’s shop and asked for a 
mobile phone valued at 200 euros, payable in instalments.  
G.D. refused initially, but he could not get away with giving the accused nothing at all 
“… he asked me if I could just give him a phone. In the end, he ordered me to give 
him a phone and he wanted to pay for just a couple of instalments. But I told him “It’s 
not possible, I don’t want to give it to you. You need to pay in full”, at which he says 
“Don’t you recognize who I am? ... So I will give you a call so that you can see who I 
am”. He showed up a few days later and, in fact, I saw his insistence, in that he was 
always coming back. So then I inquired as to who this person was because from the 
papers I found out that he was a person who had recently been released from prison. 
I gave him the phone and I gave him what he wanted, because when these people 
came into my shop I tried to make them leave immediately to avoid scaring the other 
customers”. 
After some time, the victim received a deposit of €50-100 euros for the sold phone, 
but the subsequent instalments, of course, were never paid. (Procedimento Penale 
n.45282/10 R.G.N.R. – 17778/10 R.G. Dib) 
This example seems to indicate a kind of independent extension of the pizzo, whereby S.V. 
tried to use his position as a member of the Ascione to gain extra tribute from G.D. than he 
was initially entitled to “officially” by the clan. This may be a purposeful tactic by the clan or 
an over-step of the clan’s authority by S.V.  In the Zoom document it is suggested that he is 
one of the clan’s foot-soldiers – expendable and trying to use his group’s influence where he 
can for his own benefit. Indeed, the knowledge of what these groups can do (G.D. mentions 
the local news and the fear of the clans in the town) influences the character of these 
interactions and leaves the possibility of an open-ended tribute to the clans. It seems as if 
G.D. called the camorrista’s bluff in lieu of the deposit for the phone, but still had to cover the 
following instalments as well as the pizzo he was already paying to the Ascione.  
This “logical” assimilation of the local economy is one side to this, but the (mis)use of 
Camorra power for the benefit of lower level camorristi is another. Likewise, a 
businessperson who dealt with marble recounted the time when he was approached by Ciro 
Savino (the baker’s would-be extorter) for a pizzo of €1000, replying that he could not pay it 
because he was very ill from heart disease – he was left alone. This was until he was 
approached two weeks later by some other extorters from the Birra clan, who requested that 
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instead of paying the pizzo, the businessman was to do some marble work in Savino’s 
house instead. The businessperson calculated that this would cost €5000-6000 euros 
instead – far greater than the original pizzo quoted to him before. This was never paid, 
however due to arrests (Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.). In this example, we 
see the original official pizzo amount in cash rejected, then later the camorrista tries to 
benefit as much as he can from the situation. These are not isolated incidents. In December 
2008 an owner of a bar, G.R, was approached by a man he knew to be a member of the 
Papale (linked to the Ascione), M.S, who asked to speak to him “Int’ o’ Vico” (Neapolitan for 
“in the alleyway”) because he wanted to talk to him about something. Asking for him to clarify 
what he meant, M.S. said: 
 You need to give us €450 for the prisoners 
G.R. said that it might be difficult to pay 
 If you don’t pay, I’ll blow up the bar. I’ll close the bar. You won’t open anymore.  
After Christmas, M.S. came back to the bar every now and then and would occasionally 
order drinks without paying for them. When he was asked for payment, M.S responded with 
“put it on my tab, don’t worry about it”. After this point, whenever G.R. asked him to pay 
there and then, he would respond with a “I’ll make you close the bar, I’ll blow it up…”. This 
continued for a while until he came with his wife, who was also related to the Papale, where 
they would pay for their drinks. The next time M.S. came into the bar alone for drinks, he 
was asked again to pay his tab, at which point he exploded at G.R: 
 Cornuto, you turd, I’ll kill you, your wife and your kids if you report me 
It was only at this point that G.R reported M.S to the Carabinieri (Procedimento Penale 
n.20156/11 R.G.N.R. – 19223/11 R.G. DIB.). The use of the Southern expletive cornuto is 
particularly interesting in this case. The word means “cuckold”, namely a husband whose 
wife is unfaithful to him. In the context of the mezzogiorno region it is generally associated 
with a man without “honour” in that he is unable to satisfy his wife sexually. In this context, 
the camorrista (perhaps accidentally) inverts the meaning when he refers to the shopkeeper 
as a cornuto precisely because he is resisting this, and therefore, Camorra influence into his 
affairs, logically meaning that the acceptance of payment (i.e. the metaphorical acceptance 
of their extra-marital relations with his wife) prevents him from being a cornuto, and therefore 
dishonourable. In not accepting Camorra dominance, the shopkeeper is, according to the 
clan, dishonourable. The camorrista, M.S, is quoting the line that other pizzo collectors for 
the Ascione use when they approach a business regarding prisoners, but instead of actually 
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pursing the €450, he treats the business as if it were his own, taking a drink without paying 
every now and then, and gets annoyed when the owner asks for the money. M.S had 
overplayed his hand, presumably because he thought he could rely on the fearful reputation 
of the Papale to get him free drinks, and did not expect the business to actually report him 
even when the initial demand for a substantial pizzo sum had fallen through.  
A similarly minded individual to M.S approached the owner of a restaurant, an enoteca and a 
bed and breakfast in 2007, his opening gambit being “You need to go to the Moquette, 
because we need to talk with you”. The following is an extract from the Zoom document, 
which is worth quoting at length: 
Though terrified by the invitation, in the sense that it was well-known that it was at the 
“Moquette” that one meets the representatives of the Camorra clan hegemony in the 
area … he responded that he wasn’t able to go anywhere because he had to work. 
Later, having not accepted the first “invitation”, the defendant “P.M”, a leading figure 
in the criminal world of Ercolano, directly intervened against the victim.  
According to the victim, in the second half of September 2007 an armoured dark 
coloured Lancia Thema approached his place with P.M at the wheel. After reminding 
him that he had “called him a couple of times”, he invited him again “for a walk”. 
When he refused the defendant dismissed him with a sarcastic “vabbuò” [Neapolitan 
for “okay”]   
About a month after that episode another emissary of the Ascione-Papale showed up 
at the victim’s restaurant aboard a high-powered motorbike, warning an employee 
“tell [the businessman] that he is starting to annoy us! If he doesn’t talk with us then 
we are through”. 
Despite fears for his and his family’s safety, the victim resisted the implicit and 
explicit threats intended to force him to go to the “Moquette” to “go straight” by paying 
“pizzo”.  
The pressure of the “invitations” and “warnings” culminated in a serious incident that 
occurred on the 7th July 2007 [sic], in which the accused “P.M”, explicitly expressed 
his intention to extort the victim, and of his origin from the Camorra clan hegemon, as 
well as knowledge of all the properties and economic activity of the victim, including 
those recently purchased. 
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It is incredibly interesting to look at this episode: the victim had just come out of the 
enoteca that he runs when he saw the accused aboard a scooter who said:  
“Don’t you like us? We have come here a load of times to call you and you 
never came! Don’t you understand that you too have to pay as well, just like 
everyone else? You are scrounging off all of Resina [the old name for 
Ercolano], you are scrounging … because this restaurant isn’t yours. Because 
this house isn’t yours. Because this enoteca isn’t yours”. 
The victim’s resistance even at this latest threat provoked the violent reaction of the 
accused who first slapped him in the face and then threatened him by pointing a gun 
to his legs:  
“Now if you want to denounce me, do it. I’ll be going to jail all the same! 
However, in the garden there [referring to a house that had just been bought 
by the victim] you won’t be doing anything” 
The defendant’s conduct is significant as he is not afraid to act like this in a public 
place, enough that the intimidating power of the clans he represents would be an 
effective deterrent to anyone who witnessed the incident. Moreover, it evokes a total 
and comprehensive control of the territory and of the economic activities carried out 
by criminal organisations in the area, demonstrative of the penetrating ability of 
infiltration in the economic and social fabric of Ercolano. 
The threat was not carried out because the victim reported the extortion to which he 
had been subjected to, leading to the arrest of the extortionist. (Procedimento Penale 
n.55571/07 R.G.N.R. mod.21 – 37974/08 R.G. G.I.P.) 44 
The claim to economic, territorial and therefore political dominance is incredibly striking here, 
where we see the violence that the Camorra evokes in a very meaningful way, as well as the 
punishment for not at least passively adhering to this Camorra hegemony. Similarly to the 
previous businessperson who was called a “cornuto”, the concept of “going straight” and 
paying one’s dues, namely the pizzo, is portrayed as something honourable or at least duty-
bound for a business to pay.  This works as a message to the businessperson themselves, 
                                                          
44
 In this document the events are dated “From the month of September 2007 until 07/11/2007 in Ercolano”. 
However, as noted by the insertion of “[sic]” the author of the document has incorrectly written “7
th
 July 
2007”, outside the date range. Given a number of other references (Antonio Di Florio, pp.116-7; 
Metropolisweb, 13 January 2008) that recount a similar confrontation in the street between a shopkeeper and 
a member of the Ascione, the date is assumed instead to be in the days before 13 January 2008 when two 
leading figures of the Ascione were arrested (Michele De Crescenzo and Mario Papale). It is assumed that PM 
is “Mario Papale”, though cannot be verified.  
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but also against any by-standers who watch what is happening. Fortunately, in this example 
the violence went no further and the businessperson reported the incident to the Carabinieri.  
These are a number of accounts of actual extortion or extortive attempts by local criminal 
clans on local businesses. Returning to Filippelli the reasons for these actions is clear with 
regard to territorial dominance, and goes some way to understanding the economic and 
political influence that the clans have over an area. However, there are some unanswered 
questions which we shall analyse here.  
The amount of 3 to 5% of revenues for the pizzo was a common theme for many of the 
businesses, where we are left with the conclusion that this is an acceptable Goldilocks 
number: something that is not too small for the Camorra, but also not too large as to bleed a 
business dry. The question is how the amount has been calculated: the amount that the 
business gains in revenue, at least in theory, is unknowable exactly at the point at which a 
business is approached by the Camorra. Therefore, unless the Camorra have the ability of 
knowing this figure due to inside information (e.g. contacts in the local administration or 
business),  monitoring the business or by overtly asking them, then the amount suggested 
by the camorristi is a “rough” figure based on what they predict the revenue of a business of 
that size in that area to be. This leads to an intriguing situation whereby the Camorra could 
have underestimated the business’s earnings, and therefore the percentage paid by the 
business would be lower, meaning that a shopkeeper could be paying a relatively small 
amount compared to other similar businesses. On the other hand, however, the earnings 
could be overestimated by the Camorra, meaning that the percentage paid could be too 
large a figure to reasonably pay: in such a case the Camorra may rethink the figure, in return 
for knowing the actual revenue of the business, and demanding an appropriate figure, further 
solidifying control over the shopkeeper by knowing the financial details of the business. This 
would require an element of negotiation about the amount depending on the finances of the 
business, something verified in interviews with the local Carabinieri:  
 The criminal says [to the shopkeeper], “look – I’ve got to do my rounds in the area – 
give me 3000 euros every festivity”. If they say that they have lower earnings, then 
1000 euros every festivity instead. (LE 18042015) 
So therefore we can note that there indeed is an element of negotiation regarding the pizzo, 
and that the amount of money that is being negotiated is not the issue. The issue is, rather, 
for the business to pay in the first place. This leaves us with more questions however, 
because, based on the evidence available to us, the pizzo was not as widespread as 
previously suspected.  
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3:  How many businesses paid the pizzo? 
It was noted by the representatives from the State, the Carabinieri and Ercolano per la 
legalità that the extortion racket(s) in Ercolano were powerful enough that everyone, or 
almost everyone, paid the pizzo before November 2009, when both clans’ extortion rackets 
in Ercolano were “decapitated”, and that a few years  after this time, no-one or almost no-
one paid. This was elaborated particularly by Angela Nocerino, the daughter of Filippo 
Nocerino (the building contractor), but also the coordinator of the anti-racket association in 
Ercolano, ‘Ercolano per la legalità’: 
All of them paid, oh God, the Carabinieri cannot say that all of them paid, but a large 
number of them did pay. People who moved their shops to Ercolano paid. Everyone 
in the area paid. Likewise, my father paid. We say that… The idea of having shop… 
we say that it’s a rooted idea with their associates. The first “favour” you do is talk to 
them, and give them this first “tax”. It then opens the door for further “honours”. It was 
a completely normal thing to do. This way, you feel absolutely safe with your shop. If 
you pay, everything remains absolutely peaceful. (CS2 18032014) 
And in 2014: 
We can say that no-one pays the pizzo – if someone does pay, it is a very rare case. 
There is not a justification to pay it as the shopkeepers aren’t scared. We have the 
Carabinieri who work with us – they always pass along the streets, pop into the 
stores, and just generally drive around the town – but not in an invasive way. We can 
say that no-one pays the pizzo –but if anyone does happen to… come to us! 
Because it really is a rare case – there just isn’t the justification to do so. (CS2 
18032014) 
Likewise Nino Daniele also highlighted that: 
In Ercolano everyone paid. Everybody paid the pizzo. But at the same time, no one 
would say that they pay the pizzo. The pizzo was paid by everyone. Often it 
happened that you would pay both clans – clan Ascione and clan Birra. So, everyone 
paid, but often people paid twice. (POL 18032014)  
And in 2014 there is no doubt on his part whatsoever: 
The Camorra is beaten. It’s not comparable to the organisation like before, when we 
lived under their dominion – sure, there are some that exist. And it is their wish to 
carry on and reorganize themselves, but they are beaten. When you are beaten you 
begin to collaborate, as many have done with the authorities, and have started to talk 
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[…] In three years, a city that was considered a city of the Camorra, has become a 
city of the anti-Camorra. (POL 18032014) 
Likewise, pentiti themselves spoke of the extensiveness of pizzo paying. S.F was a member 
of the Birra clan between 2001-2002 working particularly in drug trafficking. In 2003 (when 
he was 17 years old) he joined the Ascione working for the extortion racket where his role 
was to interact with the victims. Whereas building contractors and other entrepreneurs would 
go to the “Moquette” and pay “Zio Luigi”, S.F dealt with shopkeepers who paid around the 
three festivities, always accompanied by a number of his associates: 
S.F specified that it was not necessary to resort to threats because “most of them 
already knew… they would even have the envelope [of money] ready … they would 
pay immediately without discussion”, stating that the activity was spread throughout 
the area: “Everyone paid … there wasn’t anyone who didn’t pay”. (Procedimento 
Penale n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.) 
This leaves us in a troubling quagmire: according to representatives of the antiracket who 
worked with businesses and a member of the Ascione from 2003 until his arrest in 2008 who 
actually collected the pizzo, everybody paid, in complete contrasts with the judicial data and 
the accounts from businesspeople which detail a large number of individuals who paid the 
pizzo, but with a sufficient number of them who say that they denounced the pizzo upon 
being asked for the first time. Here we must choose between two equally disconcerting 
options: (1) that businesspeople have actively misled the Carabinieri and the judiciary about 
the extensiveness of the pizzo so as to cover themselves or; (2) that the Carabinieri, the 
judiciary, the antiracket and camorristi have overplayed the extensiveness of pizzo payment.  
To help answer us here, it is worth drawing on those businesses that are members of the 
antiracket, but say that they had never been approached for pizzo. This is an account from a 
“physical” shop close to the centre of the city: 
 Has your shop ever had an experience with the racket? 
Shopkeeper: Never never never. But I don’t know why. It’s strange because I’m not so 
special. People here believe that everybody pays, because in their opinion it 
is something obvious. It is true enough that we had a robbery where some 
people took [quotes amount stolen]. There was a guy outside with his friends 
who were watching for a while and then they came inside. According to 
others, those who pay [the pizzo] would not have been touched, and wouldn’t 
have had a problem with this kind of thing … it’s not because I didn’t pay that 
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they broke in. In 13 years, it is an ugly reality of being a part of the Neapolitan 
metropolis – because Ercolano is part of this great metropolis of Naples, 
because in all we have 3.5 million inhabitants, and it is something normal that 
in 13 years there would be a break-in of [amount omitted], because we are, 
as they say, a shop very much in view of the Camorra. (N1 11042015)   
To contextualise the business, it is located in the main financial area of the city, the area 
where it is generally understood that lots of businesses paid to both the Ascione and the 
Birra. It is also an open shop, in the sense that customers can walk in and out as they 
please. From the interview, the businessperson said that the shop has been present in the 
general area of Ercolano for around 13 years (i.e. since 2001/2), moving to its current 
location 10 or so years ago.  
Another interview conducted revealed an interaction, but no payment: 
 Have you ever had an experience with the racket? 
Shopkeeper: An experience in which they came here and wanted something, no. They 
asked in a veiled way, but I didn’t ever “lower my head” [submit to it]. I didn’t 
report it to the Carabinieri, instead I reported it to the [State] police. But the 
Camorra never did come back. We didn’t have any problems, my husband 
however, last year, his shop had a bomb inside which destroyed the shop 
completely. So we have been affected by it. The bomb was placed because 
they didn’t “lower their heads”, what’s more, my husband is in politics and had 
denounced the vote-exchange phenomenon. Immediately after this 
denouncement, they left this bomb, and destroyed the shop completely.  
 Why do you think that the Camorra didn’t come here?  
Shopkeeper: Because they understood that we won’t submit to them. Because fear is their 
strength. It is not that I am not scared, the fear made me understand that I 
need to be cautious – fear made me understand that I need to turn to the law. 
But, if I were to be scared, and do nothing, they are much stronger. And it is 
always like this. (N2 14042015) 
To place these different accounts in context, it is important to note that whereas the first 
business is an “open” business, this business is a “closed” one, in that you have to be let into 
the place of business, generally by appointment. The shopkeeper in this instance 
demonstrates an awareness of the clans around her, both with her own brief experience 
which she reported, and through her husband. Similarly to the previous account, it is difficult 
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to reconcile the view that the pizzo was paid en-masse in Ercolano with a shopkeeper 
voluntarily giving an interview stating otherwise, particularly when they say that they had in 
fact reported an approach by a camorrista in the past.  
We have to consider a number of factors here regarding the reliability of these sources. As 
mentioned in the methodology, I obtained interviews by distributing questionnaires to 
businesses who were members of the antiracket. The questionnaires were anonymous and 
were used to get an idea of the demographics of the people who joined the antiracket, as 
well as to gain an understanding of the general experience that people in Ercolano had with 
the racket. The interviews were anonymous, and were done one-on-one. We have two broad 
options to consider here: either these shopkeepers were being untruthful and had paid the 
pizzo and/or had been intimidated by the clans in the past or they genuinely had no 
experience with the clans whatsoever, and the only criminality experienced was one of 
robbery rather than extortion. If we consider the first option to be true, a question remains as 
to what reasons these shopkeepers have to be untruthful whilst also consenting to the 
questionnaire, and then to an interview in which they could be “exposed”. Other than to 
overtly deny any possible embarrassment of paying, or for any other personal reason, these 
individuals had no fathomable reason to (1) consent to an interview and then (2) be 
untruthful. There were other instances throughout the interview process of participants when 
the question of pizzo paying and their experiences were dodged entirely (N7 18042015). 
I judge that these shopkeepers’ account should be considered to be accurate, particularly 
when the first shopkeeper is thoughtful to our conundrum as to why that shop was skipped. It 
is for this reason that in many ways the shopkeepers who turned down the opportunity to be 
interviewed or to complete the questionnaire are viewed as the most interesting, but due to 
ethical considerations were necessarily left alone. Since this project is specific to a time and 
place, with numerous interactions with the protagonists as well as access to other 
documented data, we are able to build a detailed picture of how some of these interactions 
between shopkeepers and members of local Camorra clans happened.  
Additionally, the data collected from questionnaires given to signed-up members of ‘Ercolano 
per la legalità’ revealed that only three of the twenty-one shopkeepers who consented to this 
research project admitted to paying pizzo beforehand (see Table 1 below).  In this data we 
can also see that five shopkeepers claimed to have denounced extortion upon being 
approached. This can lead us to believe that either they are not willing to admit that they had 
paid it previously, or, that these businesses had genuinely never paid it. It was noted too in 
Palermo that the majority of joiners of Addiopizzo claimed to have never actually paid pizzo 
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beforehand and that they have joined because they were invited by friends or colleagues, or 
a sense of moral imperative to do so. 45  
 
Which of these phrases most describes your experience? 
I have never paid the pizzo and I have never experienced intimidation 
of an extortive nature 
10 
I have never paid the pizzo and I have always denounced extortion 
attempts 
5 
I paid the pizzo up until ****, and subsequently I denounced the 
extortion 
3 
I paid the pizzo up until **** 0 
I don’t want to/ I am unable to respond 2 




A number of antiracket businesses did not take part in the questionnaires, with some of them 
saying that they did not know that they were members, and others politely excusing 
themselves one way or another. Of those businesses that did not know they were members, 
one interaction was particularly interesting. In each of the previous guida per il consumatore 
critico antiracket (FAI, 2015), a number of businesses seemed to always be present. One of 
these businesses on the main street was run by an older gentleman. On approaching the 
man I told him the purpose of my project and asked if he would be willing to participate. He 
said he was, and so I agreed to return in several days to collect his questionnaire. When I 
returned, I asked him if I could collect the questionnaire, at which he told me that he was 
very confused: he had never been a signed up member of the antiracket, and therefore 
could not complete the questionnaire. I double checked later in each of the guides to cross 
reference this, and he was definitely present in each.  
Another example was that of a business a bit further away from the centre, where I was told 
to come back another day as the owner was not present. On the windows of the business 
was one of the Consumo Critico stickers, which advertise to the outside world that this is a 
                                                          
45
 I thank Carina Gunnarson for this observation. 
Table 1 
Questionnaire results from shopkeepers 
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business that has said “no” to the pizzo, so things felt promising. I came back, and the owner 
explained to me that the business itself changed hands a year or so ago, and that they were 
not members of the antiracket, but made it abundantly clear that just because they are not 
members, it does not mean that they are paying pizzo. I asked if they had received any word 
whatsoever from FAI or the antiracket, on which they told me that they had not. Here was a 
business that was freeriding on the “brand” of the anti-racket and the anti-mafia movement in 
general, but was not subject to any checks by FAI or the local anti-racket.  They are able to 
benefit from any ethical consumerism aspect to the anti-racket, the central aspect to the 
Consumo Critico campaign whereby people buy from mafia-free businesses, despite not 
being “part” of the anti-racket. In addition, it seems unlikely that they would be approached 
by an extorter from a local clan because it would be assumed that they would denounce the 
attempt immediately.  
These two notable interactions demonstrative of an antiracket association that is either 
overstating its numbers (be that purposely or passively), or does not keep its publicised 
records up to date, or a mixture of the two. These factors, combined with a low completion 
rate, made it incredibly difficult to access our specific data set and to analyse the area with 
certainty. To further this point, as shown in the introduction, investigations by the Carabinieri 
revealed the existence of a substantial piece of evidence concerning the extortion racket. In 
March 2009 Gennaro Dantese, a member of the Ascione clan, had his home searched by 
the Police, and in one of his kitchen cupboards a three page list was found. Organised by 
street and/or zone, and then placed in columns indicating name or nickname, the type of 
business, amount, and when, this seemed to list the businesses paying pizzo to the Ascione 
clan in the extortionist’s own handwriting.  
A member of the Ascione arrested a few weeks later, Fausto Scudo, decided to turn pentito 
and confirmed that this was indeed a list of the extorted businesses by the Ascione (Gerina 
and Vasile, 2015, p.208). The list contained around 80 or so names (at that time in 2009, 
only 6 businesses had actually denounced their extorters) (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.216). 
These businesses are ones that would fit the differentiation between businesses that we 
have made as “shopkeepers”, the ones that have a set location and have money collected 
from them on a regular basis. The number of these types of businesses in the whole of 
Ercolano, however, is over 700. If we limit our number of businesses to the “centre” of the 
city, ignoring businesses which require driving rather than walking to reach we could narrow 
it to around 600. If we went further and simply chose the two main streets we are left with a 
very generous 200 businesses. Even if we assume that the extorted businesses in Ercolano 
were equally spread throughout the city between the two clans (i.e. the Ascione and the 
Birra extorted the same number apiece), which we can assume that they were not, the case 
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that “all businesses in Ercolano paid the pizzo” is a spurious one, even when we know of 
one clan’s collection rota.  Unfortunately it was not possible to access the data in full, so we 
cannot say with certainty whether the businesses listed in the three page ledger were 
located close to the busier financial centre, clustered in “pockets” or spread out throughout 
the whole city, or whether other ledgers existed.  
Whilst unfortunately there is no “Birra ledger”, there are some indications as to how large 
their extortion racket was. The aftermath of the bomb that was detonated outside the bakery 
in October 2009 by the Birra led to widespread arrests, and of these arrests came the 
collaboration of Birra pentiti (Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.), who were able 
to shed light on the Birra’s extortion racket in the absence of a “ledger”, with details of 
extorted businesses. The importance of their testimony, in addition to other pentiti, was 
elaborated by local maresciallo (Marshal) of the Carabinieri “D.C”: 
The information contained in these manuscripts [from the pentiti] identified 23 
business owners who admitted to have been subjected to extortion, and of 60 
businesses that were heard [for evidence] only 10 denied having received extortive 
requests. (Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.) 
If we take the numbers here as a general estimate of the size of the Birra’s extortion racket, 
given the number of pizzo-paying businesses already identified through the Ascione ledger, 
and with the lack of other evidence saying otherwise, 50 or so businesses paying the pizzo 
are a significant number but is by no means all of the businesses in the territory. 
Comparatively we could say that the Ascione’s extortion racket is bigger than the Birra’s, and 
that the Birra received less of their revenue through the pizzo than the Ascione – although 
the emphasis the Birra placed on the drugs market due to its high profitability could explain 
this. 
It is important to reiterate the history of the clans in the area, given that the Birra only really 
became a major force in Ercolano after mass arrests of major members of the Ascione in 
Operazione Nemesi (1996) (Di Florio, 2012, p.102; La Repubblica, 13 May 1997) where they 
took control of the area around the Cuparella through well-placed partners in the drugs 
market. Later, the same clan secured an alliance with a number of other groups (notably the 
Iacomino in 2001) (Di Florio, p.103), assassinating the bosses of both the Ascione and the 
Montella clans (from the neighbouring Torre del Greco) in one ambush in 2003 (Di Florio, 
2012, p.125; La Repubblica, 12 March 2003) to start a war. Though it is not certain what the 
reasons for the war were, one major factor gradually affecting the revenues of both clans 
was the transforming drug market, moving away from Ercolano in favour of Torre Annunziata 
to the South and Secondigliano in the North This, according to testimony by pentiti, was a 
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reason why there was greater emphasis on extortion around this time, something both clans 
already practiced in the territory (Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.). Information 
gained from victims and pentiti helps us chart the shift towards extortion from 2003/4 
onwards in the area where there were a number of businesses who were (according to the 
businesspeople) approached for the first time.  
This made the territory itself and the money gained from extortion much more important than 
in the past, when it served solely as a form of revenue to pay salaries of the associations’ 
members. The clans shifted focus to the growth of the extortion racket in order to 
compensate for the reduced revenues elsewhere (namely, drugs and construction). This 
goes some way towards explaining, at least from an economic perspective, why there were 
a number of businesses who had seemingly been approached for the first time in the 2000s. 
To summarise, even when the Ascione were in their heyday throughout the 1990s, judicial 
data and individual testimony from shopkeepers indicate that the extortion racket did not 
cover the whole of the territory. Indeed, the first time a number of businesses were 
approached for pizzo, despite existing throughout the 1990s, was in the months and years 
following the outbreak of conflict between the two clans. Towards the end of 2003 there were 
a number of new approaches to businesses, and the Ascione had two instances of being 
refused on first request in 2004, whereas both clans had somewhat of a spike in first 
requests from 2005-2007. Both of these times are around times of conflict, so we can infer 
that the reasons for these demands for pizzo from different businesses was due to military 
necessity, rather than territorial/hegemonic expansion.  
It was perhaps to both clans’ detriment that they did not expand the extortion racket in times 
of relative stability when they would have been better placed to punish non-payers without 
large media/community attention, rather than at a time when they actually required the extra 
income from businesses in order to conduct their war. From 2003 there is on-off conflict 
between the clans as they both compete for the territory through violence: bringing greater 
attention to their activities through violence in the streets and making the number of killings 
difficult to ignore. Major operations by the Carabinieri eventually decapitated both clans, 
notably in 2007 against the Birra in Operazione Reset (Daniele, 2012, p.50-1; Di Florio, 
2012, p.113; Radio Siani, 2003), and from 2009 onwards against the Ascione with the 
discovery of the extortion ledger (Gerina and Vasile, 2012, p.208) through operations 
“Regalo di Natale”, “Cento Vetrine”, “Free Shop” and “Andate in Pace” 2009-2010 
(Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.), though both clans still exist in much weaker 
forms today.  
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4:  Why do businesses pay the pizzo? 
In some ways the answer to this is question is obvious. Regarding Filippelli as well as the 
insinuation or outright use of violence by camorristi upon businesspeople to force them to do 
as they say, we must point to fear. The reason why businesses pay the pizzo in its various 
forms to camorristi when they request it is because of the metus causa factum. Whilst the 
questionnaire was largely inconclusive due to a small number of respondents and other 
issues,46 we are able to say that the most chosen answer to the question “Why do you think 
people pay the pizzo” was “because people are scared” (10 businesses), followed by 
“because there is not enough support from the government” (9 businesses). Other 
responses were “Because there is not enough collaboration between businesses” (4 
businesses), “Out of habit” (3 businesses), “because there is not enough support from law 
enforcement” (2 businesses) and “Other” where one business claimed “Some businesses 
pay it due to tradition”, with the option “because paying the pizzo provides cheap and reliable 
protection” receiving no responses.  
Given the nature of the Camorra in Ercolano and organized crime in the mezzogiorno region 
in general, this is hardly a revelation, and demonstrates the manner in which pizzo payment 
is due to the metus causa factum where the consequences for not paying (violence) appears 
to be the main factor, alongside the perception that the government is not doing enough to 
protect you from this. The question was kept purposely vague – it asked why people in 
general pay the pizzo, rather than asking for their own experiences. This was instead asked 
in the interviews where applicable.  
There is more to the data than meets the eye, given that the only businesses in the 
questionnaire that admitted to paying the pizzo (3 businesses), 2 of them answered that the 
reason they did so was “out of habit”, pointing to that “creeping normality” that we have 
identified elsewhere. It is important to stress that the threat of violence is real, and has been 
demonstrated through individual acts of violence against shopkeepers as well as the murder 
of other businesspeople. Despite this, judicial accounts of what we have seen in Ercolano 
reveal that the insinuation of violence was only ever used during the first meeting that 
businesspeople had with the camorristi in their safe house and then actual violence were 
only used if a business refused to pay, whereas the monthly or festivity reminders never 
seemed to meet with the same threats.  
                                                          
46
 One respondent answered the question “Why do you think people pay the pizzo?” with “Other: I don’t think 
people pay the pizzo anymore”, whilst another ignored the question and the section of the questionnaire 
concerning the antiracket entirely. 
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Why is this? The amount asked for is often relatively small. In a simple cost-gain analysis of 
pizzo payment a businessperson contrasts the amount that they are asked to pay (which we 
have noted to be around 3-5% of revenues, though sometimes different) over the course of a 
year with the threat of violence and perhaps death. A comparable phenomenon in the centre 
of Naples and elsewhere in the mezzogiorno is that of parcheggiatori abusivi, individuals 
who request money from drivers so that they are able to park their car or motorbike in an 
area. Everyone knows that these individuals are not State employees, nor from any private 
company that owns the right to charge drivers for a parking space, yet everybody prefers to 
pay them regardless because paying one or two euros for the peace of mind that your 
vehicle will not be damaged is a price worth paying. The logic of pizzo payment when the 
amount requested is small (particularly in the form of free drinks, etc.) is the same. This is 
how camorristi have been able to get free phones, build drink tabs without payment and so 
forth. It can be better to submit to a minor request then live without hindrance.  
This is plausible for small amounts, but what about larger amounts such as hundreds or 
thousands of euros? I point to the reasons why businesses pay taxes in general: precisely 
because it is a norm to do so, and as time goes along, this norm becomes further 
entrenched. From the perspective of a pragmatic business owner, we observe a business 
bringing pizzo payment into their rational economic calculations and projections of their 
business as if other taxes or payments that they are required to pay to the State had 
increased. If there is an attitude towards the pizzo that is the same as that which exists 
towards tax (that it is a norm that one must conform to and pay), then every single pizzo 
payment becomes easier to pay – particularly if it is already taken into account in the 
planning of the business. It is notable that it was mostly “new” businesses who were 
approached for the first time who denounced their extorters without encouragement, rather 
than frequent payers where the norm of payment had already been established.  This is 
precisely the ideal “Leopold Bloom” (Agamben 2009) citizen that the Camorra fosters in their 
interactions with them – a pizzo payer who pays their dues as a matter of course, and 
passes this responsibility down to their successor and so on. This individual has been 
created by the structures around him, and the perception of what is common sense in this 
context is founded on these influences (Gramsci, 1999).  
The first step is to demonstrate the extent to which the Camorra is to be feared (measurable 
by insinuation of violence against the businessperson, the extensiveness of their influence 
throughout the area through those “affective-aesthetic effects”, such as white and red stars 
in shop windows, visibility in the media and so on) or at least worthy of submission. The 
second step was for the businessperson to accept this as normal. This step is when paying 
pizzo becomes a norm and when the payment of the pizzo enters into the financial 
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calculations of the business in general. It is just another business cost: albeit one that is 
payable in cash. This second step demonstrates the true power of the Camorra whereby the 
idea of revolting against the Camorra becomes unthinkable: revealing the ideology that it 
disseminates and fosters in the population in the habitus that the clans share – without the 
clans actually doing much at all (Pine, 2012). After the point where the norm has been 
established, it becomes a social faux-pas not to pay this amount, later solidified by the 
niceties between camorristi and businesspeople when they meet at the Moquette.  
A question worth asking here is how aware the businesspeople were during this process of 
normalisation. We can demonstrate the steps the camorristi take in order to garner passivity 
in the individuals they wish to make money off of, but it would be rash and perhaps even 
patronising to take the businesspeople for individuals for such fools here. They understood 
the process that was happening, yet they paid regardless. In an inversion of Marx’s 
conception of the commodification and what he called the “fetishism” of goods, and the 
manner in which a greater value has been placed on them beyond their inherent economic 
value, “they [the population] do this without being aware of it” (Marx, 1867, p.166-7), Slavoj 
Žižek, echoing Peter Sloterdijk, applied this to ideology and the (un)acceptance of certain 
truths. This states that “they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it” 
(2008, p.25), pushing it further to become “They know very well how things really are, but 
they are still doing it as if they did not know” (2008, p.30). This second inversion presented 
by Žižek is perhaps a more apt explanation of a businessperson’s reaction to extortion.  
Individuals know very well that they are socialised in a certain direction away from their 
“natural state” (i.e. without subjugation and conditioning), but instead prefer to live their life 
as if their new socialised reality is natural. This goes some way toward understanding the 
“political” power and influence that the Camorra has over those people who join their ranks, 
their supporters, those people they extract money from, and individuals in society in general.    
 
5:  Conclusion  
This chapter introduced the pizzo and protection money as it is experienced in Ercolano. 
Based on the response of the relevant investigating magistrate, I distinguished between the 
protection money that is paid by entrepreneurs who go from contract to contract and another 
that is paid by shopkeepers in one or more set location. From the experiences of 
shopkeepers in Ercolano I was able to analyse the extensiveness and the frequency of the 
pizzo by two different clans, concluding that unless we discount the testimony of some key 
members of the Ercolano antiracket, the pizzo did not reach full coverage in the area – 
particularly in areas where we would expect the pizzo to be collected more.  
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The pizzo was identified as more than simply a “cash” payment, but something that ranged 
from the forced purchase of goods (red and white stars, kilos of bread), forceful admittance 
of Camorra contacts onto building consortiums, and the giving away of certain products to 
Camorra associates. In the last of these I noted a possible cleavage between that which is 
the “official” Camorra clan pizzo, and that extra part that is taken by camorristi (free drinks, a 
free phone), hypothesising the nature of this and questioning whether this is a purposeful 
strategy, or merely an abuse of power which the main bosses turn a blind eye to.  A 
comparison between the accounts of different businesspeople revealed similarity in the 
actual action of pizzo payment between pizzo payers: each involved being approached by a 
camorrista who tells you to go somewhere to talk with them (in the street, in the alley), who 
then tells you to go to one of their strongholds (the Moquette or fuori al ponte for the 
Ascione, the Cuparella for the Birra) where they outline the manner in which you are obliged 
to pay the pizzo. A member of the clan then comes along every month, or every festivity to 
either collect the pizzo money, or to remind you to take it to their stronghold. Based on the 
remarks by businesspeople, with an exception of partial negotiation when business was not 
going very well, this was the extent of their relationship with their extorters.  
I contextualised the number of businesses that paid pizzo in the area before November 
2009, concluding that the declaration by the former Mayor and the antiracket association that 
all, or almost all, of the businesses paid the pizzo was an exaggeration. The number of 
businesses that paid the pizzo was significant, but without disregarding the accounts of key 
businesspeople we are unable to claim with good judgement that the pizzo was universal or 
near universal in the area. Here I reasoned why the extortion racket(s) did not cover the 
whole of Ercolano, concluding that the clans (foolishly) placed a greater emphasis on the 
erratic (and lucrative) drugs market, rather than reliable (but less lucrative) sources of 
income such as the pizzo that also guarantee territorial supremacy.  
On the basis of the data on the businesspeople collected in Ercolano as well as the judicial 
data, I concluded that pizzo payment involved similar mechanisms as taxation, whereby it is 
the normality and acceptance of the system in place over time that allows for the 
continuation of payment, rather than the overt fear of violence. The fear of violence is 
present, undoubtedly, however it is less of a factor as time goes along. The power of the 
Camorra in this context is one that does not need to use violence to compel individuals to 
pay pizzo over time, given that its influence over the community has already been accepted 
by the pizzo payer. This is extortion, but not an extortion that can be stopped by simply 
arresting the extortionist, rather it is intrinsically linked to the payer’s perception of the 
Camorra and its place in the community it inhabits.  
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This chapter is devoted to the State response against organized crime and the pizzo in 
Ercolano. Its particular focus is the combination of judicial repression and the development 
of specific cultural spheres and norms in the community that make the conduct of judicial 
repression easier. I note that the powers that be have chosen to adopt a dual strategy 
against organized crime that has incorporated a socio-cultural approach into its already 
existing judicial framework. This is a response to the pervasiveness of the Camorra and 
those socio-cultural norms that sustain the Camorra in society.  
I begin by analysing the type of repression that has been used against Camorra in Ercolano 
by law enforcement agencies. In particular I discuss methods that have been used, and 
specific examples of camorristi turned cooperating witnesses. This is followed by the role of 
funding and support for cultural organisations and voluntary associations as a means of 
challenging the Camorra. This leads to a section on the role of culture in reorienting 
individuals in society towards legality and “following the rules”. I then devote the final section 
to explain the “Modello Ercolano” (the Ercolano model), that is, the purposeful strategy that 
has been taken by law enforcement agencies, politicians and the judiciary in Ercolano as a 
means of rebuilding trust between citizens and the State.  
   
1:  Judicial repression in Ercolano 
Since 1996 and Operation “Nemesi” that arrested 194 associates of the Ascione clan, there 
has been a partial reliance on Camorra pentiti to bring other camorristi to trial. The 
interlinking ties between surveillance and the collaboration of pentiti and the individuals they 
denounced are elaborated in this first section as a means of demonstrating the utility of such 
strategies.  
The first main pentiti were the brothers Leonardo and Salvatore Zirpoli who were arrested in 
this operation. Their decision to collaborate with the police in return for reduced sentences 
led to the murder of Leonardo’s 16 year-old son, Ciro, as well as the attempted murder of 
their half-sister Giuseppina Brisciano. Another member of the Brisciano family, Gennaro 
Brisciano later turned pentito against the Ascione and gave evidence about other members 
of his clan. He was eventually murdered in 2003 in an ambush organized by the acting boss 
of the Birra, Enrichetta Cordua, the wife of imprisoned boss Giovanni Birra (Il Mattino, 14 
September 2003). There is no clear reason as to why Brisciano was murdered, given that he 
was a former member of the Ascione, though parts of the local media speculated that he 
could have been a spy (Lo Strillone, 16 March 2015). Cordua was later arrested in 2007 in 
Operation “Reset” under 416-bis, which was later upgraded to murder when the testimonies 
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of other Birra pentiti indicated that it was her who organized the hit. She later became a 
pentita (female cooperating witness), giving the Carabinieri and the judiciary greater 
understanding of the everyday organisation of the clan and their relationship with other clans 
– providing other leads for the Carabinieri (Il Mattino, 10 February 2016). The Ascione had 
similar parts of their organisation revealed, discussed most prominently in the 2016 
documentary series “Camorriste” (2016), featuring an episode about the boss-turned pentita 
Antonella Madonna. The episode featured interviews with Pierpaolo Filippelli and other 
members of the local Carabinieri, as well as a long account from the pentita herself. It 
recounted quite succinctly how she was married to a man born into a Camorra family (the 
Suarino family), Gennaro Dantese, who rose up the ranks of the Ascione. Dantese initially 
gained prominence after the murder of the acting boss of the Ascione, Mario Ascione, in 
2003 when he became involved in the organisation of the clan. After a number of lower 
ranking members of the Ascione became pentiti and incriminated the bosses above him, 
Dantese became the boss of the Ascione. During this time, Dantese controlled the actions of 
the clan, whilst Madonna controlled the economic side of the clan: paying lawyers, the 
salaries of the foot-soldiers and the social welfare of those families who had relatives in 
prison. This is not dissimilar to the social welfare provided to camorristi and their associates 
by other Camorra clans as observed elsewhere by Sciarrone (2011) and Colletti (2016).  
Dantese was arrested in 2010, and later became incriminated himself for the murder of Carlo 
Borrelli, an Ercolano-based entrepreneur who was shot, had his body burned and was 
abandoned on a road on Mount Vesuvius for not paying pizzo (NapoliToday, 10 March 
2009).  
Madonna took over as boss of the clan, and began an affair with a sailor based in Torre del 
Greco. Dantese’s family discovered her infidelity and began threatening the pair of them, as 
well as Madonna’s family. Carabinieri surveillance through wiretaps meant that they 
understood most of this situation, knowing that they needed to arrest Madonna and 
encourage her to become a pentita before she was murdered by the rest of the Ascione 
clan. She was arrested in December 2012, and became a pentita – denouncing the Ascione 
and their affiliates in return for the opportunity to raise her children, which she was permitted 
to do outside of Ercolano with protection from the State. Further collaboration from Madonna 
and between fourteen other pentiti led to another mass blitz against the Ascione in July 2016 
and the revelation of corruption between a member of the law enforcement and the clan 
(Cronache della Campania, 11 July 2016). From research on the Ascione and the Birra clans 
since the 1990s, there is evidence of collaborations between the Carabinieri and at least 
twenty-five different pentiti, giving the Carabinieri a remarkable knowledge about the 
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everyday organisation of the clans, their networks, their activities, their respective salaries, 
and the various characters within them.  
Together with the data collected from pentiti, other methods employed locally to collect 
evidence include surveillance, amounting to the covert placement of recording devices in 
visiting hours for known camorristi in prison, “stake outs” of known camorristi’s homes, 
undercover Carabinieri cars, plain-clothed officers, Carabinieri vehicles fitted with recording 
devices as well as traditional wiretapping techniques. All of this led to arrests, generally 
based on 416-bis alongside another crime, and the possibility of more pentiti, who, in turn, 
led to more arrests.  
We are left with some issues here. Whilst these types of techniques are undoubtedly 
successful with regard to the number of individuals arrested, the socio-economic and cultural 
conditions that influenced these crimes to start with are not addressed. Whilst it is important 
to apprehend those criminals who are already active, that is a limiting factor of traditional 
police work itself – it is an attempt of curing the symptom of a problem, rather than the cause 
of it. Exemplary of this approach is the aforementioned Operation Nemesi: an operation 
based on traditional police work that led to the arrest of 194 individuals of the Ascione (a 
number of whom were released after appeals). The arrests led to the rise of the Birra clan 
who partially filled the vacuum that was left by employing a number of contacts in the drugs 
business that had not been apprehended. The “pulverised” (Ministero dell’Interno, 1999) 
nature of Camorra clans in the area makes it difficult to uproot the Camorra phenomenon in 
general, where the decline of one clan leads to the rise of another in its place. Such was the 
scale of the operation that the Ascione were conducting in Ercolano, that they had become 
an integral part of the local market, with a large amount of money available to individuals in 
the area who had very little job opportunities.  
Inevitably, the supply-and-demand cycle in the drugs market was filled by another supplier. 
Ercolano was later left in a situation in the early 2000s of two Camorra clans fighting for 
control of the same market, which had been previously controlled by one of the clans. Given 
the number of Camorra clans in Naples and the surrounding area, only a region-wide effort 
would push Camorra clans back enough so that individual clans will not benefit from the 
demise of their adversaries. There have been signs that municipalities are willing to pool 
their efforts against organized crime and criminality in general, such as the “Protocollo 
d’intesa per la sicurezza urbana integrata” (2007), which provided a joint framework between 
the Prefettura di Napoli, the Regione di Campania, the Provincia di Napoli alongside the 
bordering towns of Ercolano, Portici and San Giorgio a Cremano aimed at partially solving 
this issue.   
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This quick vacuum filling also happens within the clans themselves, whereby one head of 
the clan is arrested, and one particular organisational culture comes to an end, only for 
another to take over in their place. The Ascione was founded by Raffaele Ascione, who 
conducted the clan’s activities alongside a criminal clan from Catania in Sicily, the Papale, 
with another criminal group who had a number of drug contacts, the Cozzolino. Raffaele was 
arrested, and interacted with the clan from prison through his wife until his death in 2004. In 
his absence his brother, Mario Ascione, was given control of the clan until his murder in 
2003. The boss of the clan continued to change arrest after arrest due to pentiti revelations, 
culminating in the leadership of Natale Dantese and then his wife, Antonella Madonna. At 
this point leadership returned to members of the Suarino family to which Dantese was 
related, and then eventually to Raffaele Ascione’s widow, Immacolata Adamo, who was 
arrested in July 2016 in “Operazione Freedom”. It transpired that earlier in 2016 Adamo was 
approached by members of the Birra clan to disband the Ascione for a payment of €25,000 
so that they could control the whole of Ercolano, an offer which she dismissed as too low, 
leading to the planning of her murder and her eventual arrest by the Carabinieri following 
confessions by Birra pentito Gerardo Sannino as well as surveillance (L’Ora Vesuviana, 13 
July 2016). In this case, the weakening of one clan is followed by the increase in power of 
another. The Camorra see-saw in Ercolano since the 1990s has consistently gone back and 
forth. The number of competing alliances between various clans in the area in different 
ventures means that it is incredibly difficult to avoid the mass arrest of one clan culminating 
in the rise of another.  
It is precisely this phenomenon that Tom Behan described when he wrote of the Camorra 
hydra: each chopped off head results in two heads replacing it (2009, p.161). Each defeated 
clan leaves a vacuum to be filled by others. Using these judicial and police methods alone, it 
is only possible to uproot the Camorra clans in an area if every element of the Camorra’s 
operation is destroyed. It is not enough to arrest the boss, the lieutenants, the accountants 
and the foot-soldiers since the clan can be recreated by them once they leave prison. It is 
also prudent to consider the relatives who relied financially on the clan (who now have a gap 
in their income) who may welcome another clan that is rooted in a similar social, economic 
and cultural context. The rate of unemployment in particular is important to invoke, wherein 
employment may be found using similar middle-men and contacts to before to find work. 
What is a young man who dropped out of school, for example, to do when the most obvious 
work opportunities are related to a clan in one way or another?   
The manner in which the State is able to respond to these issues is an open-ended question. 
Judicial repression has expanded by criminalizing those elements of society which are seen 
to be benefitting organized crime groups themselves by giving the better access to the licit 
113 
economy (political corruption in general, lawyers, contractors) in the area grigia, and 
arguably, will continue to expand to the detriment of liberty and privacy. If we move beyond 
this reactionary approach to crime, we have to address precisely how it is we believe that 
organized crime (1) develops and then (2) is able to flourish in a community and (3) how we 
are feasibly able to actively change the rules and boundaries of the habitus within which they 
operate. The question is not only whether we place greater emphasis on social, economic, 
or cultural factors regarding the organized crime phenomenon and its interaction with the 
rest of society, but also in what manner we should respond to these factors to prevent its 
development. Inevitably, this is an incredibly complex question: we must address 
simultaneously how the State has understood this conundrum and how they have actually 
addressed these issues. The following section outlines the manner in which the local, 
regional and national governments in collaboration with the European Commission and other 
funding organizations have approached the issues of changing the social, economic and 
cultural context in Ercolano that we can overtly designate as structural adjustment towards a 
more neoliberal economy, that is, one that is economically self-sufficient and requires 
minimal State intervention by creating generations of financially independent and innovative 
citizens.  To do this we place particular focus on those programmes which have identified 
structural changes in the area itself as a way of combatting criminality.  
 
2: Structural adjustment through funding 
There are several examples of funding and grants that have attempted to address structural 
issues. I shall first introduce them before analysing them in more detail. Of particular focus in 
Ercolano was the conservation and optimal utilisation of historical, cultural and 
environmental assets that set the territory apart from other places in the world. Here we refer 
to the Herculaneum archaeological site, Vesuvian villas built by the Bourbons, Mount 
Vesuvius and its proximity to both Naples and the Amalfi Coast (Città di Ercolano, 2008). 
These have been identified as assets whose utility should be maximized, which would then 
lead to an increase in the amount of tourist money coming to the area. It is hoped that this 
increase in tourist money will help the area to prosper, removing various economic motives 
that encourage people to work with or alongside Camorra clans.  
The opportunity to exploit the cultural and historical assets in the territory as a means of 
improving the area was not missed by locals who wished to lure outside donors. After many 
years of neglect by the Italian Ministero della Cultura, which “failed to commit the kind of 
routine funding that the care of this and other UNESCO World Heritage-listed archaeological 
sites of the Sopratindenza Archeologica di Pompei” (Thompson, 2007, p.192), a 
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“Memorandum of understanding” was reached with the Hewlett Packard Foundation, an 
American philanthropic organization, thanks to whom in 2001 a conservation framework was 
created for the Herculaneum site. In this, there was to be a partnership between the public 
and private sectors, helped financially by the Hewlett Packard Foundation where they would 
work together to improve the conservation of the area and develop the cultural identity and 
experience of the site and its related bodies. This was later expanded in 2004 to include the 
British School in Rome who was selected in order to give extra weight to the heritage aspect 
of the project. Alongside this, the private-public partnership has sought to create and 
develop certain Civil Society groups, comprised of local and international experts who would 
engage in the study of local history and culture through the site and disseminate information 
about the site, maximizing the utility of the sites in the area through talks and open-days for 
local schools.   The purposeful interaction between the site and local schools (culminating in 
school projects and trips to the site) and the local administration and other Civil Society 
groups through the creation of the role of a Community Officer is also important here47 as 
aimed at making the Herculaneum site more than simply a heritage and economic asset, 
turning it into a social unit which can benefit the local community through participation. 
Furthering the benefits of the Herculaneum site to the territory, from 2003-2009, the “Urban 
Herculaneum” project used €40,700,000 from National, Regional, Municipal and Private 
bodies for urban development of the city, focussing on five main areas: 
 The urban and environmental regeneration through the creation of 
multidimensional infrastructure, rehabilitation of squares and streets, 
restoration of the town centre, improvement of the transport system 
 The promotion of cultural resources (e.g. construction of cultural centres and 
a School of Archaeology 
 The improvement of socio-economic conditions through incentives for crafts 
and businesses 
 The improvement of sustainable tourism opportunities 
 The improvement of security. (European Urban Knowledge Network, 2010) 
On the ground, this came in the form of: restructuring and re-planning of one of the central 
squares (Piazza Pugliano), the creation of a foundation to organize the enhancement of the 
cultural experience of tourists (CIVES: Centro Integrato per la valorizzazione di Ercolano e 
                                                          
47
 Interestingly, the current holder of this post is an active member of Radio Siani. In addition, when I 
contacted the Herculaneum Conservation Project asking about their interaction with the local community, 
they directed me towards Radio Siani too.  
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degli Scavi48), renovation of some of the tourist transport, the foundation of a school for 
young archaeologists, and the “Resina Tipica” operational centre which is focussed on 
supporting local business (European Urban Knowledge Network, 2010). In 2008, CIVES 
inaugurated the opening of MAV, a virtual museum about the Plinian Eruption which 
destroyed the Roman cities of Herculaneum and Pompeii. This was located on the main 
street in Ercolano between the train station where the tourists arrive and the archaeological 
site itself. It is easy to see that the focal point of the development is the shifting of the 
economy to be more dependent on tourism. The tourist assets of the area (in the form of the 
Herculaneum site and Mount Vesuvius) have been identified as an area of development, 
bringing outside money and investment to the area for the benefit of local people through 
jobs. The inclusion of the “Resina Tipica” brand encourages products to be locally made, 
then developing the local economy through tourist money.  
The results of this funding were mixed. Despite the money spent on the MAV and the quality 
of the final product, it had limited impact on the international tourist for the simple reason that 
the virtual material is only available in Italian. Such an implemental oversight is difficult to 
understand, particularly given the number of English and German speaking tourists who 
arrive into the area with money to spend. Two reasons for this could be the poor quality of 
English in the area (there are no language schools in Ercolano, for example, and  my own 
experience rates the quality of English taught in schools to be rather low) and a lack of 
money or organisation to make the MAV accessible. Whatever the reason, inaccessibility for 
non-Italian speakers is ultimately a huge hindrance for the area and the centre itself, 
undermining attempts of making the area more and more reliant on international tourists.  
Piazza Pugliano was still undergoing restructuring work in 2015 (throughout the early 2000s 
it was the site of several Camorra murders). Furthermore, despite the amount of money 
being spent on it, the piazza is rarely visited by tourists who only go to visit Ercolano to visit 
the Herculaneum site. Despite the high hopes of the “Resina Tipica” brand, its products are 
incredibly difficult to find – particularly for tourists, who only tend to walk along the main 
street towards the Herculaneum site before leaving again.  
Later in 2007 European Commission funding came to Ercolano through the Più Europa 
programme (Città di Ercolano, 2008) by way of the region of Campania for the purpose of 
improving  
 Sustainability of decisions, obtained through the participation of citizens and Civil 
Society so as to enhance the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the actions through 
forums and participatory planning workshops 
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 Integrated centre for the enhancement of Ercolano and the excavations. 
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 The pursuit of a high quality of life, by applying the principles of environmental, social 
and eco-compatible sustainability 
 The strengthening of public and public-private partnerships  
 The optimisation of expenditure in terms of quantity and quality. (Ecosfera, 2010, 
p.10) 
This involved the structural adjustment of medium-sized cities in Campania away from a 
welfare-based and participatory State model, in favour of a participatory society and private 
businesses, involving the State only when the private and “third” sector are unable to 
address structural issues through the free-market or social and environmental awareness. 
This included, amongst other things, the assistance to local entrepreneurs, identification and 
targeted use of historic and cultural assets in the territory and the restructuring of urban 
spaces for the benefit of the community in general.  
This adjustment towards economic sustainability makes use of mass youth unemployment in 
the area, and attempts to gear citizens in the territory to create their own individual economic 
and social enterprises for the benefit of the community in general in competition with other 
medium-sized cities in the area. The program outlined a number of problems in Ercolano, 
which are viewed to be a barrier to further development: 
In an urban sense, the city has been characterised by an irrational and systemic 
growth. Furthermore, there is a substantial shortage of adequate infrastructure and 
services such as public transport, leading to urban congestion from traffic.  
In the social sense, the city exhibits a significant lack of services and infrastructure 
for the community for what is required – particularly those for children, but also in 
public spaces and places for social gatherings for both old and young. This then 
emphasises the presence of social inclusion problems and pronounced housing 
problems, resulting in increase in the crime rate. (Ecosfera, 2010, p.88) 
Here criminality and the crime rate in general are understood, admittedly rather broadly, 
partially as a result of social exclusion and housing problems. These issues were to be 
solved through an approach that addressed the perceived misuse or inefficiency of the city’s 
historical and cultural assets, and at the same time provided zones of socialisation that 
foster productive Social Capital for the further development of the area through 
associationalism and trust. Social exclusion in this context is perceived to be due to a lack of 
social gathering places in the public sphere where individuals can interact in a (albeit 
normatively defined) socially, economically and culturally productive way. 
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As noted previously, the Camorra has social power in a community and is a genuine 
alternative for young Neapolitans who would otherwise remain underemployed or 
unemployed, ultimately providing an arena for individuals otherwise excluded from 
progression in their community (culturally, socially, economically) to interact with other 
likeminded individuals in that community and feel included. Obviously, this type of social 
inclusion is not that which is being encouraged. Indeed “social inclusion” is defined here not 
just as the manner in which an individual feels part of a community, rather it is the manner in 
which an individual feels part of a specific community – that community which is the driving 
force of the social, economic and cultural development, all within the logic of a broadly 
(neo)liberal framework. The funding here is not for the purpose of encouraging people to be 
more interactive with one another in general, rather it is to encourage people to be more 
interactive with one another in a specific way that makes the community more resilient and 
sustainable, all without the need for the State. It is difficult to avoid understanding this type of 
development as a purposeful means of improving governability and resilience in the face of 
globalization.  
How did the Più Europa programme approach the underdevelopment it identified? In 
Ercolano the developmental money from the programme was earmarked for a number of 
things to target this, including: restructuring some of the streets around the archaeological 
area, linking the main Herculaneum site with the Roman Theatre nearby, creating a new 
access to the Herculaneum site, restructuring the streets outside a school, restoration of 
communal buildings for the future Carabinieri station which was based in Torre del Greco, 
the linking of two outdoor parks by creating a tunnel to take vehicles away from them, the 
creation of a historical/cultural centre for one of the Bourbon villas (Villa Maiuri) complete 
with equipment and furnishings, regeneration of one of the main streets, the creation of a 
cultural centre (ATENA) for young people in a disused royal stable which will also be 
renovated, the creation of an urban park on one of the main streets, regeneration of two of 
the main piazzas in the centre of the city, regeneration of one of the main streets close to the 
coast and maintenance work in several streets (Città di Ercolano, 2008). All of this added up 
to a total of €33,133,469, of which a majority was spent on restructuring and the renovation 
of streets, with less than €10,000,000 being spent on what we could define as directly 
addressing the social problems acknowledged above (Ecosfera, 2010, p.92-3).  
Concerining the social sphere influenced by the Camorra,  we can seriously criticise the use 
of much of this funding for merely cosmetic changes – making the city look nicer, but not 
actually addressing any of the deeper structural problems – particularly when it is in some of 
these piazzas that young adults first interact with camorristi (Camorriste, 2016). This is a 
charge that has also been levied against the political establishment in general – particularly 
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with regard to the phenomenon of naming streets, piazzas and adding plaques in the name 
of notable figures in the anti-mafia movement, or innocent victims of the Camorra. The 
discrepancy between the symbolisation and marytrisation of these individuals compared to 
the actual actions of the ruling junta was widely scorned in the media in 2016 when the 
Comune of Ercolano paid for the plaque of an innocent victim of the Camorra in 2009, 
Salvatore Barbaro, but then forgot to provide the correct paperwork that would have allowed 
the comune to be represented in the trial so as to support the victim’s family: 
They remembered with a marble slab and a solemn march a few weeks ago in via 
Mare, the place where the innocent man was killed by Camorra hitmen. They 
remembered with a mass and with a string of fine words immortalised in video and 
photography (all posted on social media of course). But when it came to get serious, 
they “forgot” - leaving only friends and relatives in the trial to face the man who killed 
him with 11 gunshots (Metropolisweb, 9 December 2016) 
This discrepancy between words and actions is common, which leaves the comune open to 
charges of talking the talk but not walking the walk. There are many parts of the city and 
streets named in the Più Europa report that were still undergoing building work during 
fieldwork, some of which was there for the duration of my stay, even beyond the summer of 
2015 (despite this particular Più Europa funding being destined for the 2007-2013 period). 
Indeed the royal stables, le scuderie, opened for the first time in the summer of 2015 
(€250,000 was spent on the cultural centre and the purchase of equipment, and €1,466,566 
on the refurbishment of the building). Whilst certainly hosting regular cultural events and 
showcasing local businesses, the clientele seemed to be what we could best define as the 
middle class, rather than the disadvantaged socially excluded youngsters that it was 
arguably supposed to help. Likewise the Urban park on the Miglio d’Oro has its issues too 
(See figures 1-3). Its opening times - Monday to Friday from 9am to 6pm and weekends and 
bank holidays 8.30am to 12.30pm are inconvenient for the young people for whom it is 
intended. In addition to this, it is forbidden to play football, a well-known pasttime for young 
Neapolitans – who instead opt to play in the street and in the areas which are commonly 
associated with camorristi. Despite containing a playground (some of its equipment is 
broken), and some park benches with some inspirational quotes on them, this project to give 
disadvantaged children something to do in public. The park cost €1,430,000, and receives 
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To somewhat hammer the points of security and legality, Più Europa provided another 
€1,880,000 which went towards: raising awareness and making better use of resources in 
the territory for the benefit of the population (but there were no details how this was done, 
costing €500,000); the installation of an integrated security system including burglar alarms, 
video surveillance in municipal buildings, public schools and the street, the creation of a 
citizen and tourist oriented web portal dedicated to warnings and recommendations made by 
the citizenry (all under the “Ercolano Città Sicura” program, costing €935,000); new 
surveillance equipment for operation centres and vehicles (working alongside the Polizia 
locale, costing €50,000); the building of raised pedestrian crossings (€320,000); and video 
surveillance for the city’s roads aimed at drivers (€75,000) (Ecosfera, 2010, p.221-2). These 
should be viewed as complementary to the already existing strategy for judicial repression, 
emphasising deterrence and the protection of comune assets.  
This is not to overtly say that this funding has been misused, rather, it is to note that despite 
the awareness that criminality in the city has been caused by a number of (societal) 
structural issues, the vast majority of the funding from Urban Herculaneum and Più Europa 
have been spent on making the city more appealing to tourists, and therefore encourage 
them to spend money there – creating jobs. Despite the amount of money that has gone 
towards these efforts, the truth is that where Più Europa pointed to the issue of social 
exclusion and housing problems, the investment into expensive road restructuring, the 
opening of outside spaces which are rarely used and fall into a state of disrepair, minimal 
efforts to boost local entrepreneurs and the expanding of cultural initiatives to disadvantaged 
young people through both programmes have fallen well short of their objectives. The 
projects appear to benefit private interests rather than alleviating the societal problems that 
have been identified. It seems that a route has been chosen that focusses on private 
interests and an increased securitization of the area.  
On the other hand, the conservation efforts by the Hewlett Packard Foundation and its 
partnership with State structures have largely been positive. Even though its main focus has 
been cultural and historical conservation, its partnership with the State and interaction with 
local associations has meant that its work goes far beyond the conservation effort itself. The 
site encourages access to local children through open days, bringing young people into 
contact with positive cultural capital, whilst the site is entirely free to access once a month, 
bringing other locals to the area who wish to visit it. The Urban Herculaneum and Più Europa 
programmes were, in many ways, freeriding off the increasing viability of the Herculaneum 
site, seeking to maximise the impact of the site itself. In some senses this is an 
understandable strategy. By focusing on the cosmetics of the city and its “image”, the city 
would be better placed to attract outside (private) investment, shifting the cost of developing 
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the city away from public institutions to the private sector instead and providing employment 
to locals. In this vein, the city tried twice to become the Italian city of culture, unfortunately 
falling short both times. Whilst there is certainly some merit to changing the economy of the 
city and gearing it towards tourism, it is unlikely to succeed in the short term given the 
astonishinging limited places for tourists to stay, as well as things to do for tourists other than 
the MAV and the Herculaneum site, all of which are worsened by the low proficiency of 
English and other international languages by locals. There is, for example, one small tourist 
info-point in the city (which opened for the first time in 2015), which is manned by volunteers 
with varying levels of language proficiency and is only open sporadically in the summer 
months. Local politicians have been grappling with how to encourage tourists to stay longer 
in Ercolano and enjoy the other parts of the city other than the Herculaneum site itself. 
This general funding strategy for Ercolano has economic development through sustainability 
and maximum utility of assets at its heart, whereby the end-game is a community that is 
economically self-sufficient. There is a general understanding here that the alleviation of 
economic underdevelopment is achieved through a more neoliberal approach to the 
economy and the creation of a community in which security and development go hand in 
hand (Duffield, 2014) in which previous underdevelopment is conceptualised as having led 
to danger and insecurity. Underdevelopment leads to criminality and vice-versa. This general 
approach to the economy and a purposeful pursuit of development should not be separated 
from the fight against organized crime and the manner in which the State approaches the 
issue. This is for the simple reason that whilst judicial repression is reactionary, these kinds 
of developmental agenda attempt to address those same structural factors in the long term 
that are understood to create economic insecurity in general, and, therefore, to address and 
remove some of the reasons for an individual to become involved in organized crime in the 
first place.  
The manner in which this funding has approached the issue of economic underdevelopment 
and social exclusion leaves much to be desired. There is very little effort to address social 
exclusion of those individuals who would otherwise be at risk of interactions with the 
Camorra and criminality in general, despite the acknowledgement in the Più Europa 
programme that this is one of the main causes of underdevelopment in the area. If the aim is 
to expand the number of local businesses in the service economy for the purpose of 
sustainability and supplying the product that tourists in the area demand (in the form of bars, 
shops, accommodation, tourist merchandise) and for the purpose of lowering unemployment 
and utilising assets, then a question worth asking is how it is possible to form such a local 
economy without giving Camorra clans access to money from the licit economy whilst at the 
same time not socially excluding those local people who do not have the relevant skills or 
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forms of capital that make them worth hiring in this service economy, namely, those same 
people who would be more at risk of interacting with the Camorra. For an individual who is 
born into a community such as the centro storico of Ercolano, to what extent are the options 
in life, and then the influences to make certain decisions over others, genuinely different? 
When these development programmes present the possibility of more options for such an 
individual with regard to work, the factors that influence whether these options are attractive 
or worthwhile compared to others remain relatively unaltered. At the same time, the types of 
Cultural Capital (Bourdieu, 1986) that some of these jobs may demand may be different to 
the ones that this individual has grown up with. 
As a further example, the expansion and redevelopment of already existing piazzas does 
very little to address these social exclusion problems, and is perhaps counterintuitive when 
one considers the influence that camorristi have over these social spaces as a means of 
disseminating their specific Cultural Capital. From the accounts of Antonella Madonna, who 
eventually became the boss of the Ascione, it is in these piazzas where she first met and 
became involved with her future husband, and therefore his network of Camorra contacts. 
As she herself noted: 
We were all very much surrounded by the business of the Camorra. Via Canalone, 
Cuparella, Piazza Pugliano. It’s there where you can meet all the boys and girls. 
Amongst all my friends I felt superior to everyone else, which was a part of my 
character. I wanted to command even when I was there!  […] I met my husband [in 
these piazzas] when I was only 11 or 12 years old. As a young man he was very 
captivating. He already was a young man who everyone feared, and was a young 
man who was above everyone else around him. (Camorriste, 2016) 
It is precisely this captivation that is not addressed by these projects undertaken in the city, 
and that must be approached in a socio-cultural manner. The area itself can become more 
cosmetically attractive, and bring in more money from outside of the territory, but the appeal 
of the camorristi who live in these areas remains relatively untouched. It is not enough to say 
that social spaces in general need to be regenerated and improved, because some of these 
spaces are also influenced and/or dominated by the Camorra and their social networks, as 
long as an element of the local population still regards with some positivity those qualities 
and specific Cultural Capital that camorristi represent and foster (See Appendix VI.II).   
In this manner, it is difficult to see many of the funding opportunities here as a definite 
approach at which to undermine criminality entirely, without also focussing on the social 
element to Camorra power: be that their appeal to locals in the services and financial 
opportunities that they offer, or the culture of omertà that they have fostered amongst 
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businesses and the general population to prevent denouncing their activities to the law 
enforcement. In very blunt terms, by addressing the economic underdevelopment of the 
area, its historical and cultural assets, transport links, redevelopment of social meeting 
spaces and supporting some local businesses without addressing the relationship that 
organized criminality and area grigia middle-men have with the rest of society, economic 
development here risks assimilation into the licit economy by the Camorra, and their further 
entrenchment into the economic life of the territory.  
 
3:  Cultures of Legality 
Judicial repression and a re-gearing of the economy to address social issues are two ways 
in which the State has attempted to combat organized crime (and the structural issues that 
cause it), but they only tackle some of the issue. Judicial repression deals with those 
individuals who already are criminals and provides disincentive for those who may commit 
crimes in future. Economic structural adjustment attempts to deal with those issues that 
create poverty and unproductivity in the first place, whilst also attempting to give other 
economic alternatives to would-be criminals. The cultural sphere and the manner in which it 
affects behaviour are also important, affecting and (re)creating those norms and perceptions 
in society that make certain life-styles and decisions more appealing or less desirable than 
others to individuals within specific (sub)cultures.  
It is useful at this point to engage with ideas proposed by Kelling and Wilson (1982), and 
enacted in New York City by the Republican Giuliani administration in the 1990s (Levitt and 
Dubner, 2006). It is notable that reactions to the so-called “Broken Window Theory” (Kelling 
and Coles, 1997) have not been tried in Naples to date. The theory posits that the feeling 
that “no-one cares” about what happens in a community, signalled by uncleaned graffiti, 
unrepaired broken windows,  and even disinterest in upholding rules in society “leads to a 
breakdown of community controls” (Kelling and Wilson, 1982). These “untended” behaviours 
increase the likelihood that individuals will commit crimes, generally disrespect others and 
abuse their community. For various reasons Naples and its metropolitan area are notorious 
for the level of low high incidence rule breaking. As we have already noted, this varies from 
the level of informal employment, informal/non-existent contracts between individuals, non-
payment for public transport, graffiti, littering, double parking cars in streets riding 
motorcycles without helmets, lack of insurance on vehicles and queue jumping. This 
coincides with the perceived lack of response from the institution or individuals in society to 
punish these behaviours – be that through penalties from the State or the use of shame by 
individuals to indicate to the perpetrators when they act in such a way. This creates a vicious 
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cycle which serves to further entrench apathy and the belief that “no one cares”, and that it is 
not in a person’s personal interest to obey the rules because of a lack of consequences. This 
represents the ebbing away of social cohesion and trust in State institutions.   
Rather than following this route, the Italian State, the region of Campania, and the comune 
of Ercolano have pursued general strategies that have attempted to change the nature of the 
habitus by influencing those socio-cultural factors that determine individual behaviour, also in 
symbolic ways. It is notable, for example, that in the early months of 2017 the Mayor of 
Ercolano announced his intention to remove pro-Camorra graffiti that has been present in 
the area for years.  It is tempting to interpret this as an institutional response to Broken 
Window Theory, but was much more about symbolism. As the Mayor, Ciro Buonajuto 
attested: 
We have been removing other pieces of graffiti over the last few months, and we will 
continue in this manner. In the fight against illegality, symbols are also important. It is 
in this way that we can develop a culture of legality [cultura della legalità]. Whenever 
we report such incidents, we will try to intervene as soon as possible (Metropolisweb, 
5 March 2017). 
The reason for wanting to remove graffiti was less about the breakdown of community of 
controls that influences individual behaviour and petty crime, as it was about symbolism vis-
à-vis the Camorra.  Rather than removing graffiti because having a cleaner public space is a 
desirable end ipso facto, the focus has been on the symbolism of particular types of 
messages in a public space.  The focus has been individual behaviour, rather than the 
changing of the external and structural factors that cause some of these behaviours.49 An 
example of this elsewhere may be found with Roy Godson’s notion of the Culture of 
Lawfulness (2000) which we refer to in the Italian as the cultura della legalità. This exists on 
a spectrum: the adherence to the law in general at one end, and the active denouncement of 
illegality at the other. In the “Protocollo d’intesa per la sicurezza urbana integrata” (2007), the 
municipalities of Ercolano, Portici and San Giorgio a Cremano adopted a joint strategy on 
building this cultura whereby they would actively pool their resources into rebuilding the 
relationship and “social trust” [fiducia sociale] between the citizen and the State. In order to 
do this it would require a joint inter-communal effort, with the additional impact of Civil 
Society Organizations, in the area of “deviance”, “bullying” and “illegality” in a concrete 
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 It should be added that one of the most eye-catching pieces of graffiti on one of the main streets that I 
noticed the first time I visited the city in 2014, “BIRRA MERDA” (insulting the Birra clan, though it is unclear 
whether it was tagged by an opposing clan member or someone else), is still sprayed on the wall as of 
September 2017. There is still a piece of graffiti referring to the “Cuparella” on Via Pace, the street where 
some businesspeople paid the pizzo to the Birra clan. 
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manner. In this context, social trust that the State is working for the benefit of the citizen and 
society at large as understood as vital for the successful conduct of State policies. In this 
context the citizen is hoped to be a willing partner.   
In Ercolano, this effect had a number of different results, given that this cultura does not 
merely encourage adherence to the law, but also active citizenship: denouncing unfairness 
and oppression where it exists with a general impetus on the improvement of the community, 
albeit within an already existing legal apparatus. Every year during the “Settimana della 
legalità” (Week of legality), a series of marches, events and activities are organised 
sponsored and conducted by various comunes, associations, schools, law enforcement, and 
aspects of the State apparatus. They all culminate in one large national demonstration in a 
designated city which changes every year of and which I was fortunate to attend alongside 
one of the partner Civil Society Organizations in Ercolano, Radio Siani, in Bologna in 2015. 
Ercolano celebrated this on the local level with its own event, “la Marcia della legalità” (the 
march of legality), a march starting from the central piazza and through the main street, 
finishing at one of the municipal squares where the marchers listened to speeches from 
various local people such as leading Carabinieri officers, association heads and school 
teachers – all talking about the topic of legality and what they can do to make their city a 
better place (see appendix 18 March 2015). The march itself was attended by different 
members of the anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano, including: the then Mayor and his 
colleagues, prominent local councillors, former Mayors and politicians, other associations 
including “Let’s do it Italy!”, representatives from Libera, Radio Siani, soldiers from the 
Carabinieri, and, most pertinently, all the children from the local primary, middle and high 
schools.  
The march in Ercolano was a product of an inter-school project by the comune of Ercolano 
called the “a scuola di… sicurezza, legalità, ambiente” (school of… security, legality, 
environment), which sought to expose young people to the concept of legality in class and in 
the street.  What is important to emphasise is that the purposeful inclusion of schools and 
schoolteachers alongside members of Civil Society Organizations and Civil Servants in this 
march was not the whole story. Part of this programme was the inclusion of issues of legality 
in the school curriculum. For the days and weeks beforehand, students from all of the local 
schools were asked to research and do school work based on the march, including the 
designing of placards and the discussion of ideas surrounding legality, organized crime and 
the community in class. Between speeches by members of Civil Society Organizations, 
politicians and Carabinieri officers, the microphone was passed to select students who would 
read out a quote about organized crime and legality that they had composed themselves, or 
from famous figures. Many of the quotes advocated active citizenship through a Societas 
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civilis, in line with post-Marxist emphasis on improving the state of affairs in a community. 
Here is a selection of quotes from the march: 
“The hard hands of our future will bring back legality” 
“He who fights risks losing, he who does not fight has already lost” 
“[Through] legality you find peace. No to the Camorra. No more injustice. We need to 
be free to talk about how to beat the Camorra – long live peace and legality – the 
earth will die from hate and will be reborn with peace” 
“Legality betters our world” 
“Legality is synonymous with a better future” 
“Legality cleans the world of the mafia and brings children on the right path, because 
we are the future of a better world. With legality there is the respect for the laws, and 
we can change our community. We choose legality because it is man who decides 
what happens to everyone in a clean, healthy and peaceful world” 
“The world is a dangerous place to live in, not because of the people who are evil, 
but because of the people who don't do anything about it” [Albert Einstein] 
“Even today Ercolano goes towards a broken society where the Camorra causes 
fear, a society in which the fear of conscience and some businesspeople prefer 
l’omertà to denouncing. Legality means waking up in the morning and clothing 
yourself in courage. The acceptance of defeat to every type of injustice and not 
knowing what to do despite what one believes [is Right] does not make the city more 
powerful. Legality is everything that renders cohabiting alongside others possible. It 
is not healthy to be lone wolves, isolated, but without sharing things together. Legality 
has made this cohabitation together possible” 
“Legality is respecting the rules. Not only the rules that we impose on one another, 
but the rules that we live day to day. The rules allow us to live a life together in a 
community in a way we can best define as ‘human’”. (Appendix V, 18 March) 
At the very least, these quotes are demonstrative of the kind of legality that is being 
discussed in schools, though it would be misjudged to assume that they account for the 
children’s understanding of legality in its entirety, rather they are an expression of the 
idealistic side to this cultura. Several of these indicate the need to follow the rules for the 
bettering of society, others are more nuanced in pressing for an active citizenship for the 
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benefit of all. One thing that they all have in common, however, is that the person who is 
responsible for this change is necessarily the individual: the citizen. The citizen must alter 
their behaviour and follow the rules for the benefit of all. One main issue, if we are permitted 
to be critical of quotes by schoolchildren, is that the existence of current rules and laws 
which some may regard as immoral, wrong, or damaging to society, is not brought into 
question. Put simply, any structural issues within the current status quo that may exist are 
not addressed. There is a risk here that the legality that is begin pushed is that of adherence 
to the rules no matter what rather than adopting a more critical view. To make this even 
more troubling, it is worth noting that one of the speakers, the then Mayor, Vincenzo 
Strazzullo, as well as other councillors in the PD were implicated on corruption charges 
several weeks later for crimes of the provision of public works contracts (Metropolisweb, 12 
October 2016). 
In connection with this project, one of the local schools, for example, took a cultural position, 
citing a “distorted knowledge of legality” (A. De Curtis – G. Ungaretti, 2014, p.7) as one of 
the main emerging problems affecting the area in its formative educational plan.  It further 
stated that 
The strengthening of research and intervention on the issue of legality is necessary 
in order to cope with the messages of Camorra subculture, which imposes 
paradoxical behaviour codes through the logic of oppression and violence and the 
subtle conditioning and recruitment of younger age groups. 
The school achieves this through education on legality and health through normal 
“schooling”, educating children, providing them with the knowledge to move in the 
contemporary world, informing their conduct, developing attitudes towards sociability, 
interculturality, tolerance and cooperation, making their lifestyles through the 
achievement of the equilibrium of the mental and the physical through textbooks, 
books, film, artistic and sporting activities and games. (A. De Curtis – G. Ungaretti, 
2014, p.14) 
This addresses precisely those elements which developmental funding did not: that of 
(re)defining the nature of the habitus to the detriment of “Camorra (sub)cultural” sphere.  
Through the school’s commitment to the “a scuola di…” project, the school identified a need 
for a “promotion of culture, security and legality as a moment indistinguishable from the 
educative-social formation of the pupil” (A. De Curtis – G. Ungaretti, 2014, p.50). Its 




























Giorno della legalità in Bologna, March 2015. 
In this photo that I took, you can see four individuals who are part of 
Radio Siani’s organising committee. The woman in the centre has a 
tablet from which she is individually reading out the names of each 
innocent victim of organized crime in Italy. At each reading of the name, 
the marchers chant a particular slogan where the victim’s first name 
changes each time: 
“GIANCARLO SIANI” 
“Giancarlo è vivo e lotta insieme a noi! Le nostre idee non moriranno 
mai!”  
(Giancarlo is alive and struggles alongside us. Our ideas will never die!) 
 
Giancarlo Siani was a Neapolitan journalist for the Il Mattino newspaper 
who was killed by the Camorra in 1985 




The Marcia della legalità in Ercolano, March 2015. 
In this picture from the Radio Siani website you can see members of Radio Siani’s 
organising committee who are leading from the front, schoolchildren and 
schoolteachers who have been given the day off in order to take part in this march, the 
community coordinator for the Herculaneum site, various members of the communal 
administration including the Mayor, members of the Carabinieri and various members 

















 To know, recover and affirm the value of the culture of legality  
 The training of legality as a means of fighting the mafia, omertà, bullying and 
oppression 
 The education of solidarity, interculturality, tolerance, diversity and friendship 
 To make people aware of the work of institutions  
(A. De Curtis – G. Ungaretti, 2014, p.50) 
Other aspects of this project went even further, such as a direct interaction and cooperation 
between law enforcement officers and members of the emergency services. There is an 
annual event at the Ercolano football stadium where children from local schools do activities 
such as assault courses and learning about the daily procedures of these officials. In one of 
these, the children were shown how dogs sniff out drugs through a demonstration of a bag of 
cocaine being placed in a suitcase alongside other suitcases – all of which was cheered on 
by parents and teachers in the stadium’s stands. By interacting with law enforcement 
officers, young people are able to see the “other side” of criminality from the perspective of 
the Carabinieri - giving members of these institutions a personal face (Radio Siani, 2014). 
Here we see the already normative conception of legality/justice placed within a status quo 
Statist discourse where the adherence to legality becomes a means of facilitating State 
actions elsewhere (represented here by assisting law enforcement).   
Following Evans and Giroux (2015), we note education to be a form of political intervention 
by its very definition. Rather than being a critique, this is an acknowledgment that the 
manner in which the State disseminates a version of cultura is never really objective. In 
favouring a broadly Marxist and Gramscian interpretation of the function of social norms over 
functionalist ones, I point here to the role that these discourses serve in reproducing and 
upholding the status quo. One of the speakers, a teacher from a local school, elaborated the 
“legalità” camp in these words: 
Like all of you, I also have a smartphone. I used it to understand the word “legalità” 
and what it referred to by our dearly loved resources. There was a thing that struck 
me. Legalità becomes adherence to the rules that protects the weak from the 
oppression of the strong. I know this because it has been referred to directly from my 
smartphone … this today is a thing we need to underline – we are not weak. We 
need to protect the weak – we need to give a hand to protect them. Here everyone 
today, you are not simply the citizens of tomorrow, you are the citizens of today. This 
is always better. We are not given a beautiful picture today of our society: corruption, 
problems, people disinterested in politics, people with nothing to look forward to in 
the future. But we need to carry on with the day. 
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These things that you have, because you all have them… Use them! Don’t just use 
them to go on Facebook or other such like. Teach yourself and memorize the 
numbers of the Carabinieri, the Mayor, the Guarda di Finanza, the State police. It’s 
not enough to say that you are here – it is better to denounce. It is the courage to say 
“this happened in this moment”. Because the other side will say that what they are 
doing is not wrong.  
[…] 
The thing that you need to understand is that this morning the schools of Ercolano 
are here, the institution is here, the law enforcement is here […] Legalità is not simply 
obeying the law, because we need to pay our dues, or because we need to 
denounce others, instead legality is everything in our lives. We are legalità. We need 
to be lawful. We have to face various points of view – the one we face today is that of 
the law enforcement. And today I want to thank the Carabinieri, the Guarda di 
Finanza, the State police, and the local police, who are always close to us. 
(Unnamed Ercolano Schoolteacher, March 2015) 
Given that this behavioural change is one-directional (in that it is the populace who are 
encouraged to change their behaviour to the State and Law enforcement, and not the other 
way around) and the State remains unaltered, insofar that the State is placed as the centre 
of the entire endeavour, Societas civilis is instead used as a weapon to assure the 
cooperation between State and society, rather than the end goal. 
The promotion of a culture of legality is one side to this cultural State-led (or promoted) 
approach to criminality. In Ercolano, the purposeful use of confiscated goods and assets (as 
allowed for with the legge n.109/96, which I discuss in the following chapter) has also 
become an essential part of this process. The various networks and relationships created 
through the broad “anti-mafia” fight on the local level has encouraged the continued fight 
against the Camorra through social and urban development. Examples of this include 18 
properties that have been confiscated and put to reuse in Ercolano up until 2015 (Città di 
Ercolano, 2015). The confiscated properties varied from apartments, farming ground, 
vineyards, cellars, and so had a varied number of uses. The recipients of these 
properties/assets were: the antiracket association “Ercolano per la legalità” (1 apartment); a 
local voluntary association50 “Arcipelago della Solidarietà” (2 apartments); a metropolitan-
level development consortium “Consorzio S.O.L.E.” (10 properties of which 8 are 
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 As prescribed to in law “legge 11 agosto 1991 n.266”. 
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administered jointly by two other social cooperatives); a social cooperative51 “Arci zona 
rossa” (2 apartments); the Comune of Ercolano (one 80-square-metre cellar), whilst two 
more properties are under consideration. The details of the recipients are important in turn to 
investigate in order to better analyse what legge n.109/96 (Libera, 1996) looks like on the 
ground. 
The apartment given to “Ercolano per la legalità” in 2013 was a property previously owned 
by a Pietro Scognamiglio (Nota n.10905 del 07.03.2014), associated with the Birra clan in 
the early-mid 2000s. The 120.5 square metre property, along with all of its furnishing, was 
given to the association so that it could become the headquarters of the antiracket, of which 
the sitting president at the time was Nino Daniele (Città di Ercolano, 2015). The two 
apartments given to “Arcipelago della Solidarietà”, a voluntary association, were transformed 
into “Casa Nelson Mandela” in 2009, which gave refugees a place to live. The association 
itself “intends to practice and promote volunteer activities in solidarity with and support for 
vulnerable individuals; promote a culture of solidarity as the concrete affirmation of rights; 
contribute to the development of a pluralistic community; push for the end of marginalization 
and underdevelopment; contribute to the development of participation as an affirmation of 
citizenship rights; and encourage the process of democratization of public facilities for equal 
participation” (n.d). With the support of the Italian Ministero dell’Interno and the Comune di 
Ercolano, Arcipeligo della solidarietà was selected to administer this property, with places for 
15 individuals (Nota n.10905 del 07.03.2014). Whilst the properties are administered by the 
association, this administration is based in a joint Comunal/Ministerial project which is to be 
renewed annually.  
“Consorzio S.O.L.E” and its intertwined organisations are somewhat more complicated to 
explain. S.O.L.E (Sviluppo Occupazione Legalità Economica - Development, Occupation, 
Legality, Economy) is an initiative of the Provincia di Napoli which seeks to streamline the 
process of giving the stewardship of a confiscated property from the State or Municipality to 
a suitable voluntary association or social cooperative. In collaboration with the national 
agency which administers “beni sequestrati” (seized goods) and “beni confiscati” 
(confiscated goods), S.O.L.E is tasked with removing obstacles which can slow down this 
process (such as mortgages) on a local level. S.O.L.E itself is a project by the Direzione 
Politiche (Political Directorate) of Naples, itself under the jurisdiction of the Città di Napoli, 
which, under a Presidential Decree must offer its services and personnel for free for S.O.L.E 
activities (Città Metropolitana di Napoli, n.d.). In short, S.O.L.E is interwoven into the regional 
and metropolitan administrations, and, therefore, also with the Italian State.  
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 As prescribed to in law “legge 8 novembre 1991 n.381”. 
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The entirety of one apartment and 89% of another in the same building were given to the 
comune of Ercolano (the other 11% is occupied by another resident) in 2010, but after a 
giunta comunale decision in 2012, the apartments were eventually entrusted to S.O.L.E 
because they were deemed uninhabitable (Nota n.10905 del 07.03.2014). The last 8 plots of 
land surrounding this building, were entrusted to S.O.L.E, who then entrusted them jointly to 
“Cooperativa Tom” (based in Portici) and “Cooperativa Giancarlo Siani” (Città Metropolitana 
di Napoli, n.d.[a]), a social cooperative associated with the aforementioned association Arci 
zona rossa. These cooperatives use these plots of land to create a “social farm” growing 
mafia-free produce in addition to conducting educational and social programmes with the 
participation of “disadvantaged individuals” (Città Metropolitana di Napoli, n.d.[a]). In addition 
to this, from 2013 both of these cooperatives were granted at least 10 years of use of these 
plots free of charge.   
Arci zona rossa received two apartments that were confiscated from the Birra clan in 2008 in 
operation “Reset”. Over the course of a few months, this association transformed itself into 
“Radio Siani”, the pro-legality radio station. It must be emphasised that the names “Radio 
Siani”, “Arci zona rossa” and “Cooperativa Giancarlo Siani” have often been and are used 
interchangeably: Arci zona rossa is the initial association founded to receive the property, 
which then created Radio Siani (indeed, Radio Siani is legally recognized as Arci zona 
rossa) whereas the Cooperativa Giancarlo Siani52 is a social cooperative and the social 
activist and voluntary wing of this associational network. We will discuss the specific social 
activities that Radio Siani and its related association conducts in the following chapter, but 
for now it is prudent to see how Radio Siani has been used by the local administration to 
promote a specific culture. In this sense, Radio Siani alters the habitus through their social 
activities using education and socialisation, whilst at the same time, the purposeful re-use of 
confiscated criminal assets denotes a very literal replacement of physical criminal assets 
(apartments) in a community.  
In the apartment itself, the Carabinieri found a radio transmitter, which upon investigation 
was found to transmit a popular radio station. Over the past decade or so, this radio station 
had various different names: originally “Radio Ercolano Stereo”, then “Ercolano Centro” and 
then “Nuovo Ercolano”, though each of them were more commonly called “Radio Camorra” 
or “radio clan”. From this apartment, the radio DJs were transmitting pro-Camorra and coded 
messages to associates on the outside – telling drug smugglers and drug dealers where to 
pick up supplies and communicating via easily accessible radio. Arci zona rossa was 
approved to be the benefactor of this property wherein they changed its modus operandi, 
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becoming a webradio of legality: they turn the house of a former boss and the site of 
Camorra propaganda and coded messages via the radio station into a site of the anti-
Camorra (Radio Siani, 2013) The president of the association, Giuseppe Scognamiglio 
explained: 
Here, there was a decision to found Radio Siani. Why? Because this apartment was 
one of the first to be confiscated here from the Camorra, it is a symbolic place: it was 
the house of the boss – where the boss had orchestrated this war in Ercolano. For 
this motive, we didn’t have to simply have a place to meet, a social centre, but 
instead a place from which to send a different message – a much more important 
one. When we were deciding what to do with ourselves, a radio in this apartment was 
also confiscated and closed down. This was one of the most famous radios in 
Ercolano: Nuovo Ercolano. From the subsequent investigations by magistrates and 
attorneys, that this was “Radio Camorra”, “Radio carcere” [prison radio] – because it 
was a real communication channel that the Camorra used to communicate 
information through various songs, dedications, phrases in codes for camorristi in 
prison, and other colleagues in the territory. There were people on the loose, 
checkpoints, “pay attention there is Carabinieri”, how to get the drugs, where a 
homicide was committed.  
[…] We basically want to respond to and investigate this phenomenon and this radio 
of the Camorra. We decided to make a radio of the “anti-Camorra” in this “bene 
confiscato” that was the home to the boss. We responded in this way. And we 
decided to follow the teaching of Peppino Impastato [a Sicilian activist who was 
murdered in 1977 by the Cosa Nostra] with his “RADIO AUT” and bring it to life. We 
then decided to name it after Giancarlo Siani, because he was from Campania, and 
the only victim of the Camorra who was a communicator, a journalist, the only victim 
who comes close to what we are doing now and what we are doing. He was a very 
young journalist, and so we decided to name the radio after him. We say that he is 
the tutor of the activists who come to the radio. (CS2 18032014) 
The radio station does this in a variety of ways. It is purposely a web-radio, meaning that 
anyone with computer access can listen to its content, rather than needing a conventional 
radio. The content itself is varied too, with a blend of popular music, classic rock, punk, 
Neapolitan/Italian music, in addition to different conversation segments where they discuss 
local issues, Italian politics, world politics and so on.  
The radio station’s main purpose is to talk about illegality, but it is also provides 
entertainment to its listeners, doing its best not to be a single-issue radio station. The 
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symbolism of the location was not missed by the Fondazione Pol.i.s., a non-profit foundation 
under the jurisdiction of the Campania regional government, who selected the Radio Station 
as a bene confiscato of “symbolic importance” (Fondazione Pol.i.s., 2013), effectively 
earmarking it for further funding opportunities such as the project “Radio della Legalità”, 
which sought to “join and give a voice to small associations, editorials and webtv; to promote 
the issue of legality; to support and contribute to the training of young people in Campania” 
(Fondazione Pol.i.s., 2013, p.11). All of this is alongside promotions and interviews for heads 
of community groups, authors, anti-mafia activists, priests, judges, politicians on both the 
national and local level.  
The radio station itself is made up entirely of volunteers, who do what they can in their spare 
time alongside whatever job or studies they also have. Some of the more prominent 
interviews pertinent to our research are those focussing on the interactions between the 
radio station and local/regional judges, politicians and law enforcement officials, wherein 
different journalists for Radio Siani have conducted or broadcasted interviews with people 
such as Pierpaolo Filippelli, Giorgio Napolitano (the former President of the Italian Republic), 
Nino Daniele, Claudio Fava (Politician, screenwriter and anti-mafia activist) (see Appendix 
VII.II for example). These interactions have benefits which are two-fold: firstly the interview 
themselves, and secondly the possible creation and facilitation of anti-mafia “networks” and 
communication. The interaction between the grass-roots groups such as Radio Siani and 
these high profile practitioners and activists goes some way to narrowing the gap between 
general citizenry and policy makers – lending a voice and a human face to the anti-mafia 
movement and State policies that target criminality in general. We could theorise this in 
terms of a process that increases vertical trust between the populace and the policy makers. 
Radio Siani’s website is an example of this, where volunteers, activists and local politicians 
write articles about their activities, or react to a local issue. Like the interaction between 
Carabinieri officers and shopkeepers, whether purposefully or not, the willingness of people 
such as Filippelli to be subject to an interview by the local anti-Camorra radio station goes 
some way to building the anti-Camorra brand in Ercolano that appears to demonstrate the 
breaking down of boundaries, and the increased fluidity between the State and non-State 
anti-mafia, and therefore increasing social trust in the area.   
Particularly in the years following the election of Nino Daniele in 2005 to mayor on an anti-
Camorra platform, the local comune and its administration also pursued their own policies 
which were purposely aimed at combatting cultures of criminality in the area. One simple 
way in which Daniele approached this was to try to “reward” or “incentivise” legality in the 
form of tax exemptions. A prominent example of this was when Daniele’s administration 
encouraged membership of the antiracket association and the denunciation of the clans 
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through economic benefits in the form of tax exemption, and the payment of legal fees in 
racketeering trials. From 2008-2010, it was recorded that Raffaela Ottaviano’s three clothing 
stores, in addition to another shopkeeper’s business were exempt from paying waste 
disposal taxes to the communal administration “X LEGALITÀ” (“For legality”), in 2011 this 
was expanded to another shopkeeper.53 The only other entities that were granted to such 
exemptions were select voluntary associations who were considered to be valuable social 
assets in the community – an incredibly symbolic message to the antiracket. For a period, 
Daniele and his administration also allowed the antiracket association to be based in the 
MAV building, alongside support from the Commissione parliamentare antimafia54 
(Conticello, 2015, p.150), giving the antiracket the space to conduct its activities, whilst also 
giving it clear institutional support. Daniele built on this, saying:  
in that moment [during the Camorra feud in Ercolano] we did many things – one of 
the most symbolic things, something very strong, was against the illegal construction 
of buildings. At this time, we demolished 30 or 40 illegally built buildings – 
houses/structures built without a permit simply to say “you need to obey the rules of 
the State”. I remember another thing we did that was very symbolic in the eyes of the 
citizens was to seize motorini [scooters], because in Ercolano, no-one wears a 
helmet on their scooters. Why? Because in general when there is a hit, the killer 
normally arrives by car or by scooters – if you arrive with the helmet, no one will 
know who you are. And so the clan pushed a disposition upon the territory that no-
one needs to wear their helmet on their scooters. And so, the State police, the 
Guarda di Finanza and the Carabinieri would create road blocks in order to stop 
anyone who wasn’t wearing their helmet, as there is a law requiring people to wear a 
helmet. If they are not, the motorino is seized. It was to show to the people that in this 
place you obey the law of the State, not the rules of the clan. It was a very symbolic 
thing. When someone is stopped at this checkpoint they see that the State controls 
this area. This then sends a message that people are able to free themselves from 
the clans.  
For example, the use of the “beni confiscati”. We took assets from the boss and the 
clan and used them for a social activity – and this also paints a strong picture for 
them. Showing that the State is being serious – so here we are creating a climate of 
trust from where we can find the courage to free ourselves. (POL 18032014) 
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 Parliamentary antimafia commission. The antiracket at the MAV was inaugurated by Francesco Forgione, the 
then President of the commission. 
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This points to a dual process in gaining sufficient trust among the people in Ercolano that 
encourages denunciations against Camorra clans and their activities. On the one hand, 
Camorra norms are purposefully questioned within a community, whereas on the other the 
State makes it clear that they are actually present in the area. Daniele’s top-down changes 
point to the latter in the form of increasing institutional trust whereby the aim was to change 
the perception of the State through visible action against petty crimes which in turn have 
been helping the “disposition” of the clans. The laws against not wearing helmets whilst 
riding a scooter or a motorbike already existed, as did laws against the illegal building of 
structures, but the issue was that the law was being ignored and law enforcement did very 
little to combat it. The illegal construction of buildings in Ercolano is particularly pressing, as 
the laws relate to the precariousness of the community on the slopes of Mount Vesuvius. In 
2003 a regional law was passed for the designated “Zona Rossa” (red zone) communities 
around the volcano (that is, the communities that would be most affected by any inevitable 
eruption) so as to mitigate the cost of the eruption. The law (Legge Regionale N.21 del 10 
dicembre 2003) made it absolutely forbidden to construct new buildings for residential 
purposes, given that the number of individuals already at risk from the volcano due to their 
proximity was already incredibly high, making already complex evacuation plans more 
difficult.  
By overseeing the demolition of these buildings, Daniele’s administration was sending a 
message that the law must be obeyed, and that it is the State who is legitimate, not the 
Camorra and not criminal businesspeople. In theoretical terms, to borrow from Robert 
Putnam (1993) and Carina Gunnarsson (2014), the “game” now has penalties for cheaters – 
illegally constructed buildings will be demolished. Analysing these measures by the State, it 
is interesting to consider these actions as what Walter Benjamin called rechtsetzend Gewalt 
(law-making violence) or rechtserhaltende Gewalt (law-preserving violence) (Benjamin, 
1921): whether this is affirming or re-affirming the strength of the State through violence/the 
law, and then what this means when we try to understand the clans themselves. If we 
consider the State to be doing the former, then we can conceive actions and violence by the 
clan to maintain their order of things to be “law preserving” in their own context. If we 
consider the State to be doing the latter, then we must ask why the laws had not been being 
preserved in the first place.  
This comparison and theoretical discourse between clans and the State was made clear 
somewhat accidentally in one of the interviews I conducted with Daniele, who in one 
interview begins by saying what we have pondered above, but quickly rewords his sentence, 
seemingly because of how unfavourably it paints the State and its institutions vis-à-vis the 
Camorra clans: 
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The State needs to retake control of the territory. And say “the Camorra doesn’t 
command this territory, instead it is the State that commands… [pause] commands? 
Here there is the need to respect the rules of the democratic State. There is a need 
to retake… [pause] reoccupy with rules, the territory. And this is what we have been 
trying to do. (POL1 18032014) 
By accident, Daniele seems to highlight the legal/illegal legitimate/illegitimate dichotomy 
between the State and organized crime groups in general – best personified in St 
Augustine’s “Pirate and Emperor” tale.55 Additionally, he points to the necessity of 
demonstrating to the population that space (both physical and metaphorical) has been 
(re)taken from the clans. Despite the fact that the laws already existed regarding 
construction and helmet wearing, we inevitably must refer to the actions of the State here as 
the former (law-making violence) given that it is pushing a new disposition upon the 
populace here – the State is making the law where beforehand it was ignored almost 
entirely. Perhaps without realising it, Daniele’s administration was pursuing a line which 
partially adhered to the policies advocated in Kelling and Wilson’s “Broken Window Theory” 
(1982), whereby relatively trivial infractions of the law were punished. This was used as a 
means of demonstrating that the State is present, and does care about the law, and will 
react to those who break it.  
This was used as a weapon against the Camorra clans, their associates, and the area grigia. 
If citizens sufficiently trusted the institution and law enforcement to react to law breaking, the 
theory was that they would report crimes to the police when they actually occur. Echoing the 
language of Liberal proponents of Social Capital such as  Putnam, regular players are able 
to denounce the cheaters of the game whatever shape and size they are, knowing that a 
referee will punish them. In a very simple way, by merely increasing the presence of the 
State and police in public life, and being less lax against criminality, Daniele’s administration 
was able to alter citizens’ perception of the State in their community compared to before, 
demonstrating that if they were to denounce cheaters, the cheaters would be punished. 
Whilst it would not be true to suggest that there is absolute trust for the institution and law 
enforcement now, we can at least note a definite increase in trust by shopkeepers for the law 
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 The story recounts the exchange between an unnamed pirate and Alexander the Great, with the Emperor 
lampooning the pirate asking him what he is doing “infesting the sea”. The pirate’s response was “The same as 
you do when you infest the whole world; but because I do it with a little ship, I am called a robber, and 
because you do it with a great fleet, you are an emperor” (Augustine of Hippo, 1998, p.147-8). This is a 
comparison that is used by various theorists on the terrorist/freedom fighter debate within terrorism studies, 




enforcement compared to before, which has encouraged more people to join the antiracket 
association. The following section will discuss how this phenomenon has been approached 
by the Carabinieri.  
  
4:  The Modello Ercolano 
Linked to this process is that of the changing perception of the local law enforcement. It is at 
this point that we introduce the “Modello Ercolano” (the Ercolano model), a term which has 
been coined by varying politicians, members of the law enforcement, the judiciary and civil 
society activists in Ercolano both past and present to describe the anti-Camorra movement 
that uprooted the racket. We start with a lengthy extract of an interview with a three 
Carabinieri servicemen responsible for Ercolano to best explain it, which for clarity we shall 
analyse piece by piece: 
 What is the Modello Ercolano exactly? 
Officer 1: It is a fusion of various elements. That is, a chain starting with the judiciary, 
ending up at the shopkeeper. 
Officer 2: There are links between these made both of trust and brotherhood where 
everyone wanted the same thing. Beforehand no-one went out at all because 
despite the gears and chain [connecting everyone together] we were missing 
a vital rawlplug56 [see figure 6]: the judiciary, the Carabinieri, Civil Society. 
Instead, today starting with the judiciary, there is the Carabinieri then Civil 
Society that have all understood that they have to do this work together. If 
there is Civil Society that wants to do something, and there is the Carabinieri 
nearby that understands what their problems are… 
There are the Carabinieri that want to help with whatever they can, but if Civil 
Society does not collaborate, the judiciary cannot do anything. It was the case 
that during the 90s, when there was a large number of Camorra, that neither 
the judiciary nor the Carabinieri did their duties, leaving Civil Society as lone 
victims of the Camorra. So everyone needed to go forward and reverse these 
                                                          
56
 The word used by the officer was “tasello principale”, also translated to “wall plug”, “screw anchor”, or 
“dowel”. 
This sentence was particularly difficult to translate due to the multiple double meanings and imageries in 
English and Italian of “chain” and “gears”. In the physical sense, gears and chains have nothing to do with 
rawlplugs, and, for clarity’s sake, we must state that Officer 2 is alluding to a metaphorical rawlplug which 
relies on our comprehension of how such an object works (see figure 6), whilst simultaneously referring to a 
“chain” and “gear” in the sense of things connected together – rather than the actual physical thing.  
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mistakes. Today everything is inversed: now there are these three entities; 
Civil Society, the Carabinieri and the judiciary who continue working and want 
the same thing, and so the Modello Ercolano will keep going forward. 
There will be, like there has been for the last 10 years, us Carabinieri 
preparing ourselves here, likewise the judiciary even when the PM Fillipelli 
eventually leaves, there will be another, one hopes, to follow that which has 
been done over the last ten years by Dr. Fillipelli. We hope that we will also 
remain here, but no matter what, we hope that whoever comes tomorrow has 
the intelligence to understand the people in this area: shopkeepers and their 
needs. Unfortunately it was the case in the past that if I, as a shopkeeper, 
received a visit from an extortionist and went to the Carabinieri, the 
Carabinieri took the threat too lightly. For too many years there was a lot of 
ignorance on our part.  
Officer 1:  At times, it happened that people were only doing their professional duty. 
Officer 2: When this problem has been shown to these people who made a mistake, 
they didn’t understand that here in this area when there is a poor guy who 
goes to denounce, that person is entering into a system that … just to make 
you understand ... it is not that a person can only speak to their brother about 
their fear. So you need to go and break the omertà that so touches fear. The 
omertà is the fear that walks alongside, in symbiosis – you know? They are 
the same thing when it comes to the Camorra. If you listen to the person who 
wants to denounce the camorrista, and then don’t abandon them afterwards – 
it is here you touch the mentality of the shopkeepers, and this is what we 
have been doing for the last ten years.  
Here, we have done some psychological work, because when the 
shopkeepers came here it is not that they sat down and I spoke nothing but 
good, especially when we are talking about the boss of the clan, every last 
turd – no one would have wanted to denounce. We stay talking for hours: 1, 
2, 3, hours – also at night – for days. So it is this: we are the way out [for the 
shopkeepers] to break the “wall of indifference”57 that for thirty years no one 
had the will or the want to go and combat – neither from the part of the 
judiciary, nor from the part of the Carabinieri. (LE 18042015)  
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 He used the phrase “Muro di gomma”, literally, the rubber wall  
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There are two distinct imageries presented here which we can use to visualise the Modello 
Ercolano: that of a rawlplug and that of gears. A rawlplug is a small plastic or metal insert 
that is placed into a drilled hole to better hold a screw, using more of the screw’s potential 
energy and more of the structural integrity of the wall without damaging it. To ensure greater 
structural integrity and ensuring that a screw does not bend, a rawlplug is added to a drilled 
hole, ensuring greater accuracy whilst drilling, as well as protecting the wall from 
unnecessary damage after a weight is added to the nail on the outside of the wall. In the 
metaphor alluded to by Officer 2, we visualise the judiciary as the screw, and the accuracy 
and direction with which the screw goes into the wall without damaging it as representing 
their ability to prosecute camorristi. 
If there is no rawlplug a screw can often end up at an irregular angle, with the result that the 
wall could be damaged and the screw could be unfit for purpose. To visualise this metaphor 
further, if the population does not sufficiently trust the Carabinieri to report crimes, then there 
is no rawlplug in the wall: the judiciary is lacking information and witnesses to prosecute 
criminals – the screw is screwed in crooked. If there is a less than favourable working 
relationship between the Carabinieri and the Judiciary, this is also the case. The rawlplug, 













Figure 6:  













The gears and chain allude to the continuous flow of these three elements and the ongoing 
relationship between these. This is explained further in the following exchange: 
Is there a difference in strategy in Ercolano, Portici, Torre del Greco in fighting the 
Camorra? [All of which are under the jurisdiction of this unit of the Carabinieri] 
Officer 1: Very often the Modello Ercolano is singled out alongside the anti-racket 
association that was founded in Ercolano and has led to the defeat of 
organized crime in the area. But this is reductive, as I said before, to specify 
only the anti-racket association, because other comunes in the area like Torre 
del Greco and Portici have had antiracket associations. But, using the case of 
Torre del Greco for example, the antiracket association didn’t work: it died, 
and then a bit later it was born again. The initial incarnation didn’t have the 
chain between the antiracket, law enforcement and the judiciary – because 
they didn’t have the same course. If a piece is missing, or there is an 
incomplete gear even just by a millimetre, it doesn’t work very well. If this 
happens, the situation would return to what it was like before, even if not as 
serious. The Modello Ercolano is a model of a system of investigations which 
is done with the help of civil society. [See figure 7] 
Figure 7 
The anti-mafia gears of Civil Society, Carabinieri and the 
Judiciary working together in unison 
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Officer 2:  That, in Italy, unfortunately doesn’t exist – it doesn’t exist! It’s absurd, but it 
doesn’t exist.  
Officer 1: In Italy and in this area we have this situation with criminals. But I believe that 
elsewhere in the world the Modello Ercolano does not exist, because there 
are not the conditions because they come from Ercolano. In America, it is 
another thing, but there are organized criminal families which were imported 
from Italy – there is extortion there too where people pay a lot. The Camorra, 
the Mafia, ‘Ndrangheta also exist there – but they haven’t created an 
association which can defeat these criminal cartels. It is for this reason that I 
say it is reductive to say that the “Modello Ercolano” indicates only the 
Carabinieri, only the antiracket, rather, it is all of this together.  
Officer 3: Like they have created an association of delinquents, in this we have created 
an association between civil society, law enforcement and the judiciary 
Officer 1: We need to combat illegality. With legality we make people understand what 
legality is. (LE 18042015) 
The gears and chains here represent each individual actor in the fight against organized 
crime. The judiciary is one gear, the Carabinieri another, Civil Society the other. If one gear 
is missing, then the whole system fails. If the Civil Society [societas civilis] gear is unable, or 
unwilling to report crimes, then the Carabinieri cannot investigate and arrest criminals. If the 
Carabinieri is unable or unwilling to listen to Civil Society and give them sufficient protection 
the system fails. If the Carabinieri and the Judiciary do not have a good enough working 
relationship, then the system fails. Each element may be rotating independently, but if 
individual cogs are broken, if the gears are not aligned properly or if the gears are rotating in 
opposing directions, the system fails.  
Using the metaphor represented in Figure 6, combined with the system presented in Figure 
7, the Modello Ercolano is imagined as a contraption which, using these three gears, aligns 
a rawlplug into place. If a gear is rotating in a different direction, or a single cog is missing, 
the contraption does not align the rawlplug properly – meaning that when the screw is 
screwed into place, it is not as energy efficient as it could be. The emphasis then moves to 
the links between each of the gears, as well as the initial push to denounce in the first place 
– rotating the first gear. The officers described the rotation of the gears between the 
Carabinieri and Civil Society, where the mixture of public and private lives, the formal and 
informal, becomes a notable aspect of the relationship between the Carabinieri and the 
extorted shopkeepers in Ercolano: 
144 
I saw when I was doing some interviews with them that their relationship with the 
police was rather… informal. It’s as if you were friends 
Officer 2: We’re friends with every one of them. You think that, you’ve gone around and 
talked with lots of shopkeepers – and I think that they only spoke nicely about 
us? Right? 
 It’s true – yeah 
Officer 2: Why is it like this? Because in the moment that they denounced, we arrested 
the camorristi. We didn’t abandon the shopkeepers – we continued to listen to 
them, we stayed at their disposal. For any problem that they have, from the 
smallest up the largest, we are available to them. We have gone to their 
houses in the middle of the night because they heard a noise … we go and 
see them and make them feel safe. And we have said to them above all – 
look at all the people who have been arrested – all of them will be sentenced 
– that is a promise. And they saw that effectively all of these camorristi in 
Ercolano have been arrested and then sentenced. All of them are serving 
time in prison.  
Officer 3: Here there is a thing that I have never seen before. I’m originally from 
[omitted: outside of Campania], and there they don’t have the need to do the 
kind of things they do here. Another thing I’ve never seen: that is the following 
of trials. At times it is done informatively, another time the person is delivered 
there, and then it is finished. A thing I have never seen in the other places 
where I have worked, a thing that is done here in particular is the following of 
the trend of the informative phase of the trial. … Officer 2 [name omitted] only 
finishes his work when the arrested becomes condemned, and this is the 
same for us. This is a thing not comparable to other police forces: first they 
arrest the person, do the informative stage of the trial, advise the judges, 
follow the trial (i.e. the condemnation of the arrested). It was to break this wall 
too – there is no longer a superior and inferior level of policing and the 
judiciary – there is no longer dependence – this is a very unique thing. It’s all 
done together. The PM calls his referent officer, Officer 2, who organises all 
of us. He calls him entirely informally without the need to have all the 
formality. We are at the trials only to support the PM in his battle – but also to 
see what’s going on. We’re all there. 
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When there was a trial where a shopkeeper is giving their testimony we are 
right behind them in the courtroom. (LE 18042015) 
The importance of trust that the shopkeeper has for the law enforcement becomes an 
essential factor here, particularly regarding the antiracket association. After several years of 
meetings, the breakthrough appeared to be the bomb placed in the bakery in October 2009, 
when the antiracket association reacted by staging a march through the city alongside the 
Carabinieri. The subsequent “maxi trial” in November, and then other trials that followed 
brought with them a front of solidarity that did not exist beforehand for Filippo in 2000 and 
then Ottaviano in her trial in 2005. In attendance were members of the antiracket, uniformed 
members of the Carabinieri, representatives of the comune di Ercolano as well as other 
organisations who came to the trials to lend some psychological support to shopkeepers 
who were denouncing. As Tano Grasso put it: 
With the participation of the antiracket association there is a significant change in the 
atmosphere within the law court. What is a mafia trial in the land of the mafia? It is 
certainly not like any other trial, however importantly, there is something that you 
don’t find in the sentence nor in the transcription of the hearings: there is a climate 
that weighs down upon it and at times weighs down strongly enough to become a 
decisive factor in the proceedings. Unfortunately, like it or not, a mafia trial is not 
conducted just between those which are institutionally provided: judges, prosecutor, 
accused, defence, witnesses; there is always an “x” variable and it is from its value 
that one gets the atmospheric context inside the courtroom. (Grasso, 2014, p.10)  
By having supporters from the antiracket, the Carabinieri and others inside the courtroom, 
the “x” is influenced in a completely different way, encouraging the shopkeepers to 
denounce, encouraging other shopkeepers to denounce too. This “x” appears to be 
something which members of FAI and the Carabinieri have identified when dealing with 
shopkeepers, as Roberta Rispoli from the legal office of FAI in Naples explained: 
There is always special attention paid in the listening to victims of extortion. The 
witness, in absolute innocence, can alter the reality of the facts. One example: there 
is a shopkeeper that is called to testify after ten people before them; if they are asked 
whether they are scared, they would deny it; on one hand they need to prove that 
they are as strong as the others that preceded them, on the other it could be that 
they really weren’t scared. The point is that they were scared, they were at the 
moment of extortion; though now, after a few months, this sensation is being relived, 
though absorbed. At present (during the testimony) they aren’t scared, instead they 
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only have the moment where the crime was committed. And it is this which must be 
held on to until the end of the sentencing. (Grasso, 2014, p.19) 
In essence, rightly or wrongly, there is an element of external social pressure inside the court 
room that other witnesses provide. It is not a “negative” social pressure encouraging deceit 
or something else similar, rather it is one that encourages a shopkeeper to “do the right 
thing” and give their account of the crime. This new “atmosphere” or “climate” of the 
antiracket replaces the old “x” variable that mafosi created in the courtroom in the past, and 
is achieved through simple and unquantifiable actions of communication amongst 
shopkeepers about their problems, and then their relationship with the Carabinieri, then later 
the judiciary.  
As mentioned previously, Tano Grasso encouraged Nino Daniele, Lieutenant Antonio Di 
Florio and Raffaela Ottaviano to found the anti-racket association “Ercolano per la legalità” in 
2006 with Ottaviano as the President. A large inauguration took place in one of the Vesuvian 
villas in Ercolano in November 2006, and had a large attendance of shopkeepers, 
Carabinieri and politicians (Di Florio, 2012, p.115). The actual first meeting of the association 
in private was described by Di Florio as something a bit different: 
The first meeting with the shopkeepers happened in a clandestine manner, in a 
classroom of a primary school. There was me, Raffaela and three shopkeeper friends 
of hers. It was so that, with an initially broken voice from emotion, I started to speak - 
to display and explain my intentions. I talked and talked with all the enthusiasm of my 
ideas but in their gazes I saw a shadow of distrust that stuck to me for the whole of 
the evening. 
During our farewells at the end of the evening the carpenter of the town, an older 
man in his sixties, took me aside and said to me that if I wanted to be heard I needed 
to demonstrate my commitment with facts. “Lieutenant, do you know what’s wrong? 
People aren’t very trusting, least of all the shopkeepers. These armed people go 
around the city and do what they like, and then you come along and say that you 
want to change things… but when? We want facts Commander! You need to earn 
the trust of these people… you need to convince them that it is better to denounce 
than pay. Facts, commander… facts and results!” 
For months I continued to organise these meetings. No-one denounced, but the 
number of participants increased meeting after meeting. Raffaela worked hard, she 
was the echo chamber of the activity of the Carabinieri [explaining to the 
shopkeepers how they had helped her]. The back-and-forth between her and the 
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shopkeepers spread, finally they began to understand that someone wanted to listen 
to them without the obligation of denouncing. (Di Florio, 2012, p.115) 
These initial shopkeepers were those who were immediately close to Ottaviano, and she 
was the main driving force of these beginnings. The difficulty was not only in encouraging 
people who didn’t already know Ottaviano to join the antiracket, but also to actually 
denounce their extorters, particularly when the previous years (2004-2006) had seen an 
increase in first-time pizzo demands (Di Florio, 2012, p.115) apparently due to the growing 
need for revenue by the clans. Up until 2009 there was on-off violence between the clans, 
leading to a number of murders in the streets of Ercolano and Torre del Greco. In June 
2007, the Carabinieri’s operation “Reset” arrested the entire directorate of the Birra clan, 
which was followed by a year and a half of hits against the Birra by the Ascione, seemingly 
to signal the absolute disarray that this decapitation had left them. The new dominance of 
the Ascione was only temporary due to the discovery of their accounts ledger in April 2009, 
followed by a mass trial in November.  It was during this period (from 2006 to November 
2009 with the end of the mass trial that the Carabinieri worked particularly hard at winning 
the “hearts and minds” of the shopkeepers, demonstrating that they could be trusted and 
would react when approached by a shopkeeper. Following the foundation of the anti-racket 
in 2006, Lieutenant Di Florio visited various businesspeople in the area and asked whether 
they wanted to join, reassuring them face-to-face that the Carabinieri would be there for 
them.  
Here are some extracts of some interviews with shopkeepers who were visited in 2006 by 
the Carabinieri: 
The racket is a plague in this territory. When a lieutenant of the Carabinieri, Antonio 
di Florio came into our stores to talk with us, and asked if we wanted to speak out 
against the racket and so on we said yes, gladly. And so, the first contact was with 
Antonio di Florio. At the same time, there was the national director of FAI who 
alongside di Florio and the Mayor, Nino Daniele, asked to have some kind of meeting 
with shopkeepers and entrepreneurs to hear their ideas.  
[…] 
We have never paid [the pizzo]. You hear things, it was not understood as one 
payment after the other after the other – it was to be paid at Christmas, Easter. And 
we knew that they were around, but they never came here. (N6 17042015) 
And another business from the same time: 
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Basically, I’ve always had this opinion of not playing ball with the Camorra. A 
Lieutenant from the Carabinieri came here and invited me [to denounce]. Having this 
opinion to combat the Camorra, and this invitation, we founded the antiracket. (N2 
14042015) 
It took another year (2007) before the first new business joined the antiracket after 
denouncing the Birra (Di Florio, 2012, p.115), and then it was not until the spectacle of a 
well-known businessman threatened in the street by the Papale (related to the Ascione) at 
the beginning of 2008 that more joined. After hearing about the incident, Di Florio personally 
approached the businessman, and convinced him to join the antiracket. Though the 
businessman could not bring himself to actually denounce the individual who threatened 
him, he took the Lieutenant’s phone number. Later that evening, Di Florio received a call 
from the businessperson saying that they had reconsidered, and that they would denounce 
after all (Di Florio, 2012, p.116-7; Metropolisweb, 13 January 2008). Following the discovery 
of the Ascione ledger in 2009, other Carabinieri officers visited businesspeople that were 
discovered to be paying the pizzo, asking them whether they would like to join the antiracket 
too and reassuring them that the Carabinieri are there for them whenever they need.  
Here we see that the Carabinieri made a purposeful effort at fostering the development of 
the antiracket once the seed had been planted, whilst also creating some kind of relationship 
between businesses at risk from Camorra interference and the Carabinieri themselves. 
Indeed from the questionnaire data collected from members of the antiracket, the number of 
businesses increases significantly after 2007 where there appeared to be greater trust for 











Left blank 6 
Table 1 
Elaboration of questionnaire data showing the years that “Ercolano per la legalità” members joined 
the association 
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Reason for joining Number of businesses 
A member of family asked me to 0 
A friend asked me to 0 
A colleague in Ercolano asked me to 3 
A colleague (in general) asked me to 0 
An acquaintance asked me to 0 
A member of the antiracket asked me to 0 
No-one asked me to, I approached the 
antiracket myself 
10 
Other (generic) 5 
Other (Approached by Carabinieri) 2 





Businesses were asked what year they joined the antiracket – where seven of them said 
either 2009 or 2010, that is, the period following the discovery of the Ascione ledger. Of 
those seven, two stated that they had been encouraged to join by the Carabinieri, two 
approached the antiracket independently, and the final three were approached by other 
members of the antiracket. Of those who approached the antiracket themselves, four of 
them joined before the mass trials (in 2009), three of them joined after 2009, and three of 
them left the space blank. Of the two businesses who were approached by the Carabinieri 
one joined the antiracket in 2009, but did not want to/could not respond to the question as to 
whether they had paid the pizzo, and the other paid the pizzo until 2009. 
One way that this trust in law enforcement was created and then fostered was to encourage 
the shopkeepers to contact them personally if there was ever a problem, or they felt 
threatened in any way. This came in the form of their work phone number, or even their 
personal phone number. This meant that if there was ever a problem, they could refer to 
“their” police officer, “their” contact in the police. As time has gone along, a number of these 
shopkeepers and Carabinieri have become friends: the Carabinieri pass by their shops every 
now and then whilst on and off duty, but also communicate with one another in their spare 
time on social media platforms such as Facebook, and occasionally even on the phone via 
WhatsApp. This could be about anti-racket matters, but, more often than not, about anything 
Table 2 
Elaboration of questionnaire data showing “Ercolano per la legalità” members’ reasons for joining  
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else: football, thr family, local news, the weather, and so on. In this context the public and 
private lives of these officers vis-à-vis shopkeepers and entrepreneurs have become blurred, 
lending to a move towards particularized trust,58 rather than generalized trust59, or vertical 
trust60 among these individuals. A brief search on Facebook reveals the levels of this 
connectivity whereby individual Carabinieri officers are “friends” with and are “tagged” in 
pictures with a large swathe of local businesspeople from the anti-racket, civil society 
activists and politicians – all complete with smiling faces.61 In this we can see an increase of 
vertical trust (by shopkeepers for law enforcement) through particularized trust: 
Officer 2:  If you return to the time I was recounting earlier with the fact that in Ercolano 
there had never been trust in the law enforcement because the law 
enforcement didn’t understand how to gain trust from the citizens. What 
happened was that in 2004, two members of the Ascione clan went to extort 
Raffaela Ottaviano, a clothes seller, and for the first time ever, someone 
denounced an extortion.62 Raffaela Ottaviano went to address the lieutenant 
of the Carabinieri, Antonio di Florio, who used to command the Carabinieri in 
Ercolano. From then, the Lieutenant together with the local institution, above 
all with the mayor Nino Daniele, because he was the mayor at the time, asked 
Raffaela Ottaviano with support from FAI if she would like to be the president 
of the antiracket association. They wanted to create something unheard of – 
exploit this problem – this request for money. These two subjects who made 
this request were arrested and from here was born, with many problems 
because as I was saying, in 2004 the Camorra in Ercolano was strong – 
having these immediate arrests. So Ottaviano says “yes” to being available, 
and so began the association antiracket which at the start consisted of only 
two or three members who had not yet denounced. Unfortunately what 
happened for the next few years was that the antiracket association didn’t 
grow because the Camorra was still too strong.  
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 Defined here with reference to Carina Gunnarson’s work on Addiopizzo as “the trust we feel towards those 
known personally from daily interactions, often people we define as close friends, family, neighbours, and 
relatives” (Gunnarson, 2014, p.48).  
59
 Defined as “the trust people have in others that they do not know”  (Gunnarson, 2014, p.48). 
60
 Defined as “trust towards the political system and its institutions”, which is commonly regarded as fairly low 
in Italy due to various political scandals on the national and local level. (Gunnarson, 2014, p.48). 
61
 Due to the commitment to anonymity in this project, this will not be demonstrated concretely on paper. It  
must be considered, instead, as personal “anecdotal” evidence. 
62
 It is important to remember the denunciations of Filippo discussed in the previous chapter, several years 
previous to Ottaviano’s denunciation.  
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Notwithstanding these foundations, this voluntary action by Raffaela 
Ottaviano at the Carabinieri station created the antiracket association. 
However for many years, it remained only a small entity because the Camorra 
was still strong. It didn’t start with an event from the prosecutor Filippelli, nor 
from us Carabinieri in the area (both that of Torre del Greco and Ercolano) – it 
didn’t start with something done differently.  
What did it consist of? We asked all of the shopkeepers that we knew paid 
the pizzo – because this came out in investigations [referring to the Ascione 
ledger and testimonies from pentiti] – we addressed them alongside the anti-
mafia that 99% of Ercolano was paying the pizzo and called them to join us in 
this police station. We would talk once, twice, three times, even ten times, 
that is until in 2009 when this wall of indifference, of which I have already 
spoken, began to crumble. Why? Because they understood that maybe the 
moment to trust the Carabinieri had come.  
Officer 1:  They understood that we are right and just people. 
Officer 2: To understand them and get them to come out with us we had to get closer to 
them, and make them understand that we weren’t joking. To give them 
options. (LE 18042015) 
The view that trust in the Carabinieri increased over time is supported by the questionnaire 
data from shopkeepers. One question asked the shopkeepers to rate the law enforcement 
institutions in Ercolano in the year 2000 compared to the law enforcement in 2015 (rated 1-
10 where 1 is worst, and 10 is the best). Even with our limited sample, we can say that 
shopkeepers assessed law enforcement in Ercolano to be better in 2015 than in 2000. 
Another question asked the shopkeepers to indicate the levels of trust that they have for 
different institutions (the Church, the press, the judiciary, the EU etc.); here the most trusted 
institutions were the “Carabinieri” and “anti-Camorra associations”. Alongside the building of 
particularized trust between the Carabinieri and shopkeepers, the Carabinieri and other 
institutions wanted to make themselves seen in the area, and so they organised various 
marches through the city as a sign of solidarity, described by the then Mayor Nino Daniele 
thus:  
The famous walk started with thirty Carabinieri in the streets and in the alleyways to 
show the clans that we are strong. The State is present – and here we are, basically. 
To give trust to the shopkeepers – and encourage them to denounce, it wasn’t 
enough to say – “you need to trust us” – you need to demonstrate this with actions 
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with which we got a good response. It’s a thing that they were encouraged to do, 
without fear – without feeling abandoned. (POL 18032014) 
Combined with the personal connection between a number of the shopkeepers and their 
Carabinieri officer friends, this show of strength goes a way towards demonstrating that the 
law enforcement is present. This is a long way from the situation in 2001 after a number of 
shootings in the city when the previous Mayor, Luisa Bossa, alongside the Carabinieri 
declared that the State simply did not exist in Ercolano.  By their own admission, before the 
implementation of the Modello Ercolano, the Carabinieri were lax when it came to 
businesspeople who reported harassment by cammoristi.  A prominent example of this is the 
aforementioned entrepreneur Filippo who reported attempted extortion in the early 2000s, 
eventually going to trial, but dropped the case simply due to the lack of trust in the law 
enforcement to protect him and his family (Gerina and Vasile, 2015). Likewise, the scandal 
in Portici and Naples in the late 1990s regarding the successful bribery of State Police as 
well as leading drugs officials would ultimately be a part of this – undermining trust for law 
enforcement in general.   
The Modello Ercolano is the building of trust and working relationships between three 
integral parts: Civil Society, the Carabinieri and the Judiciary which, when working in 
tandem, are able to prosecute people who have committed crimes in this area relating to 
Article 416-bis and other laws. The model as explained in this section is incredibly simple. 
The population needs to have sufficient trust in the Law Enforcement that the Law 
enforcement will not simply abandon them (like they seemingly did Filippo) when they report 
an interaction with a mafia-type association. (see Appendix VII.II) The population needs to 
believe that the Carabinieri are actually doing their jobs and not collecting bribes from those 
same mafia-type associations. In this way, criminal proceedings and investigations can 
begin. As investigations begin, the relationship between the Carabinieri and the Judiciary 
becomes important, one without rivalries and without competition between agencies. This is 
personified in this case through PM Filippelli and his “referent” in Officer 2, whose personal 
relationship and rapport become an important aspect in the progression of investigations. 
Civil Society and the population rotate their gear, which rotates the Carabinieri’s gear, which 
then rotates the Judiciary’s gear, hopefully leading to the development of trials and the 
eventual imprisonment of an accused individual. This then demonstrates that trust in the 
legal institutions and the law enforcement is to be merited, meaning that individuals are more 
likely to report a crime when one happens due to the belief that it will be pursued by law 
enforcement.  
153 
Despite this progress some issues still remain, particularly with regard to the perception of 
corruption in the political establishment and law enforcement. As acknowledged by the 
Carabinieri officers that were interviewed, the Carabinieri did not do enough to support 
businesspeople and denouncers of the Camorra in the period before 2006. Revelations by 
pentiti in 1996-1997 revealed the collaboration between officers in the State Police and 
affiliates of the Ascione (Corriere della Sera, 31 January 1997), which were seemingly dealt 
with by subsequent investigations. Issues of trust surrounding the political establishment are 
common in Italy due to a number of scandals, and Ercolano is no different. The dissolution of 
the communal administration in 1993, the suspected involvement of former Mayors and 
councillors in the provision of public work contracts for money in the 2010-2015 period and 
then the 2015 “Caso Ercolano” scandal ultimately affected the public trust. The same 
occurred with the outright negligence, or convenient forgetfulness of lawyers, in Strazzullo’s 
administration to push for damages from the clans in a 2011 maxi trial, much like 
Buonajuto’s administration forgetting to provide the correct paperwork to be presented in the 
trial for the murder of Salvatore Barbaro. Additionally, more recent revelations of collusion 
between individual Carabinieri officers and Camorra clans have further complicated matters, 
where pentiti spoke of occasions of officers kneeling and asking for forgiveness after arrests 
elsewhere (Cronache della Campania, 11 July 2016), ultimately undermining the whole 
process of (re)building trust.   There is a danger that the Cultura della legalità and the 
Modello Ercolano are being focussed on the population in general as a means of altering 
behaviour, but without law enforcement and the political establishment being influenced in 
any meaningful way.   
 
5:  Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the manner in which the State has responded and has been pro-
active against the organized crime phenomenon and criminality in general in Ercolano. 
Increasing surveillance of 416-bis criminals, and the increasing use of pentiti cooperating 
witnesses, led to greater understanding of particular clan structures, their association and 
their networks which we exemplified with an account of judicial repression in Ercolano 
between the early 1990s and 2016 for the Ascione and Birra clans. Though noting their 
undeniable extensiveness and importance, limits of judicial repression were identified, where 
we brought the study of organized crime back to sociology with particular regard to 
conflicting cultural spheres and how they interact in our chosen habitus in Ercolano. I 
analysed different developmental agendas that had influenced social activities in the city, 
particularly noting their focus on creating an economically sustainable community along 
broadly conceived neoliberal economic lines. Here I questioned the viability of such a 
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direction given the influence that Camorra social criminal spheres already has upon the 
community, and what the results of such developmental agendas could bring young 
Ercolanese.  
Following this, I introduced the cultura della legalità and how the State has attempted to 
develop these broad socio-cultural norms in Ercolano. From marches, interviews, and 
accounts of local pedagogy, I analysed how a top-down approach to developing this cultura 
required the cooperation from certain Civil Society Organizations such as Radio Siani and 
local schools, particularly in involving young people in order to encourage a real generational 
change in cultures and norms towards lawfulness in general. Expanding this, I analysed the 
literal physical replacement of Camorra/criminal space with “legalità” space with regard to 
the re-use of confiscated criminal assets and the role of Radio Siani. I then introduced the 
role of the local comune and the Mayor Nino Daniele in asserting its control and power as 
part of this process, where citizens could be shown in a symbolic way that reactions against 
(micro)criminality were not just “talking the talk” but genuinely “walking the walk”.   
Lastly we introduced the “Modello Ercolano”, the general response to the Camorra in 
Ercolano and the acceptance by local authorities that judicial repression alone is not enough 
to defeat the local clans. This section was the result of in-depth interviews I conducted with 
local Carabinieri officers, who outwardly spoke of the need of rebuilding the link between 
Civil Society (which we read as the Artistolean Societas Civilis, rather than “Civil Society 
Organizations”) and law enforcement institutions with regard to trust. Based on the accounts 
from these officers here and shopkeepers that I was fortunate enough to interview, I noted 
that their relationship was something more than simple “institutional” “vertical” trust, but 
instead was “friendly” particularized trust, whereby the Carabinieri actively sought to go 
beyond their duties as officers to make themselves available to individuals when they were 
needed, and actively encouraging the active membership of the local antiracket association. 
This was particularly important during subsequent trials, when businesspeople were able to 
get past that indescribable psychological phenomenon that Tano Grasso referred to as “x”, 
helping them denounce their extorters.      
I have focussed here on emphasising those “social” and “cultural” factors that allow for the 
continued existence and prevalence of organized crime groups in the mezzogiorno, 
unrepentantly remarking that these factors are as important to the reduction of this 
phenomenon as judicial repression. In this case study, the judiciary, the Carabinieri, local 
government officials, and members of anti-Camorra Civil Society organizations agree with 
this assertion, noting in no uncertain terms that where the State and the law enforcement 
have neglected the social power of the Camorra in the past – at times becoming involved in 
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corruption itself, the State needs to undertake policies and cooperate with Civil Society 
Organizations in order to “win back” the trust of the public.  
The following chapter analyses this phenomenon further with regard to Civil Society 
Organizations, where we particularly note the specific developmental direction that the State 
has taken in this regard: supporting certain organizations over others despite a broad “anti-













































In the same manner that actions against organized crime by the State have been realised 
through development, judicial repression and culture, actions by Civil Society Organizations 
that are not necessarily acting in accordance with State action also influences the habitus 
that mafia, criminal and a criminal “culture” spheres have occupied. This chapter is devoted 
to those organisations that have engaged with the issue of criminality in Ercolano, 
contributing their own cultural sphere that competes for hegemony over the habitus, often in 
contrast with other cultural poles or focal points from other sides of Civil Society. In particular 
I emphasise the complexity of the modern anti-mafia movement with varying support from 
the State, wider society and one another. I note the prominent points of difference between 
elements of it where the present strategy, specific modes of socialisation and future 
trajectory of the anti-mafia movement are in dispute. There is not one anti-mafia movement, 
but several – all of which are competing for the dominance of the strategy and socialisation 
that they see as the most effective.   
First I introduce the role of Civil Society Organizations in Italy against organized crime with 
particular focus on the association “Libera” and the use of culture to fight organized crime in 
Italy in general. This informs the rest of the chapter, in which I focus in greater detail on four 
different sections of the anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano, namely ‘Ercolano per la 
legalità’, ‘Radio Siani’, the ‘forum dei giovani’ and the associated actors of the ‘Parrocchia 
Santa Maria del Pilar’ church parish. 
 
1:  Civil Society and Organized Crime in Italy 
The Italian NGO ‘Libera’ is a poignant example of a rival sphere whose development was a 
purposeful attempt to conquer the ruling habitus. Libera was founded in 1995 by a Turin-
based priest, Don Luigi Ciotti, and was the product of personalities from the broad anti-mafia 
movement itself who had become frustrated with the one-pronged response to organized 
crime from the Italian State (Dalla Chiesa, 2014). Shortly after its foundation as an 
association, Libera started a petition concerning the management and destination of seized 
and confiscated assets from mafia-type associations, requesting that they be put towards a 
social use (FLARE, n.d, p.39). This petition acquired over a million signatures, and led to the 
adoption of the law “legge n.109/96” (Libera, 1996) which facilitates the transfer of the 
ownership of confiscated goods from organized crime that would normally go to the State, to 
the local administration of the area in which they were confiscated, where they are to be 
used for “the purpose of justice, public order and civil protection”. The local comune may 
administer these properties directly, or it may hand over administration to an already defined 
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“voluntary organisation”,63 “social cooperative”,64 or a centre that deals with the “cure and 
rehabilitation” of drug addicts,65 The only limits to the transfer of trusteeship of these 
confiscated goods/properties are that they should not be used for the management of other 
confiscated property; must not be used to hire any of the relatives/partners/cohabitants of 
the recipient of the seizure and; must not be sold for a price less than that determined by the 
competent Ministero delle finanze office in the territory have requested it if there is greater 
utility in the public interest for its use instead. Specific assets in Ercolano were mentioned in 
the previous chapter.  
Physical and monetary assets (including sold assets) are to be used to fund: the renovation 
of deprived urban areas; prevention and recovery of areas affected by hardship and 
marginalization; action in schools regarding educative courses on legality; and promotion of 
an entrepreneurial culture and entrepreneurial activities for unemployed young people. It 
must be emphasised that despite the actions of the recipient NGOs and associations, the 
targeted approval and decision as to whom receives individual properties and assets lies 
with the State and its relevant institutions, and therefore should be considered part of the 
State’s efforts against organized crime and underdevelopment, albeit through an approved 
third-party. As an umbrella organisation, Libera members set up smaller associations 
throughout Italy so as to be able to receive some of these assets, and conduct other 
activities in order to use former mafia property and assets against organized crime itself. 
This means that the literal physical structures that previously helped foster criminal social 
and cultural capital are being used to develop the social and cultural capital against it. Here 
the facilitation and development of a certain type of culture alter the nature of social relations 
in an area, and therefore challenge the norms that characterise it. In his analysis of ‘Libera 
Sport’, one of the five sectors of the Libera, Cayli addressed precisely this, noting that 
Libera Sport endeavours to renew the society through crafting new social, political 
and cultural identities. In doing so, the social bond between the individual and society 
is established to ward off the [m]afiosi. (2013b, p.437) 
In this sense, sport and participation in sports in general as a means of tackling (organized) 
crime can be understood in terms of socialisation, where “competitive team and popular 
sports help increasing a positive socialisation, discarding former undesired behavior [sic] 
patterns and reflexes, developing the attitude of respect for the rival, defying egoism and 
gaining the values that outweigh losing a game with dignity rather than winning it without 
                                                          
63
 Referred to in law “legge 11 agosto 1991 n.266”.  
64
 Referred to in law “legge 8 novembre 1991 n.381”. 
65
 Referred to in Presidential decree “decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 9 ottobre 1990 n.309”. 
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dignity” (2013b, p.448). It must be noted that there was a greater emphasis on “team” sports 
such as football or basketball, rather than “individual” sports such as surfing, shooting and 
golf – that is unless individual sport increases “collectivity and a sense of social integrity of 
[helps] their community and to develop positive socialization” (2013b, p.448) through sport 
but also through Libera as an organisation itself.  
In this context, it is important to recall Gramsci’s Cultural Hegemony in the sense that we 
observe a process whereby a culture emanating from above permeates downwards for the 
purpose of smoothing governance. The (sub)culture which suffers most is that which 
enables the continuation of criminal governance: that which we have already termed the 
“criminal” or “mafia” cultural sphere. In this manner, State-sponsored or approved Civil 
Society Organizations are able to roll back the influence of organized crime by directing and 
guiding the nature of social interactions between individuals, favouring positive socialisation, 
and altering the appeal of OCGs and the criminal cultural sphere. It is precisely here where a 
“new” sphere centred round Libera is created through its redefining and altering of the 
already existing habitus – changing and altering behavioural norms for sections of the 
population.  
The work of Addiopizzo in Sicily also represents a challenge to mafia territorial power 
through the shaping and moulding of cultural habits and practices (Gunnarson, 2014, p.42) 
whereby it focusses on changing the shopkeepers’ norms vis-à-vis the Cosa Nostra and the 
pizzo. Where it differs from the activities of Libera, however, is that it focusses purely on the 
businesspeople where pizzo paying has become the norm and local consumers, rather than 
socialisation. The organisation was started by seven university post-graduates who wanted 
to open a pub in Palermo, where one of their friends advised that they consider the cost of 
the protection money to the local mafia in their cost calculations for the business. They 
began considering the reality of racketeering in their area, and what they would do if they 
were approached for “protection”. As they were already politically active individuals, they 
decided to publicise some kind of public message against the Mafia and against the norm of 
paying pizzo, culminating in the plastering of the centre of Palermo with stickers reading “A 
whole population that pays the pizzo is a population without dignity” (Gunnarson, 2014, p.41-
3). This is particularly innovative, given that it uses symbols of “honour”, a trademark and 
image of the mafia (Gambetta, 1993, pp.127-158; Trevaglino et al., 2016), against the mafia 
itself. The organisation that these individuals founded was meant to be some kind of 
mobilisation point to enable businesses to speak out outwardly against the Mafia by placing 
Addiopizzo stickers in their shop windows, and allowing Addiopizzo to advertise their 
membership in public forums. In return, Addiopizzo would conduct campaigns in order to 
appeal to ethical consumers – encouraging consumers to buy from the clear non-pizzo 
160 
payers, therefore making it economically viable to join the organisation, as well as attempting 
to break the taboo around talking about the pizzo. They wrote: 
Have we ever thought that while doing our daily shopping we give money also to the 
[M]afia? Of course not, yet it is so. If the bakeries, the clothes shops, tobacconists, 
bars, butchers, office supply stores, fishmongers, libraries, ice-cream parlours, 
cinemas, florists, toy shops, funeral directors and so on and so forth are forced to pay 
protection money, they do so with the money that we spend at all of these 
businesses. (Partridge, 2012, p.347) 
This is an attempt at transforming the relationship that individuals have with businesses, as 
well as the relationship that businesses have with organized crime. In addition to the purely 
social awareness aspect of the organisation, Addiopizzo set up its own legal office, and now 
collaborates with many law enforcement, educational and business institutions (Gunnarson, 
2014, pp.43-4; Partridge, 2012), streamlining the process by which businesses may oppose 
the pizzo, and bringing them into contact with the institutional fight against organized crime. 
The use of Civil Society Organizations as a means of undermining organized crime goes 
much further than influencing public attitudes to certain issues and raising awareness as 
some have claimed (Ralchev, 2004). Instead, if properly directed, Civil Society Organizations 
can go some way to changing the manner in which individuals interact with the society of 
which they are a part. Similarly to Libera, this involves a reshaping of culture emanating from 
Civil Society but ultimately guided and assisted by the State, albeit in a more focussed and 
specific manner.  
A blunter instrument and another “cultural pole”, to borrow Cayli’s (2013b, p.438) 
terminology that converges on the habitus is that of Roy Godson’s so-called “Culture of 
Lawfulness” (2000), enabling law enforcement and regulatory systems to function more 
effectively. In facilitating the development of a “sympathetic culture” to law enforcement, a 
culture of lawfulness is one where the average person “believes that legal norms either are a 
fundamental part of justice or provide the gateway to attain justice and that such a system 
enhances the quality of life of individuals and society as a whole” (2000, p.93) Here we see 
the concept of Societas civilis in action, which, combined with regulatory practices as 
described by Godson,66 becomes a tool for the State to foster a certain cultural pole of 
“lawfulness” for the easier enacting of State law and order policies for the benefit of the 
society as a whole. It is here where the conditioning of structures in society by mafia-type 
associations is undermined. (Orlando, 2000, p.8) 
                                                          
66
 Which Godson notes as: Civic and School-based education, centers [sic] of moral authority, and media and 
popular culture  
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This way of thinking should be viewed with suspicion. On the one hand, the State can 
justifiably be accused of fostering consent through the purposeful development of a 
favourable dispositif (Foucault, 2008; Agamben, 2008), such as Hegemony, Habitus or 
ideology so as to condition the population to be more governable. That is to say, the social 
structures that supported mafia-type associations are replaced by ones that foster the 
powers that be instead. On the other, the facilitation of these types of socialisation can be 
viewed as a good ipso facto – creating a fairer society through the selective conditioning of 
the population at the expense of undermining already existing, and similarly functioning 
organized crime structures. The former Mayor of Palermo, Leoluca Orlando, followed the 
latter perspective in describing the anti-mafia process as 
a cart with two wheels: one the wheel of social, cultural and political reform, the other 
the wheel of police and judicial repression. Only if both move in unison does the cart 
go forward; if one wheel moves while the other stands still, the cart spins in a circle 
without advancing. (Schneider and Schneider, 2003, p.160)  
Broadly speaking this much is obvious, particularly when we use a sociological lens to 
analyse the phenomena of mafia-type associations in general. There is an understanding 
that the repressive “wheel” needs to function properly so as to discipline those who have 
transgressed societal norms, and the other “wheel” that alters the socio-cultural context in 
which crimes come to be committed in the first place. What is missing, however, is a broadly 
agreed definition as to what “social, cultural and political reform” looks like. If reform amounts 
to altering the manner in which individuals perceive Law Enforcement agencies, the judiciary 
and the State in general, without addressing any perceived deeper structural causes of 
crime, then it is worth asking who is to benefit from the Culture of Legality, and how effective 
it alone can be. Again, this is not to say that the establishment of such a culture is a bad 
thing, but it is only to question its adoption in the broader framework of the (neo)liberal 
economy that does not attempt to address any other underlying causes of (organized) crime, 
except for where it is productive in terms of social or economic capital. It is difficult to not 
play devils advocate, in that the Culture of Legality does not seem to imagine there to be 
very real grievances as to why individuals may not trust Law Enforcement agencies or the 
political system in general to represent their interests within the status quo. Like the 
quotations about legalità by schoolchildren in the previous chapter, there is a risk of 
popularising a culture that is less critical of those in power, ignoring instances of corruption 
and inequality that often characterise areas where mafia-type associations are prevalent. 
These discussions will now be contextualised as we turn our attention to the experience of 
Civil Society and culture against mafia-type associations in Ercolano.  
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2:1:  Ercolano per la legalità 
As noted previously, the antiracket was an idea proposed by Tano Grasso, the honorary 
president of FAI, who heard about Raffaela Ottaviano and her spontaneous denouncement 
of her extorters, and her decision to represent herself in court alone (Daniele, 2012; Di 
Florio, 2012). He proposed to the Mayor Nino Daniele, Lieutenant Antonio Di Florio of the 
Carabinieri and Ottaviano to form an antiracket association that would give local businesses 
an association to voice their concerns about the Camorra, and encourage communication 
between them and the Carabinieri. The underlying idea was that arrests alone were not and 
are not enough to defeat the Camorra in this context, given the influence that the Camorras 
have over the area. The issue was not that the Carabinieri were lacking in strength, rather it 
was that the Carabinieri and politicians in the area were not sufficiently trusted in reacting to 
businesspeople’s concerns (See Appendix VII.II). This was the barrier that needed to be 
broken by encouraging businesspeople not only to join the antiracket association, but also to 
denounce their extorters to the Carabinieri when approached for pizzo. We have already 
dedicated an entire chapter to the manner in which pizzo was collected in Ercolano, and 
have already detailed the manner in which the antiracket came to be founded. What is 
missing, however, is what the antiracket does, how it has expanded its membership, and an 
understanding its underlying purpose and direction. 
Up until the multiple breakthroughs in the second half of 2009, the continued existence of the 
antiracket was measured by the enthusiasm of its individual members, among whom 
Ottaviano stands out, as explained by a shopkeeper and member of the antiracket: 
Before Raffaelina, other people had denounced the pizzo [referring to Filippo], but in 
the end it was her who created the association; it was her idea, her tenacity, her 
anger, for this association in Ercolano. If it were not for the grit that she has had, the 
association would not be what it is now. There would be the pain as the people from 
the clan destroy the association. In Naples we have a saying: “il paese è del 
paesano” [the country is that of the countryman] in the sense that there are people 
who inhabit there, live here and know everyone. This is the strong point of the 
antiracket, because the shopkeepers know everyone, those who were the first 
shopkeepers knew everyone. This was the strong starting point of the antiracket. (N7 
18042015) 
As we know, it was actually Grasso’s idea to create the antiracket association; however, the 
point still holds. Ottaviano helped mould the antiracket as it is today through her own 
contacts – and encouraged other businesses in the city to join. Being the owner of three 
businesses on the same street was a good starting point with regard to her presence in the 
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local business community but another one was that her continued enthusiasm for the 
antiracket as it grew and grew. In Conticello’s words, Ottaviano’s denunciation and then 
decision to stand in court alone against her extorters changed the DNA of the city (2015, 
p.152). One initial reason for this is deeply personal and involves agency. From 
conversations with Ottaviano, I can attest that she is incredibly stubborn. The 
businessperson spoke of this tenacity - with a very strict sense of what is right and what is 
wrong – so much so that there was no chance that she would have (1) let the Camorra extort 
any money out of her, or her three clothing stores and (2) let them get away for trying to do 
so. Her long-standing position in the business community as not only a businesswoman with 
three shops on the main commercial area, but also as having family and friends who are 
businesspeople in the immediate vicinity meant that she had some early supporters for the 
antiracket association, and an opportunity to meet more businesspeople (See Appendix V, 
10 February 2015). Between 2006 and 2009 there were slowly more and more people who 
came to the semi-regular antiracket meetings. The meetings were a mixture of formal and 
informal – where formal discussions by businesspeople alongside Lieutenant Di Florio and 
Nino Daniele became more informal after the meeting had finished, and with the result that a 
number of them became friends. A decision in 2008 to further advertise the activities of the 
antiracket and the stories of those businesspeople who had denounced encouraged further 
members to join.  Indeed in May 2008 a businessperson decided to denounce the Ascione 
after seeing an interview with Ottaviano on RAI (the Italian State news channel), saying that 
seeing the interview had given him the courage to denounce, leading to the arrest of a 
camorrista, Domenico Pugliese, for attempted extortion (Di Florio, 2012, p.119).  
Based on the data collected in interviews with the shopkeepers, the reasons that they gave 
for joining the antiracket were varied. The answers to the question “what was your reason for 
joining the antiracket” are shown here by different shopkeepers: 
It wasn’t really a decision. It was something completely natural even though I have 
never received any type of extortive request. I joined to show solidarity with the 
shopkeepers. (N1 11042015) 
Because this was a comune where almost all the shopkeepers paid the racket. And 
all of us got rid of it, now all of us are together against this abuse. (N3 15042015) 
“Defend what is yours” if we can put it like that. I defended myself, my business, my 
family, myself as a person and my dignity. (N5 17042015)   
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I joined because Raffaela Ottaviano is one of my customers. She said that she was 
the President and that we should join the association. She is always the uniting factor 
of the association. (N7 18042015) 
The declaration that they wanted to show solidarity is a particularly important, whereby the 
shopkeepers seemed to have identified that the greater number of antiracket members, the 
safer that they and their community would be from Camorra reprisals, and that therefore 
there is “safety in numbers”. As we can see, some of these answers are rather vague. There 
are reasons linked to pride and what is “right” and other more immediate reasons such as 
being encouraged by the police, and even Ottaviano herself. Whilst it has been noted in 
other interviews with businesspeople and the Carabinieri that a number of the current 
members of the antiracket joined the association after being visited by officers of the 
Carabinieri after the discovery of the Ascione ledger, a significant number declared that they 
joined of their own accord or because a colleague asked them to do so.  
The actual activities of the antiracket vary between social activities organised by the 
constituent businesses and the campaigns and the work of putting prospective new 
members into contact with other members and the Carabinieri, organised by the directorate.  
In many ways, the antiracket functions merely as a meeting place for concerned individuals 
to speak freely with individuals who may be or may have been in a similar situation, where 
they are explained the process of denouncing their extorters by individuals who have 
experienced it previously. In working within FAI guidelines, the directorate organises 
campaigns to recruit new members and compiles a list of its members to be submitted to the 
FAI regional office for the purpose of encouraging ethical consumerism. They also produce 
unique Ercolano “io non pago” (I do not pay) stickers for display on shop windows or on shop 
doors. The stickers are distributed in antiracket marches through the city by other antiracket 
members, politicians, judges and officers of the Carabinieri that take place on a designated 
day every year in December. The appeal to ethical consumerism is reminiscent of, and 
arguably influenced by, the activities of Addiopizzo in Sicily, where the idea that buying 
goods from pizzo-paying businesses is indirectly funding organized crime is placed into the 
mind of the consumer (Patridge, 2012, p.347), thereby affecting their decision making. The 
placement of the “io non pago” stickers, also used by Addiopizzo, serve not only to say to 
the consumer “this business does not pay the pizzo”, but also to imply that businesses that 
do not have the stickers must pay the pizzo, which is not necessarily the case. A notable 
reaction to these stickers from the Camorra has been to avoid approaching them, as 
Ascione pentito Fausto Scudo mused with regard to a business that placed a sticker on their 
window 
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[the business] does not pay because the businessperson, in clearly posting an 
antiracket symbol outside their commercial property, has clearly declared their 
intention to denounce pizzo requests. It is this statement of intent that us from the 
clan Ascione have taken under consideration, and with this symbol [in the window] 
we skip the business entirely. (Conticello, 2015, p.152) 
In effect, trying to collect pizzo from an antiracket member was deemed too much trouble 








The role of the antiracket association itself was to convince businesses who, as Tano 
Grasso observed in his own experiences of businesses in the formation of an antiracket 
association in Capo d’Orlando, kept themselves to themselves and paid pizzo in silence. 
They aim to break the barrier of isolation: the disposition and culture of mafiosità (mafia-
ness) has been pushed on businesses, making them feel alone against their extorters, and 
has been realised for them as indifference and individualism, which hinder opposition to 
mafia (Grasso, 1992, p.19). More specifically, this culture of mafiosità can be broadly defined 
as somewhere between a type of Cutolian nihilistic individualism, and a conservative 
traditionalist preservation of the status quo. It is one that pushes the acceptance of isolation 
and powerlessness in the face of the Camorra sovereign as the normal state of things, as 
well as a view that one should be thankful that the pizzo payment is not higher. These 
shopkeepers become those Foucauldian corps dociles (Foucault, 1975; 2008) and 
Figures 1 and 2 
Two examples of anti-racket stickers found in shop windows in Ercolano  
“I don’t pay the pizzo, and I denounce whoever asks for it” with the phone number 
of the anti-racket listed below 
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Agambian-cum-Joycean Leopold Blooms (Agamben, 2009, p.22-3; Tiqqun, 2000) that the 
Camorra has purposely fostered so as to be able to govern their territory and their activities 
more effectively.  This acceptance and docility are precisely what La Boétie called servitude 
volontaire (La Boétie, 1553). The question as to why more businesses did not revolt against 
their extorters before 2004 can be answered by the process of socialisation, conditioning 
and ideological hegemony that their extorters and their clans facilitated directly through 
interaction. Like William Reich’s conundrum as to why so few people who are starving 
actually steal, we should not ask what brought individuals such as Filippo or Raffaela to 
denounce. We we should ask instead why so many shopkeepers did not denounce at all 
until encouraged to do so (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, p.38). 
Alongside the threat of violence, this is further solidified indirectly through affective-aesthetic 
effects (Pine, 2012, p.14) in the community in general where the perception of the natural 
order of things is further materialized in Ercolano through anti-police graffiti on walls, 
abandoned buildings, shouting in the streets, scooters in alleyways, red and white stars 
adorning buildings, fireworks at certain points in the day as a message to drug peddlers that 
new products have arrived or that a camorrista has been released from prison, stories of 
violence and criminality in the local news. All of this serves to reaffirm the already held view 
of the inherent powerlessness of the businessperson and the futility of resistance, whilst also 
denoting the betterment of a businessperson’s situation as possible only through 
cooperation with the clan. This is further facilitated through the belief that the existence of 
organized crime and political corruption in general is the normal state of affairs in the world, 
and exists throughout the world as much as it does in the mezzogiorno. Indeed during my 
time in Naples, I was asked on various occasions what the mafias in the UK were like, at 
which my denial of their existence was met with derision (see for example Appendix V, 10 
January 2015).   
It is precisely this feeling of isolation for businesses that needed to be addressed by the 
antiracket:  this disposition of isolation amongst a vast number of businesses in a community 
must be re-examined and imagined instead as something that can be overcome. The 
amount of fear that mafia/Camorra extorters evoke for each individual business must be 
reimagined in order for it to be shared amongst the business community as a whole, thereby 
making resistance easier. What the antiracket association sought to do was simultaneously 
to demonstrate that shopkeepers are not alone in their isolation and that they are genuinely 
in a position to oppose and then undermine this criminal phenomenon, but also that an 
individualistic mentality in the face of this type of systematic oppression will only serve to 
continue it.  
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However, one must still overcome the Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is accepted that, in order to 
uproot this phenomenon, shopkeepers need to denounce their extorters with the support 
from others (be that other shopkeepers, the antiracket association, or the Carabinieri). The 
issue, however, is moving beyond the conviction that paying a small tithe to the Camorra in 
isolation is a small price to pay for the risk of denouncing and not being supported. A 
shopkeeper needs to be convinced that they will be supported otherwise this small tithe truly 
is a very small price to pay for avoiding violence or emotional distress. The process of 
moving from this extorter-influenced attitude and logic that separates and isolates individual 
businesses, making it easy for them to pay in silence, towards an understanding that a 
business is able to say no and denounce this metus causa factum payment, is 
understandably difficult, but is nonetheless the key to the uprooting of the Camorra in this 
context. There is an element of embarrassment, if not shame, to have paid and have been 
subjected to threats of violence (subtle, insinuated or otherwise), which can be mitigated 
through a kind of group therapy between current and former payers. This is precisely why 
regular meetings have been important for the businesses in the antiracket association, 
because the meetings facilitate those trust bonds between individuals and demonstrate to 
those isolated businesses that they are not alone, and that they be able to denounce their 
extorters with the support of friends and colleagues and the assistance of the authorities. 
They are supported by the Carabinieri and the rest of the antiracket association in the 
process of denouncing when they step into the courtroom – removing the “x” environmental 
value that can weigh down on a businessperson in court (Grasso, 2014, p.10), and after the 
trial. 
The antiracket serves to redefine the link between individual businesses and the rest of the 
business community and between the business community and the Carabinieri, therefore 
restoring faith in the judicial system in general. As an organisation, it emphasises that the 
influence that the Camorra has over a business is largely due to a business’s reluctance to 
trust the law enforcement in supporting them because of the ingrained isolationism that has 
been pushed by their extorters. Therefore, from the perspective of the Carabinieri it has 
been important to demonstrate that they are genuinely serious about wanting to support the 
businesses, which is the cornerstone of the Modello Ercolano itself.  
 
2:2:  Radio Siani  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Radio Siani began as the social cooperative “Arci 
Zona Rossa” in 2009. It had registered as an official association a month or so previously, 
but had existed for a while as a young group of friends who met occasionally, talking about 
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the problems that faced their community and what they could do about it. What they lacked 
was a physical space to do this that they could call their own, instead of meeting in bars, 
cafes or piazzas. Upon hearing that a property had been confiscated from the Birra clan, and 
knowing that this would be given to a local registered association for the purpose of 
providing a social/cultural good for the community, they decided to register themselves as an 
association officially, so as to be able to apply to become the benefactors of this property. 
The then Mayor, Nino Daniele, originally wanted this property to become the site of the anti-
racket association, but due to its relatively small size, this was rejected by the association. 
Here is a description of Radio Siani’s first steps: 
After the first few months of logistical difficulty to start things due to structural 
problems in one of the rooms, the apartment started to be frequented by the young 
people of Ercolano in November 2009. On 21st November there was the first big step. 
In a few days they organized an anti-Camorra march for that evening starting from 
[the Radio at] Corso Resina 62.  You could see was not only the faces of the young 
people from the new radio, but also adults, seniors, schoolchildren, institutional 
figures who came  together to parade through the main streets of the city. The same 














AntiCamorra march, November 2009 
















The timing of this march was crucial. In the month before the march on the 21st November 
there had been the bomb detonated at the bakery, a Carabinieri march through the city as a 
show of force, and the murder of a young local Neomelodico singer, Salvatore Barbaro, in a 
case of mistaken identity by the Ascione. All these events on the back of years of Camorra 
violence formed the backbone of the anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano. Figure 3 shows a 
the sign reading “Ideas do not stop with fear”, being held up by a number of individuals who 
are now active in various other Civil Society Organizations throughout Ercolano such as the 
Forum dei Giovani, and in local media. The point was that, while there was a general social 
“anti-Camorra” movement and mood that formed around this march organised by Radio 
Siani, the different organisations and associations now approach the issue in different ways. 
The sign is now displayed in Radio Siani’s headquarters and is occasionally brought to other 
marches they take part in.  
Radio Siani, in particular, is a difficult group to place and categorise for the simple reason 
that it grew organically and separate from the State, to have a close interaction with the local 
administration only later through its symbolism as a movement against organized crime, as 
Figure 4 




clarified by its president, Giuseppe Scognamiglio during another interview at the radio 
station:  
I believe it was 2009 which was a very important year, because it was in this year 
that the antiracket association was born, that Radio Siani was born, and so they met 
the shopkeepers and organized a walk with the association and, above all, the law 
enforcement that we have to thank in this story. But they were all together – the 
Carabinieri who met with the activists who were working in this apartment and 
making Radio Siani. And so it was this union of force together, and with a hand from 
the administration and its Mayor, Nino Daniele, who like us had put himself on the 
line, with contributions as the Mayor. We weren’t paying any taxes like rubbish 
collection for two years – much like the businesses who denounced the racket. This 
union together had created an important turn in terms of the investigations, the 
arrests, the dismantling of the clans in their territory which has had a very long history 
in Ercolano. (CS2 18032014) 
It is not that they are “part” of the State, rather it is that the State recognised that this was a 
Civil Society Organizations that could be a conduit for its own social policies. This could then 
be supported with partial funding, thereby giving institutional backing to programmes. It is 
noteworthy here that, given the different manner in which different Civil Society 
Organizations are supported by the State, we can identify teloses and methodologies that 
develop simultaneously in the same space. In this context we can see Radio Siani 
conducting policies in the area with State support in a kind of Post-Marxist discourse which 
places an emphasis on the freedom of information and the necessity of democratization and 
cooperation across society within a neoliberal model and approach to Civil Society in order 
to hold politics to account. Hammering the point in an article that celebrated the success of 
the anti-mafia in Ercolano, Giuseppe Scognamiglio wrote:  
Civil society: the honest and decent. We continue to be bullied, with oppression and 
violence without liberating ourselves. This is no longer possible.  
The Modello Ercolano is precisely the product of this organisation made by Civil 
Society, young people, shopkeepers, entrepreneurs and people from the institutions. 
Here in Ercolano the honest and good parts of the city have been able to organise 
themselves, to share a common objective, deciding which sides to take, against 
injustices, the mafias and illegality for a better community, for a different future.  
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We don’t have any other secrets; it’s just that we trust one another, walking together 
on a common path. Unsurprisingly, marches signify much more than a symbolic 
action. 
Something important must be added however. This has all been made possible 
thanks to PM Pierpaolo Filippelli and his men, his staff, his Carabinieri, those at the 
Torre del Greco caserma, and their representatives in Ercolano, and the other law 
enforcement agencies that have been collaborating with one another. They have 
been able to wipe out the common mentality in the area that perceived the 
Carabinieri as the bad guys and the Camorra as the good guys who they can rely on 
where necessary. Unfortunately in Ercolano, the roles of the Stat  e and the anti-
State had been inverted for decades, thanks also to a conniving politics, all too often 
complicit [with the Camorra], like its own family-based Civil Society that has been 
known to have been wedged between the Hammer and the Sickle, between the altar 
and the dining room, between pleasures and investment, between offences, abuse 
and a couple of holidays in Mondello [a famous beach in Sicily], giving life to the 
[in]famous “zona grigia”, that continues to do so much harm to Italy and in many 
cases reigns supreme in the “new” socio-economic system.  
Fortunately for the tourist town without tourists, for Vesuvius without footpaths, and 
for the sea without areas to bathe, all of these true men, with humility and 
determination have been able to restore everything to normal, producing mind-
boggling numbers, decapitating the clans, decimating [criminal] families, eliminating 
the criminal organizations, with hundreds and hundreds of arrests, convictions and 
harsh penalties for all, without exception, from the least to the most important in their 
hierarchy. (Radio Siani, 2015)  
There are some problems here particularly regarding hyperbole. The “good” Carabinieri/Civil 
Society and “bad” Camorra, the “us vs. them” discourse is hinted at here, and should be 
rejected as oversimplified and reductive. Similarly the rhetorical combination of masculinity 
and the anti-Camorra movement should be rejected, exemplified here with the allusion to the 
“true men” that fight against the clans. This said, however, this rhetorical posturing does 
betray a subtle redefinition of local culture, world view and norms, whereby the traditional 
masculine image of the honourable mafioso is inverted, making it honourable instead to be 
against this criminal cultural sphere – itself part of the cultural hegemonic contest for the 
habitus. Despite my respectful philosophical apprehension to this particular type of rhetorical 
flourish, this redirection of deep rooted cultural norms is undoubtedly ingenious. A word, a 
phrase or an idea such as “honour”, that had previously been associated with criminal/mafia 
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culture and the protectio n of “their” culture and close-knit way of life away from the 
perceivably corrupt and oppressive State that interferes in local affairs, is purposely inverted, 
using that same drive and cultural norm to want to be “honourable” and redirecting honour to 
the fight against the corrupt and oppressive camorristi that interfere in local affairs. This is an 
example of the political character of Radio Siani, without overtly involving politics.  
Criminal influence on the local mentality, that we refer to as indicative of a criminal/Camorra 
cultural hegemony, has been identified as an obstacle to defeating organized crime in the 
area. As well as regular citizens, years of corruption and collusion between local politics and 
Camorra clans led to years of relatively uninterrupted Camorra activity that created a society 
which, according to Scognamiglio, was more disposed to turning to the zona grigia and 
criminality than the State and legal means. This can be changed through cooperation and 
the dissemination/freedom of information through a legality discourse, where Radio Siani 
can be a major player: 
We sought to create an anti-mafia radio which communicated all these things through 
different forms of art. So the world is outside this venture: we want to provide the 
truth and aesthetic information, that is, without manipulation in order to give the 
people the possibility to decide for themselves. Without taking them away from this. 
Above all, the rooms in this radio are an open canvas, and give people the 
opportunity to speak through the microphone to show people different realities. Like 
other associations, how different people do different things with other “beni 
confiscati”. We want them to tell the story and communicate their initiatives and 
seminars on legality, the anti-Camorra, anti-mafia. But at the same time we try to 
maintain the characteristic of a radio-comune.67 There is always space, but at the 
same time it is important to have a mixture of other lighter topics – ironic, funny, good 
music alongside those more serious topics. We include other things such as book 
presentations, small conferences, meetings with students at school, people in the 
street. (CS2 18032014) 
Taken literally, it is questionable whether their openness extends so far as to allow Camorra 
supporters to have a slot on the radio to speak, but this notwithstanding, it is clear that they 
want to host as many different viewpoints as possible: how best to approach problems in 
society, with a broad focus on the Camorra and criminality in general. This is particularly 
visible with claims from their members that they are an apolitical association, though these 
                                                          
67
 This is broadly understood as an approach with origins in anarchist/anti-Statist movements, when activists 
tended occupy buildings and then use pirate radio stations to broadcast their message. The difference here, of 
course, is that this is not based in an occupied building and the activists do not live on site. See Behan (2007).  
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are countered by claims to the contrary by other individuals I met and interviewed in the city, 
who noted the politicised and activist character to the organisation (N6 17042015). I also 
strongly reject the notion of apoliticality itself, particularly with regard to such political issues. 
One can attempt to be as unbiased as possible, but the notion of being apolitical in such a 
context is ludicrous. This is a common element throughout the non-State anti-mafia activist 
movement in the mezzogiorno region personified through various Leftist martyrs such as 
Giuseppe Impastato (whose Radio AUT they have emulated).68 Radio Siani is a very typical 
“anti-mafia” Civil Society Organization in this sense; most Italian anti-mafia Civil Society 
Organizations claim to be apolitical, are run through voluntary participation, and have no age 
requirements whilst primarily focusing on young members (Cayli, 2013, p.84). Grass-roots 
and bottom-up activism are identified as the manner in which the cultural and social 
problems in society can best be targeted. Scognamiglio spoke of the importance of a kind of 
“cultural” war against the Camorra and criminality: 
The final message is absolutely this: in the sense that we met inside this apartment 
really is to give out this message. At the end of the day, this radio in this place is to 
give a message to the people that haven’t yet overcome the fear of the Camorra that 
unfortunately for a long time has been present in our territory and in our heads that is 
today difficult to unhinge and change. But to enter into this place, where before it was 
impossible. Because below this apartment, where you would stop to enter the 
building, there was the chariot of the Madonna where there was a religious ceremony 
where, if you wanted to pass, you had to enter with your head bowed. It was a place 
of power, where one could not confront, where you couldn’t be against the boss in 
this place. To enter into this apartment is to give a message that we “look, we are all 
together”. On a walk together: this is a common struggle. We can do it through a 
strength in numbers –we are a city of 60,000 inhabitants – how many Camorra could 
there be? 600? 700? 1000? But there are always 56,000/ 57,000 good and honest 
people in this city. It is a message that we all together. We are people of the same 
mentality, to free ourselves from this evil. We can do it. We can do it through a 
cultural route, a cultural message created from our consciousness. Critique the 
phenomenon. Here, we work a lot with schools and through this you help the 
antiracket associations because the antiracket association became the voice of 
denunciation. The shopkeepers denounced together with the association antiracket 
                                                          
68
 In 2007 a webradio was founded in San Giovanni a Teduccio (between Ercolano and Naples) named after 
one of Giuseppe Impastato’s Radio AUT most prominent anti-mafia segments, “Radio Onda Pazza”, the radio 
broadcasts political segments, with an aim of highlighting local and national political issues to young people. 
Because of the close vicinity of this webradio and Arci Zona Rossa, “Radio Siani” was the name chosen instead 
of Radio Onda Pazzo. We can say that Radio Siani more closely represents the discourse of Impastato rather 
than Siani.  
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and therefore they are now all together, there is no longer need for any shopkeeper 
to be ordered about, and threatened. (CS2 18032014) 
Subtle examples of this are shown simply through their expanded membership and reliance 
on volunteers in the local community who are willing to dedicate a bit of their own time to the 
organisation – then coming into contact with other like-minded young people who help 
(re)define their own perceptions of cultural capital around them. Where the radio is a product 
of voluntary associationalism, its members have been recruited through already existing 
friendship ties, as exemplified not only by its foundational origins as a product of four friends, 
but also the manner in which it expanded. Here is how one of its members and broadcasters 
explains it: 
Radio Siani gave me this opportunity, like they gave the opportunity to young people 
before me. Having a good time, meeting new people – and through them I was able 
to meet new artists and other heads of social movements. Radio Siani has been a 
world where I have been able to better myself for the last two years. The last year 
has been fundamental because it has helped me understand whether my future is to 
be here with the Radio, or elsewhere. I found myself [in Ercolano] to be a big fish in a 
small pond, and also more open. And this is the same thing for Radio Siani. 
 […] 
I was invited to join the Radio, though I should give you some background before 
saying any more. It all began with an acquaintance with one of the guys from the 
Radio in 2013, who after a few months invited me to come to the radio, and invited 
me to be a part of it, where he and I began broadcasting in October 2013 (because 
they start broadcasting every year in October). My friend began to host me there 
monthly, as a cover for another political pundit. All of this was as an amateur, 
because no one at the radio is a professional, it’s just when anyone is available I 
mean. Thanks to one of the organisers, after a couple of months I had a fixed slot. 
(CS 19062015)  
Pre-existing friendship ties separate to the radio have been utilised to recruit members, who 
then come into contact with the Radio Siani social network which includes friends and 
acquaintances made through the activities that they conduct. Here is a brief example as to 
how widespread this network is: through my own private English teaching that I was doing 
during my fieldwork, I came into contact with the “British Community Naples”, an association 
that held weekly social events in pubs and film showings in hand with the British Council in 
Naples to get locals speaking English with native speakers. The Neapolitan organisers of the 
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British Community not only knew members of Radio Siani through shared journalistic circles, 
but had actually been invited to Ercolano to visit the radio a year previously. Both Radio 
Siani and the British Community have members and organisers who are active in more than 
one organisation, who are then able to meet one another when their organizations interact 
with one another (See Appendix V, 18 March 2015). Indeed Radio Siani has fused, through 
the dissemination of information and discussions according to the broadcasted interests of 
their members general culture (music, talks), their fight against illegality and criminality, and 
as a result they have been able to meet other like-minded organisations and associations 
who are active in the social sphere such as the British Community.  
Alongside the radio broadcasting itself, the promoters and managers of the group conduct 
other activities through the “Cooperativa Giancarlo Siani”, founded in March 2012 and based 
in the same location. As a “tipo b”69 cooperative in Italian law, this cooperative aimed to 
“offer opportunities for social reintegration of disadvantaged individuals, or those who are 
already on the path to recovery”. The cooperative has four main focuses: communication, 
management and re-use of assets confiscated from the mafia, social activities (including 
social and health) and cultural tourism,70 all of which are covered in turn by different parts of 
the Arci Zona Rossa, Radio Siani and Cooperativa Giancarlo Siani legal entities, using many 
of the same activists in all of them. Their communication focus includes the cultural activities 
of Radio Siani itself through its broadcasts, but also the granting of advertisement slots to 
other social movements, the renting of radio equipment, the promotion of events, and 
researching the community that they inhabit. Notable activities in this area include the 
administration of the Ercolano per la legalità website, the advertising of local socio-cultural 
events such as those run by the Scuderie and local entrepreneurship through ethical 
consumerism. Cultural events, public meetings and marches in Ercolano such as the Marcia 
della legalità, “Agricoluta locale: possibile sviluppo” (Local agriculture: possible development) 
which bring together individuals from NGOs, politicians and locals, are often sponsored, 
advertised and attended by members of the cooperative.  
In a broader sense, the cooperative also manages land confiscated from the Camorra, upon 
which it cultivates produce on a “social farm”. They produce a specific tomato species 
“pizzino vesuviano”, and honey in a beehive that they manage with the cooperation from the 
local Agricultural faculty of the Università degli studi di Federico II di Napoli. These products 
are cultivated by members of the cooperative alongside young volunteers from the local 
community. There have been occasions where local schools have included school projects 
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 Type B: involved in the management of activities aimed at providing employment for disadvantaged persons 




relating to these confiscated sites as part of their curriculum. Indeed two classes in a school 
close to the Radio Siani headquarters had to undertake such projects for two hours a week 
everyday afterschool for a week where they were supervised by two of the Cooperative’s 
volunteers (Il Gazzettino Vesuviano, 6 February 2014) which has been repeated every year 
since 2013. The use of children is easy to criticise, however Scognamiglio pre-empted this; 
We are excited to kick off this activity which is crucial to us all in the recovery and 
support for kids in the neighbourhood … although it may seem controversial [to use 
children in this sense] what really matters is the cultural aspect – particularly in a 
neighbourhood and a city that do not offer many other ideas. (Il Gazzettino 
Vesuviano, 6 February 2014) 
Whilst the cultivation of ethical produce is important in this context, particularly as a means 
of re-using assets against the Camorra and encouraging individuals throughout Italy to buy 
more ethically, the money gained from the produce that goes back into the farm is not the 
focus here. The focus is, as Scognamiglio declares, changing the culture and giving young 
people other opportunities and experiences that they would not have had otherwise. This is 
also the case with the cooperative providing vocational training for young people in the area, 
such as organising classes that both support the local tourist economy (teaching English, 
teaching local history and culture in hand with the Herculaneum site) and encourage 
socialisation in other contexts.  
An essential side to this whole strategy, however, is that of the willingness of communal and 
regional politicians to siphon money into these types of projects in the first place, which we 
mentioned in the previous chapter. Most visible here through the initial granting of the 
apartment where Radio Siani is now based to Arci Zona Rossa (specifically Scognamiglio as 
its president, to whom it is entrusted for the duration of 10 years), and the farmhouse and its 
surrounding land to Cooperativa Sociale Giancarlo Siani (alongside another social 
cooperative) as well as direct and purposeful funding for their projects (all of which are 
awarded through the S.O.L.E Consortium, part of the Città Metropolitana di Napoli 
framework). A 2014 declaration, for example, granted €199,575 to Arci Zona Rossa to assist 
its activities under the National Government department “Dipartimento della gioventù” which 
gave €11,678,448.45 to the Campania region in order to promote entrepreneurship, social 
youth employment, self-sustainable management of properties that the groups occupy with 
already existing State owned assets – all aimed at young people up to the age of thirty-five 
(Dipartimento della Gioventù e del servizio civile nazionale, 2014).  
Likewise, a  2016 declaration,  awarded the sum of €27,000 to the Cooperativa Sociale 
Giancarlo Siani for their continued social work with local young people on the farmland, in 
177 
return for declaring that the project is due to funding from S.O.L.E. and placing their logo on 
the outside of the premises (Consorzio S.O.L.E., 2016). Overall, Radio Siani relies on the 
willingness of some of their members to work voluntarily and contribute to their activities 
when they can, on State funding, and on the continued permission to use confiscated 
assets.  
 
2:3: Forum dei Giovani 
An interesting contrast to Radio Siani in the area is that of the Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano 
which from 2009 onwards has offered an area where young people can meet and organize 
activities. In line with a 2003 Council of Europe policy document entitled “Revised European 
Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and Regional Life” (Council of Europe, 
2003). The regional government in Campania created a scheme whereby they would fund 
youth forums following a set of predetermined guidelines established in a 2008 procedural 
format for the creation of youth forums (Decreto Dirigenziale del 15 dicembre 2008 n.67). 
This led to the creation of a one-standard format for youth forums across the region, of which 
the Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano is but a one piece, whereby each comune has standard 
model for a youth forum. Through a set electoral framework, the Forum votes for a President 
as well as members of its own council so that it can organise events and meetings as a 
youth group, in addition to lobbying and communicating ideas to the ruling comune and 
acting as an official representation of a comune’s young people. In this sense, each youth 
forum is a democratically elected interest group for young people, facilitated by the elected 
comune. In May 2009 the Forum was officially created in Ercolano, meeting regularly and 
talking about problems affecting the city and discussing what to do about them, in addition to 
organizing social and cultural events to give young people something to do. Examples are 
that of cleaning specific public areas, hosting local politicians, showing informative films, 
gathering petitions and promoting awareness locally of certain issues and, in order to 
support local businesses, a discount card “Carta Amicizia” for young people with an 
Ercolano postcode.  
In 2011, the comune decided to give two rooms in one of their public buildings to the forum 
as a permanent meeting place for young people, as well as a space in which they can do 
their school, college or university work. This was further developed by book donations from a 
number of people in the city to create a small library in this space, and regular opening 
times, making the Forum often frequented in exam season. The Forum benefits young 
people by providing a place where they can do school work away from home, as well as a 
space in which they can meet new people of similar ages, working and learning together. 
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The Forum provides a platform for young people in Ercolano to advertise themselves and 
the activities that they are doing, whether it is teaching a foreign language, writing articles, 
photography, website design, dance, music either with or through the Forum. Much like 
Radio Siani, the Forum advertises much of the activities that they do and other notices 
online, with a presence on Facebook, Twitter and their own website. Through the media, 
they publicise news articles and blog posts written by members of the Forum.  
The Forum has pushed for a number of local causes and conducted its own voluntary 
activities such as the cleaning of the local areas where individuals have littered or purposely 
dumped waste, collecting charitable donations and used book sales for the poor, or helping 
victims of natural disasters such as the August 2016 Italian earthquake. All of these are 
decided democratically by a Forum vote and are conducted with the direct participation of 
young people in the Forum, sometimes in collaboration with other organisations, fostering 
greater interaction and cooperation between the members of these organisations before, 
during and after the participation (see Appendix V, 12 February 2015; 3 March 2015) 
There are a number of noteworthy events and activities that they have held and collaborated 
with since 2009. The most interesting from our perspective was a 2014 project titled 
“Questionario #NOCAMORRA” (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014), conducted in 
collaboration with a researcher of the Università degli studi di Napoli Federico II, Dr. Ciro De 
Falco and the Ercolano administration. The project focussed on young people in Ercolano 
and how they perceived the Camorra phenomenon. Questionnaire data was collected from a 
local school in Ercolano with 432 students between the ages of 13 and 21. The 
questionnaire was multiple choice, had several questions that asked the participant to rank 
certain values and had a few open questions that required the participant to write a few lines 
of elaboration of their answer. What is important to highlight is that the questionnaire was 
conducted upon local students by other local students in order to understand how young 
people in the community perceive their local area and its relationship to criminality. The fact 
that the questionnaire was proposed and then conducted in the first place, in addition to 
having its results elaborated in presentation for local young people is itself demonstrative of 
the activist nature of the Forum, as well as the fact that they seek to understand the 
phenomenon itself based on data.The Forum has purposefully made this data available 
online and accessible for anyone – leading me to contact them.  
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Table 1 
Elaborations of the answer to the question “Which of these definitions best describes 











On perceptions, the results of the questionnaire showed that 44.3% of the participants 
considered camorristi to be “criminals”,71 whereas only 5.4% viewed them positively. In this 
sense we can note the definite negative perception of the Camorra and camorristi in general, 
whilst also noting (with the options of “men of honour” and “hero”) that the results display the 
perception that being a criminal in this context is negative. This is contrasted to a 2012 
questionnaire in Naples conducted with over 2000 children from 10 different schools aged 
between 12 and 14,  where 10% were found to view the Camorra favourably and 16% 
believed that the Camorra guaranteed wealth, power and the resolving of the financial crisis 
(Metropolisweb, May 2012). 
On the phenomenon in general, when the participants were asked where they got their 
information on the Camorra, the majority of individuals indicated the media in general (TV, 
Newspapers, Internet, Books, Radio) rather than people or institutions (Church, School, 
Family, Friends), referred to in the document as “agencies of socialisation”.72  It must be 
noted, however, that the amount of faith they placed in each of these as well as the amount 
that each affects their view is not pursued here – so one piece of information about the 
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 “Which of these definitions best describes the Camorra? (Indicate one response only)” 
In addition to the 44.3% who considered them to be “criminals”, 17.2% considered them to be “murderers”, 
4.5% “businesspeople”, 0.2% “heroes”, 7.3% “thieves”, 13.4% “politicians”, 5.4% “men of honour”, 7.8% 
“other”.  (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.9) 
72
 “Where have you heard talk about the Camorra? (it is possible to indicate more than one response)” 
“TV” (94%), “At the local parish Church” (29.4%), “Family” (54.2%), “School” (70.1%), “Newspapers” (70.4%), 
“Friends” (49.5%), “Books” (27.8%), “Radio” (32.6%) and “Other” (2.3%).  
(Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.6) 
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Camorra from the TV will be weighed as equal to various interactions with the Church about 
the Camorra. There is a question as to how influential different interactions are compared to 
others. Indeed, the presentation document states, “School is the first social institutions 
outside of the family home with which an individual begins the process of secondary 
socialisation” (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.7). At the very least the data here is a 
good indication of how much these media and agencies disseminate information about the 
Camorra and how widespread its impact is.73 Further indicative of this is that only 47% of the 
participants had heard of Giancarlo Siani, Radio Siani’s namesake.74  
The participants were asked to indicate the importance of certain factors that lead to the 
Camorra phenomenon, all between 0-10. The highest indicated was “corruption” averaging 
at 8.9, followed by “ignorance” at 8.4 and “bad politics”75 at 8.276. The coverage of national 
political scandals is ultimately a factor here, whereby revelations such as those in 
Tangentopoli have likely harmed the public trust in public institutions. This is also the case 
on a local level, demonstrated by the 1993 dissolution of the local administration due to 
Camorra infiltration, other corruption scandals in Ercolano such as that in 2014, and other 
collusion between the zona grigia and the provision of public work. The participants were 
also asked to value the work of Law enforcement, the local comune, the national 
government and local associations. In this, the Italian State was consistently criticised in that 
it had a 63.2% negative rating and a 16.6% positive rating. The local administration was 
more mixed with a 35.8% negative rating and a 32.2% positive rating. Law enforcement was 
more positive with a 36.7% positive rating and a 29.7% negative rating. Local associations 
were even more positive, with 40.8% positive rating and a 30.1% negative rating.77  
Regarding the Law enforcement more specifically, the participants were asked to rate their 
level of trust in its institutions, again between 0-10. In this, the Carabinieri were rated highest 
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 An interesting project for the future would be a questionnaire which goes into more detail about a local 
community and where people receive information about the Camorra. An example of this could be a 
comparison between different Civil Society organizations and specific media organizations. One could analyse 
how many of the participants follow Radio Siani / Forum dei Giovani on Facebook, how many of them have 
heard of different local organizations, are members of the local political parties, and of other voluntary 
associations etc.  I did this in a much more limited way with my questionnaire for members of the local anti-
racket, but given the limited numbers available, many of the results were inconclusive.   
74
 Other individuals’ fame that was questioned were Giovanni Falcone (Murdered Sicilian Judge, 81%) Totò 
Riina (Former Cosa Nostra boss, 77.1%), Roberto Saviano (journalist and writer of Gomorrah, 63%), Carmine 
Schiavone (former member of the Casalesi, 50.5%), Raffaele Cutolo (former boss of the NCO, 48.1%) and 
Bettino Craxi (former Italian Prime Minister, 14.8%) (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.7-8) 
75
 The original Italian is “Cattiva Politica”, where “cattiva” can be translated as “(morally) bad” or “naughty”. 
76
 “In your opinion, from 0-10, how much have the following been involved in the formation of the Camorra?”  
Followed by “Unemployment” at 7.3, “Social hardship” at 7.2, “Urban degradation” at 6.9, “marginalisation” at 
5.7 and “for career reasons” at 5.6 (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.10). 
77
 “How do you rate the following organizations against organized crime?”  
The options available were “very bad”, “bad” “bad enough”, “acceptable”, “good enough”, “good”, very good” 
and “Don’t know” (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.13). 
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(5.8) followed by the Guarda di Finanza (5.4), the State Police (5.3) and the much lower 
Municipal Police (3.7),78 which coincides with the data collected in my questionnaires with 
the anti-racket members.   
On their own activism and their own opinion of “what is to be done?” the participants were 
asked which sectors should be intervened in in order to defeat the Camorra, the vast 
majority indicated Corruption (53%), Security (50.9%) and Education (50.5%).79 Corruption, 
again, was understood to be the main issue which is damaging their society, which perhaps 
demonstrates the frustration that the participants feel towards corrupt individuals’ influence 
upon the whole socio-economic system, and indeed explains why some people are 
persuaded by microcriminality when those at the top are as criminal as those low level 
camorristi. Parts of this discourse posit that without the grey zone between some elected 
officials, civil servants, businesspeople and the Camorra, the Camorra would not be as 
influential as it is. If you remove this ability to influence politics and the licit economy, then 
the Camorra would not be as powerful. The security discourse covers varying elements from 
law enforcement, State power and even the private and personal sphere: the Camorra are 
powerful and have an influence over society because law enforcement has been lacking in 
some way – be that in the form of not protecting shopkeepers, or simply not 
catching/punishing people for their crimes when they are committed. We could also take the 
perspective of private security: the Camorra are in a position where they are able to exploit 
local people, and so therefore their security (shopkeepers through shop shutters, CCTV, or 
private security) is viewed as important to resisting the Camorra. The education discourse is 
equally varied: it is as much about educating the current and future camorristi on the harm 
their activities inflict on others as it is about educating people to report crimes and 
wrongdoings to the proper authorities when they see them. At the same time, it is education 
in a civic, cultural, entrepreneurial, psychological, social and political sense as the participant 
understood it.  
In terms of their own activism, the participants were asked whether they participate in 
initiatives against the Camorra to which 41.2% responded “yes”. It is unclear exactly what 
this might entail, but in Ercolano we can say that it could be anything from ethical 
consumerism against the Camorra promoted by the anti-racket businesses, participating or 
being a member of any anti-mafia group such as Radio Siani or Libera, to taking part in 
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 “From 0 to 10, how much trust do you have in the following bodies of the Law enforcement?” (Forum dei 
Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.14). 
79
 “If you were to suggest something to the institution, which of these sectors would you intervene in to defeat 
criminality?”  
With much less emphasis placed on “Work” (40.3%), “Environmental Protection” (23.1%), “Immigration” 
(7.9%) and “Free time” (7.6%) (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.22). 
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projects against the Camorra through the Forum dei Giovani, the Church, the scouts, or any 
other social movement. Additional exposure to these types of organisations through la 
Marcia della legalità and its related activities must also be considered here. They were 
further asked how they would judge these kinds of initiatives against the Camorra: 5.4% 
judged them to be useless, 75.1% to be useful, and 19.4% to be essential.80 Crucially, when 
the participants were asked whether the Camorra could be beaten, 46.8% said “yes”, 16.7% 
said “no” and 36.6% said that they did not know.81  
On the immediate issue of their place within this system, the participants were asked 
whether they knew anyone involved with the Camorra, and 59.4% answered “no”, 30% 
answered “yes” and 10.6% answered “prefer not to say”.82 On their future in Ercolano and 
the local area the participant were asked whether they would leave their home city in the 
future: 48.5% responded “yes”, only 13.3% responded “no” and 38.2% responded “I don’t 
know”. Following this, the participants were asked what the causes and/or motives people 
had for wanting to leave: 25% responded that it was due to reasons of work, 24% for the 
“future in general”, 17.6% citing a distaste for the city, 17.2% a distaste for Italy, 8.8% for 
easier living, 6.4% for varied reasons and only 1% was because of the Camorra.83  
To reiterate, a major aspect of this project is that it was conducted by young people in the 
local community. Indeed as the Forum stated:  
The research was useful, because on the one hand it drove young people to stop 
and reflect on a particularly important issue in our region and our future as embodied 
in the fight against the Camorra, and on the other hand because it gives a clear 
picture of the thoughts of young people in the area.84 
There was a significant element of collaboration in all the phases of the project that made it 
possible, namely from the process of proposing the idea in the Forum, communicating with 
local schools and teachers to realise it, to the eventual presentation of the results to the 
participants and their peers. In its design the project sought to enable discussion on these 
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 “Do you think that this type of demonstration [social initiatives against the Camorra] is.. (Indicate one 
response only)” This was broken down into “Useless, given the vastness of the phenomenon” (5.4%), “Useful, 
to understand other people who are against the Camorra” (4.4%), “Useful, to send a message to the criminals” 
(10.3%), “Useful, to spread the culture of legality” (25.8%), “Useful, if the institutions execute concrete acts 
too” (34.6%) and “Invaluable to combat the phenomenon” (19.4%) (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, 
p.20). 
81
 “Do you think that the Camorra and organized crime in general can be defeated?” (Forum dei Giovani di 
Ercolano, 2014, p.20). 
82
 “Have you ever known anyone involved with the Camorra?” (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.13) 
83
 “Do you intend on leaving your city to live in another place?” “If yes, why”? (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 
2014, p.19). 
84
 http://www.forumgiovaniercolano.it/iniziative/questionario-noCamorra  
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issues for the participants and their peers, with the collection and presentation of the data 
forming part of the Forum dei Giovani’s activism against organized crime.  
Similarly to Radio Siani, this project can be seen as underpinned by a post-Marxist 
perspective of Civil Society through participation and activism, within the framework of an 
institutionally based youth forum.  Members of the Forum also pointed to its general stance 
as apolitical, which, again, I reject. The group may try to exert its attempts to stay outside the 
realms of party politics, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to not politicise the issues it deals 
with.     
The main difference between the Forum and Radio Siani, however, is that the Forum stays 
afloat due to the voluntary assistance of their members to continue conducting their 
activities, as well as the continued support from the communal administration. The Forum’s 
legal status, for example, is predicated on support from the comune, which, for partisan 
reasons or ineptitude, may choose to reallocate the resources enjoyed by the Forum to other 
areas of communal administration. An area that should be persued is the relationship 
between the communal administration (in this case, overwhelmingly by the PD), the local 
youth wing of the party in power and the Forum. This could provide us with some interesting 
comparisons as to how a party may exert its influence on supposedly apolitical organisations 
such as the Forum.   
 
2:4: The Church 
Neoliberal approaches at addressing social issues in communities are rooted in a strategy 
that involves the third sector, often outsourced from and (partially) funded by the State. This 
should be understood in the context of the outsourcing of the public sector. In the case of 
areas characterised by economic underdevelopment and the influence of mafia-type 
associations, it would be prudent to compare the activities of associations that have received 
support from the State and those who have not. An idealist could imagine different elements 
of the anti-Camorra movement working together in tandem for the sake of the overall goal of 
bettering society and defeating the Camorra. But the reality is a lot more complicated. This 
was highlighted quite clearly by a local priest, Padre Pasquale Incoronato, in one of his 
pastoral youth meetings that I was fortunate to attend. The topic of this particular evening 
was “giustizia” (justice) and “legality”, which, on the basis of various readings from the 
gospels, and a particularly focussed attention on me and my research, Incoronato 
considered not to be the same thing. We can view this as the split between the 
Hegelian/Marxist concept of the Bürgerliche Gesellschaft combined with the Church’s 
perceived authority on ethical matters and a more liberal and utilitarian approach to ethics 
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and morality that has been transformed into public law. What has been decided by the State 
and the laws as legal and illegal is not necessarily the same as what is deemed (by the 
Church or God) to be right and wrong.  This appears to be a simple point, but demonstrates 
a particularly deep fissure between two prominent camps of the anti-mafia movement: the 
State-endorsed and supported camp has a focus on legality, compared to the Church’s 
focus on justice and what they believe to be Right. (See Appendix V, 3 March 2015)  
An aspect that was covered in the questionnaire with the Forum was the existence of 
“agencies of socialisation”, of which Civil Society Organizations are undoubtedly a part. 
Despite the trend of a decreasing number of churchgoers, the Church remains a significant 
part of the socialisation process outside of the family and outside of school. At the same time 
as this process, some of the local parishes in Ercolano have been rather active in trying to 
undermine the Camorra and the attraction that the Camorra has on individuals in the 
community, tying together socialisation, the Church and what it is to be against various 
injustices in society (some of it represented locally by criminality). From historically 
accessible data in newspaper archives, the first example of a Church-based anti-Camorra 
movement in Ercolano happened during the time when the communal administration was 
dissolved due to Camorra infiltration. As mentioned previously, in June 1993 the communal 
administration85 was dissolved by Presidential decree due to links with the Ascione clan, 
which meant that there was no locally elected government until November 1995. During 
these 18 months, the Church became particularly vocal in its criticism of local corruption and 
Camorra, calling for greater State presence to protect people, as well as itself organizing 
marches through the city in the public areas most associated with organized crime. In one 
letter to Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, then President of the Republic, one local priest, Don Raffaele 
Falco called for the army to come and help a struggling community: who was experiencing 
more and more violence. He called for the army because “deterrence is the only remedy for 
the wave of delinquency” and “we need everyone to mobilize themselves, but this can’t 
happen unless the people trust the [re]actions of the State” (L’Unità, 21 August 1993). In 
response, the regional government assigned more Carabinieri to the city, arresting a number 
of individuals, a temporary measure which had minimal results. The Church began 
organizing marches through the city to show its opposition to the clans: one of these 
marches numbered around 10,000 people, and is seen to have sparked some life into an 
anti-mafia movement, given that a number of the people involved in this march were to 
become elected with an unprecedented landslide victory in November 1995 on an anti-mafia 
platform (L’Unità, 30 August 2003). This movement still existed in Ercolano in 2001, but still 
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 This administration was elected in 1990: an election marred by the murder of a former Mayor, Antonio 
Buonaiuto, a prominent critic of organized criminality in Ercolano.  
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without sufficient State support, with the then Mayor Luisa Bossa declaring that the State 
simply does not exist in Ercolano. Since the Church alone was unable to defeat the 
Camorra, it sought to alter the social conditions in which it was able to flourish; by appealing 
to the clans’ families. We can interpret this desire to change the social conditions as wanting 
to change the nature of the habitus that existed in Ercolano, replacing it by Church-
influenced cultural values that focuses on what is Right. Such was the path that Don Falco 
chose to pursue appealing to people who surround the clans instead: asking women to turn 
in their Camorra men (L’Unità, 14 July 2001). 
The Church in Ercolano has been proactive against criminality and delinquency, though 
generally without the assistance or cooperation of the local administration and using its own 
devices and agency instead. One of the main focuses of Incoronato and his parish has been 
on children at risk in the community, and how to reincorporate those who are, or have been 
involved in organized criminality back into the community. In 1999, the parish had an 
opportunity to expand its reach from the church building itself to hold stewardship of a former 
pub, to be transformed it into a kind of community centre. The pub had a troubled history, 
being formerly managed by camorristi, with its former landlord being killed. In the newly 
founded “La Locanda di Emmaus” the parish would only pay the comune for electricity, 
heating, water and so on as long as the building remains a social asset for the community. 
The parish now had a canteen and space for children to learn and do school work under the 
supervision and guidance of local parents and volunteers, as well as older children who are 
brought in to help. Outside of summer time, the Locanda is also the meeting place of the 
Centro Pastorale Giovanile, the parish youth centre, which shares a number of members 
with the Forum dei Giovani – demonstrating part of the networked nature of the anti-Camorra 
movement in Ercolano.  
The main impetus behind this was the desire to protect children at risk, to keep them off the 
street and prevent them from going down the route of criminality, by giving them a space to 
interact with the church, its volunteers, and other local children. Another asset used by this 
parrochia is the so-called “La Tenda” (the tent), comprising an auditorium (Oratorio San 
Domenico Savio), a covered makeshift classroom block as well as a small artificial football 
field. Incoronato described the area before it was taken over by the parish as a “Camorra 
cemetery”: it was a commonly known area for drug dealing and taking, where two corpses 
were found. As for La Locanda, the land itself is owned by the comune, but in this case the 
parish has to pay rent to the comune of Ercolano (CS1 19062015). The idea behind this 
structure, in contrast to the educational La Locanda, was to provide a recreational area for 
the same children, alongside others in the community.  
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One particularly notable aspect of these two structures that Padre Pasquale had founded 
and their modus operandi, was that a number of the children in attendance were the children 
of cammoristi who were the most likely to be at risk of becoming cammoristi in future. One 
has to remember that whilst some people do turn to crime due to a general pursuit of action, 
excitement, pride or reputation, others do so out of necessity, all of which are simply due to 
the socio-economic system that they find themselves in. Of the parents of the children who 
these spaces there are people on the sidelines who feel the collateral damage caused by the 
presence of these groups in the community, as well as the effect of reprisals caused by the 
police. There are the people directly connected to the Camorra through family, namely those 
children and wives who have been reliant on the money gained from criminality, who, upon 
the arrest or the killing of the breadwinner, now are left looking for other sources of income 
and support. As noted previously, it has been suggested that money collected from 
businesses goes directly towards “the prisoners” and looking after their families, making sure 
that the families remain tied to the Camorra.  Whilst the arresting of criminals is an 
undoubtedly important aspect of the fight against organized crime, the social and economic 
effect that the removing of an (often male) family member or partner has upon a household 
is somewhat self-defeating in the fight against organized crime in the long-term, given that 
the systemic issues regarding the propensity towards joining a criminal clan and committing 
crimes have not been addressed. Indeed, by increasing arrests whilst not addressing these 
issues a society risks creating a vicious cycle whereby each arrested individual could leave a 
family further reliant on the Camorra, whose offspring then grow up, join the Camorra and 
repeat the process again.  
During the summer holidays, the local churches conduct various summer camps using their 
two centres: using socialisation between different children in a community and Church 
context to try and keep them off the streets and trying to break away from this vicious cycle. 
This is done through the access to various sporting and cultural activities: playing football on 
the field refereed by other children or young adults from the church or association, dance 
classes and recitals, art classes and cinema. In practical terms, what the activities of 
Incoronato’s parrocchia do is to try and move these families away from their previous 
networks of support, toward the Church and other community support networks. The ultimate 
aim is to try and uproot criminality on a local societal level.  It means that a child whose 
family has been affected by crime (directly or indirectly), or the socio-economic reality that 
created and fosters it, has an opportunity to leave this cycle. Through the Church, La Tenda 
and La Locanda, Incoronato sought to socialise the children of camorristi and individuals 
affected by the Camorra back into the community through the Church itself.  
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According to Incoronato, the creation and renovation of “culture” are an essential part of this. 
He emphatically declared that “the less culture there is, the more the Camorra wins” (CS1 
19062015). We can interpret this “culture” in a few different ways. In one sense he is 
referring to those cultural activities that young people do in this context, such as doing sport, 
dance, learning together, and so on. In another much more broader sense, we can view the 
culture that is needed as the Church’s version of the cultura della legalità, though with a 
greater emphasis on what is (in)justice and the distinction between right and wrong in a 
more moralistic sense as the Church sees it, rather than in a purely legal sense. The culture 
that Incoronato seeks to expand consists of those Catholic values which they view as 
necessary to expand into the community in order to prevent individuals from turning to sinful 
lives through criminality, amongst other things. Here we see another cultural pole and 
cultural sphere that attempt hegemony over the habitus using a combination of religious and 
activity-based socialisation to influence the norms and behaviours of the members. This 
happens in the combination of sports and fun activities in a Church or religious based 
context, facilitated by Incoronato and other local Church leaders. Here new cultural identities 
are forged in a similar manner to Libera Sport articulated by Cayli (2013b). In this context, 
the Church purposely conducts a combination of fun activities alongside educational 
programmes so as to place the Church, its values, and their importance for the bettering of 
society into view for those individuals who take part. This is facilitated as much by the 
knowledge and cultural capital gained from these activities, as it is by the friendship and 
comradery gained with the other young people around them in the activities that are 
conducted.  
What is important to emphasise in this Church-based context is that whilst the anti-
mafia/anti-Camorra movements in Ercolano are all on the same “side” against criminality per 
se, they all have different approaches as to how to defeat them. This could in part explain 
why, despite the efforts made by this particular parish to try to mitigate the effects of 
organized crime, and its attempts to change elements of society in the process, the support 
in terms of money, assets and exemption from particular taxes has been few and far 
between. What constitutes development, much like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. 
Indeed as Evans and Reid quite poignantly remark, “[d]evelopment has always been 
politically qualified. Not all development is ‘good’ and worthy of promotion” (Evans and Reid, 
2014, p.84), and here it is difficult to disagree. Whilst the local Churches have been able to 
create social centres outside of the church buildings themselves, it has come at significant 
economic cost in comparison to other associations: where Incoronato has to rent La Tenda 
from the comune (CS1 19062015), other associations have received properties and assets 
free of charge, in addition to funding. It is important to note that neither of the two properties 
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(La Locanda and La Tenda) were ever owned by the Camorra, and so would not have been 
earmarked for confiscation and stewardship as social assets. La Locanda was a pub which 
was merely managed by a Camorra associated individual(s), though it is unclear as to who 
the “landlord” was.86 The fact that it is the comune who asked the parish to restructure their 
expenses and to pay for the utility bills leads us to assume that it is currently owned by the 
comune. Whilst we note that the comune has acknowledged the work that the parish has 
done, and is able to do, there has been little support otherwise. La Tenda, however, has 
always been a communal asset and thus simply receives payment from the comune, though 
with parts of the site (the football field) entrusted to them. Aside from longstanding annual 
monetary contributions to the different churches in Ercolano by the comune, a common 
practice across Italy, there appears to be no other financial support given to the parish and 
the Church that assist the activities they conduct outside of the actual church structure. 
Despite the role that the Church in Ercolano has had in highlighting the issue of corruption 
and Camorra, and then facing it in practical terms from 1993 onwards, it remains very much 
separate to the rest of the anti-Camorra movement. This is visible in terms of the amount of 
tax exemption, payment, support and assets that have generally been passed over to other 
elements of the anti-Camorra movement but not to the church, at worst indicating a 
purposeful decision and at best indicating an oversight, on the behalf of the State, Region 
and Comune who have thus favoured certain proponents of the anti-Camorra movement 
over others. This becomes problematic when the Strategic Planning (2007-2013) aims and 
objectives of the Più Europa programme cited the need for educational workshops through 
the: 
carrying out territorial educational activities to offer: meeting and socialisation spaces 
for a positive use of leisure time, fun recreational activities in the streets, educational 
courses and workshops to stem marginalization processes and exclusion. In 
particular, moments of socialisation, both during the school timetable and during the 
summer holidays are to be consolidated in order to improve the relational 
opportunities of minors. (Ecosfera, 2010, p.68) 
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 Unfortunately, whilst increased transparency into communal legal documents and assets has meant data is 
more easily accessible for citizens and researchers, I have been unable to ascertain exactly who owned the 
property, given that transparency records for the Comune di Ercolano tend to only go back to 2002. The 
landlord is assumed to be the comune, though no records have been able to substantiate this claim. If the 
property had been “owned” by a camorrista, and had been confiscated after 1996, we would expect to see it 
as a confiscated asset designated for social use under legge n.109/96, but this is not the case. This means that 
this property has either; (1) been owned by the comune but then managed for a time by camorristi; (2) owned 
by camorristi but then aken under comune control before 1996 or (3) owned by a private landlord, rented to 
camorristi, then repossessed by the comune after the pub closed. 
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Socialisation has been noted several times in the previous section of this chapter as an 
important aspect with regard to development. The summer camps at La Tenda and the 
afterschool clubs and meeting at La Locanda, for example, undoubtedly represent a kind of 
socialisation, “educational course” and “workshop”, which are deemed worthy of 
development, even though these are all through the Church. Indeed there was a purposeful 
strategy within the Church to create a space for greater socialisation. From 2000 onwards 
the parish tried a new strategy in their educational development by purposely pairing up 
children from poorer families with less poor families, which was intended to have an effect on 
the socialisation of the young children and expand their own individual networks, for the 
purpose of bettering the community as the parish and Incoronato saw it: 
These are the families that we helped with their homework, to cloth them, to educate 
them, and to eat together. Two times a week, they come here to eat. The children of 
clan members arrive here, and the intention was that once they are grown up, they 
wouldn’t have waged war like they would have done otherwise [without our 
intervention]. (CS1 19062015) 
Not only were these children clothed and fed where applicable, alleviating the stress on 
parents,  but there was a very specific socialisation process that was encouraged involving 
the pairing up of poor and less poor, children of Camorra with other children, all mixed 
together at regular meals and helping one another with school work. The socialisation 
process here can be generalised as children interacting with one another and with adults in a 
relatively controlled environment, but also particularised as a place where children can better 
understand traits such as empathy and justice, all under the guidance of the parish. In a 
more specific manner, the socialisation in such an environment encourages children to see 
the world from perspectives other than their own.  
Despite this, the Church appears to have been overlooked by the Strategic Planning funding, 
leaving us to wonder what kind of socialisation is to be encouraged instead. As seen 
previously, much of this funding went towards other developments and redevelopments for 
already existing assets (such as the Vesuvian villas) and to improve tourism in the area, 
alongside the re-use of criminal assets. Here we can see the different “sides” or “aspects” of 
the anti-Camorra in Ercolano and their varying levels of institutional support, demonstrative 
of the phenomenon in the rest of Italy too. From the perspective of investment and funding it 
can lead us to infer that economic development in the form of increasing tourism, cosmetic 
social development, and improving the cultura della legalità has taken preference over social 
development in general. Only those elements of society which fall in line with the 
overarching Cultural Hegemony determined by the overarching social-economic system are 
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fostered, that is unless they can be co-opted for the prospect of economic gain or self-
sufficient social capital. Additionally, as announced on Incoronato’s Facebook page in early 
2017, his parish is actually in danger of losing custodianship of la tenda altogether due to 
funding issues. By this, it is meant that the assets that are available in the region for 
economic and social use (be that roads, public transport, aspects of the culture and history 
such as the Vesuvian villas and the Herculaneum Scavi) have been designated as worthy of 
development by the region in order to increase the amount of economic capital entering and 
then remaining in Ercolano, therefore enabling the development of socialisation and 
educational programmes in the city. For the groups and associations that already conduct 
these kinds of activities, such as the Church, the opposite is true: you start by building the 
culture and the socialisation of people within a community – giving them an element of 
agency within their own community, which will then lead to greater social and economic 
development in the city in a moralistic way.  
 
3: Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the role of certain Civil Society Organizations in Ercolano in 
combatting organized crime, noting the varying institutional support that they have received, 
as well as the variety of discourses that each group has deployed to approach the issue of 
criminality in their community. What is clear is that each group has emphasised the 
necessity of addressing the predominant “culture” that allowed organized crime groups and 
its supporters to flourish despite setbacks from judicial repression. It is the manner in which 
this “culture” has been conceived, the way it is to be addressed, and their desired telos that 
is the point of difference and dispute between these groups, whereby we have visualised this 
struggle as a struggle for cultural hegemonic dominance within the broad anti-mafia 
movement itself.  
I began by contextualizing Civil Society Organizations in Italy that focus on combatting 
mafia-type associations, noting particularly their strategies regarding “culture” to do so. Then 
we focussed in greater detail on the experiences of the anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano. 
I started with Ercolano per la legalità, noting individual characters and personalities who 
fostered its initial development, and the way in which it focussed on changing the inbuilt 
individualistic and isolated norms of accepting Camorra dominance. By providing a social 
space and forum where businesspeople were able to talk about their experiences and issues 
regarding (in)security, this antiracket association was able to build horizontal relationships 
between businesspeople, which were expanded to include members of the Carabinieri, 
something which facilitated the drive to actually denounce their extorters. This was an 
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exercise that was purposely aimed at (re)building the trust of businesspeople for the judicial 
system, all within the realms of the cultura della legalità, the Modello Ercolano, at the 
expense of the Camorra, their criminal sphere, and the behavioural dispositions and habits 
that had been pushed onto their pizzo-paying victims.  Similarly, Radio Siani and their 
activities were characterised by a very purposeful and overt call to change the character of 
the culture in Ercolano. Supported by the State through confiscated assets and the funding 
of projects, the ensemble of voluntary associations and cooperatives that make up Radio 
Siani geared themselves to play an active role in local media, the organisation of events or 
collaboration with organizers of events that could and can get locals involved with activities 
that provide opportunities outside of Camorra influence. Throughout this process the cultura 
della legalità was emphasised, whereby individuals could be socialised in a manner that 
removes the appeal of the Camorra and, when present, provided with other options, thereby 
facilitating the (re)definition of Cultural Capital in the habitus away from the Camorra criminal 
sphere. I found their activities to be a conduit for the enacting of State social policy in 
general, whereby funded programmes were realised by the association alongside its other 
voluntary activities which serve to complement government action (World Bank, 2013) whilst 
also increasing the levels of trust for the State.   
The Forum dei Giovani on the other hand emerged from my analysis as an organisation that 
got young locals interested in their community through direct action, albeit in a wholly 
voluntary and comune-determined context. The Forum emphasises the importance of action 
over pessimism, and whilst it can be accused of naïveté and wishful thinking, their activities 
encourage youth participation in their community that amounts to a response to 
Camorra/criminal influence (such as the cleaning up of illegal waste), and the facilitation of 
discussions about these issues – all of which strengthen the accountability of the communal 
administration. The Forum is also self-critical, as elaborated by the #NOCAMORRA project, 
where its assistance in the research methodology and then its own subjecting itsel to 
scrutiny afterwards encouraged the discussions of these previously taboo topics. This 
represents the alteration and self-realisation of certain Cultural Capitals that become 
embedded in the local consciousness.  
The Church represented the most troubling part of the anti-mafia movement in Ercolano , as 
we see a section of Civil Society that is actively and outwardly fighting mafia-type 
associations through the changing and adaption of Culture in which they thrive – attempting 
to sap the appeal of organized crime – but that receives little support from the State in this 
regard.  In this sense, I identify that from the perspective of the State the Church is tackling 
organized crime in the right way, namely through socialisation and the changing of “Culture”, 
but with a different end-game or telos with a focus on what it deems to be “Right”.    
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Whilst each of these groups has a different notion of what constitutes “Culture”, and 
therefore on what Cultural plane the habitus is to be moulded (and for whom), what each of 
them share is the acceptance that the way to undermine the Camorra in this context is to 
influence the behaviour and norms of the community through Cultural Hegemonic 
dominance. Each of these segments are fighting for dominance in the social sphere, 
together with a multitude of other socio-cultural influences and factors. Each of these 
influences the norms of individuals, their perceptions, choices and actions. In this sense, we 













































“Why have grand jury investigations and police forces failed time after time to crush 
organized crime? What is the reason why gang rule has successfully defied every attempt to 
suppress it?”  
John Landesco, 1929 
 
 “Every effort will be in vain if preventative means are not effectively adopted at the same 
time in which you try to eradicate evil with repressive means. I will never tire of this: whilst 
the present state of things lasts, the Camorra is the natural and necessary form of society I 
have described. For every thousand times eradicated, it will be reborn another thousand” 
Pasquale Villari, 1885 
 
Every reactionary effort against the Camorra must necessarily be conducted alongside 
preventative measures. Not only must actions be taken against current criminal associates, 
but also against future ones. The growing influence of organized crime in Chicago in the 
1920s led Landesco to ask the question above, but in our case study and elsewhere, these 
questions still remain pertinent. Despite seeing the entire directorate of the Ascione clan 
arrested in 1996, not only did the Ascione continue its operations in the years that followed, 
another clan was able to gain power. The norms that facilitated passivity to the Camorra, the 
networks and assistance provided by third-party area grigia, and the socio-economic reality 
of the area where the clans provide economic alternatives to lawful employment to locals 
remain unchanged. Villari refers here to what Tom Behan 120 years later called the Camorra 
hydra (2009), that mythical Lernaean monster that regrows new heads as soon as one was 
cut off. The Italian Ministero dell’Interno referred to this phenomenon through the 
“pulverised” and “atomised” (1999) nature of the clans. Judicial repression against Camorra 
clans in Ercolano up until the early 2000s faced the same problem – investigations using 
judicial tools, surveillance and arrests help undermine, if not destroy individual clans, but do 
not stop new heads growing in their place. 
Using judicial tools alone is like trying to cure a symptom of an illness rather than the cause 
– the root causes of a problem are not addressed, and the symptoms remain. In Ercolano, 
as elsewhere, the answer to underlying questions as to what causes crime, whether it is 
possible to eliminate it and what to do are still open.  The Camorra, like other organized 
crime species and subspecies (Armao, 2003) exist simultaneously as a product and 
determinant of the society that they themselves inhabit (Jamieson, 2000), consequently, any 
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attempt at defeating a deeply rooted group must use judicial repression alongside other 
social, cultural, economic measures to alter the structure and behaviour of individuals in 
society, given these species’ influence on such structures and behaviours. The development 
of a particular phenomenon in any given area, such as organized crime, must not be 
observed in a vacuum but instead as a by-product of its environment and its relationship to 
individual agency – itself determined by specific socialisation, culture, socio-economic 
factors, norms and psychology of individuals in their own contexts. Just as seemingly 
unrelated factors in a given habitus are able to influence individual agency and behaviour 
(e.g. Donohue and Levitt, 2001), we should be cautious not to place criminality, criminals 
and (in)actions by law enforcement and politicians into a bubble that are only affected by one 
another. This confuses correlation and causation, whilst ignoring other social, economic, 
demographic and cultural factors.  
This thesis has highlighted the importance of non-judicial tools in a response to organized 
crime, particularly the role of culture and socialised norms in a habitus. It did this through the 
research of one very specific case study, demonstrating that the results would be applicable 
to other similar cases. Focussing deep on one case study was my preferred method to 
collecting less data on many case studies. I analysed the nature of the Camorra pizzo, how 
and why businesses paid it, and how the ensemble of the comune of Ercolano and the 
modern anti-Camorra movement has responded to it and mafia-type associations in general. 
In our case study, we saw how society responded to these gaps that help sustain organized 
criminal clans in sometimes conflicting ways with varying rates of success.  
Two broad questions were asked in this regard: (1) what is the pizzo? and (2) how important 
is the social-cultural sphere to the anti-mafia movement? Where the payment of pizzo is a 
point of direct contact and acceptance of clan dominance by the local business community, 
perceptions of the pizzo vis-à-vis the anti-Camorra movement in general were crucial.  
These issues were addressed in the three main chapters on the theme where one detailed 
how and why the pizzo is paid in our case study by businesses, and the other two on the 
institutional and Civil Society responses to the pizzo and the Camorra in general.   
Drawing on the accounts of Ercolano’s businesspeople, court proceedings, judicial reports 
and accounts from Carabinieri officers,  “Paying the pizzo” outlined the process in which 
businesspeople were demanded (sometimes unsuccessfully) to pay the pizzo by clans in 
Ercolano. In line with our understandings of the pizzo as explained in the Introduction 
(Grasso, 2006; D’Alessandro, 2009), I concluded that the pizzo is not simply a cash 
payment, but comes in various forms that are paid differently by different types of 
businesses. The pizzo paid by an entrepreneur is different to that paid by a shopkeeper 
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given the contractual nature of the entrepreneur’s activities compared to the continuous and 
set geographical space in which the shopkeeper conducts their activities. Whilst these 
pizzos differ in the manner that they are paid (a percentage of a job for the entrepreneur, 
and three times a year or monthly for the shopkeeper), the reasoning behind any specific 
cash payment is best articulated through the Sicilian dictum “not too much to ruin the 
business, but just enough to get the beak wet” (Zaffuto, 2012), where the amount requested 
was approximately 3-5% of the job/revenue. The non-cash pizzo outside of this percentage 
was multiplicitous, and amounted to other payments, extractions or services that benefitted 
the clan or individual camorristi in one way or another. This was through the forced purchase 
of expensive ornamental Christmas stars to adorn a business (which collected cash revenue 
and demonstrated the territoriality of the clan), overpriced products (such as bread that gave 
Camorra-related businesses “clean” money, and reduced the reliance on genuinely clean 
suppliers), the acceptance  of Camorra businesses into business consortiums, the forced 
hiring of Camorra associates (where a business would pay their salary) and even unofficial 
luxuries that individual camorristi deemed themselves entitled to (free drinks, cheaper 
phones, free contracted works).  
The actual process of paying the pizzo was also elaborated in this chapter and elsewhere, 
where I noted the importance of euphemisms and specific phrases to indicate payment, and 
where to pay – notably through the Ascione Moquette and the Birra Cuparella and the 
process of making payment something honourable and even “normal” to do. This was 
particularly relevant for businesses that refused to pay their dues, where the extorter 
insinuated and outright spoke of them as dishonourable, disreputable and deviants. Violence 
was an important factor here, but not as much as the fear of unknown reactions, whereby a 
combination of cryptic phrases and “affective-aesthetic effects” (Pine, 2012) sought to 
symbolically strangle possible resistance in its cradle.  
The disposition of passive acceptance and the normalization of this relationship as de facto 
is part of this process, where I draw comparisons with Ètienne de La Boétie’s servitude 
volontaire (1553) as well as the concept of the purposeful fostering of an easily manageable, 
governable and docile businessperson-cum-Bloom (Agamben, 2008; Dean, 2009; Tiqqun, 
2000). This ideal citizen would not only pay their share of the pizzo, but would actually do so 
because they have been disposed into believing that corruption (in one way or another) is 
the way of the world – sapping support away for legality and denouncing. From the 
perspective of the businessperson, however, I indicated that this passivity is lived in 
ignorance of the potential results. Following Žižek (2008) I hold that the businesspeople 
know very well that they are they are being moulded to become this ideal citizen, but when 
interacting with the camorristi they act as if they do not know. The perceived lack of other 
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options due to a presupposed corrupt and careless State politics, police and judiciary, further 
facilitated the vicious cycle of pizzo payment.  
The pizzo was analysed as a specific mechanism used by the Camorra, whose value 
transcended the economic benefit it held, and instead provided the clans with an effective 
tool for controlling a territory, and influencing the cultural, economic, psychological and social 
character of business life there. As Beatrice (2009) noted, Camorra clans have affected 
business relations in an area for their own benefit, which we have come to understand 
through the businessperson’s choice between docility and collaboration. As we saw, this 
influence may come in the form of forced purchases (of bread, for example) which benefits 
“clean” businesses related to the Camorra.  However, to state that it was simply a means of 
demonstrating territoriality would be an oversimplification: it is a tool that provided the clans 
with a means of proving their dominance, but also to try and convince the shopkeepers that 
dominance (one way or another) is the natural order of things. Whether that is through the 
State, a kingdom, a feudal lord or the Camorra, someone is dominating this arena. 
Shopkeepers are made to feel as if they should be happy that this particular oppressor is not 
so greedy – like the perceivably hypocritical corrupt politicians elsewhere in the community. 
The disposition pushed here is one that encourages the acceptance of this relatively minor 
tithe and an uncaring, inefficient and corrupted State and its Law Enforcement as an 
unfortunate fact of life. This is its true political power, and the way in which the Camorra it is 
able to, as Jason Pine wrote, accomplish a lot without actually doing anything (2012, p.14). 
The use of violence by the Camorra in this context is demonstrative of this political power 
that has been undermined.  
The following chapter dealt with the State’s response to the Camorra, where we saw the 
limits of judicial repression without some form of cooperation with or investment (financial or 
otherwise) in an area. I detailed Carabinieri operations in Ercolano, and the use of 
surveillance and pentiti to understand the inner workings of the clan, concluding that whilst 
judicial repression is important to apprehend camorristi and their associates who have 
already committed crimes, it is a strategy that requires cutting the head off of every single 
Camorra hydra head at the same time – which itself does not look at the causes of the 
Camorra itself.   
The answer to questions such “what causes crime?” and “what causes individuals to be co-
opted by criminal groups?” is contested, but the answer provided by the State in this context 
is one that involves the pursuit of policies that encourage cooperation and association in the 
public sphere between public and private actors. In short, it is the pursuit of policies that 
encourage the entrenchment of neoliberal socio-economic policies that encourage economic 
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resilience and efficiency by making the most use of the assets that exist in a community and 
co-opting citizens. Following the discourse of writers such as De Tocqueville (1988) and 
Putnam (1993), these policies are understood to be one which improve trust in institutions, 
create interlinking networks between State and the third sector, giving areas characterised 
by economic underdevelopment the opportunity to overcome problems they face without the 
need for continuous State intervention (in the form of a participatory welfare State model, for 
example). From the perspective of neoliberalism, it is this underdevelopment that is 
perceived to be the root cause of the Camorra and criminality in general. This strategy of 
development was deemed inseparable from broader strategies of defeating mafia-type 
associations in Italy. The State encourages the development of arenas where private actors 
may interact with one another, thereby conducting State policies along associational lines 
without directly involving the State. Within the context of regional and national funding, the 
comune of Ercolano received money that aimed at achieving this kind of structural 
adjustment, maximizing assets and access to them in the territory that would best attract 
private investment and money (namely through its tourist assets) that would indirectly lead to 
jobs as well as social and cultural benefits. My analysis has shown that developmental 
efforts here can be justifiably deemed cosmetic – and not addressing deeper rooted issues 
such as housing, social exclusion and lack of areas for locals to gather socially in an arena 
(Ecosfera, 2010, p.88) that (1) does not involve the pursuit of profit and (2) does not involve 
the influence of the Camorra. Indeed the end-game of these policies may actually lead to 
further social exclusion and the beautification of those free social spaces (piazzas) where 
camorristi come into contact with other members of the community, without addressing the 
underlying cultural, economic, psychological and social appeal that being part of the 
Camorra/criminal cultural sphere involves.   
This was addressed in part through policies pursued under the expansion of the Cultura 
della legalità and the Modello Ercolano. The first of these had a disposition that involved a 
mixture of pedagogical activities in schools and other associations involving young people, 
as well as vocal institutional support for denouncers of organized crime – all for the purpose 
of affecting behaviour and (re)building social trust that the citizenry has for the State. It is 
hoped that the improvement of social trust in this context would encourage individuals to 
reject the Camorra/criminal cultural sphere in favour of a “good citizen” sphere and Cultural 
Capital (Bourdieu, 1986) that at one extreme accepts passivity to the law as is, and at 
another encourages democratic discourses that hold those in power to account (in the form 
of collaboration and discussions in the public sphere). The denunciation of criminals formed 
part of this discourse, whereby the citizenry (with a focus on the younger generation) was 
encouraged to reject passivity and tacit acceptance of the Camorra in favour of that which 
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assists the State’s effort to undermine it. This is linked to, but separate from, the Modello 
Ercolano, which focusses on those social connections between Civil Society (Societas 
Civilis), the Carabinieri and the Judiciary that facilitate the process by which a 
businessperson denounces their Camorra extorter. Similarly to the Cultura della legalità, the 
Modello Ercolano was focussed on (re)building social trust – particularly in a community that 
deemed denouncing the Camorra as useless. Since the Carabinieri were viewed to be 
unable (or unwilling) to do anything about extortion attempts – as demonstrated by the 
extensiveness of pizzo payment as revealed through investigations, as well as their abject 
failure to support businesspeople such as Filippo in their time of need in the early 2000s – 
the Modello Ercolano was focussed at winning the “hearts and minds” of the shopkeepers, 
and therefore the populace in general.  
The role of Civil Society Organizations in both of these processes was analysed in the 
following chapter, where I noted purposeful cooperation between some Civil Society 
Organizations and the State for the purpose of (re)building this trust alongside (re)defining of 
types of Cultural Capital at the expense of the Camorra and its ability to thrive in a 
community. This was conducted through the antiracket association, where businesspeople 
needed to be convinced that paying the Camorra is not normal, rather, it is an imposition, 
and that they are able to denounce their extorters in safety with support from the antiracket 
and Carabinieri officers. This links to our general perception of the pizzo as something that 
had been accepted by the shopkeepers. The norm of payment that had become regularized 
and habitualised to the point where subjugation was deemed as an inescapable facet of an 
unfair, brutish and Hobbesian world needed to be traversed to the point where any future 
extortion attempts would be reported to the relevant authorities. The initial push for this 
required a businessperson to have sufficient trust in the Law Enforcement to take the first 
step, then have a Law Enforcement institution willing to support them during the 
denunciation process – thereby creating the initial contact between businesses and the 
Carabinieri which would provide the evidence that the unthinkable can be done - used later 
to entice other businesses.   
Radio Siani, the Forum dei Giovani and the local church parishes sought to undermine the 
conditions under which the Camorra thrives in other ways. They attempted to divert those 
young people “at risk” who may engage in criminal activity in the future towards activities that 
brought them into contact with their own socio-cultural sphere. For Radio Siani, this involved 
purposeful interaction with individuals and organizations in their own Civil Society network, 
engaging in a process of promoting social and cultural projects that benefitted the territory – 
often sanctioned and sponsored by the State. These activities spread the message of the 
cultura della legalità through the radio station itself, but also pedagogically through the 
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participation of locals (notably children). This serves to provide other options to Camorra 
influence, whilst also giving young people other options through these associations and the 
social benefit that they provide. The Forum provides an area for discussion for the young 
people in Ercolano, encouraging participation in political discourses regarding the comune 
as well as direct action for any other issues they felt needed addressing (such as cleaning 
where waste had been illegally dumped). In addition to these democratically decided 
inclusionary activities, the Forum provided a space where young people are able to 
socialise, read and do their school/university work away from home, alongside general social 
activities before, during and afterwards – interacting with socio-cultural spheres that are 
separate to the Camorra one. The importance is placed on doing this in a socialised manner, 
rather than an individualised.  
This social sphere that the Forum provides is one where young people can talk about the 
issues in their community, including but not limited to the Camorra, critiquing one another 
and encouraging interaction with politics in general. Outside of these general State-
sponsored discourses is the Church, whose cultural hegemonic discourses with regard to 
what it views as “Right” are at odds with what the Cultura della legalità views as “legal”, 
leading to a disunited fight against social exclusion, organized crime and criminality in 
general. Whilst the Church is part of the broad “anti-mafia” movement in Ercolano, its 
activities are deemed not to warrant State support outside funds normally provided to non-
profit associations – this is despite its activities directly focus on those families and those 
children who have been linked to the Camorra and its socio-cultural sphere. In this context, 
the Church appears to be enticing these families and children away from the Camorra in the 
right way (socialisation), but replacing their Camorra-influenced socio-cultural sphere with 
something unprofitable and inefficient in economic and in Social Capital terms – thereby not 
worthy of fostering and support by the State.   
In the same manner that the Camorra influences businesspeople (in the fostering of pizzo-
paying norms), young people (in the attractiveness of mafiosità) and the population in 
general (through employment opportunities) so too has the ensemble of the antimafia 
movement responded to (re)occupy the habitus and influence the power of these norms. In 
this sense, “the political”, as Schmitt (1929) calls it, is the means by which social and power 
relations are organised and influenced, I contend that the antimafia movement has 
responded along a similarly opposing route – attempting to influence those same social and 
power relations so as to undermine and defeat the clans. What follows this defeat is the 
point of contention between different elements of the antimafia movement – whether that be 
the State, or different Civil Society Organizations. As Ernesto Laclau puts it: 
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A political dimension becomes constitutive of all social identity, and this leads to a 
further blurring of the line of demarcation [S]tate/ civil society: It is precisely this 
further blurring that we find in contemporary society in a more accentuated way than 
in Gramsci's time. The globalization of the economy, the reduction of the functions 
and powers of nation-[S]tates, the proliferation of international quasi-[S]tate 
organizations - everything points in the direction of complex processes of decision-
making which could be approached in terms of hegemonic logics, but certainly not on 
the basis of any simple distinction public/private. (Laclau 2000, p.53) 
In the context of the antimafia, this is achieved through the co-option of certain elements of 
Civil Society. Alongside a general restructuring of the economy away from public ownership 
and towards associationalism (De Tocqueville, 1988) sponsored by State and private 
funding, that we can refer to as neoliberal economics, the State has sought to develop social 
trust enough that citizens report illegality when it happens. Businesspeople have been given 
personal assurances by the law enforcement and members of the antiracket, the State has 
funded associations for the purpose of improving social trust and young people have been 
given access to associations that promote cooperation and personal (or moral) development. 
Despite this, important questions remain – particularly when we observe this new 
antimafia/State Cultural Hegemony as only supporting associations insofar as they are 
beneficial in economic and social terms as the State/private organisations understand it. To 
put it in another way, it is possible that some of the underlying causes of organized crime 
and criminality that should arguably be regarded as a goal to defeat ipso facto (i.e. poverty, 
alienation), are not solved with this strategy in a meaningful way when they are not useful for 
economic gain or Social Capital. In this sense, whilst the transformation of criminal cultures 
of illegality to Statist cultures of legality is a desirable telos, when culture takes preference 
over the improvement of socio-economic factors for those most vulnerable, we risk the State 
socialising its population not to question the law. In this, we should refer to the “antimafias”, 
plural, rather than “antimafia”, singular since the groups are competing for the same space in 
the habitus. Using the singular implies that there is one movement with one end goal, which  
is susceptible to co-option in the pursuit of a different end goal.  
There is a troubling and duplicitous nature to the State and the antimafia in this regard – 
particularly when we analyse the pizzo itself. I hypothesised that the pizzo is understood as 
a systemic tax, and indeed when we look at the different actors involved, the perceptions of 
the pizzo by the different actors involved appears to be remarkably similar to what we would 
call “tax”. As for the clans themselves, the money collected from businesses has been 
demonstrated to contribute (at least in part, if not entirely) towards the salaries or “welfare” of 
camorristi and/or their families (Camorriste, 2016; Colletti, 2016). A relatively small amount is 
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involuntarily given to a collector, which then goes towards the central administration, to then 
be redistributed accordingly as directed by the clan’s administrators. Similarly to taxation by 
the State, not only is this payment involuntary in the sense that a business is required to pay 
it, but at a certain point this payment has become accepted (at least passively) and even 
habitualised. In the same way that the State has been able to habitualise businesses to pay 
their required taxes with relatively little resistance, so too has the Camorra attempted to 
foster this kind of disposition upon individuals in its territory.  
In case someone from outside this culture asks why the shopkeepers did not simply 
denounce when they were approached – so as to rise up against a system that, unlike State 
taxes, simply exists for the benefit of (criminal) others, it is important to note the genealogy 
of taxation itself.  The question was asked by Ètienne de La Boétie of peasants under the 
French feudalism in the 1500s: why  
so many men, so many villages, so many cities, so many nations, sometimes suffer 
under a single tyrant who has no power other than the power they give him; who is 
able to harm them only to the extent to which they have the willingness to bear with 
him; who could do them absolutely no injury unless they preferred to put up with him 
rather than contradict him. (1553, p.42) 
The answer for us is the same: it is because they have been conditioned to do so, based on 
habit, and a flawed conception that subjugation to such power structures is the normal state 
of affairs. The fear of reprisals certainly exists, but this is only part of the story. Here we draw 
purposeful similarity between precursors to modern States, feudal kingdoms and criminal 
groups precisely because of their ability to influence “the political”. In the same disconcerting 
manner to La Boétie, Wilhelm Reich noted that the astonishing thing about people in general 
is  
not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that 
all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are 
exploited are not continually out on strike: after centuries of exploitation, why do 
people still tolerate being humiliated and enslaved, to such a point, indeed, that they 
actually want humiliation and slavery not only for others but for themselves? 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, p.38)  
We can ask ourselves the same question: the main issue is not why businesses denounce 
the pizzo, but rather why so many businesses continue to pay it? Here we point to the 
effects that the Camorra’s influence in localised social, cultural, economic matters in daily life 
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that their biopolitical power represents. This ultimately has the side-effect of posing the 
questions of our own culture and habitus and the manner in which we are socialised too.  
On first glance this seems “radical”, or even facetious, but I claim that in the same manner 
that the mechanisms that facilitate the normality of regular tax payment are a more 
sophisticated and institutionalised version of the pizzo, the facilitation of pizzo payment 
mechanisms by a criminal group work in the same way. In this sense, what makes a tax a 
tax is its involuntariness of payment alongside some kind of regularity of payments, rather 
than who decides what it is to be spent on. In the same vein, where we have demonstrated 
the pizzo to not only be “involuntary”, but also have some “regularity”, the only remaining 
difference between tax and pizzo appears to be that the contributions gained from the pizzo 
are out of sync with what the State understands to be the “public good”. This becomes a 
particularly poignant consideration when contributions gained from the pizzo go towards the 
“wages” or “salary” of clan members and/or their families, and are, one could argue, going 
towards a “good” for a community, albeit a much more closed and clandestine community 
(Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000; Colletti, 2016). These kind of contributions distributed from the 
pizzo simply go towards a “good” that is out of sync with what the State would consider a 
“public good”; both the State and the clan are doing what they deem to be best and right for 
their respective communities in their own circumstances. The only difference is the strata of 
people they are trying to benefit - one has a broader community than the other. If we are to 
understand this kind of regularised and involuntary payment to the Camorra as extortive, 
State taxation must also suffer the same judgement.  
In this I am actively drawing a definite line of similarity between a social movement that 
rejects organized crime and the pizzo with examples of tax resistance against the State. On 
the one hand the pizzo is rejected because it only benefits those who are part of the criminal 
group itself, and does not serve the payers other than the metus causa factum, whereas on 
the other its “illegitimacy” per se is decided by that institution which, by all accounts, began 
in a similar way and evolved to a point at which this tax that had already come to be seen as 
a socially, culturally and habitually normal thing, came to be more accountable to the people 
from whom it was extracting money. Simply put, much like tax resistance involves altering 
the socio-cultural sphere and through the changing of norms, the resistance against the 
pizzo must do the same.  
It was also hypothesized that the process of changing attitudes towards mafias has become 
the focus for anti-mafia movements, which we can categorically affirm, though with additional 
caveats that place this cultural war against the Camorra alongside and complementary to 
judicial repression. In this vein, I identify the cultural side of the antimafia movement (through 
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the Cultura della legalità and the Modello Ercolano) as a purposeful strategy – redefining 
notions of Cultural Capital in the area, and thereby altering the habitus. In our context, these 
notions are redefined as those which foster active citizenship, entrepreneurship and 
sustainability – where it is hoped will attract outside capital to the area, encourage local 
activism and alleviate poverty through greater employment opportunities. The rejection of the 
pizzo and mafiosità by shopkeepers is part of this process (assisted by the antiracket and 
law enforcement), as is the rejection of criminal/Camorra culture in general (assisted by 
activism and targeted socialisation).  
The Sicilian writer Gesuldo Bufalino famously wrote that “La mafia sarà vinta da un esercito 
di maestri elemenitari” (the Mafia will be beaten by an army of primary school teachers), 
which is only partly true. Socialisation is important, but what Bufalino omits is the content of 
the curriculum that those school teachers teach to the new generations – socialisation must 
be away from Camorra influence and towards something else. In the case of Ercolano, I am 
concerned as to whether this “something else” that is being pursued actually addresses the 
deeper inequalities and issues that characterise the territory and create the environment 
where criminality may flourish.  
An extended excerpt of a January 2017 news article for Metropolisweb about the Camorra 
and anti-Camorra in Ercolano is a fitting conclusion to this thesis, concerned as it is that new 
criminal hydra heads will sprout from below: 
In the six years since the last deadly ambush in the citta degli scavi, numbers are no 
longer written with blood, but instead with pride. The numbers do not represent the 
number of corpses, but rather the number of life sentences. These numbers do not 
tell of the merciless fury of the clans, but instead of their inexorable decline.  
… 
2016, in this sense, has been the annus horribilis for the bosses, murderers and 
chieftains. Godfathers, soldiers, extortionists, supporters. Pushers, runners, drug 
dealers and camorristi in skirts.  
It has been the year in which the Camorra, under Vesuvius, has had to swallow 
bitterly, adding up to thousands of years in prison. The female bosses, the last die-
hards were arrested. Godfathers who had orchestrated one of the bloodiest and most 
violent feuds in the history of the underworld were buried under a flood of life 
sentences. 
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THE NUMBERS. The figures put together by the work of Antimafia magistrates and 
the police who risked their lives in the shadows speak for themselves. The 
Carabinieri in Torre del Greco and Ercolano, along with the DDA [anti-mafia 
directorate], arrested a good five hundred camorristi between 2009 and today. An 
army that ruled the roost for twenty years by imposing the racket upon the entire city 
and killed in silence. The year that has just ended was above all a year of squeeze 
for the killers in the war between the Birra-Iacomino and Ascione-Papale clans. The 
two clans – along with their allies – have been involved in thirty-eight investigations 
over the last five years – all put up by former antimafia PM Pierpaolo Filippelli – 
which revealed thirty-eight of the sixty mafia killings. Crimes for which – in various 
levels of courts – were handed forty-four life sentences, twenty of which have already 
become final by Supreme Court judgements. The record-holder and boss of the 
Birra, Stefano Zeno, had ten of them (including two final judgements). In all, one 
hundred and twenty of the killers and bosses were arrested thanks to the words of 
forty pentiti – making Ercolano the “home” of those who have been sentenced for life 
and collaborators of justice. Additionally, there is a blow to any type of future 
reorganisation, with twenty bosses sentenced to maximum security imprisonment. 
… 
YEAR ZERO. The numbers say that the Camorra is almost gone from Ercolano. But 
the crisis and absence of work – especially in those forgotten alleyways – have led to 
the emergence of micro-bands of cocaine and marijuana dealers that often use 
children as runners. Inequalities which “strengthen” the remnants of the underworld 
because by themselves, the arrests and the work of a few associations are not 
enough. 2017 is Year Zero for the Camorra. But it is also a challenge for Ercolano. 
The city without bosses where the numbers no longer count the number of murder 

































I:  Notes on the methodology  
English-language research on the antiracket movement in Italy has largely been focussed on 
the Sicilian context. The cultural fascination with “the mafia” partly explains this, but also the 
attention that many of the anti-mafia movements have attracted. The first antiracket 
association in Italy was formed in 1990 in the small city of Capo d’Orlando, close to Messina 
(Grasso, 1990), and there has been a significant focus on Palermo (Gunnarson, 2008; 2014; 
Orlando, 2000; Schneider & Schneider, 2003) where momentous assassinations of judges, 
shopkeepers and activists were met by what has been referred to as the Palermo Spring. 
The outcry after the murder of Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in particular lent itself 
to this, where reaction over the following years led to the creation of Libera, the expansion of 
the Federazione antiracket Italiana as well as Addiopizzo. Thus, Palermo is a city that has 
been placed under the microscope and has become a potent symbol of the fight against 
mafia in Italy, but has its own history of the mafia and its own social history of the antimafia. 
The city of Naples – the latter capital of the regno delle due Sicilie, its province characterised 
by brigantry post-unification, and the first Italian city that first rebelled against Nazi 
occupation in 1944, has largely been ignored on an international level with regard to the anti-
mafia movement. It came into the spotlight with the publication of Roberto Saviano’s 
Gomorrah in English, and has the unfavourable image abroad of a city covered in discarded 
rubbish – all linked to its own local mafias, the Camorra. Naples has a different experience of 
mafia to Sicily, but has nonetheless its own anti-mafia stories to tell. As we have seen, like in 
Sicily, there is an anti-mafia movement, and there are anti-racket associations that have, 
alongside law enforcement agencies and other parts of Civil Society, uprooted their local 
clans and their extortion rackets. 
My initial fascination with the topic came from the Sicilian context, which I was fortunate to 
study during my undergraduate degree. In 2013/4 this project was originally envisioned with 
Palermo and Addiopizzo in mind, though the presence of other researchers working in the 
same area at the time (see Gunnarson, 2014) meant that I had a choice between drawing 
upon the same data as others, or conducting the project elsewhere. During this time I was 
fortunate enough to meet a relevant gatekeeper from Radio Siani via a mutual friend, who 
encouraged me to conduct my research project in Ercolano instead.  
Initial interviews were conducted in March 2014 with the help of my gatekeeper, and a 
visiting German radiobroadcaster, Jan-Christoph Kitzler, who was in Ercolano to write a 
story about the anti-racket association.87 This particularly day was the giorno della legalità, 
                                                          
87
  I am incredibly indebted to Jan-Christoph here and my gatekeeper. I was only expecting to visit Radio Siani 
and be shown around the town, however, my gatekeeper had planned a full morning of interviews with the 
former mayor of the town, shopkeepers from the antiracket and the president of Radio Siani that were much 
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the day of legality, when leading members of the institution, antiracket association and other 
actors in the anti-mafia community organised events, marches and interviews which 
highlighted the necessity to resist organized crime in the area. These interviews and 
meetings gave me the basis through which to plan further fieldwork, which was conducted 
between November 2014 and August 2015. I returned to Naples at the beginning of 2017, 
and have been living here ever since.  
In the first few months of my research, I purposely avoided contacts that I had made through 
my gatekeeper six months before. By diversifying the people I was interacting with, I hoped 
to get a broader picture of the area which I could then contrast with one another. In order to 
interact with individuals in the area, I rented a room in a shared apartment, and began work 
as an English teacher. I obtained a job for a language association close to Ercolano which 
provided native English speakers to primary schools as teaching assistants. In the evenings, 
this language association organised afterschool English lessons for people in the area where 
I was a teacher for children, young people and adults. Additionally, I organised my own 
private English lessons in the area which I did for the duration of my fieldwork. As I noted in 
the methodology, I split my research into three distinct periods, though there is an element of 
overlap. These first few months before interacting with my “contacts” in the anti-mafia 
movement could best be described as “covert” in that my underlying reasons for living in the 
area, other than teaching, were revealed only when asked.  
To my surprise most people were satisfied with my reasons for being in the area without any 
further questions, whereas the ones who pried for further explanation as to “why here and 
why not elsewhere?”, were incredibly helpful and did their best to put me in contact with 
politicians and members of local Civil Society Organizations that they knew. It is in these 
instances I relied on snowball sampling whereby one contact leads me to another, and then 
another, and so on. During this time I broadened my personal network by interacting with 
social and cultural associations in the Naples area: I regularly attended social events aimed 
at improving local’s language skills such as the “British Community Naples”, an association 
which organised weekly events that encourage young people to meet and practice their 
English. This community was particularly useful as it placed me in contact with individuals 
from the Naples area who wanted to improve their English, whether that was through 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
more far reaching than I could have ever dreamed of. Whilst Kitzler came to Ercolano with a fully functional 
and expensive microphone, I instead was going to rely on a rudimentary Dictaphone app available on my 
phone. He kindly offered to ask questions on my behalf during these interviews in addition to his own 
questions, and then even more kindly sent me these audio files in the following days, as well as giving me the 
permission to use them in this thesis.  He wrote an article based on these interviews and interactions available 
in German at: http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/kampf-gegen-die-Camorra-die-mutigen-buerger-von-
ercolano.724.de.html?dram:article_id=296721  
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lessons and/or meeting socially, as well as individuals who were interested in my research 
project, and wanted to put me in contact with relevant organizations and individuals that they 
thought could assist me.  
From the second period onwards (January) I began approaching local Civil Society 
Organizations involved in the anti-mafia movement so as to identify the extent to which 
individuals in the area interacted with, and were influenced by socio-cultural anti-mafia 
spheres and vice-versa. In the Ercolano anti-mafia movement two of these spheres were 
already identified: the antiracket association (Ercolano per la legalità) and Radio Siani. I later 
noticed that the administration-based Youth Forum (Forum dei Giovani) were involved in 
social and cultural initiatives against the Camorra. The same can be said for the local 
Church parishes, though the only activities I noted at first was them lending space for town 
meetings discussing the illegal dumping of toxic waste by Camorra and rogue entrepreneurs. 
My access to the Santa Maria del Pilar parish church and their related associations came 
through one of the guys from the Forum dei Giovani, who introduced me to Padre 
Incoronato. I continued to meet with members from both of these associations for the 
remainder of my time in Ercolano.  
By chance, I met another member of Radio Siani outside of the radio station itself and we 
became friends. Since my original gatekeeper had moved away from Ercolano for work in 
the United States, this guaranteed continued access. Indeed it was through this new 
gatekeeper that was I kept up to date on their activities, arranged further visits to the 
association and was invited to join a coach full of association members for the Libera 
national demonstration in March in Bologna as part of the “settimana della legalità”, week of 
legality, a week of events throughout Italy that highlight the issues of organized crime in Italy.  
In April I began approaching businesses in the anti-racket association to distribute the 
questionnaires. Since I had met Raffaela Ottaviano a year beforehand, and she knew I was 
coming back, I decided to meet her again to remind her that I was around, and of the 
research that I was conducting. Further information about the questionnaires can be found in 
Appendix IV.   
The final period of the fieldwork involved interviewing members of the Carabinieri and the 
PM Pierpaolo Filippelli. Interactions and interviews with the Carabinieri and the judiciary was 
purposely left until the end of my fieldwork so as to mitigate against influence that speaking 
to law enforcement institutions may have upon the shopkeepers that I interviewed.  
An obvious omission from the entire project is that of the camorrista. No effort was made to 
gain data directly from camorristi outside of judicial reports and accounts from Camorra due 
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to a mixture of feasibility and concerns for safety of myself, as well as those who I had been 
interacting with throughout the project. The inclusion of testimony from pentiti of Ercolano-
based clans as mentioned in the Zoom documents and elsewhere partially compensate for 
this (Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.; Conticello, 2015; Gerina and Vasile, 
2015; Camorriste, 2016) 
 
II:  Challenges to primary data collection 
In presentations of this project to conferences taken place before and after fieldwork, a 
common question asked was “why would shopkeepers want speak about their experiences 
with the racket with an outside such as yourself?” which I will answer directly here. Even 
when I speak Italian (as I did when I conducted this research), I am clearly an outsider to the 
mezzogiorno region – my mannerisms, my accent, my appearance, the way I dress, and my 
general sense of presenting myself are ultimately from a different culture and environment to 
that of the participants in this project. Whilst it has been suggested that this is a limitation on 
this project due to the general perception that there is a distrust for outsiders (which there 
is), I instead reject this as a limitation, and argue that precisely because I am a foreigner, 
and I am an outsider, I am able to extract data that would be otherwise unavailable to a 
project conducted by a local. Indeed, it is precisely because I am so clearly an outsider that 
shopkeepers would be more willing to trust that I am not a camorrista incognito.88 I welcome 
similar research projects conducted by locals, Italians, Southerners, and female researchers 
to account for these variables.   
Select omission of certain pieces of information should also be considered during the 
interviews of shopkeepers. As noted in the introduction there is a possibility that these 
business people paid the pizzo, or had some kind of mutual beneficial relationship with the 
Camorra (Alessandro, 2009). The payment of money to an OCG is a criminal offence, and 
any account of their experiences with local camorristi would have to corroborate any details 
that they may have given in court. This is particularly true if a shopkeeper wishes to overplay 
their resistance to the pizzo due to some notion or honour, or a fear of embarrassment.   
One particular challenge came in the interviews conducted with the baker.89 two things 
became clear: she believed that “Everyone paid it” (the pizzo), and that “this was a land 
ravaged by the pizzo” (N5 18032014); she denied that she had ever experienced 
interactions with the Camorra before the incidents mentioned in the “Businesses and the 
                                                          
88
 I am indebted to Carina Gunnarson for this suggestion. 
89
 There were two: one with Jan-Christoph Kitzler in 2014, and another in April the following year to double-
check information. (N5 18032014; N5 17042015) 
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pizzo” chapter (N5 17042015). This leaves us with two options: either we take her claims as 
merely a perception of the extent of pizzo payment in Ercolano minus her (i.e. she instead 
should have said “Everyone paid pizzo… apart from me”; “this was a land ravaged by the 
pizzo… except for me”), or it was a subtle way of saying that she had paid it beforehand too, 
which she then denied in a later interview. If she had paid before, this would lead us to infer 
that they had likely paid pizzo to the other clan (the Ascione, the historic clan of the area) 
before this interaction with the Birra clan, and that these interactions with the Birra were 
simply a step too far for a business already paying pizzo, or it was merely an extra extension 
of the payments already being made to the Birra. The timing of the interaction would also fit, 
particularly given the decline of the Ascione in light of a war they were losing against the 
Birra clan, and presumably, the Birra clan’s expansion into new territory through the 
collection of pizzo. Though it must be stressed that there is no evidence to suggest that the 
pizzo had ever been paid by the bakery, the placement of these factors in the wider context 
















III:  Ethical considerations 
The safety of the researcher is an important factor. There are enough accounts and studies 
on Camorra clans to demonstrate their violent nature to provide at least an element of 
apprehension for research in the field about them and their interaction with a community. 
Research in the field always has its risks, highlighted most recently in December 2015 by the 
horrific political murder of an Italian PhD student, Giulio Regeni, from the University of 
Cambridge during his field research in Egypt.  
The projects that researchers conduct are important, though there is an inherent trade-off 
between the safety of the researcher and some of the data, particularly when it is on a 
delicate or sensitive topic, and absolute safety cannot be guaranteed. Given that this project 
was conducted in an area where the Camorra was substantially weakened, and that the 
topic itself was the “anti-Camorra” rather than the Camorra, the risks for this project 
however, were minimal. Like many large cities, Naples is well-known for its level of petty 
crime. Throughout my fieldwork, I only had a few examples where I felt anything close to 
being in any immediate danger, and even then, they were all fairly insubstantial.  
Given that this project involved constant interaction in the field with real people, the ethical 
considerations are huge. Similarly to the ethical dilemma that William Foote Whyte (1969) 
and Joseph T Howell (1972) had regarding the eventual publication of their work , I knew I 
was going to write about the people I met, and some of them might even get around to 
reading this (though, as Whyte noted, not many of his contacts did).  Any ethical 
consideration on the part of the people I met in this time can be only be countered by strict 
anonymity. Unless the name of the individual is known or printed elsewhere, in what I can 
normatively describe as “in the public eye” (e.g. politician, heads of organizations etc.), all 
names of people I identify have been changed. One main ethical consideration on the 
ethnographic method was whether individuals I met through my overt research (i.e. people 
who knew about my research) were to meet individuals I met during my first couple of 
months (i.e. people who didn’t know about my research), but no such problem ever occurred 
– the two groups remained entirely distinct from one another.  
I also need to emphasise the considerations taken with regard to Civil Society Organizations: 
in particular those who are members of the anti-racket and other anti-Camorra organizations. 
The questionnaires that I distributed, and the interviews I conducted with shopkeepers were 
anomymous. Given that a number of the shopkeepers were likely to have been threatened 
by camorristi in the past, the line of questioning progressed so that if there was any hint of 
emotional difficulty for the interviewee, I would not press forward any further questioning. 
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Likewise, when discussing payment of pizzo money, if a question was answered 
ambiguously, and seemingly purposely so, I did not pursue it either.  
In the interviews with law enforcement there is a mixture of anonymity and openness. One of 
the officers was an undercover officer, obviously without question they are to remain 
anonymous. On the more public figures: heads of organizations, politicians, journalists – 
there is no anonymity unless requested. Indeed, it is often that these individuals want to be 
seen and want to be heard so that they can get their message out. Interactions with Radio 
Siani, Raffaela Ottaviano and Nino Daniele, for example, are a testament to this.   
I originally considered changing the name of the comune that I was studying, so that I could 
attempt to write in complete anonymity, but the more I observed and understood the area, 
the more this would become impossible – particularly considering the focus by FAI on the 
area. The sheer mention of Herculaneum excavation site, the proximity to Vesuvius and the 
structural problems that this entails, as well as the presence of a widely regarded anti-racket 
















IV:  Questionnaire 
The following thirteen pages contain the questionnaire that I distributed to members of the 
antiracket association “Ercolano per la legalità”. It was written in Italian, though an English 
version is available on request.   
The FAI “guida per il consumatore critico antiracket 2014” provided a list of sixty-eight 
businesses that were members of the antiracket association. I went to each of these 
businesses by foot to see whether they could be used, and whether the guide had correctly 
written the address and other details, or whether the business still existed. The guide itself 
was somewhat outdated in parts, and had some incorrect information, particularly with 
regard to businesses that no longer existed. Examples such as incorrect street names,90 
businesses that had closed down and not been replaced, businesses that exist out of a 
garage and businesses that were self-employed individuals in their apartment block. It was 
likely that a number of these businesses had simply listed a postal address rather than the 
address where they could be found, and therefore were not contactable. Given the number 
of outdated or inaccessible businesses, the starting sixty-eight businesses was reduced to 
forty-five. Upon the distribution of questionnaire the number reduced again for a variety of 
reasons: on inquiry the owner did not realise that they were members; the business whilst 
having the same name at the same address now had different owners and was not involved 
with the antiracket; the boss or manager was not present; they clearly stated that they did 
not want to participate or they failed to complete the questionnaire. Of these forty-five usable 
businesses from the local antiracket, only twenty-three returned their questionnaire, which 
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 I spent a long time looking for a “Corso Mesina”, which was later revealed to be a typo in the guide of “Corso 
Resina” 
91
 Two participants only filled in part of their questionnaires, making much of their data unusable. 
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Breve descrizione del progetto 
 
Questo progetto di ricerca è parte della mia tesi di dottorato, che verrà discussa 
presso l’Università di Bath (Regno Unito).  L’obiettivo primario di questo lavoro e 
comprendere in che modo, ad Ercolano, i movimenti antimafia cercano di 
ostacolare le attività mafiose.  Precisamente, l’oggetto della mia ricerca consiste 
nello studiare la società civile e la misura del capitale sociale nella città, intesi 
come reti di norme e valori condivisi che facilitano la cooperazione sia all’interno 
di un singolo gruppo che fra gruppi diversi. I principali  interessi di ricerca 
riguardano: la resistenza al pizzo (denaro/favori/provvigioni) pagato regolarmente 
alla malavita organizzata dai titolari di attivita commerciali e la reazione della 
società civile nei confronti del fenomeno mafioso.   
Il presente questionario è del tutto anonimo e una volta terminata la compilazione, 
non sarà in alcun modo possibile risalire alle risposte di nessun autore. Ia ricerca 
ha lo scopo di raccogliere dati esclusivamente per fini accademici e statistici, e 
non ha alcun tipo di relazione con associazioni come partiti politici, sindacati, 
associazioni di categoria e organismi governativi. 
La prego di completare il questionario in tutte le sue parti segnando con una [x] il 
riquadro che corrisponde alla sua posizione (indicare sempre una sola risposta, 
se non diversamente specificato). Se desidera ricevere i risultati dell’indagine non 
dimentichi di inserire il suo indirizzo di posta elettronica. Per eventuali 
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1. Informazioni relative all’intervistato  
 Maschio   Femmina   Altro 
 
2. Anno di nascita …………… 
 
3. Domicilio  
 Città di Ercolano  
 Altro comune/provincia  specificare ………………………. 
 
4. Qual è il Suo attuale stato civile  
 Sposato/a     Convivente     Divorziato/a / Seperato/a 
 Vedovo/a   Nubile/Celibe 
 
5. Qual è il Suo titolo di studio?   
 Nessuno  
 Licenza elementare  
 Licenza media  
 Diploma di scuola secondaria superior (maturità)  
 Laurea tiennale   
 Laurea specialisitica / quadriennale / magistrale ciclo unico 
 
6. Quanti figli ha? (figli SUOI, non quelli adottati, affidati o del partner) 
Specifichi il numero di figli: ……………………… 
7. A parte Lei, chi vive nella sua famiglia?  
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(Vivere in famiglia’ significa: trascorrere una media di quattro o più notti la 
settimana nella stessa casa. Includere nei figli presenti anche i figli del 
partner se vivono in famiglia, quelli adottati, quelli affidati e i figli studenti 
assenti temporaneamente) 
Prego indicare con una [x]. Una riposta per riga 
Persone che vivono nella sua famiglia SI NO Numero 
Compagno/a marito o moglie    
Figli    
Genitori    
Nonni    
Altri parenti    
Altri componenti non imparentati    
 
 
La Sua azienda 
8. Il Suo negozio/impresa è:   
 Una nuova attivita  
 Una attivita che la sua famiglia si tramanda di generazione in 
generazione  
 Una attivita che già esisteva ma ha cambiato proprietario 
 
9. Il suo negozio/impresa è …  
 Una impresa a conduzione familiare  
 Una impresa individuale   





10. Ci sono altri suoi familiari che lavorano nel negozio/azienda pur 
non essendo proprietari o “manager”?    
 Si  specificare quanti ……………………. 
 No 
 
11. Da quanti anni è aperto il suo negozio/impresa?  
 Da meno di 2 anni   Da 3 a 5 anni  Da 6 e 10 anni  
  Da oltre 10 anni 
 




13. Quante persone lavorano nella sua Impresa? (Includere sia 
 lavoratori part-time che full-time)  
 1-5 occupati 
 6-10 occupati 
 11 a 20 occupati 
 21 a 30 occupati 
 31-40 occupati 
 41-50 occupati 







14. Quali sono I Suoi clienti abituali? (tutto l’anno, non solo  l’estate)  
(inserisca un valore percentuale per ogni categoria di clienti facendo 
attenzione che il totale non superi il 100 per cento) 
 
Clienti piu frequenti % 
Persone di Ercolano  
Persone di Napoli  
Clienti di altre zone in Campania  
Clienti di altre regioni italiane   
Clienti di altre Nazioni  
Percentuale totale 100 
 
15. Qual è il fatturato annuo della Sua azienda?  
 Indicare con una [x] una sola risposta. 
 Meno di 50 000 euro all’anno 
 Da 50 000 euro a 100 000 all’anno 
 Da 100 000 euro a 200 000 euro all’anno 
 Da 200 000 euro a 500 000 euro all’anno 
 Da 500 000 euro a 1 milione di euro 
 Piu di 1 milione di euro 
 
 
16. Il Suo esercizio paga per servizi di vigilanza privata?   







17. Quanto è interessato/a alla politica?  
 Per niente interessato/a 
 Non molto interessato/a 
 Abbastanza interessato/a 
 Molto interessato/a 
 
18. Quanto spesso discute di politica con altre persone? 
 Mai 
 Raramente 
 Qualche volta 
 Spesso 
 
19. Quanto spesso parla di politica con il tipo di persone qui sotto 
 elencate? 
Indicare con una [x] una sola riposta per riga 
 Mai Raramente Qualche 
volta 
Spesso 
Amici     
Famiglia     
Vicini     
Colleghi di lavoro     
Membri di associazioni o 
organizzazioni di cui faccio 
parte 






20. Le persone utilizzano diversi mezzi per informarsi su ciò che 
accade nel proprio Paese e nel mondo. Per ognuna delle seguenti fonti 
di informazione qui sotto elencate, indichi quali ha usato nell’ultima 
settimana per informarsi 













Quotidiano   
Notiziario TV o radio   
Riviste   
Approfondimenti TV o radio   
Libri   
Informazioni via Internet (Facebook, 
e-mail, siti internet, ecc.) 
  
Discussioni con amici, o colleghi   
Discussioni con famiglia   
 
21. Quanto nella sua vita crede sia importante ciascuno dei seguenti 
ambiti?  
Prego indicare con una [x] una sola riposta per riga 








Lavoro     
Famiglia     
Amici e 
conoscenti 
    
Tempo libero     
Politica     







22. Indichi per ogni istituzione elencata, quanto fiducia ha in essa: 
nessuna, poca, abbastanza o molta 









La Chiesa     
La stampa     
La television     
I sindicati     
La polizia di stato     
I carabinieri     
La guarda di finanza     
La magistratura     
Il parlamento     
La pubblica 
amministrazione 
    
L’Unione Europea     
Confindustria     
I partiti politici     
Il Governo nazionale con 
sede a Roma 
    
Il Governo regionale con 
sede a Napoli 
    
Il comune di Ercolano     
Organizzazioni Anti-
Camorra 







23. Le chiederemo ora qual è il grado di fiducia che ripone nei 
confronti delle persone che fanno parte di vari gruppi. Indichi per 
ognuno di loro se ripone nessuna, poca, abbastanza o molta fiducia 
Prego indicare con una [x] una sola riposta per riga 








La Sua famiglia     
I Suoi vicini di casa     
Ercolanesi     
Persone che Lei conosce 
personalmente 
    
Persone che incontra per 
la prima volta 
    
I Napoletani in generale     
I meridionali in generale     
Gli Italiani in generale     
I colleghi di lavoro     
Gli stranieri in generale     
 
 
24.  Che cosa influenza maggiormente la sua scelta del voto alle 
elezioni politiche?   
 La fiducia nel candidato 
 Il programma elettorale 
 Le sue idee politiche 
 La fiducia nei leader o partiti/schieramenti nazionali 
 La sfiducia nei leader o partiti/schieramenti nazionali 
 Il consiglio di amici, familiari, parenti 




25. In politica di solito si parla di “sinistra” e di “destra”. Quale di questi 
due schieramenti rispecchia meglio la Sua posizione politica?  
Cerchiare solo uno dei valori 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






26. A Ercolano, quante opportunità ha la gente comune di esprimere 
le proprie opinioni alla classe politica?  
Cerchiare solo uno dei valori  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Nessuna opportunità   Molte opportunità 
 
27. Quanta importanza da  la classe politica di Ercolano alle  
opinioni dei cittadini comuni? Cerchiare  solo uno dei valori 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Nessuna opportunità     Molte opportunità 
 
28. Come valuterebbe l’operato delle forze dell’ordine ad Ercolano 
 nell’anno 2000?  Cerchiare solo uno dei valori  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Pessimo         Ottimo 
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29. Come valuterebbe l’operato delle forze dell’ordine ad Ercolano 
 oggi?  Cerchiare solo uno dei valori 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Pessimo         Ottimo 
 
30. Come valuterebbe l’operato della politica locale per il bene 
 comune di Ercolano nell’anno 2000? Cerchiare solo uno dei valori  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Pessimo         Ottimo 
 
31. Come valuterebbe l’operato della politica locale per il bene 
 comune di Ercolano oggi? Cerchiare solo uno dei valori  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




32. Di quali associazioni anti-racket il suo esercizio è ufficialmente 
 membro?  
(In questa sezione è possibile indicare più di una risposta) 
 Addiopizzo   
 Federazione antiracket Italiana (FAI) 
 Ercolano per la legalità   
 Altro (prego specificare) ………………………… 
 Non sono membro di nessuna associazione 
 
In che anno il suo esecizio è diventato membro? ………… 
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33. Qualcuno l’ha invitatato/a ad unirsi al movimento antiracket a 
 Ercolano?  
Indicare una sola risposta  
 Pensi bene alla Sua risposta prima di rispondere 
 Me l’ha chiesto un membro della mia famiglia 
 Me l’ha chiesto un/a amico/a 
 Me l’ha chiesto un/a collega di lavoro di Ercolano 
 Me l’ha chiesto un/a collega di lavoro (generico) 
 Me l’ha chiesto un vicino di casa 
 Me l’ha chiesto un cliente 
 Me l’ha chiesto un attivista/membro dell’antiracket  
 Nessuno me l’ha chiesto, ho contattato l’antiracket personalmente 
 Altro  specificare ………………………………………. 
 
34. Fra quale qua sotta, che frase più identifica la sua esperienza? 
 Non ho mai pagato il pizzo e non ho mai subito intimidazioni di natura 
estorsiva 
 Non ho mai pagato il pizzo e ho sempre denunciato i tentativi di 
estorsioni subiti 
 Ho pagato il pizzo fino al ……………….. e successivamente ho 
denunciato l’estorsione 
 Ho pagato il pizzo fino al ……………….. 
 Non voglio/posso rispondere 
 
35. Secondo Lei, a Ercolano, su 100 esercizi commerciali quanti 
 pagano regolarmente il pizzo? 
Su 100 lo pagano almeno …………………. esercizi commerciali 
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36. Secondo Lei, perchè la gente paga il pizzo?   
(In questa sezione è possibile indicare più di una risposta) 
 Perché hanno paura   
 Perché non c’è abbastanza protezione da parte del governo 
 Perché non c’è abbastanza protezione da parte delle forze dell’ordine  
  Per abitudine 
  Perché non c’è collaborazione tra glie esercizi  
  Perché pagare il pizzo equivale a protezione efficiente e a basso costo  
 Altro (specificare)  
..................................................................................................... 
Inserire un asterisco [*] su ciò che ritiene più importante 
 
37. Se un commerciante decide di denunciare il suo estorsore, quanto 
crede che le istituzioni siano in grado di tutelare i suoi diritti (arrestando 
l’estorsore, tenendolo per lungo tempo in galera e garantendo la 
sicurezza dal commerciante e della sua famiglia)?  
 Per nulla in grado di tutelare i diritti del commerciante 
 Poco in grado di tutelare i diretti del commerciante 
 Abbastanza in grado di tutelare i diretti del commerciante 
 Molto in grado di tutelare i diritti del commerciante 
 
38. Sarebbe disposto a farsi intervistare dal ricercatore?   
 Si   No 
 
Il Suo indirizzo e-mail: .......................................................................... 
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V:  Log Book notes 
This is a collection of log-book notes that I wrote during my time in Naples. I initially wrote 
these on paper, and then wrote them up on the computer for clarity’s sake. I have given 
pseudonyms to individuals I met who are not already in the public eye, often indicated by a 
single letter. This is not a complete publication of my log-book notes, but instead an excerpt 
of those that I have deemed the most relevant/important/interesting.  
 
10th January 2015 
I’m exhausted after a long evening of non-stop chatter – I jotted down a lot of this down 
elsewhere so I could write it up this morning instead of last night.  
I had been speaking to N online because he decided that he wanted to improve his English, 
so I arranged to meet up with him and his girlfriend for a pizza. They are from Torre del 
Greco, so on WhatsApp he offered to meet at 8 in Piazza San Ciro in Portici so save me 
walking, but there was a lot of traffic so he they didn’t actually arrive until just before 9. Stood 
there on a Saturday evening I just watched the world around me – kids as young as 11 or 12 
shouting, jumping, hitting one another for fun, sharing cigarettes. A group of girls who I 
guess were around 13 or 14 years old kept going in and out of the piazza and getting all 
jittery around some of the other older guys (18 or 20 years old) in the piazza, who looked 
pretty similar to what we in the UK would call “chavs”. It seemed as if there was some kind of 
romantic connection between some of these two groups, but I couldn’t be sure. It all seemed 
a bit odd to be to see younger kids out at this kind of time – but maybe that’s just me. 
Initially we drove to a pizzeria in San Giorgio a Cremano which apparently does fantastic 
pizza, but it was already packed with a long queue, so we decided to head to a pizzeria in 
Torre del Greco instead – “Joseph under the water” which used to be called the same, but in 
Neapolitan. N told me that they changed it to English make it appear more modern – but I’m 
not sure if he was joking or not.  
Despite his interest in improving his English, we spoke almost exclusively in Italian – I think 
N was a bit apprehensive about making mistakes and embarrassing himself. Also, M speaks 
very little English, so it would have been a bit awkward for her I guess. They started telling 
me about themselves – N and M had been together for 9 years – something incredible when 
you consider that he was 29 and she was only 25, but they did seem to be very well suited 
and comfortable with one another. Like other Italian couples I’ve met, the woman is very 
much the boss, and actually talked more than he did! We talked about a number of things: 
family, home life, the differences between Italy/Naples and the UK. They seemed incredibly 
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shocked by the revelation that (1) I don’t drive and (2) I no longer live with my family. They 
were particularly shocked that I almost exclusively cycle or use public transport – two things 
incredibly difficult to do in Naples. They told me how public transport doesn’t work – so 
everyone buys a car instead. In Torre del Greco, for example, there is limited transport links 
– you can use one of the Circumvesuviana stations which is unreliable and sometimes 
infrequent, or busses which are even worse. They had taken a trip to Paris recently and 
were surprised that the Metro and other public transports were so frequent.  
When we were leaving the pizzeria, N noticed me looking at the large amount of rubbish in 
the streets, explaining that Torre isn’t normally like this, and it was because the private 
company hired to collect rubbish had a disagreement with the comune. They were 
dissatisfied with their service, so the company simply stopped collecting it. He said that it 
was bad now, but a few years ago it was a lot worse – with no rubbish collected for weeks.  
It is reasons like this that make them want to pack up and leave the area forever. This is why 
they want to improve their language skills – M tells me that she is very competent in French, 
having studied for a year there, but she hasn’t spoken English since she went on a language 
course to Cambridge with school when she was 15.  
We continued to talk about the differences between Naples and the UK. M told me that she 
regarded the English to be rather “cold” – I’ve heard this before from other Italians, but I 
explained that it was because Italians show a lot more emotion than those in the UK. I said 
that the English generally only really show emotion when they truly mean it, or when they 
have been drinking – and also that the immense passionate emotions that Italians show can 
sometimes be perceived as invasive or full of hyperbole to the point of meaninglessness. 
She asked me what faith I was, where I told her that I was an atheist which surprised her a 
lot, even more so when I told her that churchgoing is not very common in the UK. 
Unsurprisingly, N and M and Catholic, though she attends church much more than he does.  
We drove towards the port to get a sweet coffee where M asked me “do you know what the 
Camorra is?”. The question surprised me as it was a bit out of the blue, and I responded that 
I had. They were surprised, but I told them that Gomorrah (book and film) was relatively 
successful in the UK and that the topic in general interested me. I remember seeing the book 
in a media shop in my hometown when it was first published in English, and buying it which 
got me interested in the topic. I’m almost positive that I read Gomorrah before I saw films like 
the Godfather. We had only met that day, and I hadn’t really got the chance to talk about my 
overall purpose for being in Italy yet – they had seemed quite content talking about cultural 
differences so I was a bit conflicted about how to react at this surprise question. She asked 
what I thought of the Camorra in general, so I thought that honesty was the best policy – I 
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wasn’t going to play dumb. I responded that I knew that they were territorially defined groups 
who influence and gain power from the social and economic relations of the area, and that 
they should be understood as power systems, rather than “criminal” organizations. She 
seemed impressed, and agreed with me. Our conversation was cut short as we walked up to 
the café which had a large group of guys outside. N joked that we should start talking in 
English so that they wouldn’t understand what we were talking about!  
They both see the Camorra and mafia-type associations in general as normal phenomena 
which go hand-in-hand with politics – they seemed genuinely surprised when I said that 
organized crime simply did not exist in the same way in the UK as in Italy. M said that their 
existence is simply a given – it’s part of the culture here and they are inseparable. The port 
we were walking around, they said, was infamous for the clans, much like other ports in the 
area – where there is a port there is the Camorra. I asked what people are doing about the 
Camorra – where they both answered in unison “Nothing!” I asked why not – they said the 
reason is because people get killed – if you stand up to them you get killed, if you hang 
around with them you get killed. The best option is to stay out of sight, and just get on with 
your life.  
We left the port and headed through the centre of Torre towards the top of vesuvio where 
they wanted to show me the panorama of Naples. N purposely drove through an area close 
to the port – an area with cracked façades and quite a bit of degradation, telling me that it is 
places like these that are home to the Camorra in Torre. I realised momentarily how 
accustomed I had become to seeing derelict buildings, crumbling walls and uneven roads 
and pavements. I asked why they thought that groups like the Camorra grew here and not in 
the North or in the rest of Europe. N responded with a rather biased history lesson that 
rehashed old myths about the evil northerners who ruined the south - a rather reductionist 
view. He told me how the regno delle due sicilie was incredible wealthy before the 
Piedmontese invasion, which, though true, ignores the comparative size of the middle 
classes between the industrialized North and the relatively recent feudal south, as well as 
the focus of wealth for the monarchy and the aristocracy rather than anyone else. To him, it 
was the greed of the North where the once poor Lombardia and Veneto are now rich, and 
the once rich south has become a colony of the north. He said that he hadn’t read this at 





26th January 2015 
I met with A in Portici, a friend of mine who wants to improve her English. She noted my 
interest in the culture of the South compared to the North, and then Northern Europe in 
general and happily obliged. We started talking about the South in general, where she 
began telling me about a certain “southern” state of mind – how the inefficiencies of the 
State and lack of thinking of the community by individuals makes the place so much worse. 
She mentioned a large sum of money that the EU had put aside for the Circumvesuviana 
lines – most of which had disappeared. The trains that were modernized and replaced were 
changed for trains which did not fit alongside the platform – there was also an incident 
several years ago where a train de-railed and a few people died.  
As a therapist for families she offered me some insight on competitiveness and the southern 
state of mind – one where schools and teachers separate kids into “serie a, serie b and serie 
c”, sometimes without thinking, and other times purposely. The government had talked about 
creating special schools for those struggling, but nothing had happened yet. – creating 
hierarchies in schools. Indeed I had seen this for myself whilst teaching in a primary school 
the other side of Vesuvio, where kids were actively competing against one another to get 
marks.  
She offered me some thoughts on the Italian family and relationships. Italian partners appear 
to be closer, and the women are generally more controlling, but that is because the guy is 
more likely to be unfaithful – warranting the women to sometimes demand Facebook and 
phone passwords. In response, in her experiences, the guy just creates a new profile on 
Facebook.   
She told me the difference between places like Naples proper, “provincia” like Portici and 
Ercolano and then the periphery. Naples is city living, and the chaos that goes with it. Places 
like Portici is for “snobs” (what I’d best define as bourgeois), whereas places like Ercolano, 
Torre del Greco, Torre Annunziata and Scafati is full of “tamarri”, roughly translated in 
English as “chavs “. In this context, she refers to “uncultured” young people with nothing 
really to do, but drive around on motorinis and cause trouble, with no real anchor to any 
association (other than maybe the Camorra).  
I am becoming acutely aware of interconnectedness here: despite me meeting them 
separately, A knows some of the guys from Radio Siani, whereas R is actually a member – 




30th January 2015 
I went to an event hosted at a church on Corso Resina in Ercolano about the concerns for 
the amount of toxic waste disposed locally – where the aim was to encourage civic 
awareness of the issue, all guided and clarified by local associations. It was hosted primarily 
by the church, but was organized by the gruppo ambiente vesuvio di Ercolano.  
Around 200 people or so had turned up, and were generally 40+ years old, although there 
were younger people with their families and/or the church choir. At the beginning, the padre 
thanked to all of those who had turned up – including the Mayor, representatives from Radio 
Siani, the Forum dei Giovani and so on.  
Representatives from the gruppo ambiente spoke of the issues that the city faced – 
particularly where the natural assets that the city has (Vesuvius and the sea) are being 
blighted by illegal waste dumping – often linked to the Camorra, but sometimes done by 
local businesses. They spoke of complete distrust that local people had had in the State and 
its institutions, but also where the increase in deaths linked to hazardous chemicals 
throughout the regions actually provoked a civic reaction to the issue itself. The group 
emphasised that they had found a genuine partner with regard to this issue with the 
Carabinieri, that they are very serious about the issue and that they merit trust in this regard. 
They underlined the need for citizens to report issues of illegal waste in order to tackle this 
issue.  
The event itself had a strong police presence, mostly due to the Mayor who was escorted 
away in a police car at the end 
 
10th February 2015 
This evening I met Raffaela for dinner where we went to a pizzeria that she regularly 
frequents on IV Novembre. I began talking about my travels in Italy- how I’d spent New 
Years in Ravello, for example – in which she replied that she owns a house on the Amalfi 
Coast –which her and her husband are going to visit this weekend. It is then that I thought 
about it more. They own 3 shops, as well as a house here and on the Amalfi Coast. 
Furthermore, her daughter owns the opticians next door (also a member of the anti-racket 
association). This is a fairly wealthy family. 
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We talked for a while about her travels to London over 10 years ago until she started talking 
to me about Ercolano. She regards herself as the starting point for the movement in 
Ercolano, full stop. I asked what she thought of Radio Siani and the Forum dei Giovani, and 
her response set me back a little – it seemed to be her opinion that they aren’t doing enough 
– they are all talk – and are both (Radio Siani in particular) highly politicised. She made it 
clear that she would not go into further details however. She refused to visit Radio Siani, for 
example. Elsewhere in the antimafia movement, she dislikes Roberto Saviano – thinking that 
he does not do enough for business people and is, again, all talk. Part of me doesn’t want to 
write this – and perhaps this won’t make the final write up, but she seems to me to be a quite 
a difficult person to deal with. Typically of the older generation in the mezzogiorno, she does 
not have very much formal education. Perhaps due to her role in the antimafia in Ercolano, 
or even due to her own character, but she was at times rather arrogant - talking about HER 
achievements in Ercolano – it was her show, so to speak – and not the antiracket 
movement. She is an important local figure with it, absolutely – but it was the overt and 
outward nature of her hyperbole which missed the grander picture which set me back a little. 
She had denounced the Camorra when they approached her, yes – and this is important, but 
the notion that she is the face of the entire antimafia movement is ludicrous. I remember her 
being rather forceful and demanding with the waiter in the restaurant, who appeared to only 
tolerate her presence out of politeness and normality because it seemed as if she would 
always be like this when she came to eat here- which made me feel incredibly 
uncomfortable. I really felt for the staff there – in the same sense that some shopkeepers 
could be caught in the social politeness trap and creeping normality of paying the pizzo, so 
here too was this waiter caught in a trap of continued politeness in the face of a regular 
customer’s demands. This uncomfortableness that I felt made me think of her as like the 
colour grey – this heroic lady who stood up to the Camorra in the land of the Camorra was 
not the saint that my naïveté wanted her to be. This was for me a bit hard to digest – I guess 
from my own ideas I was imagining an anti-mafia civil society movement all working together 
– but this all seems to be skin deep where concrete cooperation between different 
organizations is concerned.  
She claims that no more businesses pay the pizzo in Ercolano, but I’m not so convinced. 
Indeed as we were driving back, I asked about the new and well-furnished bar on IV 
Novembre that had opened recently, and whether they had joined the antiracket association 
– the answer was a resounding “no”. 
I asked her and her husband what they thought of the recent PD scandal that was revealed 
last week and they simply remarked that it was such a shame after all the work that the 
antiracket association had done, for the PD to have such a scandal.  
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12th February 2015 
This evening I met with the Forum dei Giovani for the first time in their headquarters at 
Palazzo Borsellino [yes, that Borsellino], in their main room “Peppino Impastato” [yes, that 
Peppino Impastato]. It was a meeting of 10 people or so who were discussion around a 
round table their plans for a market stall after organizing a clean-up of the seaside close to 
Via Marina. It was interesting to see how open and free-flowing this meeting was. I 
introduced myself to the guys there and they talked to me about the group’s formation and 
history. Their coordinator, B explained, as I supected and had been led to believe, that the 
group is indeed an institutional association in that they use equipment, etc. and are paid for 
(lights, space etc.) by the comune. But she stressed that they are independent and that they 
attempt to stay as informal and separate from the comune as possible. They stressed too, 
that they try to steer clear from politics, and that their purpose is to provide a space and 
organize events for the young people in Ercolano – as there is nothing/very little to do in the 
city. It was founded in 2009, initially as an area for people to study when the communal 
library is closed. It subsequently evolved, and became a place for young people to meet and 
discuss ideas and make friends. The thing that intrigues me the most is how short their leash 
is from the comune – how independent they are in reality. I mentioned to the guys there that 
I am in a position to teach English/do a language exchange if anyone would like which was 
received very enthusiastically. I saw online before meeting them that they had worked with a 
researcher in a project that sought to understand how young people view the Camorra. On 
meeting them in person, I was handed a print-out of this data almost immediately. I’m going 
to try to interact with these guys as much as possible.  
 
15th February 2015 
I met with the forum again at an event of theirs for a local book that was being published. 
Despite expecting a full house, only around 15 or so people turned up – with a number of 
them being the organisers of the Forum.  
After the event finished, A, one of the guys from the Forum offered to introduce me to 
someone of interest – Padre Pasquale. There is centre on Via Aldo Moro “La laconda di 
Emmaus” which used to be a Camorra affiliated pub before the Church acquired it and 
began using it as a community centre where kids could go and do their homework and 
generally interact with one another. We entered the centre  which was packed – maybe 
70/80 people or so – almost all families with cakes, sweets and so on. There was a special 
event due to Saint Valentino – but I understood the message – the Chruch in particular 
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alongside Padre Pasquale is very strong with regard to the anti-Camorra. On meeting the 
Padre I was surprised to learn that he speaks English, and fairly well too as he spent some 
time in Dublin – picking up a rather interesting accent when he spoke English (which he very 
much wanted to). He invited me to join one of his youth meetings with the “centro di 
pastorale giovanile” in the following weeks, which I happily accepted.  
A and I were talking afterwards, where he was trying to make it clear to me that there is not 
simply ONE anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano, but many. There are influenced from the 
State and other national organizations like Libera or Addiopizzo but there are far more here 
on the ground too which work much closer with people. The church here is a fantastic 
example. But again, it is interesting how interconnected things are here.  
Later I went for some drinks with some of the other guys from the Forum where one of the 
members introduced me to a guy he described as “the next Mayor of Ercolano” and he 
seemed to know the guys from the Forum pretty well. The guy, Ciro Buonajuto, was standing 
for election in the local PD primaries against and, 3 months later he really was elected as 
Mayor.  
 
3rd March 2015 
A lot has been happening in the last few weeks, so I’ll summarizs here in order for some 
clarity. I met with Don Pasquale [Incoronato] and the rest of his youth church group at La 
Locanda di Emmaus on Via Aldo Moro. The common routine is arriving on a Friday evening, 
socialise with friends and catch up on the latest news & goings on, they take orders for a 
pizza delivery together then everyone sits at a long table with the Don at the head to listen to 
him whilst waiting for the pizza to arrive.  
Pasquale begins by reading a pamphlet given to him by the Church on a particular issue 
which is accompanied by verses from the bible as well as quotes from the Pope. Pasquale 
encourages the members in attendance to read a paragraph from the pamphlet and ask 
questions about the topic – which he does his best to answer. This week’s issue was 
“legality”, particularly on the difference between “legality” (legalità) and “justice” (giustizia). 
On this, the Pasquale made it abundantly clear that the State and the Church’s version of 
“justice” are profoundly different. In the pamphlet, a question asked by the Pope was 
discussed by the group: “per te, un buon cristiano deve essere necessariamente anche un 
buon cittadino?” (do you think that a good Christian must also necessarily be a good 
citizen?) where Pasquale distinguished between the two. To Pasquale, absolute justice of 
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what is “right” is predetermined by God, which is in conflict with the law and what is legal (i.e. 
legality), meaning that that which is legal may at times correlate with that which is “good”, but 
not all of the time. Christian virtues of justice in this context supersede Statist and man-made 
notions of that which is “legal”. This becomes an incredibly interesting distinction when we 
talk of fighting for the “hearts and minds” of the people of Ercolano against the Camorra and 
criminality, when two “sides” of the anti-mafia movement are in deep disagreement about 
which virtues should be used to fight the problems in their city.  
I should note here that this discussion made me feel somewhat uncomfortable. Not only am I 
not a Catholic, but I am not religious at all, and am in fact an atheist – though not an anti-
theist. I went to a C of E (Anglican) primary school as a child, and was a Christian for a time. 
I am interested in religion and philosophy/ethics in general (and I have actually read more of 
the bible than some of my Ercolano-based Catholic friends) but I am nonetheless an 
unashamed unbeliever. I see the benefits that religious belief can bring to individual agency, 
but do not see religion as a prerequisite to being a “good” person. For this question of the 
good Christian as a good citizen, I dismiss the discussion entirely as reductionist, since the 
tenets of what makes a “good citizen” is debateable – do we define a good citizen as a 
citizen who follows the law, or is a good citizen (in principle) permitted to break bad laws 
where they believe them to be wrong? The answer given by Pasquale is one that says that 
Christian virtues of justice transcend Statist laws – but what of people who aren’t religious? 
This aspect is unaccounted for, and actually goes to the heart of the debate within the 
antimafia movement and its strategies in Italy. Where the State encourages dispositions of 
largely (neo)liberal notions of legality, the Church pushes dispositions of its own particular 
notions of justice – but what of people who dismiss laws that exist as immoral/unjust but do 
not share all of the Church’s tenets? 
Similarly to other individuals I have met in my time in Italy, knowing I am English, I was 
asked whether I was “Anglican or Catholic”, rather than whether I was religious or not. The 
possibility that I could be neither was not considered. I wasn’t going to lie to my hosts, and 
so I told them that I was an atheist – after which I was looked at with what seemed like pity. 
One of the other Priests at the meeting told me how sad he was that only 4% of the UK was 
Catholic and that I should “let Jesus into my heart”.  
During his sermon, Pasquale public remarked to me the differences between my Anglo-
Saxon world and the mezzogiorno region – how we have a greater focus on ourselves 
(privately and individually), whereas the mezzogiorno is much more communal. Though in 
some respects true, it would be incorrect to say that public programmes (health, etc.) do not 
exist in the “Anglo Saxon” world. Indeed he remarked how money is the most important 
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aspect in the Anglo Saxon world and how (wrongly, I might add) we have to pay for our 
medical services “like in the US”. I chose to wait until the sermon was finished to correct him 
in private on his oversimplification, so as not to be rude.  His generalisation says something 
about the world that he and parts of his culture understands. The South is poorer, but less 
individualistic, and therefore “happier”. It seemed a rather odd thought for him to consider 
that an individualistic Anglo Saxon country like my own to have any form of socialised 
healthcare – albeit one that works alongside private healthcare (similarly to Italy).  
I have noticed this kind of comparison countless times previously when Neapolitans have 
talked about people from the North of Italy – they are “freddi” (cold) people – not like the 
warm people in the mezzogiorno. This is of course a stereotype, but nonetheless a 
persistent one. It does make me wonder how many Neapolitans actually know people from 
outside of their own communities, and how much this reproduces this stereotype. To many 
of my Neapolitan friends, I am the first straniero (foreigner) that they have met, let alone had 
a proper conversation with.  
… 
One incredibly interesting thing I noticed between the Forum and La Locanda was the types 
of meetings that they were. The Forum encouraged conversations between everyone – 
bringing in the opinions of outsiders to the Forum to contribute their opinion on a particular 
issue – discussed in a “round table” format. La Locanda, however, was a long table of 30 or 
so, with one person deciding the topic and controlling the dissemination of information – 
moderating discussion and saying who is able to contribute to conversation and when. In this 
sense, the Forum was a lot more “democratic” and seemed to be full of more outgoing 
characters, as well as more open to “thinking outside of the box” and more engaged with 
other topics such as politics (local, regional, national and global). It is important to note the 
fluidity of these youth groups. I was only able to go to the event at La Locanda to begin with 
because one of guys, I met at the Forum, A, told me about the meeting with Don Pasquale, 
and invited me to go to the meetings with him. The brother of F, who occasionally helps at 
the Forum, and is the current President of an association that promotes tourism in Ercolano 
“Pro Loco Hercvlanevm” and former journalist for MetropolisWeb, also turned up at La 
Locanda – where  during the evening – where he was told off by Pasquale for not going to 




18th March 2015 
I’ve become a more regular member of the British Community Naples (BCN), having been 
offered teaching job in an office they rent in the centre of the city. One of the main aims here 
was to see how interconnected some of the other Civil Society groups in Naples – and 
whether there is any link between the organizations here and the ones in Ercolano. After a 
few months of observing, I am genuinely surprised at how interconnected they are. One of 
the organisers of the community, is the president of BCN, a journalist for an association that 
highlights cultural/historical interests in the city, a volunteer for a homeless shelter and its 
affiliated publication “scarpe de tenis” – similar to the British “Big Issue” newspaper which 
gives homeless people the opportunity of a legal income. Much like particular members of 
Radio Siani and the Forum, it is people like her who appear to be the link between different 
organizations that facilitates collaboration. Indeed it is interesting to note that number of the 
BCN guys had actually been invited to Radio Siani to talk about their activities in the months 
previously. The British Community was keen to advertise itself so that it may offer more 
classes and expand its own socio-cultural events (in pubs, bars, etc.), and Radio Siani had a 
space by which they are able to accommodate them – as well as an opportunity to 
disseminate their own story and purpose.   
I started talking to one of the guys from the Couchsurfing Napoli group again who messaged 
me and asked if we could meet so he could improve his conversational English. When we 
met, he revealed somewhat of a feud between some of the organizers of the group where 
one of the guys had fallen out with the main organizers due to the nature and frequency of 
events that they host. Unlike BCN or any of the other organizations I’ve come across, 
Couchsurfing Napoli is wholly voluntary and the product of its own members willingness to 
participate – understandable when you consider the general Couchsurfing mantra which 
offers travellers a free place to stay.  
… 
I’ve continued seeing R a few times a week where we normally end up talking about the 
terrible working situation in the area and the general brain drain that this has created. He’s 
begun studying German alongside English and Spanish to increase his chances of working 
away abroad.  
… 
Today there was an organized march by all the schools in Ercolano of which Radio Siani, the 
comune and the law enforcement agencies took part. At the march I met a guy called who 
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happened to be the coordinator for “let’s do it Italy”, as well as a regular contributor for Radio 
Siani, and has gotten their members involved in environmentally conscious activities such as 
cleaning up beaches and so on. It seemed that there were quite a few other representatives 
from other associations present too. It seemed to be a huge success – purposely focussing 
on the youth as a means of fostering a culture of legality. I spoke to one of the students at 
one of the schools and part of the scouts in Ercolano, and he told me that for the last week 
or so, there had been a focus on “legality” in general, and that they had been encouraged to 
do something for the march. He had chosen to find a quote to read out at the conclusion of 
the march, choosing Albert Einstein:  “The world is a dangerous place to live, not because of 
the people who are evil, but because of the people who don't do anything about it” alongside 
his peers. The younger students from the local primary schools were asked to make some 
placards and banners, which held up throughout the march. The image of the entirety of 
Ercolano’s youth parading through the streets “for legality” was a potent one – it literally 
made shopkeepers and passers-by stop what they were doing, and cheer as they marched 
passed.  
The march’s conclusion was speeches in an urban park, complete with speeches, music and 
contributions by young people. There were quite a few speakers and performances during: 
There was a band of instrumentalists in Carabinieri uniform who played fratelli d’Italia, which 
some of the kids needed a bit of encouragement to sing along to, speeches by prominent 
Carabinieri officers, school teachers, Vincenzo Strazzullo (the Mayor), Giuseppe 
Scogniamiglio from Radio Siani, and then a performance by a school rock band. The 
speakers talked about the role of changing culture, and the role of trust for institutions. I took 
the liberty of recording some of this on a Dictaphone – here is some of the speech by one of 
the schoolteachers/organizers:  
Like all of you, I also have a smartphone. I used it to understand the word “legalità” 
and what it referred to by our dearly loved resources. There was a thing that struck 
me. Legalità becomes adherence to the rules that protects the weak from the 
oppression of the strong. I know this because it has been referred to directly from my 
smartphone … this today is a thing we need to underline – we are not weak. We 
need to protect the weak – we need to give hand to protect them. Here everyone 
today, you are not simply the citizens of tomorrow, you are the citizens of today. This 
is always better. We are not given a beautiful picture today of our society: corruption, 
problems, people disinterested in politics, people with nothing to look forward to in 
the future. But we need to carry on with the day. 
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These things that you have, because you all have them… Use them! Don’t just use 
them to go on Facebook or other such like. Teach yourself and memorize the 
numbers of the Carabinieri, the Mayor, the Guarda di Finanza, the State police. It’s 
not enough to say that you are here – it is better to denounce. It is the courage to say 
“this happened in this moment”. Because the other side will say that what they are 
doing is not wrong […] 
The thing that you need to understand is that this morning the schools of Ercolano 
are here, the institution is here, the law enforcement is here […] Legality is not simply 
obeying the law, because we need to pay our dues, or because we need to 
denounce others, instead legality is everything in our lives. We are legality. We need 
to be lawful. We have to face various points of view – the one we face today is that of 
the law enforcement. And today I want to thank the Carabinieri, the Guarda di 
Finanza, the State police, and the local police, who are always close to us. 
Legality also means to learn. Us adults, have probably used our children – we have 
likely influenced our children’s minds. On the taking of drugs, on prostitution against 
all the others – these are not good for you! It’s something inhuman. They are things 
that make our society more inhuman. This is why you need to be ready and know 
what your rights are and what are your needs, and to respect one another. Also 
against your parents, and against your teachers – you need to know when your fight 
is a just one. This also is legality.  
The speakers spoke mostly of a war against the Camorra that had been won, but also that 
there is still a lot that needs to be done. From talking to people present, it seemed that the 
march itself was the first mass march in Ercolano against the Camorra since 2009 when 
Radio Siani first started broadcasting, as Scogniamiglio said in his speech: 
In this park we have many memories, particularly for marches. Here we planted an 
olive tree, dedicated to Giancarlo Siani. There was a march in 2009 which we 
participated in, very similar to this one where we wrote on one of the banners “le idee 
non si fermano con la paura”. From 2009 until today many things have changed – 
with this march and this initiative it shows that the ideas and initiatives that we need 
to go forward against fear have been understood. A big thank you to the schools in 
Ercolano, and thank you for this opportunity to collaborate with you, and really help 
out children in difficulty in this territory that need a helping hand. I ask you to give a 
further hand to these associations like ours, because there is need to do this from the 
bottom-up through the children  
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After talking to R and some of the guys from Radio Siani after the march, I was told that 
there was a free space on a coach that they were taking up to Bologna for the national 
“Libera” march in a few days’ time, which I asked to take.  
 
24th March 2015 
On Friday I met with the guys from Radio Siani and some of their friends from Libera for the 
trip to Bologna. A coach was booked for the evening so that we would drive through the 
night and was shared between Radio Siani and another association based in Somma 
Vesuviana. I sat next to R for the journey and we spent a lot of the journey during the 
daytime practicing his English. I had a chance to meet some of the other guys from the 
Radio that I hadn’t already met – where I realised that we actually had quite a few friends in 
common through people linked to BCN. As well as broadcasting for Radio Siani, many of 
them are also journalists elsewhere.  
When we arrived at the march in the morning, a thing that struck me was the importance of 
memory/memorialization. This is unsurprising considering the fashion in Italy of renaming 
places/organizations after martyrs or historical figures (for the antimafia, Falcone and 
Borsellino are common names). Members of Radio Siani prepared a list of names of 
innocent victims of organized crime in Italy which they read out in chronological order to be 
followed by chants.  
E.g. “GIANCARLO SIANI” 
“Giancarlo è vivo e lotta insieme a noi! Le nostre idee non moriranno mai!”  
This was similarly used by organizers of the Libera march itself, where they read out every 
single victim’s name on tannoys. Present at the event were many other groups and slogans 
that we can generally designate as being “Left”: the communist party, nuclear proliferation, 
anti-war etc. who had decided to attend too. In addition to these, there was a strong 






29th March 2015 
I went out tonight with some of the guys from Portici to a pizzeria, where one of the girls 
recommended that I research a bit more about Drama groups in the area given that they are 
well attended by young people, and that they often do topics surrounding organized crime 
and the cultural fight against it, which I’ll have to look at in more detail.  
At the table we came onto the topic of religion, where the guys were mostly confronting P 
about his strong by-the-book Catholic beliefs. O, who is a Catholic too, for example, 
questioned him for not being critical of his own beliefs enough – noting that it is acceptable 
and human to not know the answers. It got a bit heated and awkward when one of the other 
guys started talking about evolution, and P started quoting bible verses. We tried our best 
not to seem as if we were ganging up on him, per se, but it was quite difficult given the 
circumstances – he just wasn’t listening to any other view than his own, even when told 
about hypocrisies in his argument. I enjoy his company, and debating with him though.  
On leaving the pizzeria we drove up Via Libertà through a load of traffic. In the stop and start 
traffic, a car behind us accidentally nudged our back bumper. We tried to get the other car’s 
attention, asking them to wind down their windows so we could swap insurance details. The 
guy at the wheel said he didn’t bump our bumper at all, and that he didn’t need to swap 
details at all. Luckily we had already written down the licence plate. Q told him “okay, no 
worries, but we are going to report it to the insurance company anyway”, at this point, the 
driver started shouting at us and getting irate. We locked the doors and did up the windows. 
We drove on for a few metres in traffic before one of their other passengers got out of the 
car to come to speak to us. Q wound down his window to speak to him, where this guy 
started aggressively bulling him into not contacting his insurance company. When he 
refused, this guy started hitting the car and windows, where we had to quickly drive off to get 
away from him. We drove around for a bit just to be sure before we arrived at a park so that 
we could assess the damage. There wasn’t anything huge, but there was a definite dent on 
the back bumper, and small marks on the door where he hit it. We saw a similar car drive 
towards us, so we got back in and drive off again – but nothing came of it.  
In the car, the guys were telling me that the driver probably had not paid for insurance, and 
that he was bullying Q so that he wouldn’t have to pay anything. They were purposely using 
the uncertainty of knowing if they were camorristi and/or armed to try and influence Q’s 
decision. They could have just been some regular guys, who didn’t want the trouble of 
paying. F was quite shaken up, later apologizing to me “for his area” – saying how ashamed 
he was of these kind of people who make things worse for everyone. It’s because of people 
like them, that everyone needs to buy insurance, and that the cost is so high.  
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Log book additions:  Post-script – 18th March 2017 
I recently moved back to Naples, not for fieldwork, rather it was to live in the city itself whilst 
finishing the remainder of this thesis as I have grown quite fond of it. Something unfortunate 
happened yesterday that I believe is interesting and relevant enough to add to these 
fieldwork notes. 
Yesterday I was unfortunately robbed whilst in one of the central gardens of the city. No 
harm or anything, a group of 4 guys took my phone and about 30 euros cash – unfortunate 
and irritating, but not the end of the world by any means. The most pertinent part of this with 
regard to this project, however, was the process at which an individual denounces a crime to 
law enforcement agencies in the city. Law enforcement were contacted by telephone, and 
within 30 minutes or so a couple of Carabinieri officers arrived. They were initially concerned 
as to whether they would be likely to catch the thieves, but shifted their attention to more 
procedural matters fairly swiftly when it was obvious that it highly unlikely. They asked for 
relevant documentation so that they could log the crime, though, to my surprise, required me 
to go directly to a Caserma (either of the Carabinieri or Polizia di Stato) in order to give a 
statement. I was told that it was not possible to give a statement immediately, because the 
office was closed for the day (it was about 10pm). There and then they asked me to give a 
vague idea of what happened, though would take a more detailed statement if I chose to 
actually go to the Caserma the next day.  
I went to the Caserma the next day but was incredibly surprised how unfriendly and how 
imposing and intimidating it was to actually enter into the Caserma. There were no signs, 
and no real assistance for individuals who had never actually denounced a crime before. I 
approached the front office where a Carabinieri officer sat behind a thick glass window, thick 
enough that you almost needed to shout to actually be heard. Then I had to wait in a 
cramped waiting room to be seen by another officer who would take my statement properly. 
The interaction with the officer who took my statement was friendly enough, and was clearly 
well disposed to encouraging victims to talk about crimes committed against them, but my 
initial interactions with the Carabinieri the day before, and in the time before giving the 
statement were much less positive. To put it simply, it is not easy enough to denounce. Not 
only do you not give a statement to the first officers you meet, but you may even have to 
return another day to actually denounce.  
It is worth considering how a businessperson would feel in this situation. They are 
approached for pizzo, and, depending on the time of the approach, may have to wait until 
another time to actually denounce and give a statement properly.  Given the environment, as 
well as the fear and uncertainty that such an approach can give a businessperson, this kind 
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of operational oversight may deter a businessperson from denouncing, and giving a 
statement. The intimidating and unfriendly nature of the Caserma I entered prior to giving my 
statement was almost enough to make me think that it wasn’t worth denouncing at all. There 
was no doubt that it was the right thing to do, but there was also the consideration that there 
is no point in doing it. Waiting to give a statement, and entering into a fairly unfriendly 
environment was inconvenient, with little incentive to actually denounce. It is an interesting 
thought as to the number of businesspeople across the mezzogiorno who composed 
themselves enough to denounce, but then decided against it due to the sheer inconvenience 
and intimidating nature of the place.  
What we saw in Ercolano was individual Carabinieri officers who took it upon themselves to 
smooth the process that businesspeople went through to denounce. Some businesspeople 
could bring themselves to report a crime, but may not have been able to bring themselves to 
trust the Carabinieri enough to give a statement. It may have been too difficult, too 
inconvenient. Maybe it is easier and less hassle to just pay the pizzo, it is only a small 
amount. The process of denouncing a crime is to admit that were unable to control a 
situation, which is, among other things, an issue of embarrassment and honour as one sees 
it. In a cost-benefit analysis, does an intimidated businessperson judge a relatively small 
pizzo a decent price to pay for avoiding embarrassment, inconvenience and to live a more 













VI:  Miscellaneous material:  
 
VI.I  “Programma Integrato Urbano (PIU) Europa” Introduction to Ercolano 
 
The comune of Ercolano, in the province of Naples, located at the South-Western 
slopes of Vesuvio, along the coastiera vesuviana between Portici and Torre del 
Greco, to the average height of 44m above average sea level. The area has a wide 
altitude range, varying from zero up to 1275m summit of Vesuvio. The comune has 
an area of 19.64 sq km and a population density among the highest in Italy (2,813 
inhabitants per sq km). The resident population is 55,261 inhabitants.  
The city has a considerable and prestigious variety of natural, cultural and 
architectural assets: the archaeological ruins, 22 Vesuvian villas, the volcanic 
complex of Somma-Vesuviana, in part which is also part of the Parco Nazionale del 
Vesuvio, the sea and the favourable climate. In addition, it enjoys a privileged 
geographical position due to its proximity to the city of Naples, Pompei, which along 
with Oplonti, Castellammare and Boscoreale make up the prestigious Vesuvian 
archaeological system to Sorrento, Baia, Capri, Ischia and Pozzuoli. 
… 
Like Pompei, Herculaneum [the Roman city that Ercolano is built upon] entered the 
Roman orbit at the end of the 4th Century BC becoming its own municipality in 89 BC. 
After the plague of 1656, the eruption of Vesuvius from 1631 to 1698, the official 
identification of Herculaneum in 1709 was due to Emanuele d’Elboeuf, Prince of 
Lorraine. Subsequently the area was hit by flowering lavish holiday residences, the 
Vesuvian villas, in part by changing the trim of the families that in the two previous 
centuries had enriched their architectural heritage. The process continued throughout 
the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century.  
The area was badly hit by the bombing of 1941-43 and then the military occupation. 
From the second half of the twentieth century, the municipality became almost 
entirely saturated from building speculation: Urban expansion in the recent years had 
become massive – thickening the buildings along the existing roads and urban areas 
begin to occupy most of the areas between the main road and the Napoli-Salerno 
highway with extensive residential quarters and multi-storey building expansions. 
Residential expansions then spread even more uphill along the highway along the 
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lower slopes of Vesuvio with sparse buildings and the extension of existing 
residential nuclei.  
The urban growth of Ercolano was strongly influenced by the presence of 
infrastructure for mobility on a regional scale that gradually occupied the territory in a 
longitudinal manner: the ancient Strada Regia per le Carabrie (then Miglio d’Oro now 
Corso Resina), the Napoli-Salerno State railway, the track of the Napoli-Torre 
Annunziata Circumvesuviana train and the A3 Napoli-Salerno highway, have in fact 
sliced into the same longitudinal sectors, each of which has developed its own 
difference and almost indifference to other neighbouring sectors over the last fifty 
years. This phenomenon was certainly encouraged by the poor development of 
roads which criss-cross one another, which has affected the part of the territory that 
goes from the sea to the highway. It goes without saying that the urban growth is 
oriented also by sector, mainly unravelling in the longitudinal direction, up to the 
“overflow” towards the adjacent sectors. 
The Corso Resina axis along which focusses much of the city’s history still preserves 
its original role as a centre of gravity compared to urban dynamics and is the only 
one with connective function and with great potential for improvement of the use of 
these resources. The most urbanized part of the city of Ercolano is between the A3 
highway, the Corso Umberto and the municipal borders of Portici and Torre del 
Greco, as you climb towards the crater of Vesuvio the amount of buildings thins more 
and more. Of the current real estate assets in the municipal territory, about 80% has 
been built over the last 50 years with overall poor architectural quality which has 
significantly lowered the sense of urban identity perceived by citizens. The 
infrastructure deficit, inevitable in the presence of an urban growth of such size, has 
further depleted the newly expanding urban environment. At the same time, the 
centro storico [historical centre] … lost its significance due to the lack of planning to 
address urban regeneration as it gradually became abandoned with an exception of 
the most vulnerable sections of the population, in which they acquired some kind of 
extra-territoriality to the rest of the city. Indeed, since the end of the 1960s, things 
became more unrecognizable whereby any new buildings were prevalently 
residential and intensively build, juxtaposed and superimposed amongst the other 
historical buildings, imposing themselves in a manner so completely indifferent to the 
values and the qualities of their areas.  
The importance of the sea has gradually waned too whereby the physical barrier 
formed by the railway, alongside new building works that have claimed the areas 
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around the gardens of the Vesuvian villas, the lack of adequate pedestrian and cycle 
paths, coastal roads and the decline of fishing and shipbuilding has resulted in the 
coast becoming isolated resulting in, at times, the inability to perceive even the 
presence of the sea.  
Another element of urban relevance is represented by the complicated relationship 
between the city and the archaeological excavations that, in many ways, have always 
represented an island almost positioned accidentally and indifferently alongside the 
structures and urban life. The building planning of recent years has aimed at enabling 
the desired integration process between the two cities through a systematic set of 
physical actions aimed both at improving the accessibility of the archaeological area 
as well as the integration between both the old city and the new city with the aim of 
an accessible archaeological city through various serving systems that are perfectly 
integrated to the system of environmental, historical and architectural resources 
within the territory.  















VI.II  An interview on Radio Siani between Giuseppe Scognamiglio, Concita De Gregorio 
(journalist for RAI), Pierpaolo FIlippelli and Pasquale del Prete (Vice President of the 
antiracket association), 28 November 2016.92  
 
Scognamiglio:  Here we are for a special broadcast for Radio Siani, as always from 
the house of a boss, that of a bene confiscato to tell you what has happened. We have here 
with us the Precoratore aggiunto, our, if I am permitted call him as such, friend, Dr Filippelli 
who has come here yet again to help us and tell us a bit about what has been happening. 
We are getting occasional bursts of life sentences that keep on coming – condemning acts 
committed against victims such as Salvatore Barbaro, illuminating us about the events, and 
asking for such an important sentence against the perpetrators – important regarding his 
homicide. Thank you Dr Filippelli for being here, for your availability in times such as these.  
Filippelli:   Thank you all, and thanks to all to the listeners. I want to say that the 
trials currently underway, is as always the result of team work, it is not a single individual – it 
is the work of an exceptional team of investigators helped by the Carabinieri company in 
Torre del Greco. There are important results because of this organisational body. The 
number of life sentences is a record, 42 to give the exact number – though this should not be 
interrupted because it is a grave error to be satisfied with this number. Instead it is the 
contrary since it is just demonstrative that control of the territory is both preventative and 
repressive and needs instead to be total control.  
Scognamiglio:  Likewise “non si torna” [no going back] is our new slogan which we will 
write and recount alongside all of you, in wanting to finally close the book on all of this. We 
don’t want to go back. We are talking about important numbers, about important events for 
our local history and to provide an example for other comunes which is well noted. However 
what I would be interested to know, since we have you here, a bit more about the local 
context [of the Camorras] such as the beginnings of alliances and the presence of Ercolano 
being part of a larger picture: the Birra clan with the Lo Russo and the Gionta, whereas there 
is the Ascione with the clans of Castellamare and Secondigliano – could you tell us a bit 
more about this? We understand the basics, but we know that Ercolano is just one arena of 
a much larger game outside of Ercolano and for the entire area. 
Filippelli:  This is not an easy thing to do, because the whole thing is complex, 
and of much greater synthesis which has changed over many years. The clans in Ercolano 
were networks of equal strategic and military importance – they understood that they could 
interweave themselves with drug trafficking contacts with bosses, all reinforced by military 




alliances outside of Ercolano. For example, the Birra became close with the Gionta from 
Torre del Greco and the Lo Russo from Maiano and Secondigliano, as well as clans from the 
provincial Caserta area. Whereas the Ascione did the same with other clans in the general 
provincial area. In this Ercolano found itself at the centre, if we can put it like this, of a much 
broader criminal panorama – bringing Ercolano to the centre of other feuds: the faida di 
Torre Annunziata, di Maiano, di Secondigliano. It is in the most recent sentences that we can 
see the history of criminality in Ercolano. The perpetrators of a double homicide against the 
Ascione and the Montella clans [where the Birra clan killed the opposing clans bosses] in 
2003 were condemned a few days ago. These perpetrators were not only those sent by the 
Birra clan, but also killers from the Lo Russo clan.  
Camorra criminal clans are never to be measured in a strict communal sense, but instead as 
a network, if I can put it like this, containing those contacts in the drugs market. This is not 
only in the local area, but also in a national context.  
Scognamiglio:  To all of our listeners I’d like to introduce another one of our guests, a 
great journalist with us, Concita De Gregorio, who is going to be both an interviewer and an 
interviewee for us – and we are on the air with her where she will ask questions to us 
herself. In this sense I am not going to participate any further, I am instead going to follow 
what is being said. We have the good fortune of having her here in our studios to chat with 
us, so yeah, thank you for letting me have a word here!. 
De Gregorio:   Good evening, and thank you for your hospitality. I was listening to 
both of you with great interest because we arrived here with our own programme, fuori 
Roma to make the point that in order to see what has happened here in Ercolano, it is 
fundamental to understand what has been happening under the surface such as with this 
Radio with its symbolic importance and with the work of Dr Filippelli which has brought the 
results to which all of this is linked.  
Many people do not know about the reality in Ercolano, and so I would like to ask some very 
simple questions. We say that the Camorra “families” have been decapitated, we say that all 
of these life sentences has genuinely affected the underworld here. I would like to ask, 
however, do you consider this social criminal underworld genuinely to be eradicated – I’m 
thinking of the wives, the children, the sisters, nieces, nephews, cousins and all of those who 
are left here. Those who are still alive, and those who are not in prison and are left waiting. 
What are they doing? Where are they? How do they organize themselves? What is the 
function of the women now in this reality? My second question I have for you is whether you 
have the feeling that there is a “legend” surrounding criminality that derives from things in 
television series, from films, from the Gomorrahs of this world. I ask because I was coming 
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from Naples earlier and I was stopped in Marianella to see Enzo Avitabile [A Neapolitan 
singer] and Enzo said to me that all the youngsters mimic all of the “heroes” from Gomorrah. 
Television instructs, because there aren’t so many schools – television is a very important 
educational agency. My second question is whether television could become a sort of 
example in this sense. Michele Santoro presented his documentary “Robinù” in Venezia, 
which came out before Roberto Saviano’s book La Paranza. In this sense I mean these child 
soldiers, could you help us unpick these two things? 
Filippelli:  These are very challenging things, and would take a lot of time to be 
able to respond to both of these questions, in my opinion, Dr, there is too much to discuss. 
I’ll try to answer where I can in this moment. With regard to your first question, I think that 
you would have to say that the elements of the Camorra’s defeat, or at the very least, it’s 
curbing, would be if the camorristi’s children will not be camorristi in the future. This is the 
real objective. The children of the boss today will not be bosses or soldiers themselves – 
they will have a different fate. They will be good citizens, they will not follow the alternative 
path which leads to them becoming marginalized – and this is something that is incredible 
clear to see.  
De Gregorio:  This depends on their mothers? 
Filippelli:  Yes, this depends on their mothers, but not only this – it’s a number of 
things. It depends on school, it depends on society: there is a need to clothe oneself with 
schooling, with culture. There is a need to job opportunities and development for these 
people. It’s not enough, in our opinion, to just “take them”, in the sense of the judiciary or law 
enforcement. It’s an essential moment of course, but alone it is not enough 
De Gregorio:  Returning to the theme of the mothers and the women of the Camorra, 
have you been able to facilitate collaboration with them? 
Filippelli:   The response is something quite particular. This is because often it is 
the women who are the most sacred parts of this culture among the alleyways. When there 
is an opportunity or motivation for collaboration that has not yet been realise, it is often the 
women who want to do it. They are the ones who are often the most linked to the tradition 
and the mentality of the Camorra. There are also many women who have had the courage, 
the intelligence to think about their own children, and to have the courage to break away 
from this culture and to decide to collaborate 
De Gregorio:   From your experience, what is it that leads them to this decision? 
Their children’s future? 
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Filippelli:  Their children’s future. The will to not live on the street, to not have a 
future set in stone that will lead to being locked in prison with a life sentence. The person 
who used to live in this house we are in now was given a number of life sentences, his 
relatives too were also familiar with imprisonment. They are scared of this future, a future 
that could also lead to death. These women are definitely courageous, they know what often 
happens to the men, however in this context of the Camorra they often still care about them 
and the work they do. It is a mixed picture that we have to consider in light of other facts. 
For the other discourse with regard to television, this is also a very complex topic to discuss. 
We never undervalue the importance of culture, especially on the streets. In Ercolano we 
had a trial that investigated the writer of a song that was called “O Capoclan”. It was a song 
that was written by a boss of a clan here, the clan Birra, and then performed by affiliates of 
the clan with a video that was all filmed around Ercolano. For us, this was encouraging 
young Ercolanesi to affiliate themselves with the Camorra and their values. We know that 
the war against the Camorra is also one of culture in the street. This will never be 
undervalued. Absolutely, television is very important because it forms the culture of the 
youth and the way they view the world, their hopes and dreams, and also how they want to 
create their own future, and in this sense we have a great responsibility. You ask me about 
Gomorrah, and I don’t want to talk so much about whether I like it or not. 
De Gregorio: No no, I know that. Just tell us about the reality. As I was saying before, I saw 
an epic of the young soldiers, of young kids who wave their pistols around to show everyone 
how strong they are, the one I saw at the festival in Venice. I just wanted to know if these 
kinds of epics are based on something here too in reality, and what are the methods in which 
one can intervene.  
Filippelli:  Here it is absolutely present. The only thing for me that is missing in 
Gomorrah, and I don’t want to enter into the discussion as to whether the series is actually a 
good thing or not, is that it misses the prospective of the victims, the perspective of the State 
– this is missing from the series. Instead of an epic about the Camorra, why not create an 
epic as we have in Ercolano, about the courageous shopkeepers that challenged the 
Camorra, have denounced the Camorra, courageously went to trial, standing face to face 
with the wrongdoers, condemning them. 
De Gregorio:  How many were there? 
Filippelli:  There were loads. In the one trial there were about 20, but we’ve had 
more trials too. It’s a movement that keeps growing. 
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Scognamiglio:  Almost 80, the association has about 80 members. 
Filippelli:  It is something that has really moved me. It is something where you 
had people crying in court, but it’s also something that is quite freeing, it’s a wonderful thing. 
Scognamiglio:  I am in complete agreement with Dr Fillippelli. With regard to culture, 
before Gomorrah, the kids from Scampia and Secondigliano had pictures of Paolo Di Lauro93 
on their phones. Its very much a lack of cultural instruments and values. As you asked 
earlier, with regard to the decapitation and the control over the families and these top-down 
organisations, we already had a problem with the number of young kids who didn’t have their 
fathers or mothers because they were in prison or killed, and as such the kids were in 
carehomes or whatever. They no longer have these instruments – if they go to school alone 
they just won’t get them at all, just because there are loads of them [in this same situation]. 
So we are trying to conduct works in social recovery because with these kids we think it is 
very much the lack of prospectives. The Camorras and the mafias, as Don Ciotti94 teaches 
us, are a cultural factor, but there is another important element. In my opinion this leads us 
to look at the desire of actually wanting to do something about all of this, which, again is 
always about culture. The lack of values and of money, become important particularly when 
you want to become someone through violence… 
De Gregorio:  This is something I want to look at again particularly when we look at 
the mothers of these children because these kids lack their fathers, and the wives lack their 
husbands- because this is important when we consider the way they act. There is a society 
of vendetta and getting your own back… 
Scognamiglio:  There are those kids who quite simply have a lack of human affection, 
that no longer have the feeling of love on the part of their parents, of their grandparents, of 
their aunts or uncles. They grow up to be naughty in the logic of the streets. We have kids in 
Ercolano who don’t even realise that our town is actually has a seaside. We have kids that 
don’t go into certain areas of the town because they already know that it is controlled by the 
rival clan. We had a phenomenon that seems to be weakened in the schools, particularly 
when the parents sign their kids up to be part of the clans when they are still in primary 
school. These are the things that we need to shake off, and to try to change as an important 
intervention. Otherwise these kids don’t have any other prospectives or visions. We’re trying 
to intervene, and to go to them afterschool as collaborators. For example, the paper-mache 
statue of Giancarlo Siani that we have in the entrance here was done by them. With regard 
to the women, we are trying to manage a network because we don’t want to do things by 
                                                          
93
 A prominent boss who managed to garner his own cult of personality 
94
 The founder of Libera 
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ourselves, but instead by involving all the positive sides of our town. We are involved in a 
centre that deals with violence against women – which in the last meeting had about 20 
women who came there to report violence against them. There is a need to, how can I put it, 
get your hands dirty, in the town to help recover the generation, and stop these criminal 
mechanisms that are stopping this generations – and obviously this is not an  easy task. It’s 
a long and difficult path, but it’s the one that will produce the most results.  
De Gregorio:  Thank you very much. We can hope for something done by State TV 
with a fiction about the shopkeeper of the antiracket in Ercolano [laughter]. It could be 
something very interesting and important – write it!  Thank you very much for this meeting, 




Scognamiglio:  We carry on again now as we promised, with Concita and her troupe 
having a tour around the radio. We are joined now by Pasquale del Prete, the Vice-President 
of the anti-racket association, who joins Dr Filippelli who is still here with us. Before our chat 
there was some chat here in the studio these two, showing us the relationship of the 
anomaly that has broken through those factors that had made the town a Camorra town 
before. There was the divide wth regard to law enforcement agencies, because, as we 
remember, there was a bit of a stereotype that policemen were bad, and the Camorra were 
good. For years, citizens turned to the bosses to resolve their problems of injustice rather 
than law enforcement agencies because there wasn’t trust any more. Here, we are very 
much talking about trust. 
So I would like to ask you both in your opinion, what happened? and why? beyond the 
prowess of the people who were operating in this area, is it very much the word trust that 
has overturned the status quo and led to this revolution? 
del Prete:   Historically, Ercolano has always been a difficult area. We don’t need 
to go back as far as the post-war period, but rather in the period immediately after the 
earthquake in the eighties. Interest was shown in many fields, particularly in reconstruction, 
where there was a small amount of involvement in at all levels. So, certain dynamics made 
sure that there were good quotes in Ercolano which then led to them to be in a good 
position. Unfortunately in Ercolano in these years and up until 10 years ago, the residual part 
of this left a scant civic sense, and a scant, if not inexistent consideration towards State 
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institutions in general. This ranged from law enforcement agencies in general to politicians 
and schools. In this context, it was difficult for businesspeople and entrepreneurs to make a 
network of trust that said “enough!”. This is also because the dynamics of the pizzo and 
intimidation are so deeply rooted. We have been fortunate to live in such an important 
moment whose sum is of circumstance and an alignment of the stars. It was mainly, if I can 
say so, the star player on a football team which makes the difference. But if there a team 
that doesn’t play at all, then it’s difficult for such a star player to emerge. We can also attest 
that the Modello Ercolano that everyone now knows about, is based on something really 
simple, that is the most natural thing in the world: respect of the institutions. The importance 
of trusting the institutions to be honest, for example. When there are these factors of respect 
for the institutions: of living honestly and with civility, or culture, the Modello Ercolano can be 
repeated the whole world over. Because what did we do? We had trust in the institutions, in 
the first moment, in the first step that we took, it is that of having faith in the institutions. We 
are involved with faith in the institutions, particularly with the Carabinieri we found a family 
that will always be close to us. Many years have passed since our first secretive meetings 
and we can say without a shadow of a doubt that without this closeness, of walking together 
shoulder to shoulder, we would not have been given this real possibility to take notice of 
what they give us. The Carabinieri, the judiciary and Dr Filippelli who we won’t forget here, 
really was our star player 
 
[Filippelli protests at the notion that he was the principal actor, suggesting that del Prete is 
giving him needless compliments. This is followed by laughter from Scognamiglio and del 
Prete] 
 
del Prete:   Its not me trying to butter you up, it’s the reality! I want to conclude 
with the judiciary, the law enforcement and Civil Society, represented in that historical 
moment, who contributed to the founding of the antiracket association with the then mayor of 
Ercolano, Dr Nino Daniele. It was the certain dynamics in the territory that managed to be 
released with Daniele’s intelligence, culture and forcefulness, turning the common feelings of 
people in the area so that we felt protected by the institutions represented by the mayor, the 
judiciary and by law enforcement. We then saw that a good number of the citizen supported 
this, and we are still all close together.  
[…] 
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Scognamiglio:  Why was this movement born spontaneously? […] Why didn’t this 
happen before? All of this – what is the difference? Why did this all break out after 2007 with 
“operazione Reset”? In Ercolano there was a huge drugs market selling heroin and other 
drugs from everywhere. It was a completely unrestricted market. Why did it happen when it 
did? 
Filippelli:  This is a good question, but it is instead better to look forward from the 
present and towards the future, and look at this with good faith, and to never let our guard 
down. Not letting our guard down involves doing the work you do every day as a watchman 
of legality, completely involved in culture for the next generations. Thank you.   
Scognamiglio:  Thank you, and thank you both for your availablilty. We know that this 
team will always be vigilent and present in Ercolano, always growing. We will come back to 
this theme again with other guests, because, as Dr Filippelli said, we don’t want to go back 
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